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ABSTRACT 
 
The Progression of Political Censorship:  
Hong Kong Cinema 
From Colonial Rule to Chinese-Style Socialist Hegemony 
 
by 
 
YAU Lai To Herman 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Censorship is an important cultural regulatory instrument for the government of a 
society, or even a state.  In certain socio-political settings, it can become a powerful 
administrative apparatus (dispositif) and technique (techne) designed to render 
society governable.  Censorship decisions often embody hegemonic views on social 
and political issues.  No matter how virtuous the original intent may be, the practice 
of censorship is inevitably geared to the social tensions surrounding issues of human 
rights and political dissent.  The theory behind film censorship may once have been 
benign but banning or cutting a movie always involves an unnatural set of procedures 
and actions.  This study examines this problem in the context of socio-political 
changes in Hong Kong.  It is an enquiry into the evolution of political film 
censorship in its more conventional form to its full-fledged integration into other 
institutions and policies under today’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy.  It also 
analyses the discourse surrounding the changes in film censorship practices from the 
days of early cinema to Hong Kong in the 21st century.  By contextualizing Hong 
Kong cinema from a historical and political perspective, the study of the Hong Kong 
experience aims to shed light on censorship’s socio-political meanings for, and 
effects on, filmmakers and film production. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
It might be supposed that Mainland-Hong Kong (Mainland-HK) co-produced 
films, which have become very popular in the past decade, were simply a cultural 
mix or hybrid of the two regions.  However, there is a sound marketing reason for 
making such movies.  They provide a way for Hong Kong cinema to blend into the 
Chinese Mainland market and enjoy the same potential benefits as those enjoyed by 
the domestic cinema across the border.  It is not the first time that the Hong Kong 
film industry has been drawn to the economic prosperity of the vast movie-going 
market and witnessed the popularity of co-productions but, today, its reliance on its 
northern neighbour is much more significant than it was the first time around in the 
1930s. 
The current economic boom in the Chinese Mainland is owing to the ‘reform 
and opening-up’ national policy put forward by Deng Xiaoping in December1978.  
The expansion of the Chinese market was particularly notable after the south tour of 
Deng in 1992, which aimed to reinforce and speed up the policy in the aftermath of 
the June Fourth Massacre.  In addition, in order to attain “(a) stability in external 
economic relationships; (b) firmer and speedier economic reform; (c) long-term 
growth based on efficiency and innovation” (Cheng, Leonard K. 1999), the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) put in a great deal of effort — and fifteen years’ worth of 
work — into gaining membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), finally 
attaining its goal on 11 December 2001.  While it is still questionable whether 
China has fulfilled its WTO commitments, its domestic market is never free for 
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products of cultural industries.1  Extensive censorship is widespread across the 
Chinese Mainland and, to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, in the right key, one can 
get pecuniary benefit, in the wrong key, nothing: the only delicate part of the job is 
the establishment of the key.2  
Even before Mainland-HK co-produced films have become common, film 
censorship was familiar to Hong Kong filmmakers, although it did not resemble the 
Chinese style.  Censorship can be strict or lenient, but its rationale and the criteria 
for its implementation in the Chinese Mainland make it no easy game for Hong Kong 
filmmakers to play.  They generally perceive Chinese-style censorship as outmoded, 
weird, erratic and sometimes ridiculous for it is beyond their empirical experience 
even though they do know about it at an imperfect common-sense level.  Most of 
the contemporary Hong Kong filmmakers were brought up in a more liberal 
socio-political culture that enabled a greater degree of economic and political 
freedom than that in the Chinese Mainland.  While government censorship is 
always part of a judicial system, Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland implement 
law and order in different ways.  Hong Kong citizens are used to the rule of law and 
judicial independence while law and order in the Chinese Mainland is administered 
in the arbitrary fashion favoured by the autocratic rule of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC; also known as the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP).  At the Third 
Plenary Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) held in 1990, Jiang Zemin, the 
former General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of the PRC, 
                                                 
1 For an account of China’s WTO commitments, see “Protocol on the Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China” (WTO 23 Nov 2001). 
 
2 Bernard Shaw’s original: “In the right key, one can say anything, in the wrong key, nothing: the 
only delicate part of the job is the establishment of the key.” 
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urged those holding the reins of government at all levels, including the NPC, the 
Government, the Court and the Procuratorate to accept the leadership of the CPC 
(Jiang 2006: 112).  Jiang’s public utterance is contrary to the trias politica principle 
of most liberal states, and reveals an ideological characteristic of the PRC; as a 
single-party State, its judicial system and judicial decisions have to favour the ruling 
CPC.  The NPC, however, gave its approval to an addition to Article 5 of the 
Constitution of the PRC as the first section in 1999: “The People’s Republic of China 
governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country ruled by law” 
(The State Coucil of the PRC).3  This seems to represent the transition of the PRC 
from a rule-of-man regime to a rule-of-law regime.   
Under the rule of man, law is just as the sword in man’s hand, whereas, 
under the rule of law, law is the sword suspending over man’s head. 
Man is restrained under the rule of law, even though man can take 
advantages of legislature and make bad laws.  The man would be 
punished by laws, too, when he violates the laws.  This is the 
fundamental difference between the rule of law and the rule of man.  
(Qin, Guoji 2008: 73)4 
However, Chinese leaders and government spokesmen just pay lip service to the rule 
of law and the Central Politics and Law Commission under the Central Committee of 
the CPC is still leading and supervising the judicial system as well as overseeing all 
political and legal affairs on behalf of the CPC.  Thus, the proclaimed “socialist 
country ruled by law” is a de facto country under the rule of man, which can also be 
tantamount to the arbitrary rule by government.  As Chinese law professor Li 
Shuguang says:  
                                                 
3 It was also officially translated as “The People’s Republic of China practices ruling the country 
in accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law” (People’s Daily Online 2004). 
 
4 The rule-of-man governance is a Confucian legacy.  For more about rule of man, see Qin 2008: 
72-4. 
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‘Chinese leaders want rule by law, not rule of law’. . . . The 
difference . . . is that under the rule of law, the law is preeminent and 
can serve as a check against the abuse of power.  Under rule by law, 
the law can serve as a mere tool for a government that suppresses in a 
legalistic fashion.  (Cited in Tamanaha, Brian Z. 2004: 3)  
Although Hong Kong is now part of China, there are historical, economic, 
legal, political and socio-cultural discrepancies between the Chinese Mainland and 
Hong Kong.  That is, in part, recognized under the Basic Law (Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC), the constitutional document 
of Hong Kong, enacted by the NPC on 4 April 1990, which pledges that, at the 
domestic level, the Hong Kong way of life and capitalist system as well as a high 
degree of autonomy will be maintained.5  As the former Secretary for Justice, Wong 
Yan Lung, said at the Third ICAC (Independent Commission Against Corruption) 
Symposium: 
The core values on which the governance of Hong Kong is based 
include the rule of law, an open and free society, an impartial 
administration, a level playing field, and the maintenance of 
international links.  Hong Kong is fortunate also to possess a tried and 
tested legal system, which has its roots in the English common law, as 
this is crucial to the preservation of confidence in the way in which we 
conduct our affairs.  (10 May 2006) 
Under the ‘one country, two systems’ constitutional principle secured by the Basic 
Law, Hong Kong, as a special administrative region of centralist China, does not 
have to be absorbed by or act in accord with the PRC’s legal system, which is mostly 
a civil law system, and other policies within Chinese-style socialism.  Therefore, no 
matter how film censorship is implemented in the Chinese Mainland, the question for 
                                                 
5 At the international level, the constitutional framework for the legal system of Hong Kong after 
1 July 1997 is provided by the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in 1984. 
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Hong Kong filmmakers is, critically, to be or not to be — either to get into the 
booming Chinese market and abide by its strict and despotically lopsided censorship 
system or to stay in the local market, which is shrinking but where the censorship 
system, while it is not absent, is relatively more sensible to Hong Kong filmmakers.  
However, the system is not the same all the time and it has undergone a number of 
changes, transformations and developments in the course of history.  It is also 
important to note that conventional censorship enforced by law and administrative 
order, which is usually explicit and visible, is not the only version.  In the 
contemporary world, for example in Hong Kong, the extension of censorship has 
evolved and transformed into a less overt mode embedded in other institutions and 
policies such as the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) that are seemingly not relevant to censorship (see Chapter 5 for 
a detailed examination and discussion).  The past is past, but the present cannot be 
genuinely comprehended without mapping it.    
Undoubtedly, the first film censorship policies followed the emergence of 
film in every region but the judicial institutionalization of censorship and the 
formulation of relevant provisions and regulations tended to lag behind cinema 
activities, particularly during the early years of cinema.  However, cinema activities 
and film censorship are in an interactive relationship once the latter is 
institutionalized, but that relationship is not self-evident and it is always conditioned 
and affected by historical and socio-political contexts.  Lawrence Grossberg says, 
An event or practice (even a text) does not exist apart from the 
forces of the context that constitute it as what it is.  Obviously, context 
is not merely background but the very conditions of possibility of 
something.  (1997: 255) 
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Articulation is the methodological face of a radically contextualist 
theory.  It describes a nonlinear expansive practice of drawing lines, of 
mapping connections.   
[C]ontext is always understood as a structure of power.  But the 
very structure of the context is precisely where one must go to locate 
the power that is operating, since contexts do not exist independently of 
power.   
If a context can be understood as the relationships that have been 
made by the operation of power, in the interests of certain positions of 
power, the struggle to change the context involves the struggle to 
understand those relations, to locate those relations that can be 
disarticulated and to then struggle to rearticulate them.  (1997: 260-1) 
Cultural studies believes that politics is contextually specific.  The 
sites, goals, and forms of struggle must be understood contextually.  
(1997: 264) 
In fact, film censorship, as well as the films under it, barely makes sense of its 
existence unless it is contextualized within a historical trajectory and articulated into 
a relationship with its contemporary socio-political context, in which a structure of 
power stemmed from economy and politics matters and censorship also serves as a 
political watchdog for governments.   
By contextualizing various forms of film censorship, relative to which 
filmmakers, film productions, social economy and political powers are articulated 
together, this study aims to map the historical trajectory through which political 
censorship imposed on Hong Kong films has arrived at the form it is today, and to 
investigate what politics and market mean for Hong Kong filmmakers.  Moreover, 
as I am a current filmmaker in Hong Kong, this work is written from a practitioner’s 
perspective.  
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In the following chapters, I will firstly, in Chapter 1, attempt to provide an 
overview of the phenomenon of censorship and theoretical foundation for the type of 
analysis of censorship the rest of the chapters will undertake.  I will also discuss the 
modern state functions of censorship, the particular intensity of film as a 
governmental site for the practice of censorship and an account of the ‘work’ of the 
censor as a textual ‘reader’ who requires texts to have concrete, nameable ‘author’ in 
quite specific ways.  Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are enquiries from a historical approach 
into the emergence and transformations of film censorship in Hong Kong during the 
British colonial period.  As a matter of fact, in the some one hundred years of the 
history of Hong Kong cinema, the colonial period has occupied more than eighty 
percent of the time span.  The colonial rule has played a significant part in the 
shaping and formulation of official film censorship system in Hong Kong today.  
The chapters put emphasis on the political film censorship of the colonial rule and 
also how Hong Kong cinema was interfered by the PRC led by the CPC and Taiwan 
led by the Kuomintang.  It is worthy to note that the British colonial government 
suspiciously tried its best to make Hong Kong in line with the political ideology of 
the West during the last ten years of its rule.  Chapter 5 is an account of 
investigations into the transformations and political significance of Mainland-HK 
co-produced films.  It also discusses how the censorship of the PRC is extended to 
Hong Kong cinema by means of such co-productions under the ‘one country, two 
systems’ policy.  Chapter 6 is an illustration of, as well as a discussion about, the 
problematic film censorship of the PRC via an ethnographic study of the making of a 
Mainland-HK co-produced film.  Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the whole study. 
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Chapter 1 
Film Censorship  
as Apparatus and Technique of Governmentality 
 
It seems that everyone knows about film censorship, but its meaning and 
implication vary from person to person and from people to people.  Some presume 
it to be normal and necessary while others see it as, or associate it with, the limitation 
of freedom of speech, the undermining of expression and a force which regulates, 
suppresses, controls, silences and dictates the popular mind.  In fact, today, 
censorship has become “a complex matter with psychological as well as political and 
moral dimensions” (Coetzee, J. M. 1996: 90).  Then, what exactly is censorship?  
What is film?  What is film capable of?  Why do governments have to censor films?  
Other than being entrusted by government, what privileges censors to rule whether a 
certain film should be banned?  This chapter is an attempt to examine these 
questions, and give theoretical foundation and a broad historical setting for the type of 
analysis of censorship that the following chapters will undertake for the specific 
circumstances of Hong Kong cinema under the British colonial rule and then the ‘one 
country, two systems’ policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
 
An Overview of the Phenomenon of Censorship   
As a matter of fact, mankind has been practicing censorship since ancient 
times.  A number of scholars, such as Aurelie Hagstrom and Julian Petley, consider 
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Socrates the earliest and most famous victim of state-sponsored censorship in 
recorded history.6  The teachings and teaching methods of Socrates were censored.  
The sage was accused of impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens and was put on 
trial.  The Athens court brought in a guilty verdict, and the punishment was the 
ultimate form of banning — the death penalty.  Socrates was executed with a 
poisonous drink containing hemlock in 399 BCE.  Dramatically, one of his students, 
Plato, advocated censorship of the arts in his famous philosophical treatise The 
Republic.7  Although ancient Athens is always appraised as the cradle of democracy, 
Sue Curry Jansen notes in her work Censorship - the Knot that Binds Power and 
Knowledge: 
Careful rereading of the subtext (background comments) of Plato’s 
Apology for Socrates indicates that by the time Socrates was brought to 
trial, Athenian censorship was so extensive that a hierarchy of sanctions 
ranging from prohibition of public speech (banning) through denial of 
civil rights, exile, imprisonment, and execution was routinely invoked 
to suppress dangerous ideas.  (Jansen 1991: 36)  
In the Eastern hemisphere, when the Qin state conquered and annexed the other 
warring states in 221 BCE, Qin Shi Huang became the sole ruler of the first imperial 
dynasty of unified China, the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BCE).  He reigned over his 
empire by using totalitarian measures and the philosophy of Legalism (Fajia, a form 
of absolutism).8  In order to secure his empire from perceived danger, Qin Shi 
                                                 
6 See Aurelie Hagstrom’s “The Catholic Church and Censorship in Literature, Books, Drama, 
and Film” in Analytic Teaching, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2003); and Julian Petley’s Censorship: A Beginner's 
Guide. 
 
7 There is a clear account of censorship, particularly of the arts, in Book II, III and X of Plato’s 
The Republic.  “[T]he division of The Republic into the ten ‘books’ was not made until centuries after 
Plato wrote it” (Rouse, W. H. D. 2008: 197). 
 
8 Fajia is sometimes regarded as a development of Confucianism because two of its leading 
figures, Han Feizi (281-233 BCE) and Li Si (280-208 BCE), were students of Confucian master Xunzi 
(313-238 BCE).  Li Si was the Prime Minister of the Qin Dynasty. 
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Huang eradicated the old schools of thought by extensive burning of books except 
those the Legalists considered productive, such as books on agriculture, medicine 
and divination.  In addition, dissident scholars were banished or executed by being 
buried alive. 
However famous or infamous the above two cases might be, one may 
reasonably assume that censorship has been shadowing free speech and expression 
ever since human beings became capable of acquiring and exercising power over 
others.  As various forms of civilisation had advanced to a certain stage that the 
dissemination of ideas, thoughts, beliefs and opinions became easier and more 
widespread, censorship became more rigorous and vigorous.  This was particularly 
real after the invention of printing press.  In Europe, particularly with the 
introduction of the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (Index of Prohibited Books) by the 
Roman Catholic Church in 1559, the banning and destruction of books persisted for 
centuries, and many authors were prosecuted, persecuted or executed under the 
‘sacred inquisition’.  In China, the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) was particularly 
notorious for the implementation of the ‘literary inquisition’ (wenziyu), in which 
literary works were censored, a large number of books were destroyed, and 
intellectuals were persecuted.     
After centuries of development, censorship, alongside with the furtherance of 
the notion of government, has been institutionalized and become an apparatus and 
technique of what Michel Foucault termed ‘governmentality’ (the next section will 
discuss governmentality in detail).  Here, ‘apparatus’ is the English translation of 
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the French word dispositif, and ‘techinque’ is that of the Greek word techne.9  
According to Foucault (cited in Bussolini, Jeffrey 2010: 91-2): 
[The dispositif] is by nature essentially strategic, which indicates that it 
deals with a certain manipulation of forces, of a rational and concerted 
intervention in the relations of force, to orient them in a certain 
direction, to block them, or to fix and utilize them.  The [dispositif] is 
always inscribed in a game of power and, at the same time, always tied 
to the limits of knowledge, which derive from it and, in the same 
measure, condition it.   
[The dispositif] is precisely this: an ensemble (set) of strategies of 
relations of force which condition certain types of knowledge and is 
conditioned by them. 
As for techne, Foucault defines it as “a practical rationality governed by a conscious 
goal” (2000: 364).  In the sense of practical rationality, techne is “a mode of 
intervening upon becoming within the context of a social order, a mode of 
conducting events in order to determine precisely those aspects of the future that are 
not knowable in advance” (Altamirano, Marco 2014: 16, emphasis in original).  In 
its actual practice, censorship serves both as an apparatus and a technique of 
governmentality for governments.  Furthermore, the actual realization of censorship 
has gone beyond the conventional definitions of censorship.  With regard to this, 
Jansen offers another definition of censorship:  
Censorship is a form of surveillance: a mechanism for gathering 
intelligence that the powerful can use to tighten control over people or 
ideas that threaten to disrupt established systems of order.  
                                                 
9 Graham Burchell, translator of many of Foucault’s lecture courses, notes that there “does not 
seem to be a satisfactory English equivalent for the particular way in which Foucault uses this term 
[dispositif] to designate a configuration or arrangement of elements and forces, practices and discourses, 
power and knowledge, that is both strategic and technical” (2008: xxiii).  Dispositif is also translated 
as ‘dispositive’ or ‘deployment’ by other translators.  For more about dispositive, see Bussolini 2010: 
85-107. 
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[T]he term encompasses all socially structured proscriptions or 
prescriptions which inhibit or prohibit dissemination of ideas, 
information, images and other messages through a society’s channels of 
communication whether these obstructions are secured by political, 
economic, religious, or other systems of authority.  It includes both 
overt and covert proscriptions and prescriptions.  (1991: 14, 221)    
Jansen has redefined the ‘censorship’ by extending the conventional definitions to 
reflect the emergence of new problems and a new understanding of censorship.  The 
redefinition, being broader and from a more sociological perspective, seems to 
encompass everything, but it specifically enunciates the complexity of censorship in 
today’s societies and addresses other forms of censorship outside the realm of the 
conventional, governmental one.  Censorship can be covert, which suggests that, the 
censorship today can also be in progress and working without the general population 
knowing it (cf. Foucault’s discourse on ‘government of population’ that will be 
discussed in the next section).  Such a redefinition also implies that legislation is not 
the only way to make censorship legitimate.  There are various disciplining 
institutions in human society, such as the educational and the religious circles which 
are secured by social structure.  They are licensed, not in the lawful sense, but in the 
cultural and ideological sense.  Sometimes, movies that have passed the official 
censorship are nevertheless regarded as infringing social norms or codes of conduct 
and are denounced.  There can even be calls for a ban.  However, above all, 
censorship is particularly important to governments. 
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Censorship in Relation to Government 
In a broad sense, censorship is a controlling and silencing practice as well as 
a repressive apparatus.  It significantly manifests the hegemonic views on social, 
ethical and political issues as well as the ruling regime’s governance mentality.  The 
most recognized form is the one imposed by the government that acts in a top-down 
dimension.  Official censorship always supports government policies on domestic 
and international issues.  It is an institution that is propagandistic by nature and has 
the effect of propaganda.  It protects the government from foreign and domestic 
opposition or opposing propaganda, and furthers the government’s own propaganda 
by censoring others.  It also helps to shape the minds of the governed population 
and prevents them from any interference by others, particularly any opposition to the 
government.  
The typical targets of censorship are obscenity, pornography, vulgarity, 
violence, subversion, and so forth, but such terms are always ill-defined customarily 
and legally, and are subject to individual interpretation in connection with different 
cultures and contexts.  It is, indeed, hard to give these terms a stable and universal 
definition that can be agreed by all, and, thus, their meanings remain theoretically 
and practically ambiguous with a wide range of perceptual judgments.  However, 
such ambiguity may enable conservative and autocratic regimes to extend their 
censoring power by defining these kinds of terms arbitrarily so as to limit the 
manifestation of reality and conceal the political suppression of human liberty.  By 
censorship, a government exercises its power to prevent, prohibit, restrict, suppress 
or ban something from production, reproduction, distribution, circulation, access and 
consumption in the name of the common good of the populace and the state.  
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Nevertheless, such common good, which is not the same thing at all times 
and in all types of civilization, is also not a universal constant and is seldom 
well-defined in hegemonic narratives.  What the populace sees as ‘common good’ 
can be something that the government sees as ‘common bad’.  Censorship is the 
government’s watchdog against the formation of anything that the government sees 
as bad.  It is politically designed to maintain the status quo of the powerful and 
power relations.   
In the contemporary world, official censorship can be found in all countries 
with functioning governments, with varying objectives and powers of 
implementation.  Even the most liberal governments today would not deny the 
efficacy of censorship entirely and would always enforce strict censorship during 
critical times, such as wartime.  In totalitarian regimes, however, strict censorship 
always plays a dominant role in government policy.  No matter how virtuous the 
original intent of a censorship system may be, its implementation is always 
controversial in regard to universal human and social values and public opinions.  
Its repressive and prohibiting nature inevitably has an adverse effect on freedom of 
expression and freedom of speech.  Subsequently, censorship creates tension 
between government and the governed, and one people and another people.  It 
sometimes creates struggle and protest in society too.  Then, why does government 
have to implement censorship?  Is it an essential and necessary duty for a 
government to enforce censorship?  What is the relation between government and 
the governed?  To answer these questions, it would be illuminating to deliberate 
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firstly on the question: What is meant by government (of the state) in relation to what 
Foucault termed ‘governmentality’ in the contemporary sense?10    
In a lecture on the history of governmentality, Foucault starts with a 
controversial text “relative to which the whole literature on government established 
its standpoint” (1991: 88).11  The text is The Prince by Machiavelli (1469-1527), a 
treatise presented as “advice to the prince”, in which the prince is placed “in a 
relation of singularity and externality, and thus of transcendence, to his principality” 
(Foucault 1991: 89-90).  Its objective was to secure the prince’s principality.  With 
regard to the politics of the prince, Foucault says:  
[T]he objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and 
protect the principality [sovereignty], to identify dangers, . . . to develop 
the art of manipulating relations of force that will allow the prince 
[sovereign] to ensure the protection of his principality [sovereignty], 
understood as the link that binds him to his territory and his subjects.  
(1991: 90)  
The objective of the prince was different from the objective of the government 
during the late sixteenth century when the idea of government was still a novelty.  
                                                 
10 In its common usage today, ‘government’ refers to the executive policy-making body of a 
political unit; the unit can be a state, community or a region.  In “Governmentality” (1991: 87-104), 
Foucault specifically uses ‘government of the state’ when he refers to something as such, so as to 
distinguish it from other types of government he brings up in his discourse, such as government of 
oneself, government of souls and lives, government of children, etc. 
 
11 Foucault delivered the lecture at the College de France in February 1978.  By 
‘governmentality’, Foucault (1991: 102-103) means: 
(i) The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has 
as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security. 
(ii) The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the 
pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may 
be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific 
governmental apparatuses, and; on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs. 
(iii) The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle 
Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
gradually becomes ‘governmentalized’.   
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The difference lies in the fact that “[h]aving the ability to retain one’s principality is 
not at all the same thing as possessing the art of governing” (ibid).  About 
sovereignty, Foucault says:  
[S]overeignty is not exercised on things, but above all on a territory and 
consequently on the subjects who inhabit it.  In this sense we can say 
that the territory is the fundamental element both in Machiavellian 
principality and in juridical sovereignty as defined by the theoreticians 
and philosophers of right.  (1991: 93) 
However, the notion of the governing body discoursed in Machiavelli’s The Prince, 
that is, the institutions of sovereignty, also differs from the notion of government in 
the modern and postmodern times that has been developed since the eighteenth 
century in the West, notwithstanding the fact that some autocratic governments still 
take sovereignty as their chief objective.  In any event, criticism of The Prince led 
to the introduction of the art of government in later anti-Machiavellian literature and 
significantly inspired the furtherance of that art in the years to come. 
The art of government . . . is essentially concerned with answering 
the question of how to introduce economy — that is to say, the correct 
manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family 
(which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children 
and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper — how to 
introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into 
the management of the state. 
. . . To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set 
up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising 
towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a 
form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a 
family over his household and his goods.   
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. . . [T]he art of government is just the art of exercising power in the 
form and according to the model of economy.  (Foucault 1991: 92; 
emphasis added) 
The art of government in this sense, taking family as a base model, is rooted in 
patriarchal characteristics, and the idea of censorship is inherent and embedded in the 
exercise of power described as a form of surveillance and control.  When governing 
a family, the primary concern is the individual members of the family.  In contrast, 
the territory, in spite of its quality, is the very foundation of sovereignty by juridical 
principle.  As mentioned above, the exercise of sovereignty is, above all, on a 
territory and the subjects who inhabit it are just consequence.  Foucault (1991: 95) 
notes that the purpose of sovereignty, or the common good with respect to the prince 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, “means essentially obedience to the law” 
and “is in sum nothing other than submission to sovereignty.  This means that . . . 
the end of sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty.”  Hence, sovereignty, or the 
principality of the prince, achieves its aim by imposing law on people inhabiting it.  
Nevertheless, one should notice that power is exercised in the form of force and 
violence to varying degrees in order to realize the law and make people submissive 
to the sovereignty, and the existence of the law is inseparable from punishment.   
While sovereignty has an end to accomplish, a government also has its own 
goal to meet.  Government, as defined by Guillaume de La Perrière in his 
anti-Machiavellian treatise, Le Miroir Politique, is “a right manner of disposing 
things so as to lead . . . to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are 
to be governed” (ibid); in other words, the objective of a rational and legitimate 
government.  But, what do the ‘things’ refer to?  According to Foucault’s 
interpretation:  
 
18 
What the government has to do with is . . . a sort of complex composed 
of men and things.  The things with which in this sense government is 
to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, 
their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, 
means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, 
irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of things, 
customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc.; lastly, men in their 
relation to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as 
famine, epidemics, death, etc.  (1991: 93) 
In order to meet its objective, a government has to dispose things by employing 
tactics and even by using laws themselves as tactics — “to arrange things in such a 
way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved,” 
and that requires the government, or the governor, to possess “the knowledge of 
things, of the objectives that can and should be attained, and the disposition of things 
required to reach them” (Foucault 1991: 95, 96).  In the ensuing years, the 
development of the theory of the art of government, in its own proper form of 
rationality and organized around the theme of national interest, or what Foucault 
calls ‘reason of state’ (raison d'être), leads to the emergence and development of 
governmental apparatuses (inclusive of the institution of censorship in our times).  
It also resulted in a set of analyses and forms of knowledge on the state that 
constituted the discipline of political science.  Yet, the propagation of the art of 
government is not an undisturbed one. 
However, the development and spread of the art of government were 
immobilized in the seventeenth century by a series of great crises such as the Thirty 
Years War, the peasant and urban rebellions, and the financial crisis (Foucault 1991: 
97).  Besides, Foucault believes that the preeminence of the problem of the exercise 
of sovereignty was also a crucial and fundamental factor.  He says, “So long as the 
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institutions of sovereignty were the basic political institutions and the exercise of 
power was conceived as an exercise of sovereignty, the art of government could not 
be developed in a specific and autonomous manner” (ibid).  It was not until the 
eighteenth century when the demographic expansion began to be seen as a problem, 
that the notion of economy was re-centered on different planes of reality larger than 
family, and “the problem of government finally came to be thought, reflected and 
calculated outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty” (Foucault 1991: 99).  
However, as population appears absolutely irreducible to the dimension of the family, 
the problem of the population makes the family disappear as the model of 
government.  Family begins to become “an element internal to population”.  Since 
“whenever information is required concerning the population (sexual behavior, 
demography, consumptions, etc.), it has to be obtained through the family,” family 
also becomes “the privileged instrument for government of the population” (Foucault 
1991: 99-100).  At the same time, a new sense of the economy, which is irreducible 
to the old model of the family, is born.    
The population now represents more the end of government than 
the power of the sovereign; the population is the subject of needs, of 
aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the government, 
aware, vis-a-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what 
is being done to it.  Interest at the level of the consciousness of each 
individual who goes to make up the population, and interest considered 
as the interests of the population regardless of what the particular 
interests and aspirations may be of the individuals who compose it, this 
is the new target and the fundamental instrument of the government of 
population: the birth of a new art, or at any rate of a range of absolutely 
new tactics and techniques.     
[T]he transition which takes place in the eighteenth century from an 
art of a government to a political science, from a regime dominated by 
structures of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government, 
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turns on the theme of population and hence also on the birth of political 
economy.  (Foucault 1991: 100, 101) 
Nevertheless, as the art of government developed in the eighteenth century is no 
longer derived from the theory of sovereignty, sovereignty that previously 
characterized a state becomes characterized by the form of legitimacy it gains from 
the new art which places the population as its end.  Along with the furtherance of 
this new mode of government, the problem of sovereignty (that starts to appear in the 
seventeenth century but is left in place by great crises until the eighteenth century) in 
the eighteenth century has been becoming more critical than ever, and collective 
discipline is crucial in the in-depth and comprehensive management of the 
population which has become a field of intervention and an object of governmental 
techniques and tactics.  Foucault remarks, “[I]n reality one has a triangle, 
sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population 
and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security” (Foucault 1991: 102).  
Concerns about the public’s demand for welfare, a measure of security and a sense of 
safety are essential constituents of modern governmentality as well as the aims of the 
subsequently derived apparatuses of security.   
It is pertinent to note that Foucault’s notion of the term ‘apparatuses of 
security’ is in reference to the security or the feeling of security of the population.  
However, based on Foucault’s discourse on governmentality, it is illuminating to 
consider another sense of ‘apparatuses of security’ which is in reference to the 
protective and preventive mechanisms against the opposing forces directed against 
the government, that is to say, it is for the safety and security of the governing body.  
The rationale behind this sense of the phrase is that it recognizes that the public is 
also a considerable source of power that might impair the legitimacy, authority and 
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interest of government.  In the light of this potential danger, the institution of 
censorship that serves as a technique of surveillance and control, on the one hand, is, 
or is claimed to be, for the ‘common good’ of the governed population and, on the 
other, it is also an apparatus of security for the government’s governance, particularly 
for the government which still situates a large part of its exercise of power within the 
juridical framework of sovereignty.     
Foucault sketched the historical development of most of the governments in 
the West today.  More precisely, he only focused on the leading states with 
liberal-democratic governments, such as France, the United States of America (US) 
and the United Kingdom, which possess the power of discourse in international 
affairs in the current world.  However, Foucault’s discourse on the different forms 
of government occurring in the history of the West can still be applicable for analyses 
of other forms of government in the world today, although the developments of these 
governments have differentiations in time, space, and, as a matter of course, also in 
culture and historical context.  Foucault’s effort to map the transformation of the art 
of government implies neither a replacement of the old form by the new form, nor a 
total elimination of the old form.  Rather, what one can see from the world today is 
that the old and the new co-exist.  Because of the various ways of foreign intrusion 
and conquest as well as the advancement of technology in the twentieth century, 
policies and procedures are transnationally shared across continents and regions.  
Thoughts that originated or were initiated in one place might become prominent 
somewhere else, but fade out or diminish in their birthplace, for example, 
communism and Buddhism.  Indeed, many Asian states have adapted or adopted the 
political modes derived from the West’s art of government and consequent political 
science to varying extents because of the foreign policy of the US after World War II 
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and other influences.  For instance, the style of governance in India is due to 
colonization by the British; in Japan, and partly and intricately in China, it is due to 
the importation and impact of industrialization and Western democratic thought that 
began more than a century ago (see Ball, Alan R. 1973: 56-72).  Foucault reminds 
us that La Perrière’s notion of the art of government (see previous paragraph) was 
still very crude back in the sixteenth century, but it can be seen that the PRC today is 
still dominated by the characteristics of this primitive notion of government.  The 
Chinese Government “exercises towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior 
of each and all, a form of surveillance and control, as attentive as that the head of a 
family over his household and his goods” (Foucault 1991: 92).  This patriarchal 
notion of government, in a way similar to the pastoral ministry of the Church before 
the Enlightenment, suppresses the will of individuals and privatizes and monopolizes 
the state to a large extent.  It is widely recognized that the Communist Party of 
China (CPC; also known as CCP, the Chinese Communist Party) rejects religious 
beliefs, but its Chinese-style socialist governance today possesses the characteristics 
of the patriarchal notion of government, and its attention is consciously directed to 
the behavior more than the welfare of the inhabitants.  From another perspective, 
the CPC regime is still characterized by sovereignty rather than the legitimacy it 
gained from the population via its governmentality.  Censorship, serving as an 
apparatus and technique of surveillance and control, is particularly essential to the 
Chinese Government.  Politically, the more attentive a government is, the stricter 
the censorship will be.  That in turn indicates an insecure government and a 
government that is aware of its insecurity and the possibility that the legitimacy of its 
power to govern will be put into question.  Legitimacy, naturally, is not a constant 
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in the course of history in much the way it is not a constant in different cultures and 
civilizations. 
There are choices of government, but in the PRC, the population cannot 
choose, and are not given the right to choose or publicly disagree with their 
government.  It is still principally Machiavellian or taking Machiavellianism as 
their underlying principle of governance, albeit with modification and hybridization 
with the modern notion of governmentality, sometimes disguised by liberal 
vocabulary.  The ‘common good’ for such a government is the submission to the 
governing regime, and the exercise of power is an exercise of sovereignty (see 
Foucault 1991: 95).  With government understood as such, the institution and 
implementation of censorship is an apparatus and technique of security and a tactic 
for exercising power to secure a regime’s ruling position and ideology.  It serves to 
identify and eliminate danger and functions as a means of manipulating opposition 
forces that ensures the protection of a regime (see Foucault 1991: 90).  This type of 
protection always means suppression of dissident power among the population and 
outside the sovereign territory.  In short, it is a matter of security, but security of the 
regime rather than that of the governed population, which is especially valid in the 
PRC.  Censorship can also be a control technique for the government in the context 
of modern governmentality, such as colonial Hong Kong after the Pacific War (see 
Chapters 3 and 4).  The main difference is that the former upholds the raison d'etat 
while the latter upholds the interest of the population relatively more.  
When Foucault interprets the definition of government in accordance with La 
Perrière’s text, he says, “The things with which . . . government is to be concerned 
are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those 
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other things” (Foucault 1991: 93).  Here, the idea of ‘men’ and ‘those other things’ 
undoubtedly include the thoughts, ideas, opinions, beliefs and ideology of the 
population, which are also the objectives of censorship.  Accordingly, speeches, 
writing and publications, as carriers of such things, are inevitably the concerns of 
government and thus the targets of censorship, but these only mark the early chief 
subjects of censorship.  From the moment human beings stepped into the age of 
mechanical reproduction — and during the years to come — censorship has reached 
out to every new medium of communication resulting from technological 
development and new form of creative art.  And amid the creative art, film is 
undoubtedly a prevailing new medium and a new form of art for mass consumption.  
The unique features of film and its relations to and impact on the public have placed 
film under the scrutiny of censorship ever since its early emergence.    
 
The Political Problematic of Film in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
In his 1936 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, 
Walter Benjamin examines the social and political implications of mass 
(re)production of art works in capitalist culture, and also tries to define the 
tendencies of development of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.  He argues 
from the perspective of world history that technical reproduction around 1900 had 
reached a standard sufficient to cause the most profound change in the impact of art 
upon the public.  Among the various reproducible forms of art, he maintains that the 
most powerful agent in constructing the modern perspective is film.   
 
25 
Film has unique significance in popular culture, possesses the characteristics 
of a commodity since its emergence and is also the first-ever reproducible mass 
medium as well as an art form designed for mass consumption and simultaneous 
collective experience.  The invention of film has subverted the traditional value of 
art work and transformed the nature of art a lot, even if not entirely.  “Its social 
significance, particularly in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its 
destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the liquidation of the traditional value of the 
cultural heritage” (Benjamin 1988: 221).  At one level, the perfect reproduction of 
art work and the art of film have principally upset the traditional concepts of 
authenticity and aura in the art sphere.  It is because “[e]ven the most perfect 
reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and 
space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be” (Benjamin 1988: 220; 
see also Benjamin 1988: 220-4).  At another level, when mechanical reproduction 
has made art works more and more tangible to the masses, art works are received and 
valued on their exhibition values.  Furthermore, mechanical reproducibility 
emancipates art work from its traditional values, such as its symbolic value in early 
rituals and the cult of beauty developed during the Renaissance.12   
When art is emancipated, it is no longer only the province of the elite and 
privileged but has become easily accessible in the mass market and appealing to the 
                                                 
12 As time goes by, Benjamin’s notions of and discourse on the authenticity and aura of art work 
are challenged and questioned by postmodernists more and more.  I do not think Benjamin was saying 
that the traditional concepts of authenticity and aura are not valid anymore.  He just said that these 
concepts were not applicable to discourse on new forms of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.  
Benjamin was in a way questioning and challenging the traditional concepts that prevailed during his 
time.  The phenomenon was that: An old tradition was withering or decaying, and a new practice was 
flourishing and under development.  After more than seven decades, the once-new practice which was 
under development has matured to overshadow the older one.  The concepts of authenticity and aura 
have been redefined and reinterpreted, which is, indeed, a fluid process in the course of history.  
Nevertheless, Benjamin’s examination of the phenomenon brought about by the development of the 
technical reproduction of art work — or the preferred term today, medium — is still insightful and helps 
to map the historical trajectories of human thoughts. 
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big crowd of consumers.  Under these conditions, the total function of art begins to 
be based on another practice — politics — as Michael W. Jennings remarks, 
“Reproducibility is thus finally a political capacity of the work of art” (Jennings 
2008: 15, emphasis in original); it is always an objective of governance and a big 
concern of government.  For film, Benjamin writes, 
We do not deny that in some cases today’s films can also promote 
revolutionary criticism of social conditions, even of the distribution of 
property.  (1988: 231) 
The characteristics of the film lie not only in the manner in which 
man presents himself to mechanical equipment but also in the manner 
in which, by means of this apparatus, man can represent his 
environment.  (1988: 235)  
Benjamin helps people understand the essence of film more, but at the same time, the 
expertise and knowledge of this new art form, or of this new medium, also helps 
censorship institutions to flourish; attention and concern is placed on its capabilities 
and its capacity to express and communicate.  Film censorship started with 
government recognition and awareness of the potential of film and has persisted in 
order to serve objectives other than restraining obscenity, pornography, vulgar 
dialogue, violence, crime, and so forth.  Such objectives, also always in the name of 
the common good of the populace and the state, serve to guard against the formation 
of ideology that would trouble government administration and the hierarchy, and to 
prevent turmoil and social turbulence.  As film censorship presumes certain effects 
of film on its spectators and film consumption as a process potentially capable of 
altering the general audiences, it is political and all about the security of government 
and the discipline of the governed population, which are always weighty concerns for 
government.  All governmental film censorship plays such a role, though there may 
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be differences in the degree of strictness and how implicit or explicit its deployment 
and practice.    
 
Film Censorship is as Old as the Film Itself 
In its early days, cinema seemed a threatening phenomenon — the critics 
assailed it, the government kept an eye on it.  Literally, ever since the emergence of 
film, film censorship and the demand for film control have been following the film 
industry and its art like a shadow.  As French and Petley put it: 
From its birth in the dying days of the nineteenth century to its hi-tech 
proliferation today, cinema has been a mote in the eye of the censors.  
Its popular appeal and widespread dissemination made it an obvious 
and easy target: it was widely accused of corrupting morals, spreading 
dangerous ideas and having a particularly malign effect on children and 
members of the ‘lower orders’.  (2007: book sleeve) 
The US and France launched the first film industries.  The first commercial 
public exhibition of film took place on Saturday, 14 April 1894, when the first 
Kinetoscope parlor, the Holland Brothers Kinetoscope Parlor at Broadway (the site 
of the Broadway Plaza Hotel today), New York City, opened for business.13   There 
were ten Kinetoscopes in the parlor. 
[They] were arranged in two rows of five, and surrounded by a brass 
rail for the patrons to lean on as they viewed the films.   Each machine 
showed a different thirty second film [sic], and payment of a fee of 25 
cents entitled a customer to watch five films.   The title of each film 
                                                 
13 The Kinetoscope (aka ‘peep-show machine’) is an invention commonly attributed to Thomas 
Edison (1847-1931), but it was mainly developed by a Scot, William Kennedy Laurie Dickson, 
(1860-1935) between 1889 and 1892.  “The Kinetoscope is an early motion picture exhibition device.  
Though not a movie projector — it was designed for films to be viewed individually through the 
window of a cabinet housing its components” (Wikipedia, accessed 10 May 2012).  
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was displayed on the machine on which it was shown, and an attendant, 
after receiving a ticket from the patron, who would then peer into the 
machine’s peephole, would start the film (the kinetoscope would later 
be coin-operated).  (MovieMovieSite.Com)  
The first films shown were shot at Thomas Edison’s Black Maria studios and 
primarily made for the male audience.  As the launch of the Kinetoscope gained 
success, more film parlors were opened across the US.  However, the film parlors at 
that time, commonly known as ‘peep shows’, were hardly regarded as upscale 
entertainment, but lowbrow entertainment for the unwashed commonality.  Three 
months later, the first recorded incident of motion picture censorship sprang up.  
The Kinetoscope film in question was Dorolita’s Passion Dance, performed by 
Carmencita, a well-known Spanish dancer in New York City.14  The film was 
prevented from exhibition by the police in New Jersey and was finally withdrawn 
from circulation.  The little clip was regarded as an ‘erotic item’ because the dancer 
revealed her undergarment in a serpentine dance.  In France, in the evening of 28 
December 1895, brothers Auguste (1862-1954) and Louis (1864-1948) Lumière held 
the first commercial exhibition of their ten short films, principally scenes of real 
life — Workers Leaving the Lumière Factory, A Gardener with a Watering Hose 
(also known as Sprinkler Sprinkled), Cordeliers Square in Lyon, and so on — by 
means of their Cinématographe projection in the Salon Indien of the Grand Café 
situated in the basement of the Second Empire Grand Hotel at 14 boulevard des 
Capucines in Paris.15  Thirty-three tickets were sold, and a number of guests were 
                                                 
14 To view Dorolita’s Passion Dance and for more details: 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/h?ammem/papr:@field(NUMBER+@band(edmp+4019)) or 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-15jwb1ZTMA 
 
15 To view the Lumière brothers’ first films:  
http://www.institut-lumiere.org/francais/films/1seance/accueil.html or 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nj0vEO4Q6s  
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invited to the occasion.  The day is often taken as the birth of film, or ‘the first 
cinema’ — the projection of moving photographic pictures on a screen for paying 
audiences.16  The French illusionist Georges Méliès (1861-1938), who later became 
a prominent and prolific filmmaker and the first to infuse drama into movies, was 
among the audience and witnessed the birth of cinema.  He later recalled: 
The other guests and I found ourselves in front of a small screen, 
similar to those we use for projections, and after a few minutes, a 
stationary photograph showing the Place Bellecour in Lyons was 
projected.  A little surprised, I scarcely had time to say to my 
neighbour: “Have we been brought here to see projections [lantern 
projection]?  I've been doing these for ten years.”  No sooner had I 
stopped speaking when a horse pulling a cart started to walk towards us 
followed by other vehicles, then a passerby.  In short, all the hustle and 
bustle of a street.  We sat with our mouths open, without speaking, 
filled with amazement.  (MovieMovieSite.Com)   
“The early films of the Lumières, as with most early cinema, were known as 
actualities, films that simply depict regular everyday events as they unfold” (Manley 
2011: 7, emphasis added).   
The next year, on 23 April, Thomas Edison held the premiere of his Vitascope 
projection of moving images at the Koster and Bial’s Music Hall in New York City.17  
In June, there was a call to ban a twenty-second Vitascope short film, The Kiss, in 
America.  The film recorded the reenactment of the lingering closed-mouthed kiss 
                                                 
16 Cinématographe was a Lumière brothers’ invention which was both a motion picture camera 
and a film projector.  Prior to the Lumières, Woodville Latham and his sons Grey and Otway (with his 
Eidolscope, co-developed with W. K. L. Dickson who parted from Edison), and brothers Max and 
Emil Skladanowsky (with their Bioscope) had already shown the moving projected images to a paying 
audience in the US on 20 May 1895 and Germany on 1 November 1895 respectively.  However, both 
of their images were indistinct, and their equipments were relatively unwieldy, while the Lumières’ 
Cinématographe had clear images, and the equipment was portable (MovieMovieSite.Com; Manley 
2011: 6-8).  
 
17 The Vitascope was also a film projection device.  It was developed by Charles Francis Jenkins 
(1867-1934) and Thomas J. Armat (1866-1948), but usually attributed to Thomas Edison.  
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between a middle-aged man, John Rice, and a middle-aged woman, May Irwin, in 
the Broadway stage play, The Widow Jones.18  Critics and the US papers considered 
the film absolutely disgusting, indecent in its emphasized vulgarity and a threat to 
morality.  Herbert Stone of the Chicago literary magazine The Chap Book fumed 
about the first on-screen kiss in film history and deemed that such things called for 
police interference.  He wrote, “I want to smash the Vitascope.  The name of the 
thing is itself a horror.  Its manifestations are worse” (cited in French and Petley 
2007: 8).   
Broadly speaking, while films like The Kiss and Dorolita’s Passion Dance 
raised concerns about the issue of sex, others prompted concerns about violence.  In 
1897, “moral opprobrium focused on screen violence as exemplified in a string of 
films bringing championship boxing matches to the general public” (French and 
Petley 2007: 3).  The same year in France, on 4 May, a booth housing a 
cinematograph show in the Paris Charity Bazaar, held at the Rue Jean-Goujon near 
the Champs-Elysees, caught fire due to the carelessness of the projectionists and a 
faulty projector lamp fuelled by a combination of oxygen and ether.  The fire 
instantly lit the canvas awnings and the neighboring booths, exploded the lamp and 
the celluloid film, and engulfed the whole street in flames within minutes.  The 
accident caused the death of one hundred and twenty one people, including a number 
of the French nobility.  Thus, the movie industry was born under such conditions 
that encouraged governmental control and censorship (see French and Petley 2007: 
2-10; Manley 2011: 5-8; Sadoul 1982: 3-39; MovieMovieSite.Com).   
                                                 
18 To view The Kiss and for more details:  
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?papr:2:./temp/~ammem_U0mA:: or 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zURTEs8C1lo  
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While there was acute competition between the camera and projector 
technologies in the early years of cinema, no one could fully envision the future of 
the movie industry.  The Lumière brothers declared in 1902, “Cinema was an 
invention without a future” (Manley 2011: 12).  Nevertheless, before cinema grew 
into an established and extensive entertainment industry, the moving projected 
images endured to evolve from a novelty and an experiment to a content carrier 
which helped define the modern life of human beings.  Concurrently, cities, states 
various places of the world developed their own film censorship institutions 
wherever and whenever films were made or exhibited.  The concerns about images 
of sex and violence were just a start for film censorship, which extended to other 
concerns in the course of time.  French and Petley list seven aspects that caused 
concern during the early years of cinema:  
First, there was the very size of the image and the immediacy, the 
intimacy of the experience.  Second, film opened up life socially, 
geographically, in time and space, transporting audiences to places 
unknown, hitherto forbidden, invented.  Third, the violence and 
eroticism were palpable.  Fourth, cinema offered an invitation to 
fantasize, to dream, to revolt, . . . Fifth, the movies rapidly became the 
most popular leisure activity of the expanding urban working classes, 
feared by the bourgeoisie as a potential source of revolution and by 
intellectual devotees of eugenics as a threat to the future of western 
civilization.  Sixth, movie-going was a public activity that took place 
in the dark, offering terrible temptations to innocent boys and girls.  
Seventh, there were health and safety fears, some real, some imaginary: 
fear of fire hazards from unsafe buildings and highly inflammable 
nitrate film; fear that the flickering images might damage eyesight or 
induce epilepsy; fear that these hot, fetid auditoriums could spread 
contagious diseases.  (2007: 5, 7) 
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With the development of sound film during the late 1920s, disturbing and filthy 
language were added to the above list (see French and Petley 2007: 5).  Nonetheless, 
the list has become longer in the ensuing years, and perhaps will become even longer 
as time goes by, notwithstanding that it may not be announced officially.  All in all, 
censorship has never deserted cinema and has been institutionalized, perfected and 
evolved in the more than one hundred years of complex interactions among 
filmmakers, censors, politicians, scholars and critics.   
 
Theoretical Legitimization of Censorship 
According to Foucault (1980: 93), “We are subjected to the production of 
truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of 
truth,” and as Jansen (1991: 7) puts it, “Power secures knowledge, but knowledge 
also secures power.  Systems of power-knowledge contain both emancipatory and 
repressive elements.  They do not just set limits on human freedom, they also make 
it possible.”  We owe a great deal to the scholars who have emancipated human 
beings from coercion and subjugation by theorizing and rationalizing human liberty, 
phenomena, behaviors, activities, and so forth.  However, history is cunning.  We 
can find in the course of history that some theories aiming to emancipate ideas and 
thought in the first turned into the theoretical grounds for repression or oppression, 
and vice versa.  Official censors acquire the power to interpret and judge content 
carriers of their own accord through the ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ produced by the 
intellectual powers, notwithstanding that it can be an appropriation of such 
knowledge and truth.   
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By film censorship, some of the ‘things’ (in La Perrière’s sense as interpreted 
by Foucault, see Foucault 1991: 93) in a society or in a state — government as the 
ruling body; audience as consumers, spectators as part of the population; film as 
content carrier that carries ideas, thought, opinion, criticism and ideology; filmmaker 
as the professional or artist who produces, creates or injects content into film; official 
censor who censors on behalf of the government; investor in film production and 
owner of the movie house whose primary concern is profit — are ‘articulated’ to 
each other.  In such an articulation, the ‘things’ inside are imbricated; they are 
interactive, both active and passive, and are wrestling and mingling with each other 
in a competition for power.  Taking Hong Kong film industry and the process from 
the initiation of a commercial film production to the public exhibition of that film as 
an example, the formation of such articulation can be divided into a few stages.  
Firstly, someone — typically a film director, a screenwriter, an investor, a film 
producer or whoever is the driving force — initiates a film project.  At this stage, 
other than making money, the articulated individuals might have other ends to meet 
or ideals to reach.  In order to distribute the subsequently completed work in the 
market, everyone involved has to consider the problem of censorship.  Usually, if 
there are foreseeable difficulties in passing the official censorship, the project will 
probably be dropped.  For instance, the screenplay of a Chinese-foreign 
co-produced film has to be censored by the Chinese Mainland authority prior to the 
start of actual filming (see Chapters 5 and 6 for a detailed examination).  The 
censorship authority may ban or give a green light to the screenplay, but the most 
likely outcome is that the authority would ‘suggest’ amendments, which are, indeed, 
requirements.  Filmmakers would amend the screenplay accordingly if they are 
going to proceed to actual filming.  In such a case, two forms of censorship are 
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involved in the early stage of an anticipated film production, namely, the 
self-censorship of the creators and the official censorship of the authorities.  The 
articulation expands during the second stage, that is, the actual production in which 
cast and crew members of various departments, sometimes the publicity staff and 
media personnel as well, would be articulated.  When the production enters into the 
third stage, the post-production, some more departments and staffs would get 
involved while those who have their works finished would leave and become, 
perhaps, part of the audience later.  The last stage is the public exhibition of the 
finished film, in the process of which, it must pass the official censorship and 
sometimes needs to be amended in accordance with the censors’ requirements.  In 
this stage, the articulation expands with all its might with the effort of publicity and 
promotion to absorb as much audience as it can.   
Other than a medium in the sphere of communication, a form of art in the 
sphere of creativity and a form of popular culture under capitalistic logic, film is also 
a form of text for literary analysis.19  While some audiences simply watch a film to 
kill time, other audiences read a film, which implies that they watch attentively to 
absorb meanings.   
By the word reading we mean not only the capacity to identify and 
decode a certain number of signs, but also the subjective capacity to put 
them into a creative relation between themselves and with other signs: a 
capacity which is, by itself, the condition for a complete awareness of 
one’s total environment.  (Terni, as cited in Hall, Stuart 2008: 484; 
emphasis in original; cf. Benjamin 1988: 231 and 235 discussed 
previously in this chapter) 
                                                 
19 It is familiar in cultural studies that “ ‘text’ in the broad sense . . . includes not only written texts, 
but film, television, the visual arts, music — in fact, ordered complexes of meaning in any medium or 
combination of media” (Couldry, NIck 2007: 88). 
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Although the notion of ‘subjective capacity’ is open to debate, when situating this 
definition within the scope of film, it implies that to read a film is to decode or 
interpret, or try to grab meanings in and from a film.  As for the official film 
censors, they are part of the audience, and indeed, the first audience outside film 
production.  In order to fulfill their jobs, the censors become part of the readership 
for they have to read the films being censored and are aware of their signification in 
relation to the total environment.  What they weigh most is the influence and effect 
of any particular film on the public audience.  The director of a film is always 
considered the ‘author’ of the film, that is, the leading person who created it.  
People are accustomed to seeking explanation, deep meaning and signification in a 
work from its author.  However, in 1967, Roland Barthes declared, “the birth of the 
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author” (1977: 148).  In his essay 
“The Death of the Author”, Barthes says,  
As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on 
reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function 
other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this 
disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into 
his own death, writing begins.  (1977: 142) 
Barthes’ theory extends to film.  When a film is done and displayed 
on-screen, it is the moving images and the sound that act, speak and perform before 
the audience, not the director.  That is to say, a movie is watched and interpreted in 
such a way that, at all its level, the director is absent.  “Once the Author is removed, 
the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile.  To give a text an Author is to 
impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing” 
(Barthes 1977: 147), which means that, with the death of the author, the ‘writing’ of a 
text will be continued with the meanings and interpretations given to it by its readers, 
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inclusive of the censors.  According to Barthes (1977: 148), “a text is made of 
multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of 
dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is 
focused and that place is the reader, not . . . the author.”  Foucault echoes Barthes’ 
idea in his essay “What Is an Author?” firstly published in 1969:  
[T]oday’s writing has freed itself from the theme of expression.  
Referring only to itself; but without being restricted to the confines of 
its interiority, writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority.  
This means that it is an interplay of signs arranged less according to its 
signified content than the very nature of the signifier.  Writing unfolds 
like a game that invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses 
its limits.  In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of 
writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it is, rather, a question 
of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears.   
. . . The work, which once had the duty of providing immortality, 
now possesses the right to kill, to be its author’s murderer.  (1998: 206) 
By disqualifying the privileged position of the author in the sense-making process 
and the subsequent discourse of a text, the readers, and thus the act of reading, are 
emancipated from the constraints and predispositions preset by the author and the 
attribution to the author.  Accordingly, the meanings of and the meanings in any 
film are not up to its director’s decision and do not rely on his/her intent and 
biographical attributes.  The meanings in accordance with the director are not in any 
ways more privileged than the meanings the readers interpret and absorb, and 
directors are not the source of their respective films’ meanings anymore.  Therefore, 
in regard to the film censors, Barthes and Foucault validate their interpretation of any 
films.  In the mindset of the official censors, the film director, being the author of 
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film, is dead.  The censors can interpret a film in whatever way they engage with it 
regardless of the authorial intent. 
However, where Barthes activates the readers by just singling out a generic 
‘Author’ as his subject of criticism, Foucault (1998: 209) complicates the notion of 
‘authorship’ and reconsiders the various notions of ‘author’ in literature by saying: 
“[W]e must locate the space left empty by the author’s disappearance, follow the 
distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings this disappearance 
uncovers.”  After illustrating that the author’s name is situated between the two 
poles of description and designation, Foucault reconsiders the relationship between 
the author (or the author-figure) and the text (or the work) attributed to him/her by 
introducing the concept of ‘author function’, which designates the author as a 
functional agent of discourse itself and is “characteristic of the mode of existence, 
circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society” (Foucault 1998: 
209-211).  He lists four different characteristics of the author function that he sees 
as the most visible and important.  These characteristics are also enlightening in 
respect to the theoretical and practical comprehension of censorship.   
Firstly, it is “linked to the juridical and institutional system that encompasses, 
determines, and articulates the universe of discourses” (Foucault 1998: 216), and it is 
about ownership.   
[H]istorically, this type of ownership has always been subsequent to 
what one might call penal appropriation.  Texts, books, [films,] and 
discourses really began to have authors . . . to the extent that authors 
became subject to punishment, that is, to the extent that discourses 
could be transgressive.  (Foucault 1998: 211-2)  
 
38 
In the case of film censorship, when the authority deems that penal punishment is 
necessary for any officially recognized transgression owing to a certain film’s 
discourse, the owner(s) of the discourse, that is, usually the film director, producer, or 
both would be prosecuted, although Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” has provided 
a theoretical ground for the making sense of the censors’ own interpretation on any 
film.  For example:  
Dhondup Wancheng [Tibetan filmmaker] was sentenced to six years’ 
imprisonment for ‘inciting separatism’ for making a documentary, 
Leaving Fear Behind, which features a series of interviews with 
Tibetans questioning the Chinese authorities’ promises of greater 
freedom in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  (Amnesty 
International 22 April 2010) 
Secondly, the author function varies in different fields and disciplines and 
“does not affect all discourses in the same way at all times and in all types of 
civilization” (Foucault 1998: 216).  In Europe, scientific texts in the Middle Ages 
were accepted as ‘true’ only when marked with the authors’ names, but, since the 
seventeenth or eighteenth century, these texts began to be accepted without 
attribution to their authors, and the author function faded away.  In contrast, there 
was a period in history when no one questioned the identity behind literary texts but, 
from the eighteenth century onwards, literary discourses were accepted only when 
endowed with the ‘author function’.  “Literary anonymity is not tolerable; we can 
accept it only in the guise of an enigma” (Foucault 1998: 213).  By the same token, 
anonymity in film is also not tolerable, particularly when a film is submitted to the 
censorship authority in the Chinese Mainland.  
Thirdly, “it does not develop spontaneously as the attribution of a discourse to 
an individual.  It is, rather, the result of a complex operation that constructs a certain 
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being of reason that we call ‘author’ ” (ibid).  The operation of author-construction 
varies according to periods and types of discourse, and depends on the manner and 
rules by which the existing texts and discourses are handled, authenticated and 
classified.  The author, or the constructed figure of the author, is defined as a 
constant level of value and a field of conceptual or theoretical coherence, and at the 
same time it is conceived as a stylistic unity and an historical figure at the crossroads 
of a certain number of events.  Furthermore,  
[T]he author provides the basis for explaining not only the presence of 
certain events in a work, but also their transformations, distortions, and 
diverse modifications (through his biography, the determination of his 
individual perspective, the analysis of his social position, and the 
revelation of his basic design).  The author is also the principle of a 
certain unity of writing — all differences having to be resolved, at least 
in part, by the principles of evolution, maturation, or influence.  The 
author also serves to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge in a 
series of texts: there must be — at a certain level of his thought or desire, 
of his consciousness or unconscious — a point where contradictions are 
resolved, where incompatible elements are at last tied together or 
organized around a fundamental or originating contradiction.  Finally, 
the author is a particular source of expression that, in more or less 
completed forms, is manifested equally well, and with similar validity, 
in works, sketches, letters, fragments, and so on.  (Foucault 1998: 
214-5)  
This characteristic is significant in the practice of censorship, particularly in political 
censorship.  In reality, not all the film directors are the same for they are not bound 
to the same level of value nor the same field of conceptual or theoretical coherence.  
Censors are more alert to the works of some particular filmmakers who are seen, 
ideologically or politically, as potentially seditious and hostile to the governing body, 
the status quo of the powerful or the political view of some parties in power.  For 
 
40 
example, in the 1960s, the leftists considered the prominent Hong Kong auteur 
Patrick Lung (also known as Lung Kong) a spy working for the British Hong Kong 
Government.  Thus, Patrick Lung’s films were under the scrutiny of the leftists.  
Given Lung’s identity, value and stylistic unity, the leftists had no doubt about 
finding his films reactionary.  Although the leftists were in no way the official 
censors, they had the power to influence and to interfere in the official censorship of 
the British colonial rule, and would ‘censor’ their targets by their own means (see 
Chapter 3).     
Fourthly, an ‘author’ does not refer purely and simply to a real individual and 
is always constituted of several simultaneous subjects.  “In fact, however, all 
discourses endowed with the author function possess this plurality of self” (Foucault 
1998: 215-6).  In film, this is particularly true of biopics such as The Woman Knight 
of Mirror Lake, which is about the extraordinary life of the historical figure Qiu Jin.  
The censors of the Chinese Government always require a film about major historical 
events and figures to be loyal and faithful to history.  Such a requirement means that 
the specialized censors perceive that there are other people who have participated in 
making up the story of the film and function as the ‘authors’ other than the film 
director.  However, such a requirement is always in tension with artistic treatment 
and subject to how one would interpret the process of ‘adaptation’ and the meaning 
of ‘artistry’ (See Chapter 6 for a further discussion by referencing the making of The 
Woman Knight of Mirror Lake as an example).   
Foucault also introduced the term ‘transdiscursive’ — the position of authors 
who produced or inspired a literary tradition or a school of thought in which other 
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books and authors will, in their turn, find a place.  In the light of this idea, Foucault 
(1998: 217-8) classified such rare authors as ‘founders of discursivity’. 
They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works.  
They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for 
the formation of other texts.  [For example, Freud and Marx]: they 
both have established an endless possibility of discourse. . . . [T]hey 
made possible not only a certain number of analogies but also (and 
equally important) a certain number of differences.  They have created 
a possibility for something other than their discourse, yet something 
belonging to what they founded.      
In the light of both Barthes and Foucault’s discourses, a closer inspection of 
the film censorship practices in the modern world (and the postmodern world as well) 
reveals that, although the meanings of any film are at the censors’ disposal without 
passing the author, the author function has played a significant role.  The experience 
of Hong Kong cinema during the Cold War era, a time when there was severe tension 
in relations across the Taiwan Strait, shows clearly how the author function was 
engaged in film censorship.  The CPC, the Kuomintang and the British Hong Kong 
Government at that time were attentive to films that would lead to a transdiscursive 
effect, albeit not to the extent of the effect caused by Foucault’s ‘founders of 
discursivity (see Chapter 3).       
Barthes and Foucault’s discourses have shed light on the problem of authors 
in relation to their respective works which are in the form of text, inclusive of film in 
the contemporary sense.  But what then is the mechanism for reading a text, or 
attentively watching a film?   
Stanley Fish, a major proponent of reader response criticism, also echoes 
Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” with his dismissal of taking the author’s intent as 
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the fundamental principle in interpretation.  For Fish, reading is an activity which 
makes meanings and values in a text rather than deriving meaning from a text 
passively in accord with the author.  He stresses the importance of the role of 
readers in determining the meaning and significance of a text.  According to Fish, 
reading is an interpretive act, by which a reader does not have to read a text in a 
specific appointed way, but in whatever way he/she chooses in a relatively 
autonomous manner.  Thus, the meaning of a text can vary from reader to reader, 
from time to time and from place to place.  In reality, there may be a number of 
separate readers who come up with — though they do not have to — the same 
general meanings or similar understandings on the same text.  Fish says that, given 
this, “both the stability of interpretation among readers and the variety of 
interpretation in the career of a single reader would seem to argue for the existence of 
something independent of and prior to interpretive acts” (1980: 167-8), which is what 
he terms as the ‘interpretive strategy’.  A reader reads a text with his/her particular 
interpretive strategy, a product of the reader’s cumulative experience, which is 
dependant on the reader’s education, point of view, cultural background, context of 
environment in which the reader is reading the text, and so forth.  The sameness, or 
similarity, in interpretive strategies situates separate readers in an ‘interpretive 
community’, a figurative community introduced by Fish, which is “made up of those 
who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for 
writing texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions” (Fish 
1980: 171).  Here, the notion of ‘writing texts’ refers to the making of meanings in 
the text being read, which recalls Barthes’ idea of removing the Author to let the 
writing continue.  As for religious scriptures, for instance, the Bible, the author is 
not removed.  The Bible seems to bind the reader to one fixed meaning in accord 
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with the interpretation of the Church; indeed, it is the duty of Christians to seek a 
way to obtain the same interpretation and understanding as such.  By the same 
token, this kind of fixed meaning aids the comprehension of the CPC’s compulsory 
perspective on history — the CPC, by exercising its sovereignty over the population 
under its rule, has privatized and monopolized the narrative, interpretation and 
discourse of history, particularly modern and contemporary Chinese history, and it is 
the governed population’s duty to see and understand history in the same manner as 
the ruling body.  This explains why the films that are categorized as major 
revolutionary and historical theme films under the Chinese Government’s 
administration have to be examined carefully by the appointed and specialized 
Leading Group for Major Revolutionary and Historical Theme Film and TV 
Production – Film (see Chapters 5 and 6), of which the members are readers in the 
role of censors who apply their interpretive strategy in determining the meanings and 
significance of a film.  
Unintentionally, Barthes, Foucault and Fish have provided theoretical ground 
for the censor’s interpretation of any texts, inclusive of films.  Their theories ground 
and elucidate the ways in which censors read films, and thus their practice in making 
censorship decisions.  While some films are cut because of explicit images and 
utterances, others are banned because of their embedded or ‘concealed’ message, 
meaning and ideology according to the censors’ interpretation.  In this sense, 
censoring film is also an activity of making meanings in a film, and sometimes out of 
the film, in an active manner — film censorship is also a matter of interpretive acts.  
By employing their interpretive strategies, the censors determine the meanings in 
film and thus the censorship result.  Those who support the result are within the 
same interpretive community of the censors.  The director is hardly in a privileged 
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position to defend and explain because his/her intent is out of context in the process 
of the censors’ interpretation.  Ironically, when censors consider a film to be 
violating the law or detrimental to the state to a certain extent, and when the 
government deems punishment is necessary, the director is the one to be held 
responsible and punished.  With regard to the ‘ownership’ of any discourse, 
Foucault’s idea of the author function plays a role.  By the time responsibility is 
asked for, the director cannot detach himself/herself from his/her work and is 
regarded as the one who acts, speaks and performs before the audience.  In some 
cases, for example, the ban on Lou Ye’s Summer Palace (2006), other related persons 
such as the producer and the leading cast are punished too (see BBCChinese.Com 4 
September 2006 and 15 October 2006), and the banning of the film can be 
comprehended as a safeguard against any potential transdiscursivity.  
The mechanism of reading constitutes a significant part of the practice of 
censorship.  Today, successful censorship, and thus its suppression of film, relies on 
deploying strategy, involving complex operations and transformation, and which are 
not so apparent as before.  The contemporary day-to-day practice of censorship has 
been implemented in a mode more complex than the past.  The primary objective is 
to make the directly and indirectly governed people willingly and automatically 
submissive to the censorship standards set by the ruling regime.  However, 
censorship remains as an apparatus and a technique of governmentality for 
governments, which deals with a certain manipulation of forces, intervenes upon 
becoming within the context of a social order and determines precisely those aspects 
of the future that are not knowable in advance. 
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Chapter 2 
Development of Hong Kong Cinema and Colonial Film Censorship 
vis-à-vis Chinese Nation-Building and National Defence 
 
Specifically, Hong Kong cinema is not equivalent to Chinese cinema.  The 
term ‘Chinese cinema’ is, in fact, not definite; it does not denote a single genre.  As 
Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu puts it: “Chinese cinemas cover a broad geographic and 
historical terrain, including Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and to some extent 
overseas Chinese communities” (Lu 1997: 1).20  Poshek Fu further remarks:  
There has, in fact, never been one monolithic form that can be called 
Chinese cinema in the singular; rather, a number of different Chinese 
cinemas have historically made films in different languages (or dialects) 
and at different geopolitical locations.  Chinese cinematic traditions 
include not only films made in mainland China that cater to audiences 
that speak the standard Chinese language, Mandarin, but also films 
made in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other communities of the Chinese 
diaspora . . . that feature a variety of themes and genres and use local 
dialects.  (Fu 2003: xii) 
In a general sense and in its common usage, the attributive determiner ‘Chinese’ in 
‘Chinese cinemas’ does not necessarily refer to China or qualify the ‘cinemas’ as 
something belonging to the country named the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
‘Chinese’, in this instance, is usually taken to mean ethnicity rather than nationality 
and includes those who do not possess the legal right of belonging to the PRC, and 
Chinese cinemas are perceived as the cinemas in Chinese languages that include 
                                                 
20 Lu notes: “One must speak of Chinese cinemas in the plural and as transnational in the 
ongoing process of image-making throughout the twentieth century” (1997: 3). 
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other Chinese dialects other than Putonghua.  Although the political rhetoric of the 
PRC leadership always includes Hong Kong (also Taiwan and Macau) as part of the 
PRC, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) is regarded as a foreign 
region under the Central People’s Government of the PRC’s administrative 
provisions for film despite its reunification with China on 1 July 1997.  Thus, in a 
practical sense, to the Chinese government, a Hong Kong film is not equivalent to a  
Chinese film even though most of the Hong Kong films are in a Chinese language, or 
more precisely, in the Chinese dialect Cantonese.  This problematic situation is 
leftover from history. 
By the time motion picture was invented in the dying days of the nineteenth 
century, feudal China under the Qing Empire was heading towards its downfall, 
Hong Kong had been a British colony for more than half a century since the Qing 
Empire lost the First Opium War (also known as the First Anglo-Chinese War) in 
1842, and Taiwan had been ceded to Japan under the terms of the “Treaty of 
Maguan” (also known as “Treaty of Shimonoseki”) after Japan won the First 
Sino-Japanese War (also known as War of Jiawu) in 1895.  As time went by, the 
three different major streams of Chinese cinemas have had different experiences and 
trajectories in their developments.  There have been times of separation and times 
of reunion, and they have been fostered in different historical contexts and mobile 
cultural, economic and socio-political conditions.  Despite that a rigorous research 
on Hong Kong cinema in the past cannot be claimed to be completed, it can still be 
seen that Hong Kong played a significant role in the Chinese cinemas over the past 
century. 
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Before the 1990s, academic studies on Chinese cinemas and their histories 
were rare in both the Chinese-language and English-language spheres.  The most 
prestigious Chinese-language historical text is Cheng Jihua, Li Shaobai and Xing 
Zuwen’s History of the Development of Chinese Cinema (Zhongguo Dianying 
Fazhan Shi), first published in Beijing in 1963, which is a magisterial, orthodox and 
official two-volume narrative work based on the revolutionary historicism of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC; also known as Chinese Communist Party, 
abbreviated as CCP).  In English, Jay Leyda’s work, Dianying/Electric Shadows: 
An Account of Films and the Film Audience in China, published in 1972, is a 
representative and remarkable one.21  Cheng et al.’s work with its heavy pro-CPC 
and anti-Kuomintang (KMT, also known as Guomindang or the Chinese Nationalist 
Party) tone only has bits and pieces about Hong Kong cinema scattered in the two 
volumes.22  Moreover, because of the political slant and biased historical views of 
the editors/authors, many films and filmmakers are omitted from the text.  Leyda 
once asked Cheng Jihua why there was no detailed record of the Shanghai and 
Northeast China cinemas during the Japanese occupation in History of the 
Development of Chinese Cinema.  Cheng replied that he considered the films 
produced at that time to be the products of the concerted efforts of the Imperial 
Japanese invaders and a small group of traitors.  Since such films transgressed the 
spirit of the Chinese people’s patriotic resistance against Japan, they should be 
condemned with every endeavour and were not worthy to be included in the history 
of Chinese cinema(s).  This was a matter of principle to Cheng.  However, Leyda 
                                                 
21 Leyda stayed in China from 1959 to 1963 and took part in the research work of Cheng et al.’s 
History of the Development of Chinese Cinema (Leyda 1972: xiii). 
 
22 Fu remarks, “Hong Kong film has been largely ignored by China scholars. . . . [M]ost 
authoritative historical texts on Chinese cinema overlook the significant role played by Hong Kong in 
its development as a pan-Chinese mass culture industry” (2003: 52).   
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responded that he could accept condemnation, but not silencing (see Leyda 1972: 
139).  In the light of academic study and genuine communication, one may suppose 
Cheng et al.’s work is a (self-)censored work; its documentation is far from complete, 
and its discourse is far from authentic.  As for Leyda’s work, there is only one 
chapter (Chapter 11) on Hong Kong cinema.   
The first book in English entirely devoted to Hong Kong cinema came out in 
1977; it is Window on Hong Kong: A Sociology Study on the Hong Kong Film 
Industry and Its Audience by I. C. Jarvie, a colleague of Jay Leyda at New York 
University.  In addition, starting in 1978, the Hong Kong International Film Festival 
issues a yearly bilingual (Chinese and English) special edition of essays devoted to 
Hong Kong cinema retrospectives.  Such works have provoked and invigorated the 
research on Hong Kong cinema among local and overseas scholars.  Nevertheless, 
despite the increasing number of publications on early Hong Kong cinema over the 
past twenty years or so, there is no conclusive or agreed-upon narrative on a number 
of historical issues, for example, the claim to be ‘the first’, and there are even 
contradictory data among different scholars’ works.  However, while some factual 
accounts in older publications were disproved later upon new research findings, other 
previous mistakes are still being shared (to be discussed specifically in the section 
below).  Those discovered mistakes, and the unknown mistakes as well, are either 
owing to the scarcity of relevant primary materials or being misled by the errors in 
formerly acclaimed works.  In short, a genuine documentation of Hong Kong 
cinema is still an on-going project.23  
                                                 
23 Unless otherwise stated, the historical materials in this text are deliberately selected and 
verified with primary sources or based on discursive evidence by the writer or other scholars.  However, 
since many Chinese movies of the early years have no official English titles, there are inconsistent 
translations in different English-language narratives and documentations.  This text uses mainly the 
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The Beginning of Hong Kong Cinema 
With the aid of the memoirs and monographs of film veterans, such as Lai 
Man-wai (also known as Li Minwei), Moon Kwan (also known as Kwan Man-ching), 
Lo Dun and so forth, film researchers and scholars have basically outlined a concise 
picture of the early Hong Kong cinema by assembling and analysing the related news 
reports, column articles and advertisements in the preserved old newspapers such as 
The China Mail, Hong Kong Daily Press, The Hong Kong Telegraph and so forth.24   
An advertisement in the Hong Kong Telegraph published on 24 April 1897 
declared:  
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HONGKONG – ‘THE 
CINEMATOGRAPH’ (The latest and greatest success of London and 
Paris) will exhibit for a short season, commencing TUESDAY, the 
27TH April, 1897. . . Admission: ONE DOLLAR; Children, half-price. 
(Capitalizations in original)   
Two days later, the earliest recorded cinema activity in Hong Kong took place when 
Professor Maurice Charvet, coming from Paris as reported by The China Mail, 
presented the Cinématographe to the press at the Theatre Royal of City Hall 
(demolished in 1933).  The previewed short actualities, as indicated in the 
newspaper advertisement, included The Arrival of the Czar in Paris, Loie Fuller’s 
                                                                                                                                          
translations available from the Hong Kong Film Archive; such an option also applies to the early 
Chinese filmmakers who do not have any endorsed English names.   
 
24 (i) Yu Mo-wan, a notable researcher who spent forty years researching into the early cinema of 
Hong Kong, had a large collection of Chinese-language literature and materials related to the early 
Hong Kong cinema, including rare copies of old film magazine, newspaper clips, special publications, 
books, film stills, film posters, etc.  He donated all his collections to Hong Kong Film Archive before 
his death in 2006.  Other scholars in this area include Law Kar, Frank Bren, Chung Po Yin, etc. 
(ii) The Hong Kong Public Library has eleven issues of Hong Kong newspapers published from 
1853 to 1987, with the old English newspapers being more completely preserved.  The English 
newspapers, however, concentrated on the news and activities of westerners, paid little attention to the 
local Chinese and ignored cinema activities in Cantonese opera houses, tea houses, etc. 
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Serpentine Dance, Boxing Bet – ‘Corbett and Mitchell’ and so forth.  Reporters 
complimented the show as a ‘marriage of photography and electricity’.  Hong Kong 
Daily Press (26 April 1897) said that it was a first for Hong Kong; The China Mail 
claimed that all were Lumière brothers’ productions and reported on 28 April 1897: 
The mechanism of the Cinematograph is of the simplest description.  
A long strip of photographic film, containing very minute photographs, 
is wound from one cylinder to the other, the photographs passing the 
lenses at the rate of fifty per second. 
Nonetheless, an announcement published in The Hong Kong Telegraph of 27 April 
1897 notified the public that the scheduled opening exhibition was postponed for one 
day due to a mechanical problem of the projection machine.25  The Cinématographe 
was then opened to the public on 28 April with five sessions a day as indicated in an 
advertisement published in The Hong Kong Telegraph.26  According to Frank Bren 
(1998), the show lasted until 4 May at least.  The hour-long show attracted a large 
audience every day, and business boomed according to a report in The North China 
Herald published in Shanghai on 14 May 1897 (cited in Law and Bren 2012: 16).  
However, records and reports of the event can only be found in English newspapers 
and not in the preserved Chinese newspapers perhaps because the novel 
entertainment was initially confined to the colony’s dominant class that included 
westerners and the wealthy and usually British-educated Chinese commercial elite. 
                                                 
25 According to Chung Po Yin (2011: 44), there was a premiere of the Cinématographe on 27 
April 1897 that the Governor of Hong Kong William Robinson and the Colonial Secretary James H. S. 
Lockhart also attended.  However, Chung did not mention the source of the information. 
 
26 In 1998, an L’Institut Lumière spokesman in Lyon replied to film scholar Frank Bren’s queries 
in a letter; he confirmed: “[The right to use ‘Cinématographe’] was definitely the property of Lumiere, 
but was impossible to protect.  We estimate that, starting in 1896, over 600 copycat machines were 
soon manufactured or patented in France alone.  So, unauthorised screenings under the 
‘Cinématographe’ name could easily have been done a year later in Hong Kong. . . . As for the name 
Maurice Charvet, we have no record” (as cited in Bren 1998).  For more about the Cinématographe, 
see footnote 16. 
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After the debut of the Cinématographe, moving pictures became very popular 
in Hong Kong and that drew western businessmen to the colony to explore the highly 
profitable cinema business.  As can be seen in the advertisements found in old 
newspapers, the City Hall was often one of the venues for moving picture exhibitions.  
However, the projection device was not limited to the Cinématographe.  For 
instance, according to an advertisement in The Hong Kong Telegraph of 23 April 
1900, a special attraction, the Bioscope with a repertoire of two hundred of the latest 
pictures, had come to town (cited in Law and Bren 2004: 20).  Starting at roughly 
1900, more and more advertisements appeared in Chinese newspapers, which 
implied that the entertainment had gradually extended to the commonality.  During 
that time, the moving picture businesses were largely led by western businessmen 
who rented out projection facilities and imported films from the US and Europe with 
the help of compradors.  In order to lure in bigger audiences, opera houses that 
initially catered for Cantonese opera performances introduced moving picture 
exhibitions as an extra attraction, a move which proved to be very helpful to business 
(Chung 2011: 46-7).  Other venues included open areas at night and tea houses and 
rental premises.  Nevertheless, the early venues were either temporary or just had 
business for short periods due to insufficient film sources.  There were no dedicated 
premises for film shows until movie house business began to flourish after 1910 and 
feature films gradually replaced the compilations of shorts (Zhou and Li 2005: 17-8; 
Yu 1996: 26-28).27 
Actual filming took place in Hong Kong not long after the first motion 
picture exhibition.  In 1898, an American crew came to the British colony and shot 
                                                 
27 For more on the early exhibitions of motion pictures in Hong Kong, see Law and Bren (2012: 
13-7, 24-30, 292-5), Law (2002: 45), Chung (2011: 44-9), Zhou and Li (2005: 12-8), Bren (1998) and 
Yu (1996: 5-70, 81-107).  However, some historical materials in these texts contradict each other.   
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some short travelogues for the Thomas Edison Company.  There were at least seven 
such shorts according to the documentation in film historian Charles Musser’s 
Edison Motion Pictures, 1890-1900 – An Annotated Filmography, published in 1997 
(Law and Bren 2001: 13-14).  They were all in 35mm film format, including 
Government House at Hong Kong, Street Scene in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Regiment 
No.1, Hong Kong Regiment No.2, Hong Kong Wharf Scene and some others; all are 
now preserved in the Library of Congress, the United States of America (US).28   
Controversially, a number of unspecialized publications still credit the 
two-reel, fifteen-minute long Chuang Tzu Tests His Wife (Zhuangzi Shiqi), also 
known as Zhuangzi Tests His Wife or The Defamation of Choung Chow), produced in 
1914 as the first narrative film ever made by Hong Kong filmmakers in Hong 
Kong.29  Filming facilities for the film were provided by a Russian-born American 
Jew, Benjamin Brodsky (who changed his last name to Borden in 1957), who also 
                                                 
28 In his essay “The American Connection in Early Hong Kong Cinema” (2002 [2000]), Law Kar 
took the shootings led by James Ricalton, a photographer working for Thomas Edison Company, as the 
first Hong Kong cinema activity.  However, in his later book Hong Kong Cinema: A Cross-Cultural 
View (2004) (a revised Chinese edition was published in 2012), the credit goes evidently to the 
‘Cinématographe’ presentation in 1897.  Furthermore, Law only says an American crew shooting for 
Thomas Edison Company without mentioning James Ricalton because he finds in Musser’s work that 
those short films are credited to James White and Frederick Blechynden (or Bleckyrden).  Besides, 
Stephen Teo’s Hong Kong Cinema – The Extra Dimension (2007 [1997]: 27-8) and Poshek Fu’s 
Between Shanghai and Hong Kong – The Politics of Chinese Cinema (2003: 54) also take the ‘Ricalton 
shootings’ or the ‘shooting for Edison’ as the first Hong Kong cinema activity.  
 
29 (i)  Zhou and Li (2005, 2007) argue that Chuang Tzu Tests His Wife was funded by an 
American businessman (or company) and thus cannot be claimed as a Hong Kong film. 
(ii)  Hong Kong celebrated a 100 years of cinema in 2009 with the recognition of Stealing a 
Roast Duck, reputedly made in 1909, as the first Hong Kong film.  This was based on a few 
authoritative works on cinema history, such as Cheng et al.’s History of the Development of Chinese 
Cinema (1978a [1963]: 28-9) and George Sadoul’s Histoire du Cinema Modial (1982 [1979]: 545, 746).  
Recent studies by scholars, such as Law and Bren (2012), have found Stealing a Roast Duck was 
probably made later than Chuang Tzu Tests His Wife, and, perhaps, made in Shanghai.   
(iii)  Film scholars such as Zhou and Li (2005), Law and Bren (2012), on the basis of new 
research findings, have indicated that the film was probably produced in early 1914.   
For more on the relevant narratives and discussions of the above; see Zhou and Li (2005: 23-39, 
44-5, 74; 2007), Law and Bren (2012: 31-57), Feng Qun (2009: 28-38) and Yu (1996: 73-9).  For the 
synopsis of Chuang Tzu Tests His Wife, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I (1997: 3). 
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funded the production.30  Lai Man-wai wrote the script and played the wife of 
Chuang Tzu (also known as Zhuangzi), his wife Yim Shan-shan (also known as Yan 
Shanshan) who played the maid of Chuang Tzu’s wife became the first Chinese 
actress on screen, Lai Man-wai’s elder brother Lai Buk-hoi (also known as Lai 
Pak-hoi or Li Beihai) played Chuang Tzu, and R. F. Van Velzer, an employee of 
Brodsky, was the head cameraman.  Since the division of labour in filmmaking was 
probably not precise at that time and there was no such term literally meaning 
‘director’ in Chinese, who directed the film remains a matter of debate.31  For 
instance, Leyda (1972: 365) and Cheng et al. (1978a [1963]: 521) credit Lai Man-wai 
as the director while Yu Mo-wan (1996: 76) and Zhou and Li (2005: 37-9) argue that 
the film was directed by Lai Buk-hoi.  Soon after the film was finished, it was 
shown in Hong Kong with great success.  Later, Brodsky brought the film together 
with some other Chinese films, including Stealing a Roast Duck (Tou Shao Ya; also 
known as The Trip of the Roast Duck; also financed by Brodsky) to the US and 
exhibited them to the American public.  Veteran film director Moon Kwan confirms 
the US screening in his memoir (1976: 110). 
As documented in Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I (1913-1941) published by 
Hong Kong Film Archive in 1997, beginning with the fiction film Chuang Tzu Tests 
His Wife, Hong Kong produced more than six hundred films before the fall of Hong 
Kong in 1941, among which some four hundred were produced in the 1930s.  Also 
controversially, particularly in the age of globalization, research coordinator Yu 
Mo-wan defines ‘Hong Kong film’ in the “Preface”: 
                                                 
30 For more about Benjamin Brodsky (1875?/1877?-1960), see Law and Bren (2012: 31-58). 
 
31 According Zhou and Li (2005: 38-9), the Chinese term ‘daoyan’ (or ‘do yin’ in Cantonese) as a 
translation equivalent to ‘director’ in English first appeared in 1922. 
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‘Hong Kong film’ must be made by a company that is established in 
Hong Kong (even though the company may not have a long history or 
has only a small office).  If its production company is not established 
in Hong Kong, the film cannot be considered as a ‘Hong Kong film’.  
(1997b: xiii) 
Yu further remarks:  
Out of the 600 feature films and documentaries produced in the pre-war 
years, it is estimated that only four features and one documentary have 
survived and there are less than 20 synopses and 50 film stills preserved 
from that period.  Since most of the information contained in the 
filmography came from film advertisements in different newspapers 
and a very small number of newsletters and reviews, this filmography 
cannot claim to be complete.  (Ibid) 
 
Censorship in Early Hong Kong Cinema  
During the early twentieth century, the films shown in Hong Kong were 
mostly imported from the US, France and England by western businessmen.  
However, there was no record of official ban or cut of any film.  Anti-colonial 
sentiment might attribute that to the colonial government’s policies which were 
lenient towards, and in favour of, the benefit and economic domination of westerners.  
Whatever the reason, the colonial Legislative Council enacted no dedicated 
censorship law in the nascent years of Hong Kong cinema.   
The Legislative Council of Hong Kong was established under the first 
constitution of British Hong Kong that was in the form of “Queen Victoria’s Letters 
Patent” entitled the “Charter of the Colony of Hong Kong”.  
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[The Legislative Council] empowered “the Governor for the time 
being . . . with the advice of the said Legislative Council . . . to make 
and enact all such Laws and Ordinances as may from time to time be 
required for the peace, order and good government . . . of Hong Kong”. 
The Letters Patent of 1888, which replaced the 1843 Charter, added the 
significant words “and consent” after the words “with the advice”.   
The Legislative Council has undergone great changes over the past 
one and a half centuries and evolved from being an advisory body to a 
legislature with powers and functions to render checks and balances on 
the executive authorities.  (Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR 
of the PRC) 
At its very beginning in 1843, the members of the Legislative Council were the same 
as those of the Executive Council which was also established under the “Charter of 
the Colony of Hong Kong”, and there were only four official members, inclusive of 
the Governor as president and member.32  Unofficial members were first introduced 
into the Legislative Council in 1850, and the number of councillors increased 
gradually in the ensuing years.  Ng Choy (also known as Wu Ting-fan) was 
appointed to be an unofficial member in 1880 and became the first Chinese member 
of the council.  Before 1985, all unofficial members were appointed by the 
Governor.  
The first ever elections to the Council were held [in 1985].  After the 
elections, there were 11 Official Members (including four ex officio), 
and 46 Unofficial Members, of whom 22 were appointed by the 
Governor, 12 elected from functional constituencies, one elected from 
among members of the Urban Council, one elected from among 
members of the Regional Council, and 10 elected by an electoral 
college constituency made up of members of all district boards.  (Ibid) 
                                                 
32 For a brief account of the formation of political system in colonial Hong Kong, see Au et al. 
2011: 53-65. 
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In 1995, the last British colonial Legislative Council became a fully elected 
legislature; there were sixty members, of whom thirty came from functional 
constituencies, twenty were returned by direct elections in geographical 
constituencies and ten were elected by the Election Committee constituency.  In 
2012, the number of members had increased to seventy, with thirty-five returned by 
geographical constituencies through direct elections and thirty-five returned by 
functional constituencies (ibid).   
According to the records of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR, 
the earliest ordinance related to Hong Kong cinema was “The Theatres Regulation 
Ordinance” passed by the Legislative Council on 15 October 1908 (Hansard: LegCo 
Sittings 1908 Session: 147).33  The ordinance took charge of:  
Theatres and places for public performances to be licensed.  
Cinematography displays subject to permit of Registrar General.34  
Penalty for presenting cinematography displays without permit.  
Regulation of theatres and places of public performance.  (As 
abstracted by the University of Hong Kong Libraries) 
The ordinance concerned mainly the order and safety issues of the premises, such as 
seating accommodation, control and the prevention of fire and overcrowding 
(University of Hong Kong Libraries).  The time this ordinance emerged coincided 
with a time when movie-going had become a popular entertainment for the general 
public which drew the attention of the authorities.  According to French and Petley, 
in early cinema: “[T]here were health and safety fears . . . , fear of fire hazards from 
unsafe buildings and highly inflammable nitrate film . . . ; fear that these hot, fetid 
                                                 
33 From 1896 to 1929, the colonial Legislative Council was consisted of eight official members 
and six unofficial members (Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR of the PRC). 
 
34 The Registrar General was later renamed the Secretary of Chinese Affairs in 1913. 
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auditoriums could spread contagious diseases” (2007: 7).  The Chinese Mail (Wah 
Dzi Yat Po) reported on 18 September 1905 that a moving picture exhibition venue 
made of bamboo scaffolding in Central District caught fire at night; luckily no one 
was injured (cited in Yu 1996: 32).35  Concurrently, opera houses and theatres were 
always overcrowded with enthusiastic moving picture audiences.  For instance, The 
Chinese Mail of 17 July 1905 reported that Ko Sing Theatre, situated in the Western 
District of Hong Kong Island, was fined fifty dollars for admitting three to four 
hundred people, allowing them to stand and overcrowd the passageways by the 
auditorium during a period of intense heat (ibid).  “The Theatres Regulation 
Ordinance, 1908” can be understood as the colonial government’s response to such 
occurrences.  However, Article 4 of the ordinance, the only article aimed at film 
content, simply required a written description of every scene intended to be presented 
or produced at any cinematograph display of a public nature be first furnished to the 
Registrar General and that a permit be obtained before any presentation and 
advertising.36  This meant that the film itself was not required to be censored.   
Substantive film censorship came about in 1919.  The Chinese Mail reported 
on 2 May 1919 that Henry Pollock, a senior unofficial member of the Legislative 
Council, delivered a speech about fulfilling an urgent task in Hong Kong: 
                                                 
35 The Chinese Mail formerly published Chinese-language special pages named Chung Oi Sun 
Man Chat Yat Po (Seven-Day Post of Chinese and Foreign News) attached to the China Mail.  Starting 
from 17 April 1872, it was published on its own, at first thrice a week, and was one of the most 
significant Chinese newspapers before the Japanese occupation.  Its publication ceased upon the 
Japanese occupation on 25 December 1941 and resumed publication twice in 1946; however, it closed 
down again because of insufficient capital.   
See also Chapter 1 for the fire incident caused by a cinematograph show occurred in the Paris 
Charity Bazaar on 4 May 1897. 
 
36 The Registrar General served as an agent of communication between the government and the 
people, particularly the local Chinese.   
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Pollock said that Hong Kong is in dire need of censors.  Films coming 
from England and the US have been censored in their place of origin, 
but films that are suitable for the Englishmen and the Americans may 
not be entirely suitable for the local.  There are three censors in total in 
Hong Kong . . . , hearing no whole film but parts of the films were 
censored out.  (Cited in Yu 1996: 92-3; my translation)   
The speech indicates that official censors were already in office in 1919 and had 
carried out their duty albeit no documentation on any official orders of excisions is 
available thus far.  Inasmuch as the news was reported by a Chinese newspaper, it 
can be presumed that it was thought to be of interest to the general public.  On 31 
October of the same year, the colonial government replaced “The Theatres 
Regulation Ordinance, 1908” by the enactment of the “Places of Public 
Entertainment Regulation Ordinance, 1919” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1919 Session: 
114-6).  According to Article 4 of the ordinance: 
(1)  No person shall advertise, present, or carry on any cinematograph 
display to which the public are invited, or cause any such display 
to be advertised, presented, or carried on, except under a permit in 
writing from the Captain Superintendent of Police, who shall have 
full discretion either to grant or to withhold or to cancel the same, 
and, in the case of a cinematograph display at a Chinese theatre to 
which the public are invited, such person must also obtain a permit 
in writing for such performance from the Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs.37  
                                                 
37 (i)  “In 1930, the English title of the Head of the Force was changed from Captain 
Superintendent to Inspector General . . . . In 1935, the English name . . . was changed yet again to 
Commissioner of Police [however, such a title was written in the “Places of Public Entertainment 
Regulations, 1934”] . . . . In 1969, in recognition of the Police Force’s outstanding performance during 
the 1967 riots, Queen Elizabeth II bestowed the prefix ‘Royal’ to the Hong Kong Police Force and the 
Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force. . . . At the stroke of midnight on July 1, 1997, the ‘Royal’ prefixes 
were dropped” (Offbeat, Issue 779, 2004; published by the Hong Kong Police Force). 
(ii)  In 1913, the former Department of Chinese Affairs headed by the Registrar General was 
renamed Secretariat for Chinese Affairs with the Secretary as its head officer.  The department changed 
its name to Home Affairs Department in 1971 as the colonial government considered its duty not only 
confined to matters relating to Chinese.  The department was renamed Home Affairs Bureau after 1 
July 1997. 
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(2)  No such permit by the Captain Superintendent of Police shall be 
given until the film or films to be used at such display and the 
poster or posters in connexion therewith shall have been censored 
and passed in accordance with such regulations as may be made 
for the purpose under this Ordinance, and any film or poster, when 
once censored and passed as aforesaid, shall not be altered or 
added to in any way whatsoever without a fresh censoring and 
passing.  (University of Hong Kong Libraries; emphasis added) 
This marked the first legislation dedicated to film censorship in Hong Kong.   
More precise regulatory provisions for film were implemented with the 
promulgation of the “Places of Public Entertainment Regulations, 1934”.  
According to Part VII of it, before any screening and display, all films and their 
associated posters had to be censored by the ‘board of censors’ composed of the 
Commissioner of Police, the then Secretary for Chinese Affairs and the then Director 
of Education.38  Nevertheless, with the sanction of the Governor, the actual 
censorship work was carried out by one of the board members or other authorized 
persons.  Article 179 under Part VII instituted a judicial ground for appeal; it stated 
that if the owner of a film were not content with the censorship result, he/she could 
appeal to the board.  Nonetheless, the board would have the final right of decision.  
There were censorship fees for fresh censoring as well as for appeal in respect to the 
length of film, and the fee for the latter was very much higher (see Historical Laws of 
Hong Kong Online by the University of Hong Kong Libraries).  
 
                                                 
38 The Director of Education was the title of the head of the colonial Education Department, who 
was called the Inspector of Education before April 1909.  In 1983, the former Education Department 
was restructured into the ‘Education and Manpower Branch’ and the Education Department, with the 
latter reporting to the former.  In 2003, the Education Department was replaced by the Education and 
Manpower Bureau, which was split into the ‘Labour and Welfare Bureau’ and the Education Bureau in 
2007; the Education Department has been headed by the Secretary for Education since then up to the 
present (2014). 
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Statute Law Not the Only Means of Censorship 
Statute law is not the only means of film censorship.  Film production can 
also be regulated by administrative decision and other ways of governmental 
intervention.  Lai Man-wai’s experience is an example.  There was neither a local 
film production nor a local film company in Hong Kong until 1923 when the Lai 
brothers — Lai Hoi-Shan (also known as Li Haishan), Lai Buk-hoi and Lai 
Man-wai — established the first solely Hong Kong Chinese-owned film company in 
Hong Kong, the China Sun (Man Sun; also known as Minxin) Film Production 
Company.  Besides buying new cameras and all the other necessary filming and 
editing equipment from the US, the company was fully equipped with film 
development and processing facilities.  However, when they applied to the colonial 
government for a piece of land to build their studio, the application was protracted 
and was not approved in the end.  China Sun, thus, moved to Guangzhou 
(historically known as Canton) in the winter of 1924 and built their studio there, and, 
in February 1926, the company moved again to Shanghai and built their studio in the 
French concession (Cheng et al. 1978a [1963]: 104-5).   
The Hong Kong Government’s disapproval of the Lai brothers’ application 
was probably due to political considerations.  Lai Man-wai was particularly 
concerned about socio-political issues and had been a member of Sun Yat-sen’s 
Tungmenghui (also known as the Chinese United League or the Chinese 
Revolutionary Alliance), a dedicated underground organization initially formed with 
the aim to overthrow the Manchurian rule over China.  He was also a senior 
member of the KMT and had made a number of documentaries on Sun Yat-sen and 
other KMT leaders.   
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Li Minwei [Lai Man-wai]’s backing for Sun’s republican philosophy 
and political aims is the first instance in Chinese film history of a 
film-maker using the new medium of film to propagate a political cause.  
It was Li [Lai] who raised the slogan ‘Save the Nation Through 
Cinema!’  (Teo 2007 [1997]: 4)    
The ‘Nation’ that Lai Man-wai referred to was the revolutionary China led by Sun 
Yat-sen’s KMT.  However, the British Hong Kong Government of the time did not 
embrace the political pursuit that Lai Man-wai advocated because Britain recognized 
the Beiyang Government in Peking (now Beijing), which was also the internationally 
recognized government of the then Republic of China.  Besides, the colonial 
government was sensitive to the development of new world and regional powers 
after World War I, particularly those related to Chinese nationalism and communism.  
The then Governor of Hong Kong, Reginald Edward Stubbs who was in office from 
September 1919 to October 1925, distrusted the KMT activities highly.  When Sun 
Yat-sen was elected as the Extraordinary President (Feichang Dazongtong) of the 
Republic of China in 1921, Stubbs said, “[N]o one in the colony should have 
anything to do with the unrecognized government” (South China Morning Post 7 
May 1921).  Stubbs was also agitated by the seamen’s strike of 1922, a labour 
movement influenced by nationalistic ideology and supported by Sun Yat-sen, in 
which some one hundred and twenty thousand workers joined in and showed their 
support to the seamen.39   
The Lai brothers, on the other hand, were idealists.  In setting up China 
Sun, they believed in cinema as something more than entertainment.  
They believed films had the power to educate, to criticize, and to 
                                                 
39 “The 1922 strike, which involved in the main Hong Kong’s seamen, was called primarily as the 
result of a dispute on wages.  The strike demonstrated the ability of the seamen to bring Hong Kong 
trade to a standstill, and ended in victory for the strikers” (Faure 1997: 149-150).  For more about the 
seamen’s strike of 1922, see Chan (1994: 40-5) and Liu (2009: 143-6). 
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improve society as a whole – principles broadly stated in the company’s 
articles of association.  (Law 2002: 48-9) 
What the Lai brothers wished for and from cinema was not in line with the political 
stance of the colonial government.  Any colonial government prefers purely 
entertainment films over those that are undesirable to colonial rule; governance turns 
difficult the more nationalistic and patriotic the colonized become.  In short, the 
colonizer would scarcely welcome any socio-political interference which would 
impede colonial policies.  The Hong Kong government’s refusal to approve China 
Sun’s application to build a studio can be understood as a form of political 
censorship, albeit a premature and impulsive form, which can prevent and hinder the 
possible or foreseeable productions of any ‘troublesome’ films not welcomed by the 
colonial government.40  This sort of determination testifies to Foucault’s theory of 
‘author function’, by which Lai Man-wai, though not necessarily the actual maker of 
the films that would be produced by China Sun, was understood as an author and 
functional agent of the discourse itself and was “characteristic of the mode of 
existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society” (see 
Foucault 1998: 205-222).  As a matter of course, the colonial government 
anticipated that China Sun’s production would probably tend to be undesirable 
discourses of the colonial governance, particularly when politics was concerned.  
Films can also be prohibited from public exhibition for contextual reasons.  
For example, on 15 May 1925, Chinese workers of a Japanese-owned textile factory 
in Shanghai went on strike to resist the ill-treatment by Japanese foremen.  The 
workers attempted to break into the factory when the factory’s owner refused to 
negotiate on their terms.  In the struggle, a Japanese foreman shot a labour leader 
                                                 
40 For more about Lai Man-wai and the China Sun, see Zhou and Li (2005: 58-72). 
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dead.  The incident stirred up numerous strikes and protests against Japanese-run 
industries.  In the May Thirtieth Movement (also known as May Thirtieth Incident), 
thousands of students and workers held a rally in the foreign-controlled Shanghai 
International Settlement.  When they were demanding the release of previously 
arrested demonstrators in the afternoon, a British officer commanded the Sikh police 
to open fire on the protesting crowd, leading to more than ten dead, some forty 
wounded and another some forty arrested.  The massacre triggered off an outburst 
of vigorous anti-imperialist and anti-foreign sentiment across the nation.41  The 
Communists and the Nationalist Government in Guangzhou immediately conceived 
an idea of staging a mass strike and a boycott of British goods in the nearby British 
colony, Hong Kong.  Some one hundred and forty primarily separate labour unions 
in Hong Kong united together to form the Federation of Hong Kong Trade Unions 
and mobilized a strike.  The strike committee announced a number of demands and 
presented them to the colonial government on 21 June 1925.  The demands included 
an eight-hour working day; the right to vote for a Chinese Legislative Council 
member; social and political equality between Chinese and Europeans; freedom of 
speech, press, association and assembly; and so on.  On 23 June, one hundred 
thousand people held a protest march in Shamian (also known as Shameen Island or 
Shamin Island), Guangzhou, but they were fired on by the garrisons in the French 
and British concessions, resulting in fifty-two massacred, and more than one hundred 
and seventy wounded.  When the news reached Hong Kong, it further intensified 
the resentment against the British colonial rule and the westerners’ privileged status.  
Workers responded by expanding the on-going strike to a general strike, which gave 
rise to the historical Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott (also known as the 
                                                 
41 For more about the May Thirtieth Movement, see Ku Hung-Ting’s “Urban Mass Movement: 
The May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai” (1979: 197-216). 
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Canton-Hong Kong Strike).  Hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong students and 
workers, including those in the film industry, joined the strike and left for Guangzhou.  
Strikers soon blockaded the land and sea transportation in and out of Hong Kong, 
making the colony isolated from both Chinese and foreign accesses.  Under the 
organized strike and economic blockade, the society and economy of Hong Kong 
were caught in chaos and crises — streets were piled up with garbage, transportation 
in the city was stagnant, everyday life provisions were in shortage, food price 
increased sharply and so forth.  However, the colonial government kept on ignoring 
the strike committee’s demands.  Instead, Governor Stubbs exercised his authority 
empowered by the “Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1922” and took emergency 
measures by imposing a curfew, raiding the strike leaders, restricting Hong Kong 
citizens from departure and censoring mails, telegrams and Chinese newspapers to 
block the circulation of pro-strike materials.  While some movie houses were shut 
down as a result of the strike, the government prohibited all film exhibitions to 
prevent people from assembling.  In this regard, the ban was not on any particular 
films, but on the movie-going activities of the public.  At the same time, other than 
some short newsreels, film productions were also forced to a halt; film companies 
were either closed or moved to China, mainly to Guangzhou and Shanghai (Law and 
Bren 2012: 116-7; Zhou and Li 2005:77-78).42   
According to the Great Britain Colonial Office Series 129 (cited in Liu, 
Shuyung 2009: 149), Governor Stubbs, in order to stop the strike, telegraphed letters 
to the British Colonial Office from June to September 1925 to advocate military 
action to overthrow the Nationalist Government of Guangzhou that supported the 
                                                 
42 For more about the productions and screenings of the newsreels during the Guangzhou-Hong 
Kong Strike-Boycott, see Yu 1996: 163-5. 
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strike.  The British Government (Her Majesty's Government, the central 
government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), however, 
considered the idea transgressed Britain’s China policy, and it was unrealistic to levy 
a war on China because the British partial interest in Hong Kong should yield to the 
British interest in China as a whole.  Later in October, an expert on China, Cecil 
Clementi who was well-versed in Cantonese, replaced Stubbs as Governor (see Liu 
2009:149-150).  The new governor extended a gesture of friendship to the Chinese 
community by appointing a local Chinese for the first time in the colony to be an 
unofficial member of the Executive Council, the colony’s top policy-making body.43  
However, the colonial government’s representatives still refused to talk with the 
striking workers and insisted on negotiating with the Nationalist Government of 
Guangzhou only.  The negotiation took a long time, however, and got caught up in a 
seesaw battle without a substantive solution (Au et al. 2011:154). 
The Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott eventually lasted for sixteen 
months.  The Nationalist Government in Guangzhou called it off in October 1926 
because of internal conflict between the left and right wings, and more pressingly, the 
government had to focus on the Northern Expedition (also known as the Northern 
March), a military movement led by the KMT to unify the country by eliminating the 
warlords in northern China.  The strike-boycott remains the longest general strike in 
the history of the world labour movement.  Every aspect of everyday life was 
                                                 
43 The Executive Council was a formal body of advisers to the Governor as well as the Hong 
Kong Government’s core policy-making organ (Chan 1994: 51).  In 1926, Chow Shouson, a 
businessman, was the first Chinese, or more precisely the first Hong Kong local, appointed as an 
unofficial member of the Executive Council.  At first, Leo Amery and Austen Chamberlain, the then 
Colonial Secretary and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respectively, objected to the appointment 
because they considered Chinese not trustworthy in maintaining confidentiality.  It took Clementi’s 
repeated requests to persuade the British Government to finally agree to it.  However, after the 
appointment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO; commonly known as Foreign Office) 
insisted that Executive Councillors were not allowed to read confidential files (Welsh 1997: 400).   
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affected, and a sizable portion of the Hong Kong economy was crippled, which made 
Hong Kong both a ‘dead city’ and a ‘dead port’.44  Normal feature film production 
remained dormant until 1928 when Lai Buk-hoi came back to Hong Kong from 
Guangzhou and collaborated with the tycoon Lee Hysan to establish the Hong Kong 
Film Company which started on the productions of The Witty Sorcerer (Joh Chi Hei 
Cho) and The Pain of Separation (Hak To Chau Han) in the same year.  However, 
the completion of both films was delayed when Lee was gunned down in an 
assassination because of his opium business.  Finally on 14 March 1930, The Witty 
Sorcerer directed by Lai Buk-hoi was released in Hong Kong and was the first local 
title on screens since the end of the general strike.  The success of The Witty 
Sorcerer symbolized the recovery of Hong Kong cinema as the aftermath of the 
general strike gradually subsided (Law and Bren 2012: 117; Zhou and Li 2005: 
79-81). 
Besides causing immense hardship and drastic economic losses to Hong 
Kong, the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott dealt British imperialism and 
colonial rule a severe blow politically and economically.  Governor Clementi 
absorbed the lesson and was impelled to develop good relations with the Chinese 
population so as to be able to govern effectively (Au et al. 2011:155).  “By the 
1930s, the Hong Kong government made serious effort in various social reforms, 
which, in turn, set the course for some of its [social welfare] policies in the 1950s” 
(Faure, David 1997: 150).  However, the strike-boycott had also awakened the 
government’s awareness of the Communist and Nationalist ‘subversive’ ideology and 
activities, and led to more distinct and substantive censorship of the media in the 
                                                 
44 For more about the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott, see Liu (2009: 146-153), Anjali 
Cadambi (26 Sept 2010), Chan Lau Kit-ching (1999: 53-70), Au et al. (2011: 151-9) and Chan Ming 
Kou (1975: 268-356). 
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ensuing years.  For example, the enactment of “Places of Public Entertainment 
Regulations, 1934” mentioned earlier enabled the colonial government to implement 
more precise regulatory provisions for film and the formation of the official board of 
censors.  However, the Chinese national cinema (minzu dianying) began to grow at 
the same time.  
Modernity, nation-building, nationalism, anti-imperialism, 
antifeudalism [sic], and new gender identities are among the central 
themes of such a national cinema.  Chinese national cinema 
necessarily becomes part and parcel of the forging of a new national 
culture.  Amidst the proliferation of “soft” entertainment films 
(romance, butterfly fiction, martial arts, ghosts, costume drama), the 
left-wing film workers seized upon the political and revolutionary 
potential of this new technology of visuality and attempted to make it 
into a mass art of conscious social criticism.  (Lu 1997: 4-5)   
However, before the CPC and KMT collaborated to fight against their common 
enemy, Japan, in early 1937, there were tensions within the so-called ‘national 
cinema’ as the conflict between the two parties became tenser and tenser, and 
expanded into civil war in 1927.45  The civil war weakened China’s defensive 
power militarily, and encouraged Japan’s ambition.  The Japanese military took 
control of Manchuria in the September 18 Incident (also known as the Mukden 
Incident or Manchurian Incident) in 1931 and attacked Shanghai in the January 28 
Incident (also known as the Shanghai Incident) in 1932.  It was in this context that 
an aggrandisement of the national cinema — the ‘national defence’ series of patriotic 
films emphasising the resistance to Imperial Japan — emerged as the Chinese 
filmmakers’ response.  The national defence films persisted and played a significant 
                                                 
45 The hostile acts of the two parties endured for decades after the end of the Pacific War and 
influenced the ecology of Chinese cinemas significantly.  For more about the disagreements on and 
conflicts over ‘national cinema’ between the CPC and KMT camps, see Cheng et al. (1978a [1963]: 
171-299), but bear in mind that the discourse is inclined to the CPC. 
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role in the Chinese cinemas until the Japanese occupations.  While the Japanese 
military had brought down the curtain on national defence films in regions they 
occupied, Joe Chiu (also known as Chiu Shu-sun, Joseph Sunn or Zhao Shu-sen) and 
Moon Kwan continued to contribute to the Chinese national cinema in the US. 
Grandview (Daguan) (US) Film Company was founded in San Francisco in 
1933 by Joe Chiu with the aid of Moon Kwan, who were both Cantonese but 
educated in the US.  Grandview’s debut Romance of the Songsters (Goh Lui Ching 
Chiu or Gelu Qingchao), one of the first Cantonese-speaking films in the world, was 
directed by Joe Chiu and starred by Kwan Tak-hing (also known as Guan Dexing) 
and Wu Dip-ying (also known as Hu Dieying), with the Chinese community in San 
Francisco as the story background.46  The company moved to Hong Kong in late 
1934 and produced some sixty Cantonese films between February 1935 and 
December 1941.  It also produced some twenty films in the US from 1939 to 
1945.47  In 1935, Grandview (Hong Kong) released one of the first Chinese national 
defence films, Lifeline (Sang Ming Sin or Shengming Xian), produced by Joe Chiu 
and directed by Moon Kwan.48  When the film was submitted for censorship, the 
                                                 
46 According to Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I, the earliest Cantonese films produced in Hong 
Kong were The Idiot’s Wedding Night (Soh Jai Dung Fong, 1933) directed by Lai Buk-hoi, Conscience 
(Leung Sum, 1933) directed by Chow Wing-loi and Mak Siu-ha, Nightmare of Fortune (Fan Wah Mung, 
1934) and The Mischief Makers (Nau Gai Jo Chung, 1934) directed by Mak Siu-ha.   
 
47 ‘Grandview Film Co., Ltd.’ was the English name of the company printed in Business 
Directory of Hong Kong and Macao 1939 (as cited in Jarvie (1977: 7).  According to the American 
Film Institute Catalog: Within Our Gates – Ethnicity in American Feature Films, 1911-1960 (cited in 
Han: 2009: 11), there were two English names for Grandview (US); they were ‘Grandview Film 
Company’ and ‘Tai Quon Motion Picture Company’.  For more about Grandview, Joe Chiu and Moon 
Kwan, see Law (2002 [2000]:50-9), Law and Bren (2012: 82-3, 85-92) and Kwok (2001: 213-4).  For 
more about Grandview (US), see Han (2009: 11-5).  
 
48 Examples of other Cantonese national defence films before the war include: 
 Return from the Battleground (Chin Dei Gwat Loi,1934) - directed by Wong Toi, starring Ng Cho-fan 
and Wong Man-lei, made in Hong Kong;  
 A Patriotic Woman (Oi Gok Fa, 1936) – directed by Runji Shaw, a Tin Yat production.  
 Resist! (Dai Kong, 1936) - produced by Joe Chiu, written and directed by Moon Kwan, a Grandview 
production. 
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colonial government banned it.  According to film veterans such as Lo Dun (1992: 
277) and Moon Kwan (1976: 202), it was because of the film’s anti-Japan content; 
the colonial government dared not to infuriate Japan.  Moon Kwan appealed against 
the ban arguing that, since the film did not clearly identify who the invader or the 
devil was, the Japanese would hardly identify with evil enemy and, therefore, there 
was no excuse for them to raise any objection.  Lifeline was then returned to the 
censors and was finally permitted for public exhibition without excision.  When the 
World Theatre screened the film in late November 1935, it attracted a large audience 
and broke the Hong Kong box-office record.  Although Lifeline passed the censors 
in the end, it was initially subject to the first recorded official banning order of any 
film in Hong Kong.  
 
National Unity by Silencing Voices of Ethnic Minorities 
Chinese sound film prospered in the 1930s with Hong Kong emerging as 
pivotal for Cantonese film production while Shanghai became the key city for 
Mandarin films.  Fu notes: 
Hong Kong cinema began to acquire its distinct identity with the 
introduction of talkies.  The identity was, indeed, derived from the 
language spoken on screen — namely, Cantonese.  When Hong Kong 
made only silent films, there was little to distinguish them from those 
produced in Shanghai.  But after the rise of talkies around 1933, the 
difference became marked.  (2003: 55) 
                                                                                                                                          
 Heartaches (Sum Hun, 1936) - produced by Esther Ng (aka Esther Eng or Wu Jinxia), photography 
supervised by Chinese two-time Oscar winner James Wong Howe, made in San Francisco.  The film 
is acclaimed as the ‘first Cantonese Singing-Talking Picture made in Hollywood.’ 
For more about the movies mentioned above, except Heartaches, see Hong Kong Filmography 
Vol. I (1997: 26, 87, 107); for Heartaches, see Law and Bren (2004: 93-4 or 2012: 97-8). 
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That distinct identity prompted a crisis in Cantonese-speaking cinema.  Before 
Chinese sound film emerged, Hong Kong filmmakers were unaware of how the 
regime in China would deal with films in Chinese dialects.  Besides the previously 
mentioned Romance of the Songsters by Grandview, Tin Yat Motion Picture 
Company (widely known as Tianyi Studio in English-language texts) produced Tang 
Xiaodan’s White Gold Dragon (Bak Kam Lung or Baijin Long) starring Sit Kok-sin 
in 1933 in Shanghai.49  The film was another one of the earliest Cantonese films.  
Both Romance of the Songsters and White Gold Dragon became smash hits at 
box-offices in many regions such as Hong Kong, Macau, Guangzhou, the 
Chinatowns in the US and the Nanyang regions (now commonly known as Southeast 
Asia) that included Singapore, Malaya, Siam (now Thailand), Borneo, Indonesia and 
Vietnam.  The huge success of the two films laid a favourable foundation for 
Cantonese-speaking films and stimulated an upsurge in investment as well as the 
establishments of film companies in Hong Kong which, in turn, brought about a 
quick expansion and boom in the Hong Kong film industry (see Law and Bren 2012: 
121-3; Lo Dun 2000: 125).50  However, the early development of Cantonese movies 
was not a smooth one.  When White Gold Dragon was completed, its public 
exhibition was delayed for one year because the Nationalist Central Government of 
the Republic of China in Nanjing (widely known as Nanking before the pinyin 
                                                 
49 Although the translation as ‘Tianyi’ is widely used among film scholars, ‘Tin Yat Motion 
Picture Co.’ is the company’s English name printed in Business Directory of Hong Kong and Macao 
(cited in Jarvie 1977: 8).  The company moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong in 1934.  It was renamed 
‘Nam Yang Motion Picture Co.’ (the company’s English name printed in Business Directory of Hong 
Kong and Macao, as cited in Jarvie 1977: 7) when it was reorganized in 1937.  It was also the 
predecessor of the Shaw and Sons Limited established in Hong Kong in 1950 and the Shaw Brothers 
(HK) Studio established in Hong Kong in 1958 (see Chung 2011: 197-201; Law and Bren 2012: 
164-166, 188-191).  For more about Tin Yat, see Chung (2011: 88-91). 
 
50 Lo Dun’s monograph was compiled in Monographs of Hong Kong Film Veterans (2000), a 
bilingual (Chinese and English) publication by Hong Kong Film Archive.  However, the English 
translation is just an abridgement of the original Chinese edition, e.g., the part on the Japanese 
occupation is entirely omitted in the English edition.  On this account, page number here refers to the 
Chinese one.   
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language reform) banned it on the grounds that Cantonese films would ruin the 
unification of the national language.51  According to film veteran Lo Dun (1992: 
82-6), the ban was finally lifted after Tin Yat made pleas through someone and spent 
some money.  
When the banning of White Gold Dragon is placed in a broader historical 
context, the fundamental causes can be traced back to the Qing Government’s 
founding of the ‘Committee for the Establishment and Research of a National 
Language’ (Guoyu Biancha Weiyuanhui) in 1909 and the Vernacular Movement 
(Baihuawen Yundong) that constituted a significant part of the New Culture 
Movement from the mid-1910s to 1920s.  In the 1910s, the Republic of China, led 
by the KMT, chose the Beijing dialect of Mandarin as the national standard language 
(Guoyu), and set up the ‘Preparatory Commission for the Unification of the National 
Language’ (Guoyu Tongyi Choubei Hui) in 1919.52  After years of research and 
debate, the commission produced and published a list of ‘the standardized national 
pronunciation of the most important characters’ (Guoyin changyong zihui) in 1932.  
The Nationalist Government officially adopted the list, which signified that the time 
for stipulating what the standard national language should be was ripe, and the 
timing coincided with the emergence of the Chinese sound film.53   
                                                 
51 After the warlords had been wiped out in 1928, China became a single-party state led by the 
KMT; the newly established Nationalist Government of the Republic of China in Nanjing replaced the 
Beiyang Government in Beijing to become the internationally recognized legitimate Chinese 
Government, and Beijing was renamed as Peiping until the CPC renamed it Beijing again in 1949. 
 
52 During the Ming and Qing Dynasties from 1368 to 1911, Mandarin was called the ‘language of 
the mandarins, the state officials’ (Guanhua) and served as a common language for oral communication 
for the state officials coming to Beijing from all parts of the country.  The PRC adopted Mandarin as 
the national language in 1949 and renamed it to Putonghua in 1955.  Today, the principally identical 
language is called Mandarin (Guoyu) in Taiwan, and ‘Chinese (language)’ (Huayu) in Singapore and 
Malaysia. 
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By 1936, armed with an earlier influx of capital as well as talented and skilled 
filmmakers mainly from Shanghai, Guangzhou and San Francisco, Hong Kong had 
developed into a base for productions and a significant exporter of Cantonese films 
which had already become a fad in Nanyang, overseas Chinese communities in North 
America as well as in Guangdong and Guangxi in Republican China.  The 
Nationalist Government in Nanjing, again, saw the phenomenon as a threat to the 
unification of the national language and an obstruction to the nation-building 
struggle.54  In order to restrain the popularization of Cantonese and to outlaw 
Cantonese films, the Nationalist Government promulgated an order to ban all the 
making, importation and screening of Cantonese films within its jurisdiction, and 
stipulated Mandarin to be the only standard language in all Chinese films.  
Cantonese films undergoing production had to be finished within two months and 
then censored by the authorities.  On the one hand, the provision of ‘Mandarin only’ 
was claimed to be a safeguard for cultural and national unity, on the other, it was also 
amounted to suppression of other ethnic dialects, a reinforcement of the Nanjing 
Nationalist Central Government’s control over cultural others and a means to 
strengthen the reins of government.  Fu sums up: 
The movement to unify the language aimed to destroy local ties and 
loyalties believed to impede the modern project of nationhood by 
standardizing (homogenizing) the immense multiplicity of ‘linguistic 
others’ constituted by the dialects spoken and identified with by 
Chinese in everyday life.  In this light, Cantonese-speaking films, with 
their popularity among Cantonese speakers in the pan-Chinese 
                                                                                                                                          
53 For more about how Mandarin was instituted as the national standard language of China, see 
Theobald 2011.  
 
54 According to The Chinese Mail of 21 June 1937, the Central Government in Nanjing, for the 
sake of the unification of the national language, considered that Cantonese films significantly affected 
the work on the advancement of the unification of the national language and prohibited them by explicit 
order (cited in Yu 1997a: 159). 
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community, became a natural object of concern and suspicion.  
Especially suspicious in the eyes of the Nanjing leaders was the 
homeland of Cantonese dialect, Canton, which was the political centre 
of south China and home base of such powerful rivals to the state as the 
warlord Chen Jitang and the Guomindang [KMT] elders Hu Hanmin 
and Sun Fo.   
The Nationalist Central Film Review Commission denounced 
Cantonese cinema as ‘superstitious’ and ‘frivolous’ and accused it of 
perpetuating the evils of ‘feudalism’ in Chinese life.  (2003: 58-9) 
Hong Kong is just a small city with a relatively limited population that the 
local market is always insufficient to support the growth, or even the survival, of the 
film industry.  Except for some low budget productions, Hong Kong cinema relies 
on overseas markets to make a profit and is greatly affected by the official policies, 
economics and socio-political conditions of those regions.  During the 1930s, the 
Hong Kong film industry counted heavily on the market in the Chinese Mainland 
even though the sizeable Nanyang and Chinese communities in North America were 
also significant markets.55  News of the ‘Mandarin only’ provision, which made the 
Cantonese-speaking film industry culturally and politically illegitimate in the 
Chinese Mainland, caused an uproar among filmmakers in Hong Kong, as well as 
those in the South China regions.  They were worried not only because the vast 
Chinese Mainland market was critical to the Cantonese film industry but also 
because the Cantonese dialect was a selling point to the Chinese communities in 
other overseas markets.  In response to the issue, the first filmmakers’ guild in Hong 
Kong, the South China Film Association (Wah Nam Dian Ying Hip Wui; my 
translation), was formed in May 1936, and a Cantonese Film Salvation Movement 
                                                 
55 ‘A small city with limited population’ is still a crucial predicament for the Hong Kong film 
industry today.  Stepping into the 21st century, with the shrinking of other conventional Southeast 
Asian markets due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Chinese mainland market has become the 
largest market for Hong Kong film again, and is a more decisive factor than ever.   
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was initiated.56  The association sent a delegation to Guangzhou to petition the 
provincial government, and then to Nanjing to petition the Nationalist Central 
Government for a retraction or deferral of the new provision.  Moon Kwan was a 
member of the delegation; he wrote in his memoir that the petition raised some 
queries and suggestions:     
(1) Cantonese and other Chinese provincial dialects are a result of 
thousands of years of Chinese history and not created by cinema.  
If it is banned without guilt, how can this convince the public? 
(2) The schools in the Guangdong province are still teaching in the 
local dialect, Cantonese opera is still sung in Cantonese.  Now 
these two are not banned, but only film is banned.  This is not fair 
in principle. 
(3) Cantonese film is created by overseas Chinese who are mostly from 
Guangdong.  In order to communicate with their fellow 
countrymen and to convey the culture of the motherland, Cantonese 
film is the best tool. . . . If it is banned now, it virtually denies the 
homesick among our compatriots and forces them to assimilate into 
other nations.   
(4) After Cantonese film is banned, if Mandarin film cannot fill the 
vacancy, foreign film will make use of the opportunity to force its 
way in.   
(5) The way to put the language unification policy into effect does not 
seem to be by banning other dialects immediately.  Instead, time 
should be taken to educate the public positively.  For instance, 
schools can have more Mandarin teaching hours and the 
government can make a large number of educational films with 
voice-over narration in Mandarin.  Furthermore, by making it 
mandatory for movie houses to screen educational film as an extra 
programme during their regular screenings, the public can learn 
subconsciously while they are being entertained.  In the long run, 
Mandarin will spontaneously become a common language, and 
other dialects will naturally fall out of use without banning them.  
(1976: 214-5; my translation)  
                                                 
56 For more about the South China Film Association, see Yu 1997a: 135 and 163. 
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The press such as the movie magazine, Artland (Yilin), and Kung Sheung Daily News 
also expressed their negative view of the ‘Mandarin only’ provision with similar 
arguments and published positive views on Cantonese cinema (see Yu: 1997a: 
159-161).57  However, in early 1937, the Central Film Review Commission of the 
Nationalist Government in Nanjing still maintained the provision and announced that 
the decree on the prohibition of Cantonese films would be put in force from 15 April 
onward, but the deadline was later deferred until 1 July (see Artland, Issue No. 3, 1 
April 1937; Issue No. 7, 1 June 1937).58  Meanwhile, an article in Artland (Issue No. 
7, 1 June 1937) mentioned a rumour that the sudden decision to prohibit Cantonese 
films was actually due to pressure by film businessmen in Shanghai.59  The Chinese 
Mail (26 June 1937; cited in Yu 1997a: 162) also reported that when the 
representatives of the South China Film Association went to Nanjing to petition, their 
counterparts in Shanghai also sent representatives to Nanjing to ask that prohibitory 
edict be maintained.  Soon, the rumour was proved to be true.  Stardom (Ling Sing, 
Issue No. 197) revealed a hidden telegram sent to the Central Government from five 
managers of six film companies (one of them was the manager of two companies) 
based in Shanghai.60  The telegram said that the status of Mandarin film in South 
                                                 
57 Artland (Yilin) was a Nationalist émigré semimonthly movie magazine published in Hong 
Kong from the late 1930s to early 1940s.  It was first published in February 1937, with a picture of Sit 
Kok-sin on the cover.  Its official English name can be found inside the magazine; however, it is 
sometimes as ‘Art Land’ in some issues.  Most of its issues are preserved in Hong Kong Film Archive.   
 
58 See “Kwan yu gam ying Yuet Yue ying pin ji min min koon” (literally “The Views from Different 
Aspects of the Prohibition of Cantonese-language Films”) by Jik San (Jackson) and “Yuet Yue pin si fau 
goi gam” (literally “Should Cantonese Sound Film Be Banned”) in Artland, Issue No. 3, (1 April 1937) 
and Issue No. 7 (1 June 1937) respectively. 
 
59 The article was titled “Yuet Yue pin si fau goi gam” (literally “Should Cantonese Film Be 
Banned”). 
 
60 Stardom (Ling Sing, my translation; ‘Ling’ literally refers to the performers of Cantonese opera, 
and ‘Sing’ literally refers to movie stars) was a publication founded in Guangzhou in 1932 and moved to 
Hong Kong later.  It began as a weekly magazine and changed to a daily later.  Its publication stopped 
during the Japanese occupation and resumed after the war, and finally ceased in 1954 (see Yu 2000: 57).   
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China was declining owing to the encroachment of Cantonese film, and further urged 
the officials to enforce the provision as scheduled without delay (cited in Zhou and 
Li 2005: 213).  The disclosure of the biased commercial considerations behind the 
‘Mandarin only’ provision together with the united opposition of the pan-Cantonese 
community, the negative views of the public expressed in the Chinese press and 
several more petitions by the South China filmmakers, finally led the Nationalist 
Central Government to defer the provision in June 1937 for three years — but there 
was a proviso, “adding that studios had to insert Mandarin-language segments into 
their films and pay for the setting up of a Film Review Bureau in Canton to review 
dialect film during the transition period” (Fu 2003: 59). 
However, the war against Hong Kong films.  On 3 August 1938, the South 
China Morning Post reported that the Nationalist Government, which required the 
film industry to reflect the spirit of resisting foreign invaders, would now seek to ban 
those Hong Kong and Macau films that were artistically poor or which would 
demoralise the Chinese (cited in Law and Bren 2012: 126).  Other than preventing 
the dispersal and popularization of Cantonese, what the Nationalist Government 
wanted to prohibit were, indeed, all films except those with a social educational 
purpose and those that facilitated the rule of the KMT.  It was a form of censorship, 
albeit censorship as part of the KMT’s nation-building project during chaotic times, 
and it can be understood as a continuation and modification of the earlier advocacy 
of a national cinema.  As Lu (1997: 3) says:  
[A]ny project of national cinema is bound to suppress and surmount, for 
the sake of defending the country against real or perceived dangers of 
imperialism or in order to uphold national unity by silencing the voices 
of ethnic and national minorities.   
 
77 
Although one cannot ignore the fact that building a national cinema at a particular 
historical conjuncture could have originated from a genuine will and intent, it can 
become an abuse of human liberty in a fundamentalist way when it was taken too far.  
However, history is cunning; it did not correspond with the Nationalist scenario.  
After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (also known as the Incident of 7 July or Logou 
Bridge Incident) ignited the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Nationalist 
Government, being occupied by the war which was, indeed, a more pressing matter, 
loosened its control over Cantonese films.   
 
Hong Kong Cinema on the Periphery of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
During the turbulent years from the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese 
War till the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, the Chinese cinemas consisted of 
three main production centres situated in Chongqing (historically known as 
Chungking), occupied Shanghai and Hong Kong.   
In that period, Hong Kong became the largest production centre of 
Chinese-language films catering to Chinese communities abroad. 
While Chongqing under the Nationalist government mainly 
produced propaganda films to aid resistance against the Japanese, and 
Shanghai, in the ‘orphan island’ period (1937-1941), made films that 
were socially irrelevant to the immediate reality, Hong Kong produced 
both pure entertainment and socially/politically relevant films that 
supported the anti-Japanese struggle. . . . Even in wartime, 
entertainment and patriotic cinema appeared side by side in a Hong 
Kong cinema that was more pluralistic, more adventurous, and more 
open to different ideologies than the other two production centres.  
Hong Kong cinema was not just an extension of mainland Chinese 
cinema nor was it a pre-war wasteland made prosperous by the influx of 
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Shanghai filmmakers at around the time of Liberation.  It evidently 
reached a peak in 1938 and 1939 and began the formation of an identity 
that imbibed Chinese elements from Shanghai as well as Western 
elements from Hollywood in an interplay with strong local elements 
such as Cantonese opera.  This interplay can be traced to the very 
beginnings of Hong Kong cinema, and it is still going on today.  This 
is the ever-changing identity of Hong Kong cinema — open-minded, 
eager to experiment in various topics and genres, never in a fixed 
pattern, never stopping.  (Law 2002 [2000]: 69) 
In this description, Law Kar has concisely and clearly traced back and outlined the 
formation of Hong Kong cinema’s identity by contextualizing its development from a 
historical perspective.  It did not consciously strive for its identity as it was moulded 
by the socio-political context of times.  That is also to say, a turn of destiny for the 
Hong Kong cinema, and thus the censorship it encountered, was rendered by 
historical conjunctures.  During the period from the January 28 Incident in 1932 up 
to the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong in December 1941, a 
considerable number of filmmakers from Shanghai and Guangzhou came to the 
British colony to continue their careers in addition to those from San Francisco.  
They included wealthy businessmen with capital as well as those with technical and 
creative talents and the necessary knowledge, skills, techniques, artistry and 
experience in different aspects of film production.  According to Teo: 
The anti-Japanese war stimulated Hong Kong’s film industry as 
filmmakers rushed to put out national defence movies.  As the 
mainstream film industries in China fell under the control of the 
Japanese, Hong Kong was the only place where patriotic national 
defence movies could be made freely (even though the Japanese 
exerted pressure on the British authorities to ban or censor them).  
Historians have usually pointed to the outbreak of war on the Mainland 
as a turning point in Hong Kong’s film history.  It led to the growth of 
the local film industry as Hong Kong absorbed migrants fleeing 
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Shanghai.  In fact, the migration flow had started earlier, and the 
historical intercourse between Hong Kong and Shanghai went much 
deeper than is suggested by the consequence of migration due to the 
cataclysm of war (although political uncertainties caused by the 
incursions of the Japanese army into China from 1931 onwards would 
have played their part).  (2007 [1997]: 7)   
By the same token, Fu also asserts: 
Starting at least as early as the 1910s, the film industries of Shanghai 
and Hong Kong were intimately connected by extensive movement of 
capital, people and ideas across the border. . . . These border crossing 
activities reached their peak in the years between 1937 and 1950, a 
period marked by unceasing violence and turmoil: the War of National 
Resistance against Japan and the Civil War between the Nationalists 
and Communists.61  (2003: xii) 
Moreover, government regulations also played an important part.   
Throughout the 1930s, film censorship increasingly became the concern of 
the Nationalist Central Government, particularly after the setting up of the National 
Educational Cinematographic Society in 1932, which functioned as an ideological 
guidance apparatus that instituted a set of criteria for filmmaking.  With regard to 
the political struggle, the initial task of the Nationalist Government’s film censorship 
was to extol the KMT leadership and to repress Communist propaganda, but it also 
impacted on the film industry as a whole.62  In addition to the ‘Mandarin only’ 
provision, Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life Movement in 1934, which aimed 
to counter Communism ideology with a blend of Confucianism, nationalism and 
                                                 
61 For more about how Hong Kong cinema ‘benefited’ from the unrest of China during the 1930s, 
see Law and Bren (2012: 118-27), Zhou and Li (2005: 132-94, 214-55) and Teo (2007 [1997]: 3-11). 
 
62 For more about the Nationalist Government’s reinforcement of censorship on media and more 
on the National Educational Cinematographic Society, see Cheng et al. 1978a [1963]: 174-5, 199 and 
294-6. 
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authoritarianism that shared some characteristics of German fascism.  The 
movement put an emphasis on civil education which encouraged people to reject all 
things foreign and return to Confucianism and traditional Chinese morality.  Under 
the movement, all entertainment films considered not to be contributing to 
nation-building were condemned.63  For instance, Tin Yat, which had already set up 
their subsidiary distribution company in Hong Kong in 1932 (Law and Bren 2012: 
119), moved their productions from Shanghai to Hong Kong in 1934 to avoid the 
threat of an official ban on purely entertainment movies such as the martial arts and 
fantasy genres, of which Tin Yat was exquisite leading exponent.  This was just one 
example of film companies in the first wave of southward migration which occurred 
between 1933 and 1935 when Cantonese-speaking film attained great market success 
and the Nationalist Government implemented censorship against entertainment 
cinema and ethnic dialects.  Most significantly, the incident sowed the seed which 
enabled the martial arts genre of film to flourish in Hong Kong and which would 
later make Hong Kong cinema internationally famous.64 
The second wave of migration took place when China started a full-scale war 
against Imperial Japan in July 1937, particularly after the fall of Guangzhou in 1938.  
After that, huge crowds of refugees, including filmmakers, fled to Hong Kong and 
increased the colony’s population drastically from some nine hundred thousand to 
1.64 million by 1941.65  The third wave in 1946 was due to the acute political unrest 
                                                 
63 For more about the KMT’s New Life Movement, see Liu, Chi-hui Joyce 2000: 95-150. 
 
64 According to Law and Bren (2012: 113), the Nationalist Government proclaimed a total ban on 
martial arts films in 1931, which led to an influx of many Shanghai filmmakers who were skilled in such 
films into Hong Kong, resulting in a new genre in Hong Kong cinema that emerged in the late 1930s.  
After decades of development, the martial arts genre has become a signature genre of Hong Kong 
cinema.  Hong Kong has virtually transformed something ‘decadent’ in Shanghai into something 
‘miraculous’. 
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and civil war in China, and the fourth wave between 1948 and 1949 was driven by 
aspirations about fleeing from either the oppression and ‘white terror’ of the KMT, or 
the gloominess of Communist governance after the victory of the CPC in the civil 
war.  In short, the causes of the filmmakers’ migration from China to Hong Kong in 
the 1930s and 1940s were: Firstly, the business opportunities of Cantonese cinema; 
secondly, escape from political unrest, turmoil of war and political persecution in 
their homeland; and thirdly, the pursuit of more creative freedom. 
As a matter of fact, for most of the time during the last century, colonial Hong 
Kong was politically more stable, its society was more tranquil, and film censorship 
policy and its criteria were relatively more lenient and liberal than that in China.  
Film productions were thus under less arbitrary governmental control and 
manipulation, which potentially meant greater creative and career freedom.  All this 
made Hong Kong a more steady, convenient and favourable place for filmmaking.  
Whenever the filmmakers in Shanghai encountered political unrest, social turmoil or 
the outbreak of war, they would flee to Hong Kong as a safe haven to continue their 
careers in spite of the fact that they saw the colony as a place of inferior, slavish and 
un-Chinese culture, or simply a ‘cultural desert’.  This prejudiced ‘elitist’ view was 
prompted by what Fu (2003: 52, 68) describes as the ‘Central Plains syndrome’.  
[A] China-centred nationalism that has been embedded in the 
centralizing, anti-colonial state-building discourse underlying 
twentieth-century representations of Chinese culture.     
                                                                                                                                          
65 According to Endacott (1964 [1958]: 289): “In 1930, the population was 838,800, and in 1937 
the estimate was 1,006,982, of whom 984,000 were Chinese.  Japanese hostilities against China in 
1937 and the fall of Canton in the following year led to a great migration.  About 100,000 refugees 
entered the colony in 1937, 500,000 in 1938 and 150,000 in 1939, and the estimate of the 1941 
population was 1,639,000, of whom 1,615,000 were Chinese.”  As written in the dust jacket flap of the 
book, “The book is based largely on Colonial and other government sources.” 
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By valorising China’s Northern Plains as the primordial place of 
origin of Chineseness within a hierarchy of cultural differentiation, it 
held in contempt and saw as alien all ethnic cultures that had developed 
on the periphery of the mainland. . . . Hong Kong was on the mainland’s 
margin and its colonization by the British accentuated its marginality in 
the modern Chinese geopolitical imagination.     
For example, renowned writer Mu Shiying said, “Hong Kong is a city of colonial 
culture, everything is grotesque, in a foul mess.  Don’t expect to find art here at all” 
(cited in Fu 2003: 69).  Criticising Hong Kong cinema, Shanghai-born Cantonese 
film director Cai Chusheng (also known as Tsai Chu-sang) expressed his view in this 
manner: 
The backwardness of Hong Kong culture as a whole inevitably has a 
proportional effect on its cinema.  Thus, although Hong Kong has 
produced many, many movies and although so-called artists here claim 
that since Shanghai’s fall to Japan, Hong Kong has replaced it as the 
centre of Chinese cinema, this is nonsense.  All the movies made here 
are frivolous, vulgar commodities catering to the low taste of the 
uneducated.  It is impossible . . . to find any title that has a national 
defence theme that would justify Hong Kong’s claim to be a cinematic 
centre.66  (Cited in Fu 2003: 70)  
Although such views were popular among the cultural elite of Shanghai, when the 
Japanese military took control over Shanghai (except the foreign concessions) four 
months after the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out, a considerable number from 
                                                 
66  Fu argues: “A reconstruction of the historical situation in which Hong Kong cinema operated 
before the World War II Japanese occupation demonstrates, however, that it had developed a distinct 
local popular tradition since the introduction of Cantonese ‘talkies’ in the 1920s.  Cantonese-language 
films were enormously popular among local moviegoers, as well as in Chinese communities elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia and in the Americas, audiences marked by cultural marginality, economic 
disadvantage, and in aesthetic orientation shaped by the vernacular tradition of local opera and folk 
literature (contrary to the May Fourth culture of modernity).  From this perspective, the stereotype of 
Hong Kong as a ‘cultural desert’, which was created and circulated by mainland intellectuals exiled in 
the colony in the 1930s, reflected only the elitist, anxiety-ridden views of those who brought with them 
in their displacement the sinocentric sense of cultural superiority that I call the Central Plains syndrome.  
They . . . sought to transform [the local popular culture] in accordance with their mainland-centered 
worldview.  As a response to this marginalization, Cantonese-language films of pre-occupation Hong 
Kong began to develop a local identity that was markedly hybridized and ambivalent” (2003: xiv). 
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Shanghai’s elite class fled to Hong Kong, including filmmakers.  Filmmakers such 
as Cai Chusheng, Situ Huimin and Xia Yan (also known as Hsia Yen) were among 
the émigrés who would later bring about unprecedented prosperity to the Hong Kong 
film industry and contribute to the golden age of Hong Kong cinema before the Fall 
of Hong Kong in 1941.  Together with the local filmmakers, they made a number of 
notable patriotic and national defence films with box-office successes.67  According 
to Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I, the films released in Hong Kong in 1937 almost 
doubled those in 1936 from forty-nine to eighty-five.  In 1939, the number reached 
a record high of one hundred and twenty-five.  The boom was due both to the 
considerable expansion of the audience numbers fed by the huge crowd of southward 
migration and the improvement in film quality.   
   
Chinese National Cinema vis-à-vis Colonial Censorship  
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, in order to safeguard British interests 
in China that had been established since the Opium Wars, and to avoid going to war 
on two fronts at the same time — as it seemed inevitable that Britain would go to war 
with Nazi Germany in Europe — Britain adopted an appeasement policy towards 
                                                 
67 As amended by Teo: “Although the standard line in cinema history books published in China 
states that Hong Kong cinema only produced ‘national defence movies’ as a result of the infusion of 
Shanghai émigrés . . . , the fact was that many local Hong Kong film-makers were just as keen as their 
émigré colleagues to contribute their talents to making anti-Japanese war propaganda films, as is borne 
out by the Grandview productions directed by Chiu Shu-sun and Kwan Man-ching. . . . At This Crucial 
Juncture/Zuihou Guantou (1937) [was] a voluntary effort by the territory’s major stars and directors to 
raise funds for the Hong Kong Film Industry Aid Relief Association (founded by film celebrities after 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident . . .).  None of these national defence films by Hong Kong’s own film 
personalities has survived.  Critical writings have thus tended to focus on those [films] . . . made by 
prominent Shanghai expatriates” (2007 [1997]: 9). 
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Japan.68  Accordingly, the colonial government of Hong Kong proclaimed a neutral 
position in the Sino-Japanese hostilities but placed films with anti-Japan contents 
under scrutiny.  In 1938, an anti-Japan propaganda film March of the Guerrillas 
(Youji Jinxing Qu; also known as March of the Partisans), which was written by Cai 
Chusheng and co-written and directed by Situ Huimin, was caught in censorship 
trouble.  Censors ordered that some two thousand feet of the total footage of the 
film had to be cut before public exhibition.  The owner of the film refused the cuts; 
the government banned the film.  Three years later, the government lifted the ban on 
an abridged version of the same film which was re-titled to Song of Retribution 
(Ching Hei Goh) when it was released in Hong Kong in June 1941 (Yu 1997a: 
169-170, 1998: 31-2).  As mentioned earlier, filmmakers at that time usually 
reckoned such bans or cuts were due to the Japanese consul’s strong remonstrations.   
In 1938, national defence was one of the main genres side by side with the 
purely entertainment genres in Hong Kong cinema.  According to the 
documentation in Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I, at least eighteen released films can 
be categorized as such in that year alone.69  Notable ones include the voluntary, 
                                                 
68 As Yue Qianhou (2004: 41) says, “Various historical and practical factors determined that 
China, Britain and Japan had a complex relationship during the war. . . . The overall trend of 
Sino-British relations during the war was marked mainly by conflicts and contradictions and less 
significantly by cooperation.”  Furthermore, according to Yue (2004: 41-2), after the September 18 
Incident and the Incident of 7 July, Japan had replaced Britain as the chief enemy of China.  The 
domination reshuffle among foreign powers challenged British interests in China.  The parallel 
existence and continuation of contradictions between Britain and Japan as well as between China and 
Japan gave rise to a common strategic interest between China and Britain.  While China theoretically 
saw Britain as a potential ally, Britain, in order to avoid the Japanese infringement of the British interest 
in China, was absolutely unwilling to see Japan subjugating China.  However, because of the limitation 
of its national power, being restricted by the situation in Europe and the consideration of the degree of 
harm to its interest, Britain decided not to be antagonistic to Japan immediately; an appeasement policy 
became possible. 
 
69 The number of national defence films genre varies among scholars, e.g., Law and Bren 
reckoned that there were 22 in 1938 and Zhou and Li regarded only 18 as such.  Categorization, after 
all, is always subjective; it depends on how one reads and interprets the films.  Moreover, these 
numbers are largely an estimation based on available synopses and related materials because only a few 
out of some 600 pre-war films have survived.  The editor of Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I, May 
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collective effort of Hong Kong filmmakers At This Crucial Juncture (Jui Hau Gwaan 
Tau), Situ Huimin’s The Blood-stained Baoshan Fortress (Huet Chin Bo Saan Shing) 
and Moon Kwan’s Public Enemy (Gung Dik).70  Anti-Japan consciousness, 
sentiment and propaganda were the most common elements in national defence films, 
yet the only banned film on record was March of the Guerrillas although there might 
be some more unknown and unrecorded bans and cuts.  If the ban on this film and 
the previously mentioned initial ban on Lifeline were because of the anti-Japan 
elements as expounded by film veterans and scholars, how and why could other films 
with such elements escape from the censors?  While banning might rest on to what 
extent a film was regarded as ‘offensive’ to Japan (which was bound to be a 
subjective and arbitrary decision), no guideline for the colonial censors during the 
pre-war and war periods have been discovered thus far.  This is illustrated by 
Lifeline.  Director Moon Kwan (1976: 202) briefly recalls in his memoir that the 
point of argument in his appeal against the initial ban was the consideration of 
whether the film identified the invader, the imperialist, the ‘devil’ or the subject of 
resistance in an explicit manner.  Furthermore, one can also easily observe from the 
Chinese-language press in Hong Kong during the anti-Japanese war period that 
offensive words like devil, imperialist as well as the descriptive phrases referring to 
Japan or the Japanese were substituted with ‘XX’ or left blank.  For instance, all the 
Chinese character ‘yat’s that referred to ‘Japan’ in all the issues of Artland were left 
                                                                                                                                          
Wong, reminds readers, “To define a certain film’s genre, one needs to understand how a story is told 
apart from what the story is about, and how the story inherits the conventions of a genre while having its 
own adaptation.  In the process of editing, we had to rely on our literary materials to classify the genres 
since there was no way we could see the pre-war films” (1997: xv). 
 
70 Teo (2007 [1997]: 9) and Yu (1997a:139) identify At This Crucial Juncture as a film of 1937.  
However, according to Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I, the film had its public release on 2 March 1938; 
according to Zhao and Li (2005: 227) and Yu (1997a:139), the actual filming of the film started on 4 
August 1937, and wrapped on 22 September 1937, and was premiered on 29 December 1937.   
For more about At This Crucial Juncture, see Yu (1997a: 139-142) and also footnote 67; for more 
about The Blood-stained Baoshan Fortress, see Yu (1997a: 168-9); for more about Public Enemy, see 
Yu (1997a: 143, 175). 
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with empty squares (□).  In another instance, in The Tien Kwong Po published on 24 
July 1937, eleven words were censored resulting in blank spaces in an advertisement 
of an anti-Japan movie titled Vanguards of the Times (Si Doi Sin Fung, 1937).  In 
another advertisement of the same movie published on 26 July, twenty-eight words 
were censored and, again, there were blank spaces (cited in Yu 1997a: 149-50).  The 
colonial government was much concerned about its fiercely warlike ex-ally Japan.71  
In addition, the British Government, especially since the Japanese troop took control 
of South China and occupied Guangzhou in 1938, saw Hong Kong as militarily 
indefensible (see Liu 2009: 268) and deemed it unwise for the colonial government 
to infuriate Japan.   
As for the case of March of the Guerrillas, an article in Artland (Issue No. 54, 
15 May 1939) reported it was because of the film’s depiction of intense resistance 
against Japan that the colonial government, which was subjected to strong objections 
from the Japanese consul, ordered a total of two thousand feet of the footage, which 
was about one-fifth the whole length of the film, to be cut.  Since the cuts would 
affect the integrity of the film, the owner of the film deferred its release.72  Besides, 
there was footage showing Chinese people resisting and fighting directly against the 
Japanese troops.  It can be inferentially supposed that the tacit guideline for film 
censors included the consideration of the explicitness of the evil deeds of Japan and 
the extent of anti-Japan sentiment.  In fact, deliberation about the degree of 
prejudice to ‘good’ relations with territories outside Hong Kong was a censorship 
                                                 
71 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with 
Japan in 1902.  It was officially terminated in 1923. 
 
72 The article was “Yau Gik Jun Hang Kuk bei gim hui yi chin yu chek” (literally “Two Thousand 
Feet of March of the Guerrillas were Censored Out”) in Artland, No. 54 (15 May 1939). 
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criterion that persisted throughout the colonial period even after the war (see 
Chapters 3 and 4).   
In 1939 and 1940, there was a decline in the number of national defence films 
released in Hong Kong — nine in 1939 and only four in 1940 according to an 
estimate in the Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I (see footnote 69).  Other than being 
driven by the filmmakers’ patriotic and nationalistic sentiment, the substantial 
quantity of national defence film productions in 1938 was also prompted by the 
box-office successes of the earlier films of the same genre.  Film scholars, such as 
Zhou and Li (2005: 234-5), generally attribute the decline of the national defence 
genre in 1939 and 1940 to the previously excessive releases, the drop in quality and 
the commercial consideration of investors since the later national defence films could 
not attain satisfactory box-office takings.  Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I reveals 
that there was also a general recession in the Hong Kong film industry as reflected in 
the total number of films released in 1940 and 1941, with the record high of one 
hundred and twenty-five in 1939 dropping to eighty-nine in 1940 and eighty in 1941.  
The recession may have been caused by the successive rises of entertainment tax, 
which made film production a harder business in which to make profit.  However, 
Law and Bren (2012: 137) further remark that since Britain declared war on 
Germany in September 1939, Hong Kong people had been feeling that war was 
approaching.  There was also a significant increase in the price of film stock due to 
a shortage of resources and so film companies in Hong Kong reduced their 
productions or shifted to low-budget and speculative productions (see also Yu 1997a: 
211-3, 1998: 51-2).  Furthermore, on account of the British appeasement policy 
towards Japan, official suppression in response to the strong objection of the 
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Japanese consul could also be a cause for the decline in national defence film 
productions.   
Near the end of 1938, an article in Artland (Issue No. 44, 15 December) 
reads: 
Because of the invasion and harassment of the Japanese troop in South 
China now, war is still growing strongly.  The Hong Kong 
Government, for the sake of the strict observance of neutrality, does not 
want excessive exaggerations in our war-of-resistance propaganda, and 
neither does film art.  The Secretary of Chinese Affairs has convened a 
meeting with film production companies to discuss the productions 
thereafter so as to avoid too palpable a depiction of the resistance 
against Japan.  In this case, everybody has to change style slightly, to 
carry through the advocacy of the war of resistance by satiric or 
insinuative ways.  Direct national defence film and drama can only be 
laid aside and neglected.73  (My translation) 
About the same time, another magazine Movie (Dian Ying, Issue No. 15, December 
1938) also reported that the Secretary of Chinese Affairs warned the film production 
companies that, from then on, whenever they made any national defence film, neither 
words nor costumes were allowed to identify the enemy otherwise the film would be 
subjected to cuts or a ban (cited in Zhou and Li 2005: 235 and Yu: 1997a: 189-190).  
A few months later, Artland (Issue No. 74, 15 May 1940) reported that the colonial 
government suddenly banned the widely popular The Battle of Changsha (Changsha 
Huizhan), a documentary about the defeat of the Japanese troop in Changsha, before 
its public exhibition.74  Although the report did not mention the reason for the ban, 
it was enough to let the filmmakers know the government officials meant what they 
                                                 
73 See “Gum hau dik Wah Nam dian ying sai kai” (literally “The Hereafter of the Film World in 
South China”) written by Sung Man-lei in Artland, Issue No. 44 (15 December 1938). 
 
74 See “Changsha Huizhan dat jo kam ying” (literally “The Battle of Changsha Was Suddenly 
Banned”) in Artland, Issue No. No. 74 (16 May 1940); many words were left with empty squares. 
 
89 
said.  The new censorship criteria inevitably increased difficulties in making 
national defence films to a great degree; it also explained the drop in national 
defence film productions afterwards.  In order to escape from bans and cuts, 
persistent filmmakers such as Cai Chusheng, did not expose the enemy directly but 
shifted to unfold the story of the positive patriots when he made Orphan Island 
Paradise (Gudao Tiantang, 1939; a Grandland Motion Picture Corporation 
production) or, like Ko Lei-hen and Yeung Tin-lok, made a metaphor of national 
defence as in their period film, The Luminescent Cup (Ye Gwong Booi, 1939).75  
According to Yu (1997a: 199-200), none of the films released in 1939 that can be 
categorized as in the national defence genre directly depicted the patriotic struggle 
against Japan, but shifted mainly to the eradication of traitors (hanjian). 
Although the Hong Kong film industry was declining, there was a revival of 
the national defence genre before the Japanese occupation.  According to an 
estimation by Yu (1998: 28-38), including the Cantonese film The Little Tiger (Siu Lo 
Fu) which topped the box-office of the year and the Mandarin film Ten Thousand Li 
Ahead (Qiancheng Wanli), there were thirteen national defence films released in 
1941 against only four in 1940, but no official bans or cuts were known thus far.76  
As discussed earlier, the colonial government’s censorship of anti-Japan films 
depended on contemporary Anglo-Japanese relations.  The United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland (UK) signed the “Anglo-Japanese Alliance” with Japan in 
                                                 
75 Orphan Island Paradise is the first Mandarin film made in Hong Kong (Yu 1997a: 200; Liu 
2009: 254).  Yet, Grandland Motion Picture Corporation was subordinate to the China Movie Studio in 
Chongqing, which was supported and funded by the Nationalist Government.  ‘Grandland’ is an 
English translation of Dai Dei (or Dadi) and is used by Hong Kong Film Archive, but some other 
English works have the translation as ‘Great Earth’.  For more about Grandland, see Law and Bren 
2012: 131.  For more about Orphan Island Paradise and The Luminescent Cup, see Yu 1997a: 200-1. 
 
76 For more about The Little Tiger (1941), see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I (1997: 468); for 
more about Ten Thousand Li Ahead (1941), see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I (1997: 513) and Cheng 
et al. (1978b [1963]): 84-5). 
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1902, and were allied with Japan in the fight against Germany under the terms of the 
alliance during World War I.  After the alliance was officially terminated in 1923, 
Britain’s policy towards Japan became ambiguous.  In the 1930s, Britain, on the one 
hand, seemingly pursued neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict and endeavoured to 
soothe Japan, but, on the other, placed no restriction on exports of war materials to 
China.  According to British historian Frank Welsh: 
Once full-scale, although still undeclared, war with China had begun, 
Japan endeavoured to cut off supplies to the mainland by a blockade of 
the whole of the Chinese coastline, excluding only the foreign ports, of 
which Hong Kong was incomparably the most important.  Enormous 
quantities of arms — estimated at sixty thousand tons per month — 
poured from the colony into China, in spite of Japanese demands . . . to 
prohibit military goods crossing the border.  (1997: 407-8) 
The cession of Hong Kong to Britain as a result of the First Opium War was a 
very real disgrace to China.  But history is cunning and overturns expectations.  
Many years later, during the years of turmoil, Hong Kong was to play a significant 
role in aiding China which had reached a historical juncture when pragmatism 
superseded political niceties.   
Hong Kong, being a free port with advantageous geographical position, 
has all along been a vital doorway that connects China to the outside 
world.  To the Nationalist Government, Hong Kong during the War of 
Resistance was an entrepot for importing firearms and exporting 
strategic commodities, a ‘hidden war field’ of intelligence gathering 
and secretive Sino-Japanese diplomatic manoeuvres, an important 
stronghold for trade, finance and air traffic, as well as a ‘refuge’ for 
party and political figures of different political views and their families.  
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Hong Kong contributed tremendously to the Nationalist Government’s 
resistance efforts.77  (Lo, Koon-cheung 2004: 88)  
When the Japanese troops moved southward and occupied Guangzhou on 21 October 
1938, the military threat of Japan came close to Hong Kong.  The British 
Government refused to open Hong Kong to Imperial Japan to supply its military 
needs in warring China, but agreed to suspend all arms shipments across the colony’s 
border.  However, arms supplies to aid China were sent by another route through 
Burma which was also a British colony bordering China (Welsh 1997: 409).  Japan 
raised strong objections again and again; on 18 July 1940, Britain set up a blockade 
(Yue 2004: 49).  But, before the second blockade, Anglo-Japanese relations were 
already exceedingly edgy after the Tientsin Incident (also known as the Tianjin 
Incident) in June 1939, which nearly triggered off an Anglo-Japanese war.  In 
September 1939, the Hong Kong Government adopted the UK’s National Service 
(Armed Forces) Act which stipulated that all British male citizens in the colony aged 
from eighteen to forty-one had to enlist for military service (Ko 1995: 52).  The 
following year Imperial Japan allied with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to form the 
Axis powers upon the signing of the Tripartite Pact while the UK formed an alliance 
with the US and the Dutch to impose an embargo on raw materials to Japan so as to 
restrain Japanese militarism.  The two pacts were indicative of the increasingly 
hostile relations between Britain and Japan, particularly in the context of the wars in 
Europe and the tense international relations in Asia.78  In the summer of 1940, the 
Hong Kong Government began a massive programme of building air-raid tunnels 
and shelters (Endacott 1978: 50-1), held repeated air-raid, strengthened the Gin 
                                                 
77 For more about how Hong Kong (and Britain) assisted China in the resistance against Japan, 
see Lo (2004: 88-123) and Liu (2009: 153-6). 
 
78 For more about the Anglo-Japanese relations after the September 18 Incident in 1931 and 
before the Pacific war, particularly the aftermath of the Tientsin Incident, see Yue 2004: 41-54.   
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Drinkers Line (a British military defensive line in Hong Kong) and evacuated about 
three thousand European women and children to Australia (see Ko 1995: 52, 56; 
Endacott 1978: 50-1).  As 1941 approached, it seemed only a matter of time before 
Britain and Japan were at war.  On 7 January 1941, the British Prime Minister at 
that time, Winston Churchill, wrote to the British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, 
who had been urging Britain to send reinforcement to Hong Kong: 
If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of 
holding Hong Kong or relieving it.  It is most unwise to increase the 
loss we shall suffer there.  Instead of increasing the garrison it ought to 
be reduced to a symbolical scale.  Any trouble arising there must be 
dealt with at the Peace Conference after the war.  We must avoid 
frittering away our resources on untenable positions . . . I wish we had 
fewer troops there, but to move any would be noticeable and dangerous.  
(Cited in Welsh 1997: 411) 
Nevertheless, in November, the Canadian Government sent two battalions, about two 
thousand personnel altogether, to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison (see Endacott 
1978: 59-60).  Finally, after Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and 
invaded British Malaya, the UK together with the US declared war on Japan on 8 
December 1941.   
It can be seen from the above outline that Anglo-Japanese relations had been 
deteriorating to the point of a complete breakdown since 1939.  That could be the 
reason why the colonial government gradually appeared to turn a blind eye to the 
anti-Japan elements in films.  In spite of the ‘tricks’ by which filmmakers avoided 
bans and cuts resulting from censorship, no official bans or cuts on the national 
defence films released in 1941 are known, which is probably because the colonial 
government placed no such orders. 
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The Disobedience of Hong Kong Cinema during the Fall of Hong Kong 
After its surprise bombing on the US naval base at Pearl Harbour sparked off 
the Pacific War on 7 December 1941 (Honolulu time), Imperial Japan assaulted 
Hong Kong less than eight hours later on the morning of 8 December (Hong Kong 
time).  After eighteen days of fierce fighting, Hong Kong fell to Japan on Christmas 
day and surrendered unconditionally.  After Governor Mark Young surrendered in 
person at the Japanese headquarters in the Peninsula Hong Kong Hotel, Hong Kong 
was absorbed into the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, renamed as the 
Captured Territory of Hong Kong.  It was subject to martial law for three years and 
eight months, during which Hong Kong people suffered from hunger and fear and 
the brutality and humiliation of the Japanese Imperial Army.  Because of the 
shortage of food and other essential items of everyday life, the Japanese military 
administration enforced a food-rationing policy and continuously repatriated Hong 
Kong people, mainly the jobless and the homeless, to China.  During the occupation, 
the population dropped from one and a half million to about six hundred thousand.79  
Unlike occupied Shanghai where film productions were kept going, the filmmakers 
who were still in Hong Kong, inclusive of the local and expatriates, made no films at 
                                                 
79 According to Endacott (1978: 142), “The reduction of the population was a Japanese war 
measure . . . . In December 1941 the population was estimated at 1.5 millions, some 200,000 less than 
what it had been six months earlier.  A quarter of a million were said to have left in the first month, that 
is February 1942, and a census in February 1943 gave a figure of 968,524.  By August 1945 the 
population was estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000, indicating a reduction of some 23,000 per 
month throughout the whole occupation, or rather under the target of one thousand a day which the 
Japanese had set.”  According to the record by Percy Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, the Director of Medical 
Services in Hong Kong from 1937 to 1943, 48,474 people were born in Hong Kong from 1942 to 
August 1945, wherein 170,586 died (see Liu 2009: 282).  
For more about the repatriation policy in occupied Hong Kong, see Endacott (1978: 139-142), Tse 
(1995: 23-32), Au et al. (2011: 165-170); for more about Hong Kong and the miseries and sufferings of 
the Hong Kong people under the Japanese rule, see Endacott (1978: 139-164) and Liu (2009: 265-284); 
for more about the cultural activities during the occupation, see Faure (1997: 225-7). 
 
94 
all.80  In fact, only one feature film, The Battle of Hong Kong, was produced in 
occupied Hong Kong; it was, of course, a Japanese production.   
On 11 April 1942, the Chinese edition of the Japanese authority’s mouthpiece 
Hong Kong News reported:81 
Movie undertaking has come to halt after the war.  Other than the 
bosses and those film stars with hoards of money, the rest have been 
whirled into the eddy of poverty and have close combat with their 
livelihood.  Those who can playact on stage are, of course, better off; 
those who cannot would run small businesses as their vocation.  In 
order to earn their livings, cameramen have started to run stalls of 
sundry goods, sound recordists have become merchandisers of old 
stuffs, screenwriters have switched to contributors for publications or 
running small businesses, workers have mostly shifted to coolies or 
other hard toils, directors have become agents or stage supervisors at 
theatrical troupes and assistants to transport businessmen.  However, 
they can only maintain their individual livings; their family members 
have to watch out for themselves.  (Cited in Yu 1998: 55-6; my 
translation) 
The reality was rather different.  About three hundred members of the expatriate 
cultural elite, including filmmakers such as Cai Chusheng, Situ Huimin and Xia Yan, 
were rescued by the Communist East River Column and escaped to the unoccupied 
regions in the Mainland while some local filmmakers such as Lo Dun and Lee Ching 
                                                 
80 According to Fu (2003: 93), nearly 200 films were made in occupied Shanghai.  “The 
occupation cinema of Shanghai . . . has been represented in nationalist discourse as a site of ‘cultural 
treason’ and marginalized and demonized in official narratives of Chinese film and urban popular 
culture. . . . [A]ll the artists and filmmakers affiliated with the cinematic apparatus in occupied Shanghai 
became ‘traitors’ to the Chinese nation-race (hanjian)” (ibid).  However, Fu argues, “[T]he occupation 
cinema, rather than being a treasonable cultural apparatus in opposition to the Nationalist controlled 
cinema in Free China, constructed a public space in which the occupied could participate in a popular 
cultural discourse that placed them outside of the hegemonic ‘Greater East Asia’ culture of the Japanese 
Army and its control and manipulation” (2003: 94). 
 
81 Hong Kong News was a newspaper founded, funded and run by Japanese.  Its publication 
began in 1941 and ceased in 1945.  It was published in Chinese, Japanese and English.  According to 
the Government Record Service of the Hong Kong SAR Government, its English edition was the only 
English daily during the occupation period.  See also Liu 2009: 278-9. 
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hid themselves to escape being caught by the Japanese army.82  Nevertheless, one of 
the immediate tasks for the new ruler was to resume a peaceful social ambience so as 
to bring order in the aftermath of the war.   
In order to centralize, reorganize and revive the entertainment business for 
functional ‘decorative’ reasons, the newly formed Military Governorate Press Bureau 
dispatched special extra food to major filmmakers and, in March 1942, founded the 
Hong Kong Film Federation which had its name changed to the South China Cinema 
Federation soon afterwards.  The English edition of Hong Kong News on 5 April 
1942 reported that forty production companies and one hundred and sixty three of the 
estimated five hundred film people had registered with the federation (cited in Jarvie 
1977: 14).  The federation organized two troupes, one for the expatriates who were 
mainly from Shanghai and another for the local ones.  Both troupes were expected 
to perform drama and opera at the re-opened theatres.83  According to Ng Cho-fan, 
the purpose of these performances was “to give an aura of peace to the enemy’s rule” 
(cited in Fu 2003: 89).  The federation, under the supervision of the press bureau, 
was also responsible for the registration and re-distribution of some three hundred 
Chinese films and some two hundred films imported from the West that the Japanese 
army seized from the local film production companies and distributors (see Zhou and 
Li 2005: 277; Yu 1998: 57, 59-60).84  All the films were, of course, under close 
                                                 
82 For more on the exodus and the rescue of political figures and the cultural elite during the 
Japanese occupation, see Tse (1995: 6-22), Zhou and Li (2005: 290-6) and Lo Dun (2000: 128).  For 
more on the rescue by the East River Column in Hong Kong, see Ye Wenyi (2004: 169-174).  For more 
stories about the miseries of specific film people, see Zhou and Li (2005: 283-290). 
 
83 For more about the South China Cinema Federation and how the federation helped the 
filmmakers make their living with its two troupes, see Yu (1998: 56-9), Fu (2003: 88-9) and Zhou and 
Li (2005: 274-5, 288-9). 
 
84 The numbers of films here are based on the Chinese-language newspaper Heung Tao Daily as 
cited in Yu (1998: 57), but they do not match with those mentioned in Jarvie (1977: 14), in which the 
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scrutiny.  The Japanese officially banned all Euro-American movies, but in order to 
fill up the programmes of all the re-opened theatres, they exempted some old 
Hollywood movies such as The Thief of Baghdad and The Wizard of Oz during the 
first year of their occupation (Fu 2003: 89).85  
On 5 June 1942, the Governor's Office of the Captured Territory of Hong 
Kong promulgated a list of regulations for censorship, which was published in Heung 
Tao Daily (9 June 1942; formerly Sing Tao Daily).86  The most important 
regulations were:   
Section 1 – Films and plays must be examined by the Governorate of 
the Captured Territory of Hong Kong before any presentation within 
the jurisdiction of the Governorate of the Captured Territory of Hong 
Kong. 
Section 3 – If the contents of the film/play contradict any of the 
following matters, it must be stopped from screening/performing, or 
have part of it removed. 
(1) Disrespectful to the Imperial Army. 
(2) Libel or criticism against national policy, or being regarded as 
impairing national policy. 
(3) Impairing the prestige of the Empire’s army and soldiers. 
(4) Being regarded as impairing the enforcement of military 
administration, the security of the country’s territory and the 
prevention of espionage activity.  
(5) Impairing the reputation of an allied country. 
(6) Benefitting adverse nations and hostile nations, producing or 
fostering audience’s admiration for adverse nations. 
                                                                                                                                          
numbers were based on the English-language edition of Hong Kong News.  In Jarvie’s, four hundred 
Cantonese and sixty Mandarin titles were registered with the South China Cinema Federation. 
 
85 For more about the screening activities during the occupation period, see Yu 1998: 59-62, 66-7 
and 70-6. 
 
86 Sing Tao Daily is a Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong first published in 1938.  It changed its 
name to Heung Tao Daily during the Japanese occupation and resumed the title, Sing Tao Daily, after 
the liberation of Hong Kong from the Japanese Military.   
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(7) Being regarded as disturbing the peaceful order of society. 
(8) Being regarded as having other reasons for prohibition from 
screening/performing. 
Section 4 – When the examination result decrees the film/play 
contradictory to the regulations and the film/play is banned from 
screening/performing or has part of it deleted, no appeal is allowed; the 
film is to be confiscated. 
Section 6 – Things that have passed the examination are still subjected 
to banning or having part of it removed when found necessary 
afterwards.  (Cited in Chen, Jinbo 1979: 76; my translation)  
However, these regulations were simply words on paper and were in name only to 
the disobedient Hong Kong filmmakers as no one was likely to make any films under 
Japanese rule.   
In the beginning, the South China Cinema Federation also served the critical 
function of roping in and recruiting famous Cantonese filmmakers to make a film to 
endorse the Japanese occupation, sanctify the war launched by the Japanese Imperial 
Army and propagandize the amity between Chinese and Japanese and the realization 
of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.  However, the local filmmakers 
refused to service the invader and to involve themselves in such a project to promote 
something they could not agree to so, instead, they all went into exile.  For instance, 
Ng Cho-fan, Pak Yin (also known as Bak Yin), Sit Kok-sin, Wong Man-lei, Tse 
Yik-chi, Mok Hong-si, Tang Xiaodan, Lo Dun and many others hid themselves and 
then risked their lives to flee to nearby regions such as Kwangchowan (now 
Zhanjiang), Guangzhou, Macau and Taishan (traditionally known as Toishan).  
Later, a Japanese director Shigeo Tanaka came to Hong Kong to take charge of 
directorship, and actual filming started in mid-1942.  The film was titled The Battle 
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of Hong Kong (Hong Kong Kung Leuk Jin, also known as The Last Day of Britain or 
The Day England Fell) and was released in Hong Kong on 8 December 1942 to 
celebrate the first anniversary of the start of the Greater East Asian War (the Japanese 
term for the Pacific War).  It featured an all-Japanese cast apart from seventeen-year 
old Chinese starlet Tsi Lo-lin, being cheated by the Japanese into flying to Japan and 
played a minor role in the film.87  In January 1943, the military administration gave 
up the plan to revive the Hong Kong film industry and abolished the South China 
Cinema Federation in the wake of the non-cooperation and exodus of the local film 
people.  A Japanese corporation took over the business of film distribution and 
became the sole official movie supplier.  Meanwhile, all Euro-American films were 
strictly banned in order to drive out Anglo-American imperialism (see Zhou and Li 
2005: 277; Yu 1998: 68-9).  
By mid 1944 . . . , the Hong Kong cinema industry collapsed when 
severe fuel shortages combined with high operation costs forced all but 
a handful of first-run houses, such as the Meiji (formerly Queen’s) 
theatre, which had to cut back to one screening a day, either to shut 
down or switch entirely to live performances.  The Japanese military 
administration thought, however, that the Hong Kong cinema industry 
deserved to collapse because of its refusal to cooperate: “Film is not 
merely entertainment . . . it is principally an instrument of social 
education,” an official declared.  “It has to carry out the critical 
mission of wartime cultural propaganda.  But what had the Hong Kong 
film community done in achieving this mission?  That’s why we did 
not supply electricity to the . . . cinema industry.”  (Fu 2003: 90) 
As mentioned previously, before the fall of Hong Kong, Mu Shiying commented that 
Hong Kong was a city of colonial culture; everything was grotesque, in a foul mess 
                                                 
87 For more about the story behind the making of The Battle of Hong Kong, the exodus of the local 
filmmakers and how and why Tsi Lo-lin got involved in the film, see Zhou and Li (2005: 294-300), Yu 
(1998: 63) and Lo Dun (2000: 128-9). 
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(cited in Fu 2003: 69), and Cai Chusheng said that Hong Kong culture was backward 
and it was impossible to find any title that had a national defence theme that would 
justify Hong Kong’s claim to be a cinematic centre (cited in Fu 2003: 70).  What 
then did the Hong Kong filmmakers’ disobedience to, as well as their 
non-cooperation with, the Japanese military during the occupation period 
represent?88  In this regard, while Cai Chusheng defined a cinematic centre (at his 
time) as one that produced national defence themed film and while Shanghai 
filmmakers who stayed in Shanghai during the Japanese occupation period 
collaborated with Japanese to make entertainment films, Hong Kong filmmakers 
showed their nationalism by another action — giving up their careers.89  In addition, 
in regard to Cai Chusheng’s criticism, Fu says: 
[T]here is margin in the centre and centre in the margin.  China’s 
marginalization in twentieth-century global politics is well known, but 
much less known is the Chinese marginalization of other places and 
cultures inside and/or outside its territorial boundaries.  Hong Kong 
has been one of these Others.  In fact, it has been doubly marginalized 
in the official discourses of Chinese nationalism and British 
colonialism.  (2002: 220) 
Nevertheless, about one year after the collapse of the Hong Kong cinema 
industry, the Japanese military rule also collapsed.  In 1945, after the US dropped an 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August and another on Nagasaki on 9 August, 
Imperial Japan declared an unconditional surrender on 15 August.  Hong Kong was 
then liberated from the imperial oppression, and the British claimed power again and 
asserted their authority.  Hong Kong people wanted to revive the city.  Welsh 
(1997: 421) says, “The great achievement of Japanese rule in Hong Kong was to 
                                                 
88 For a detailed discourse corresponding to this question, see Fu 2002 [2000]: 199-226. 
 
89 For more about the Shanghai cinema during the Japanese occupation, see Fu 2003: 93-132.  
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convince the Chinese population that, by comparison with that of the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, British rule was both benign and competent.”  
Nonetheless, freedom of expression was still not guaranteed in the years ahead. 
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Chapter 3 
The Complex Vicissitudes of  
Filmmakers and Colonial Film Censorship 
 in the Heat of the Cold War 
 
When Britain resumed control of Hong Kong after the Pacific War, law and 
order in the colony was maintained by the British military until Mark Young returned 
as governor on 1 May 1946 and restored normal civil administration (Endacott 1964: 
302-3).  But it took the film industry about a year to see the dawn of new prospects in 
part because the filmmakers who had fled did not return immediately after the retreat 
of the Japanese military, and in part because the production companies’ filming 
equipment and stages were severely damaged in the war.  A brief timeline of the film 
industry’s recovery can be seen in the news reports and op-ed articles of contemporary 
newspapers.  According to the Chinese daily Wah Kiu Yat Pao on 16 May 1946 (cited 
in Yu 1998: 80-1), the entertainment business flourished after the liberation of Hong 
Kong and appeared to grow by the day with twenty-six cinemas re-opening, showing 
mainly American films.  Some three months later, the same newspaper (27 September 
1946, cited in Yu 1998: 81) reported that the Legislative Council intended to adopt a 
quota system by which all the first and second-run cinemas had to allocate one-tenth of 
their show time for British films; offenders were subject to fines and imprisonment.90  
                                                 
90 When the Attorney General moved the “British Cinematograph Films Bill” at the Legislative 
Council on 10 April, he said, “The essence of the Bill to attain the first objective to ensure that by 
employment of a quota system for a quota period of 70 days it shall be incumbent on cinemas to which 
this Ordinance applies to show for at least 7 days British films of which one at least shall be 5,000 feet 
long.”  The council passed the bill on 24 April 1947 (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1947 Session: 106, 128), 
and it was abolished in 1971.  
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These two reports indicate that regular business at the movie houses was back on track 
in the second half of 1946.  According to Wah Kiu Yat Pao (21 September 1946; cited 
in Yu 1998: 88-9) again, two movie studios had productions at that time.  On 5 
December of the same year, Mok Hong-si’s Flames of Lust (Qing Yan) had its 
premiere, marking the first showing of a local production after the war.91  Ten days 
later, the premiere of another local title, Gone Are the Swallows When the Willow 
Flowers Wilt (Lu Hua Fan Bai Yan Zi Fei) directed by He Feiguang took place.92  
According to Law and Bren (2011:141), out of the nine Chinese-language titles 
released on-screen in 1946, only four were new productions.  They were not, however, 
in the common language of Hong Kong, Cantonese, but in Mandarin.  For example, 
one of the four new titles, Flames of Lust featured a Cantonese cast with lead roles by 
Lee Ching and the title holder of the first Miss Hong Kong contest held in 1946, Lee 
Lan, but it was a Mandarin-speaking film.  It had to be in Mandarin in deference to the 
censorship of the Nationalist Government which was still the ruling regime in the 
Chinese Mainland.  According to Chung (2011: 100), the Nationalist Government 
re-organized and centralized the Chinese film industry within its jurisdiction by 
nationalizing and suppressing the private film companies soon after the war.  Law and 
Bren (2012: 141) remark that the Nationalist Government continued with the 
implementation of its regulatory provisions for film that started before the war and 
banned Cantonese-speaking films again.  Thus, local film companies preferred to 
invest in Mandarin rather than Cantonese films so as to tap into the Mainland market.   
                                                 
91 For more about Flames of Lust, see Yu (1998: 87-8) and Hong Kong Filmography Vol. II (1998: 
16). 
 
92 For more about Gone Are the Swallows When the Willow Flowers Wilt, see Yu (1998: 82-84) 
and Hong Kong Filmography Vol. II (1998: 17). 
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But that did not stop local people still longing for films in their own language. 
It was Joe Chiu who filled the gap by bringing over the Cantonese films Grandview 
made in San Francisco during the Pacific War years.93  Those films were 
well-received and yielded admirable profits in Hong Kong and other Nanyang 
(commonly known as Southeast Asia today) markets.  The success of the Grandview 
films encouraged Hong Kong film companies to produce Cantonese films in spite of 
the prohibition in China (Law and Bren 2012: 141).  The first one to come out was 
Wong Toi’s My Love Comes Too Late (Long Gwai Maan), starring Ng Cho-fan and 
Pak Yin.  Shooting started on 17 December 1946, and according to a report by Wah 
Kiu Man Pao (18 December 1946; cited in Yu 1998: 90), when the film was released 
on 21 January 1947, it achieved box-office success in Hong Kong and the Nanyang 
regions.94  According to Hong Kong Filmography Vol. II (1942-1949), ninety local 
titles, with seventy-two in Cantonese and the rest in Mandarin, were released in Hong 
Kong in 1947, which signified a recovery of the Hong Kong cinema after the war.  In 
1948 and 1949, Hong Kong produced more than three hundred films in total, with 
more than two hundred and fifty in Cantonese.  According to Chung Shan Yat Po (15 
September 1947; cited in Yu 1998: 123), published in Guangzhou, some Mandarin 
films were even dubbed into Cantonese in order to attract the local audience.   
The fast recovery of the film industry was, firstly, because of the civil war and 
social turbulence in China, which led to the migration of filmmakers and entrepreneurs 
to Hong Kong (as discussed in Chapter 2).  Among the migrants were Zhu Shilin, Bu 
Wancang, Cheng Bugao, Zhou Xuan, Li Zuyong, Zhang Shankun and his wife Tong 
                                                 
93 According to Wah Kiu Man Pao (1 October 1946, as cited in Yu 1998: 81-2), an evening post 
of Wah Kiu, those Grandview films were in 16 mm format.  Since the cinemas in Hong Kong were only 
equipped with the 35 mm projectors, Grandview also imported some 16 mm projectors. 
 
94 For more about My Love Comes Too Late, see Yu (1998: 90-2) and Hong Kong Filmography 
Vol. II (1998: 27). 
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Yuejuan.  Many of them were considered to have been co-operative with the Japanese 
in occupied Shanghai during the Second Sino-Japanese War and thus were widely 
regarded as traitors by the nationalists and patriots.95  Secondly, more and more major 
local filmmakers who fled during the Japanese occupation returned to Hong Kong in 
the latter half of 1946 including Ng Cho-fan, Pak Yin and Moon Kwan.  Thirdly, the 
outbreak of full-scale civil war in China in July 1946 resulted in enormous crowds of 
refugees pouring into Hong Kong, including elite groups and talents from all walks of 
life that swelled the colony’s population from about six hundred thousand in August 
1945 (Endacott 1978: 142) to an estimated 2.36 million by March 1950 (Welsh 1997: 
438), that is about six months after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).  Undoubtedly, the massive influx of refugees in the post war years put heavy 
strains on the colonial administration and caused substantial social issues but, at the 
same time, it also brought labour, talent and wealthy Shanghai capitalists whose 
wealth was under threat of confiscation by the Communists.  Together, these people 
helped speed up the recovery of the colony’s economy and the advancement of the 
industrialization of the city in the years to come (see Welsh 1997: 438-9).   
Even the potential threat from Chinese Mainland troublemakers appeared to 
have been dealt with.  The Labour Minister of Defence said in the House of 
Commons on 5 May 1949: 
Hong Kong has long had a tradition of neutrality and non-interference 
with the politics of China . . . , steps have been taken . . . to deal with any 
breach of the conditions under which Chinese nationals, either 
                                                 
95 For more about Zhang Shankun and Tong Yuejuan, see Wong and Lee (2009: 23-6) and Tong 
(2000: 25-44).  For more about the occupation cinema in Shanghai and Zhang Shankun, see Fu (2003: 
93-132) for a wonderful and insightful discussion that puts the orthodox, official and reductionist 
narratives of the occupation cinema in question.  For an overview of Fu’s discourse, see footnote 80. 
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Kuomintang [Nationalist] or communist, are allowed to reside there.  
(Cited in Welsh 1997: 439) 
But, perhaps, Britain was overly sanguine.  After the birth of the PRC, the 
Communists, together with their fellow travellers (commonly referred to as the 
‘leftists’) and the Nationalists, together with their fellow travellers (commonly 
referred to as the ‘rightists’) were going to cause considerable friction in various 
aspects of Hong Kong, including the film industry.96  In addition, the Cold War and 
the tense power struggle that succeeded World War II would place Hong Kong 
cinema and filmmakers under considerable stress.  When politics matter, when it’s a 
politically hypersensitive era, what, then, should the ‘politics’ be for filmmakers?    
 
Hong Kong after New China was Born – an Enclave of Complexity  
On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong (also transcribed as Mao Tse-tung and 
known as Chairman Mao), atop the Tiananmen Gate (also known as the Gate of 
Heavenly Peace) in Beijing, proclaimed the founding of the PRC (known for a time 
as New China or Red China) at three o’clock in the afternoon and asserted the 
leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over China.  In December of the 
same year, the Kuomintang (KMT; also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party) led 
by Chiang Kai-shek (also known as Jiang Jieshi or Jiang Zhongzheng) retreated to 
                                                 
96 After decades of evolution, the term ‘left’ today encompasses and refers to a complex variety of 
meanings.  In the political context of contemporary Hong Kong, there are broadly at least two sects of 
‘left’.  One is usually addressed as ‘joh pai’ (literally ‘left faction’) which supports the CPC regime in 
China for various reasons, but without serious concern about the ethos and values of the conventional 
‘left’, even though some of its members were once patriotic idealists some years ago.  Another is 
usually addressed as ‘joh yik’ (literally ‘left-wing’) and it embraces and upholds freedom, democracy, 
equality and human liberty and is against the exploitation of capitalism and the authoritarian regime of 
the corrupt CPC.  Although ‘leftist’ and ‘left-wing’ refer to the same in the English context, this text 
deliberatively avoids using the term ‘left-wing’ while it is literally translated as ‘joh yik’ in the 
Chinese-speaking world.  Instead, ‘leftist’ would be used to refer to ‘joh pai’.  However, ‘leftist’ and 
‘left-wing’ in citations are kept as they are.  
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Taiwan to re-establish its Nationalist Government.  Nevertheless, the hostility 
between the two parties did not cease.  The Chinese Civil War became a cold war 
punctuated by fragmentary small-scale ‘hot’ wars.  It was to last for decades and 
had a significant impact on Hong Kong.  During that time, historical, cultural and 
geopolitical factors placed Hong Kong at the centre of arena of the cold war between 
the CPC and the KMT regimes against the backdrop of the major Cold War.97  
The governments of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing) and the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) both considered Hong Kong rightfully part 
of their own territory, but set their claims aside while using the colony 
as a convenient location for espionage, agitation and propaganda one 
against the other.  The government of the USA [United States of 
America], wrath against the People’s Republic of China and wholly 
supporting the Republic of China, made free use of the espionage 
facilities, while gravely damaging the colony’s economy in the interests 
of its crusade against Communism.  The government of Great Britain, 
nominal masters of Hong Kong, were content to let things take their 
course as long as neither the People’s Republic of China (too important 
politically), nor the USA (essential economically), was offended.  The 
interests of the people of Hong Kong were not much considered by any 
of these powers, but were reasonably well looked after, according to its 
own lights, by the colonial administration.  (Welsh 1997: 442)   
In addition, Hong Kong after the war was a particularly complex enclave where 
sections of the population were antagonistic to each other.  There was hostility 
between the leftists and the rightists, the poor and the rich, workers and capitalists 
plus an increasing level of annoyance among the apolitical towards the struggle and 
                                                 
97 A curator of the American Library of Congress says that the Cold War was the most significant 
international conflict during the last half of the twentieth century; it was also the longest and most 
distinctive form of war in the history of mankind (cited in Zhou 2009: 21).  David Faure adds that there 
were the major and minor cold wars.  While the major Cold War [with capital letters] referred to the 
contention between the US and the then USSR, which also included the confrontation between the 
ideologies of capitalism and communism, the minor cold war [with small letters] referred to the struggle 
between the CPC and KMT in Hong Kong [particularly during the 1950s and 1960s] (cited in Wong and 
Lee 2009: 5). 
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propaganda of the Nationalists and Communists as well as the disturbance brought 
about by the leftists and rightists.  As a significant part of the population were 
former refugees from China, British historian Frank Welsh remarks, “Most of the 
newcomers were apolitical, relieved to be alive and anxious only to be left alone; 
insofar as they manifested an interest in politics it was likely to be unsympathetic to 
the Communists they were attempting to avoid” (1997: 445).  However, in the 
1950s, 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, there was a common sentiment among 
the population against exploitation by capitalists and suppression by British 
colonialists, in particular, the infamously corrupt Hong Kong police of that time.  
Police officers were bribed by the rich, triads and drug pushers to bully the poor.  
The mood among the general population meant that, even though there were not a 
large number of genuine leftists in Hong Kong, it was not difficult for the leftists to 
upset their British colonial rulers and their collusive capitalists.  They organized 
trade unions to motivate a considerable number of poor workers (the proletariat) to 
fight for their rights and benefits.  And the workers, since they were fighting for 
their own cause, did not necessarily need to be sympathetic to the Communists to 
participate in social and labour movements. 
In times of political conflict, contention between rival ideologies plays an 
essential role in influencing and motivating public opinion.  As cultural products 
always carry content which is influenced by an ideology, the cultural industries in 
Hong Kong inevitably got involved in, and became a battlefront for, the KMT and 
CPC’s cold war.  Since both parties, particularly the CPC, considered film an 
effective medium for political propaganda, Hong Kong cinema turned into a 
battleground for the ideological struggles of the leftists and rightists, which was 
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something the colonial government could not disregard.98  Against the backdrop of 
the Cold War, Britain was nominally part of the coalition allied with the United 
States of America (US).  Being politically subordinate to the Government of the 
United Kingdom (British Government) and geographically close to China and 
Taiwan, the British colonial government of Hong Kong, on one hand, proclaimed its 
neutrality in the KMT-CPC conflict and, on the other, operated like a fence sitter 
actively preventing domestic social turbulence and passively reacting to political 
conflicts by referencing the greater international context and seeking instructions 
from London.  In a tense triangle of power relations, the Communists, the 
Nationalists and the colonial government each implemented a regulatory 
administration, censorship and restrictive measures on market access within their 
respective jurisdictions to control film.  For instance, soon after the CPC seized 
power in the Chinese Mainland, strict censorship was enforced within its jurisdiction.  
The Hong Kong edition of Ta Kung Pao (cited in Yu 2000: 25) reported on 13 
February 1950 that fifty Hong Kong films, ten in Mandarin and forty in Cantonese, 
were banned in Guangdong because of their reactionary contents.99  They included 
Revenge at Guang Chang Long (Kwong Cheung Lung Yan Sau Gei, 1937) banned for 
inducing superstition, Mok Hong-si’s The Romantic Thief White Chrysanthemum 
(Ching Chaak Pak Kuk Fa, 1947) banned for inciting lust and covetousness, Wu 
Pang’s Waving the Red Ribbon (Foon Baai Hung Ling Daai, 1948) banned for 
depicting love in a frivolous manner and tolerating traitor (hanjian) and Bu 
Wancang’s The Soul of China (Guohun, 1948) banned for being faithful to the 
                                                 
98 See Chapter 2 for the KMT’s regulatory policy on film and Chapter 5 for the CPC’s 
administration of film and Mao Zedong’s ‘literary and art’ (wenyi) doctrines. 
 
99 The Hong Kong edition of Ta Kung Pao was first published in 1938 but stopped publishing 
during the Japanese occupation and resumed on 15 March 1948.  Before turning to leftist politics in 
November 1948, it was a pertinent and unbiased newspaper run by idealist journalists (see Kwong Daat 
3 May 2012). 
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monarchic ideas and feudalism.100  Such bans were as autocratic as that of the 
Nationalist Government in the 1930s and were always orthodoxy, doctrine and 
ideology-driven, signifying that the regime change did not change the manner of film 
censorship.  Significantly, cold war reasoning played a role.  The Soul of China, 
for instance, was a film extolling the loyalty of Wen Tianxiang (also known as Man 
Tin-cheung), a scholar general during the last years of the Southern Song Dynasty, 
who chose to die instead of yielding to the country’s enemy.101  When the film was 
distributed in China in October 1948, it received commendations from the 
Nationalist leaders in Nanjing and was shown to the army at the battlefront.  
Although the story of the film took place against the historical background of the 
feudalistic Song Dynasty, the film undoubtedly advocated patriotism.  The 
Communist censors’ decision of banning the film manifested a Cold War ideology, 
that is, what the enemy deemed right had to be wrong.   
However, all the films mentioned above met no censorship problems in Hong 
Kong.  Although the colonial government handled film censorship much in the way 
it did in the days of the Sino-Japanese conflict before the Pacific War (see Chapter 2), 
the contextual circumstances had become more complex with the interference from 
the US in addition to the antagonism between the CPC and KMT regimes.102   
                                                 
100 For more about Revenge at Guang Chang Long, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. I (1997: 
177); for more about The Romantic Thief White Chrysanthemum and Waving the Red Ribbon, see Hong 
Kong Filmography Vol. II (1998: 109, 163). 
 
101 For more about The Soul of China, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. II (1998: 207-8), Fu 
(2003: 145-7) and Yu (1998: 152-3).  
 
102 Welsh (1997: 447) notes: “The staff of the US Consulate in Hong Kong suddenly, and not at 
all mysteriously, multiplied, to the embarrassment of the colonial government.  In 1938 there had been 
a Consul-General, two Consuls, and two Vice-Consuls; in 1953 there were 115 in all, including four 
Consuls and twenty Vice-Consuls, to administer the affairs of an American community of 1,262 — 
including themselves.  Sir Alexander Grantham . . . [said] in his 1968 radio interview . . . : ‘I took a 
poor view of it [the consulate] — the largest anywhere in the world’, with a staff ‘at enmity with the 
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While the Hong Kong administration did not share the American 
admiration for Chiang Kai-shek, although at the same time not being 
enthusiastic about the Communists, most people in Hong Kong had not 
initially been averse to the new government in China, believing that 
almost any change from the Kuomintang would be for the better.  
London agreed; after some hesitation, and following the established 
pragmatic principle of recognizing any government in obvious control 
of its territory, Britain was among the first, in January 1950, to offer 
recognition to the new regime in Beijing.  Since Britain continued also 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of Taiwan, it was many years before 
relations were formalized by an exchange of ambassadors, but the 
China Hong Kong had to deal with was now the People’s Republic.  
Since Beijing refused to agree that Hong Kong was anything other than 
an integral part of China, temporarily under foreign administration, it 
was impossible to have direct diplomatic links between the two; the 
dilemma was solved by entrusting Chinese interests to Xinhua (Hsin 
Hua), the New China News Agency, . . .  ostensibly as a news agency 
but in fact, and quite openly, as the representative of the People’s 
Republic.103 
None of this was at all to the liking of the United States, still 
committed to the support of the Kuomintang, and bitter criticisms of 
British weakness towards Communism were forthcoming.  American 
subjects were advised to leave the colony, and some American 
companies closed shop.  A rapprochement between the wartime allies 
was achieved in June 1950 when [Britain] . . . followed the United 
States’ lead in opposing the North Korean invasion of the south.  
(Welsh 1997: 446) 
                                                                                                                                          
lawful government of mainland China’.  The CIA especially were ‘extremely ham-handed at one time 
until we had taken a very strong line to stop them being so stupid’ [sic]”.  Welsh (1997: 443) also 
comments, “[When the Nationalists were] confined to the island of Formosa – now to be known as 
Taiwan, where they ruthlessly established an authoritarian regime.  It also took twenty years for 
American policy to accept that this did not constitute the government of China.” 
 
103 Since its establishment up to 1 July 1997, the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch was 
de facto carrying out diplomatic mission of the PRC within the territory.  It was renamed to ‘The 
Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ 
on 18 January 2000. 
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While the US was trying its best to suppress communism, the colonial government 
was seemingly guarding against communist infiltration so as to avoid open rupture 
with the US, social unrest in Hong Kong and the potential threat to British interests.  
 
Hong Kong Cinema and the Colonial Prevention of Communism  
On 1 June 1950, a Chinese-language newspaper in Singapore, Nan Chiao 
Daily (Nan Chiau Jit Pao), reported that, according to a telex dated 22 May 1950 
from United Press (UP), a US news agency, the movie companies in Hong Kong 
were under the control of the Communist Party [referring to the CPC] almost without 
exception.  The [colonial] government asked for a halt to all communist propaganda; 
that was to say, the government would not let Hong Kong ‘go red’ [go communist] 
(cited in Yu 2000: 24).  In point of fact, a number of leftist people in the arts world 
fled from China to Hong Kong to escape persecution by the KMT.  The people, who 
escaped from mid-1948 on, included renowned writers Mao Dun and Kuo Morou, 
screenwriter/director Ouyang Yuqian, screenwriters/playwrights Xia Yan, Yu Ling 
and Yang Hansheng, and some other talented filmmakers.  According to Jarvie 
(1997: 29): 
In the early days after the Communist victory in China, the left-wing 
film people in Hong Kong seemed to have been very cocky.  This is 
understandable enough.  Their side had won a great victory and could 
at any moment decide to extend control to Hong Kong.  
However, the leftists in Hong Kong probably did not know when and why Beijing 
decided to leave Hong Kong alone.  In fact, Yonghua (also known as Yong Hwa) 
Motion Picture Industries Limited, founded by Li Zuyong and Zhang Shankun, did 
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produce some communism-themed films in 1949 such as Wu Zuguang’s Peasant’s 
Tragedy (Shan He Lei, 1949) and The Story of Little Shrimp (Chun Feng Qiu Yu, 
1949) as well as Cheng Bugao’s A Fisherman’s Honour (Hai Shi, 1949) when 
Ouyang Yuqian headed the company’s major directorial and scripting works (Law 
and Bren 2012: 145-7).104  However, this was not typical of the Hong Kong film 
industry in 1950, which was far removed from the UP telex description of being 
under the operation of the Communist Party almost without exception.  Based on 
the materials available thus far, the telex overstated the situation at the time of its 
publication.  Since the information was from a US news agency, it could be seen as 
a warning made by the capitalist camp in the Cold War.  Almost at the same time 
the UP telex was published, the colonial government convened a meeting of the film 
producers.  According to the English-language newspaper, the Hong Kong Standard, 
published on 23 May 1950, “Hong Kong Government . . . told [the film producers] 
not to produce films that would cause disturbance” (cited in Jarvie 1977: 29-30).  
Yu (2000: 24-5) further remarks that the government said that all screenplays had to 
be censored before actual filming, which was against the traditional British cultural 
policy, and no pro-communism film would be permitted (while erotic films were not 
on the list).  Moreover, the telex was issued about one month before the outbreak of 
the Korean War, a sensitive and tense time for the Eastern and Western blocs in the 
Cold War.  It was reasonable to assume that the colonial government, being 
politically subordinate to the British Government which was an ally of the Western 
bloc, was obliged to make a gesture indicating its stance about restricting 
communism.  Later, the British Commonwealth Forces took part in the Korean War 
to fight against the North Korean army and the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC.   
                                                 
104 For more information about A Peasant’s Tragedy, A Fisherman’s Honour and The Story of 
Little Shrimp, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. II (1998: 329, 411 and 423). 
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In the 1950s, Britain valued Hong Kong as a trading centre and an entrepot, 
and the main task of the colonial government in Hong Kong was to safeguard British 
interests in China and Asia and the economic benefit Britain anticipated receiving.  
The profound lessons of the seamen’s strike in 1922 and the sixteen-month long 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong Strike-Boycott from 1925 to 1926 had made the colonial 
government wary of labour movements and it considered workers’ strikes a 
subversive action that threatened colonial rule, public order and economic 
prosperity.105  It would also have been aware that, since mid-1948, the successive 
victories of the CPC in the Chinese Civil War had stirred up strong nationalist and 
anti-imperialist sentiments among the local leftists.  On 5 March 1949, Creech 
Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, mentioned in a memorandum to the 
British Cabinet that he considered Hong Kong might face threats from three 
directions, namely, disturbance produced by leftist unions, the influx of refugees and 
guerrilla invasion from the outside organized by the CPC (cited in Chau 2009: 28).  
In light of the memorandum, the Hong Kong Government reinforced the colony’s 
military and police force and strengthened its governance through legislation.  As 
can be seen in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong SAR’s Hansard, several 
ordinances in relation to these anxieties were enacted in 1949.  On 20 January, the 
Legislative Council passed the “Immigrants Control Bill, 1949” into law (Hansard: 
LegCo Sittings 1949 Session: 21-3).  Before the enactment of this ordinance, 
Chinese could enter into, exit from and move within the colony without any 
formality, but by this new ordinance, no persons could enter the colony except at 
                                                 
105 For more about the seamen’s strike of 1922, see Liu (2009: 143-6); for more about the 
Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott, see Liu (2009: 146-153), Anjali Cadambi (26 Sept 2010), Chan 
Lau Kit-ching (1999: 53-70), Au et al. (2011: 151-9) and Chan Ming Kou (1975: 268-356).  See also 
Chapter 2 for the impact of the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott on Hong Kong cinema. 
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specified points and with permission.  In addition, Subsection 1 under Section 11 of 
the ordinance states:   
[A]ny immigrant . . . [who] is suspected of being likely to promote 
sedition or to cause a disturbance of the public tranquility . . . the 
Immigration Officer may prohibit such person from landing in the 
Colony and may in his discretion detain him until an opportunity arises 
to return him to his place of embarkation or to the country of his birth or 
citizenship.  (University of Hong Kong Libraries) 
On 27 April, the Legislative Council enacted the “Illegal Strikes and Lock-outs, 
1949” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1949 Session: 152), which was alleged to be: 
An Ordinance to prevent strikes and lock-outs having an object other 
than or in addition to the furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade 
or industry in which the disputants are engaged and being calculated to 
coerce the Government, and to prevent breaches of contract of service 
the consequence of which may be injurious to the public.  (University 
of Hong Kong Libraries) 
On 25 May, the “Societies Bill, 1949” was passed into law (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 
1949 Session: 178-9); Subsection 3 of Section 5 of it states: 
Where the Registrar is satisfied that a local society is a branch of or is 
affiliated or connected with any organization or group of a political 
nature established outside the Colony, he shall refuse to register it and 
where it appears to him that any local society is likely to be used for 
unlawful purposes or for any purpose prejudicial to or incompatible 
with peace, welfare or good order in the Colony, he shall refuse to 
register it.  (University of Hong Kong Libraries) 
On 17 August, the council passed the “Registration of Persons Bill, 1949”, which 
was “to provide for the registration of persons the issue of identity cards” (Hansard: 
LegCo Sittings 1949 Session: 236-7).  Section 9 of it provided the Registration 
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Commissioner or any authorized police officer with the lawful power to arrest and 
detain any suspect, and to search his/her property (University of Hong Kong 
Libraries).  On 31 August, the council enacted the “Expulsion of Undesirable 
Ordinance, 1949” and the “Emergency Regulations (Amendment) (No. 2), 1949” 
(Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1949 Session: 240-3); the former was purported to be “[a]n 
Ordinance to control the population of the Colony by providing for the expulsion of 
undesirables therefrom as occasion may require” (University of Hong Kong 
Libraries), and the latter clarified: “(a) that the death penalty and other sanctions may 
be imposed; (b) that it has always been the law that such emergency regulations 
could over-ride the ordinary law” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1949 Session 1949: 
234-5).   
Not long after the establishment of the PRC, the law-enforcement officials in 
Hong Kong exercised the power commissioned by the new ordinances mentioned 
above.  On the fourth and fifth of January 1950, the colonial government expelled 
the chairman of the silk labour union and the principal of Heung To Middle School 
from Hong Kong respectively (Chau 2009: 95-6).  On 31 January 1950, the 
government expelled three leaders of the tramway workers’ union after a more than 
one-month long strike which had led to a violent confrontation between the police 
and the workers on the night of 30 January 1950.106  From 4 January 1950 to 29 
May 1959, a total of one hundred and eighteen persons were expelled without any 
court trial (Chau 2009: 365-7).   
In 1952, the colonial government used the “Expulsion of Undesirable” and 
the “Illegal Strikes and Lock-outs” ordinances against the leftist filmmakers for the 
                                                 
106 For more about the tramway workers’ strike that occurred from 24 December 1949 to 10 
February 1950, see Chau 2009: 50-6. 
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first time.  After two large-scale productions, namely, Bu Wancang’s The Soul of 
China and Zhu Shilin’s Sorrows of the Forbidden City (Qing Gong Mi Shi, 1948), the 
film company mentioned earlier, Yonghua, went into financial crisis in 1949 even 
though the two films were instant hits upon their releases.107  The crisis was mainly 
due to the collapse of currency and the paralyzed banking system in Yonghua’s 
previous major market — China — after the CPC defeated the KMT and took 
power.108  Very soon, Yonghua could not pay its staff regularly, and the financial 
crisis evolved into a severe conflict between the boss of the company, Li Zuyong, 
and the staff when the pay was in arrears for a time.  The leftist filmmakers at 
Yonghua went on strike in succession and mobilized outside support from the film 
industry.  In early January 1952, the company’s business was crippled by a strike 
which was eventually ended by government intervention.  On the tenth and 
fourteenth of January, Hong Kong police arrested ten leftist filmmakers and deported 
them.109  In this outline, the incident might seem like an ordinary industrial dispute 
and has been represented as such by scholars such as Law and Bren (2012: 152) and 
Yu (2000: 66-7).  Nevertheless, when the expulsion of the leftist filmmakers is 
placed in a greater socio-political context, it does not stand alone.  It took place at a 
time of tension between the colonial government and leftist activists.  The climax of 
the industrial dispute at Yonghua happened in the aftermath of a fire at the Tung Tau 
squatter area on 21 November 1951, which made more than fifteen thousand people 
homeless.  Two days after the fire, the colonial government clashed with the 
                                                 
107 For more about Sorrows of the Forbidden City, see Yu (1998: 153-9) and Wong (2001: 56). 
 
108 For more about the financial crisis of Yonghua, see Fu 2003: 146-7. 
 
109 The ten filmmakers were screenwriters Qi Wenshao, Shen Ji and Ma Kwok-leung; artistes Shu 
Shi, Liu Qiong, Yang Hua and Di Fan; director/actor Bai Chen; writer/critic Si Ma Wen Sen and 
cinematographer Jiang Wei (Chau 2009: 102, 366; Law and Bren 2012: 152).  See also Wong (2001: 
40-2) for Shu Shi’s recall of his deportation experience.   
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squatters and sympathetic Hong Kong citizens when the government proclaimed the 
Tung Tau squatter area a demolition zone and asked all the victims to move to a hill 
at Ngau Tau Kok, a district in Kowloon.  The government made matters worse by 
keeping the money donated by the public, a total of two hundred and twenty 
thousand dollars, and not distributing any of it to the victims.  The government’s 
performance angered the victims who were supported by social activists, mainly the 
leftists, who also gave food aid.  On 6 January 1952, the victims’ representatives 
issued an open letter to expose how wrong the government had been in dealing with 
the aftermath of the fire and revealed that some one hundred policemen had 
dismantled the remaining squatters’ homes by force and injured some victims.  Thus, 
the government, being pressurized by public opinion, distributed the donated money 
on 9 January but expelled two leftist union leaders and five representatives of the 
victims from Hong Kong between 10 January and 3 February.110  The expulsion 
started on the same night that the leftist filmmakers were expelled as a consequence 
of the strike of the Yonghua filmmakers.  Shu Shi, one of the deported filmmakers, 
said in his monograph that he did not take part in any strike and had left Yonghua by 
the time the police arrested him.  However, he was considered sympathetic towards 
the Communists as he had joined a group of filmmakers on a trip to Guangzhou to 
entertain and honour the People’s Liberation Army after the establishment of the 
PRC (see Wong 2001: 37-41).   
Research has shown that the strike at Yonghua and, thus, the subsequent 
expulsions of filmmakers, was not only due to salary matters, but also politics and 
that it was related to Yonghua’s internal political censorship and the clash of 
                                                 
110 For more about the aftermath of the Tung Tau fire and how it developed into hostility between 
the leftists and the colonial government, see Chau 2009: 82-90.  
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ideologies.  For example, according to Taiwanese film historians Du Yunzhi (1988: 
414-6) and Huang Ren (2009: 71-2), Li Zuyong incinerated tens of thousand feet of 
the film negative of The Misfortune Young Nobleman (Luonan Gongzi) directed by 
Li Pingqian in 1950 because he was resentful about the director’s alteration to the 
script on filming locations and considered the film sympathetic to the Communists.  
The incident upset the leftist filmmakers and led to a strike on the pretext of asking 
for owed wages.  In addition, the newly established Central People’s Government of 
the PRC (Chinese Government) froze Yonghua’s box-office income in the Chinese 
Mainland and confiscated Li Zuyong’s assets in Shanghai.  Yonghua was forced to 
stop production for a year.  A few years later in 1955, when Yonghua was about to 
go bankrupt, Li Zuyong turned to the KMT for backing.  Yonghua finally dissolved 
when Li died a frustrated man in 1959 (see also Law and Bren 2012: 153).  Fu 
(2003: 149) also attributes the issues to politics: 
[What] troubled Li Zuyong most was what he saw as Communist 
infiltration in Yonghua.  The escalation of the Nationalist-Communist 
conflict since 1947 had brought a stream of leftist writers and artists 
fleeing the white reign of terror to Hong Kong. . . . All of them were 
committed to transforming Hong Kong film culture into an ideological 
weapon against the Nationalist state.  As a result, many well-known 
leftists were on the payroll of Yonghua.  Under their influence, a few 
films produced in 1949 . . . contained subtle messages of class struggle.  
At the same time, ‘study groups’ (dushu hui) and other organized 
cultural activities were formed to discuss current affairs and promote 
the Communist cause among the staff.111  An avowed Nationalist 
loyalist, Li Zuyong declared war on this Communist infiltration.  He 
demanded that all scripts be approved by him, and no deviations from 
them either in dialogues or scene arrangement were allowed in 
production.  This led to a series of confrontations between him and the 
leftists, whose numbers and influence had steadily increased after the 
                                                 
111 The ‘study groups’ were set up to study the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. 
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Communist victory on the mainland, culminating in a week-long strike 
in early 1950 that, among other things, demanded that Li respect their 
artistic autonomy and pay them all the salaries he owed them.  
Yonghua stopped production during the strike, but Li refused to give up 
his anti-Communist policy.112   
As Fu says, Li Zuyong was an “avowed Nationalist loyalist” and “refused to 
give up his anti-Communist policy”.  However, Law’s analysis of Li and his work 
provides a different perspective: 
[W]hen discussing the career of film mogul Li Zuyong . . . , 
Cheng’s book [1978, Beijing] describes him as an “arms merchant and 
an opportunist dealing in the gold market”.  “He was also the major 
shareholder of an enterprise specializing in printing money for the 
reactionary KMT Government and maintained close links with 
reactionaries all over the country.  He founded the Yonghua Studio not 
only to make money but clearly to put it at the disposal of the KMT 
reactionaries in their hour of flagging fortunes.  Hence from the 
beginning, he drew to his side the traitor Zhang Shankun who had also 
fled to Hongkong, employing him as production chief.  Because of his 
own reactionary standpoint and the KMT’s reliance on him, the 
majority of Yonghua’s productions — such as Soul of China, Sorrows 
of the Forbidden City . . . — contained reactionary thinking” (Volume 2 
p. 316). 
Here is what Du [1972, Taipei] says: “. . . [Li Zuyong] established 
the Yonghua Company with an investment of US$3,750,000 and came 
up with high-quality works such as Soul of China, Sorrows of the 
Forbidden City . . . . Li was an outstanding Chinese filmmaker who 
could not fulfil his life’s ambitions because of the turbulent times he 
found himself and his country in.  He died in frustration, a great loss 
for Chinese cinema.  Li had many admirable qualities, one worth 
mentioning was his determined anti-communism.  He would rather 
face the most extreme of difficulties than to bow to the demands of 
                                                 
112 Shu Shi’s recall of Yonghua in Wong (2001: 37), though briefly, testifies to Fu’s narrative.  
For a complete story of and controversy over Yonghua from its founding to its collapse, see Du (1988: 
405-416, 517-524) and Cheng et al. (1978b: 315-320); see also Fu (2003: 144-150), Yu (1998: 163-6; 
2000: 66-7), Huang (2009: 71-3) and Wong (2001: 22-3) for relatively more objective views. 
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left-wingers.  Such resolute anti-communism was rare in men” 
(Volume 3, pp. 103-104). 
Both authors display their obvious political leanings, their views of 
historic personalities in Chinese cinema being coloured by politics.  
Which author is correct?  (1997: 15) 
Perhaps, both Cheng and Du are incorrect, perhaps they are just biased, blinded by 
doctrinal ideologies and obeisance to political correctness.  However, the 
contradiction between their views remains a clear illustration of the KMT-CPC, or 
the rightist-leftist, ideological rivalry as well as a manifestation of cold war reasoning.  
Law continues: 
When it was first established, Yonghua was under the influence of 
‘progressive filmmakers’ (Cheng’s words) or was ‘infiltrated by 
left-wingers’ (Du’s words).  In point of fact, both the Peking regime 
and the Taipei regime were fighting a ‘united front’ war and both 
wanted to woo Yonghua.  Li did not make known his preferences until 
the very end.  Hence, how was it possible to maintain that he had 
political motives for founding Yonghua right from the very start?  The 
facts have shown that both Li and Zhang Shankun established the 
company as a business investment.  Li was the money-man, Zhang the 
brains behind the operation.  Because Shanghai’s film industry was 
affected by the Civil War, Li and Zhang found it opportune to move to 
Hongkong and produce Mandarin-language films for distribution in the 
Mainland.  They fished around for Shanghai talent to bring with 
them . . . . 
The political orientation of these talented individuals cannot be 
determined one way or the other.  Li and Zhang brought them to 
Hongkong not for any political reason.  They were motivated by pure 
business facts, i.e. the depressing state of the industry in Shanghai and 
the Civil War. . . . In their business calculations, they failed to reckon 
with the speed with which the Communists won ascendency over the 
KMT.  In 1948, seeing that the situation in the company was 
worsening, Zhang Shankun announced that he was pulling out of 
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Yonghua for good. . . . [T]he vital Mainland market was lost when the 
Communist authorities started to ban Yonghua products. . . . Between 
1950 and 1951, the studio was in dire financial straits with productions 
starting and closing down intermittently and staff not paid.  The 
‘progressive left-wing filmmakers’ employed by the studio (in 
particular Shen Ji) began to instigate workers to press for pay, leading 
to a workers’ strike . . . .  (1997: 16) 
If Law is correct, it would mean that Fu’s depiction of Li Zuyong’s refusal to 
give up his anti-Communist policy would have been based on the more commercial 
consideration of securing the Taiwan market rather than any political consideration.  
In another sense, Li Zuyong either made use of politics with the intention of 
furthering his business or he was manipulated by politics and political powers.  In 
any case, the industrial dispute at Yonghua in 1952, which is understood to have been 
a struggle between the leftists and rightists, was just a prelude.  In the following 
years, the Hong Kong film industry was split into the leftist and the rightist camps.   
  
Hong Kong Cinema as Battlefront between Left and Right 
Although the Chinese Civil War ended with the CPC’s seizure of power over 
the Chinese Mainland and the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan, both the PRC and the 
Republic of China (ROC) governments’ fight to be the legitimate government of 
China continued; cross-Strait relations remained in a state of war.113  In 1953, the 
US exported considerable quantities of armaments to Taiwan and was exchanging 
views with the ROC Government on the “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 
                                                 
113 By and large, the state of war across the Taiwan Strait ceased in 1979 after the PRC 
established diplomatic relations with the US.  However, the end of the state of war was officially 
signified when the Taiwan Government lifted martial law in 1987 and abolished the “Mobilization for 
the Suppression of Communist Rebellion Provisional Act” in 1991.   
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States of America and the Republic of China”.  The aim was to forge the American 
policy of containment against the expansion of communism in East Asia.114  In 
response to the military liaison between the US and Taiwan, the People’s Liberation 
Army bombarded Taiwan’s Kinmen (also known as Quemoy) on 3 September 1954 
and triggered off the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (also known as Formosa Crisis) that 
continued for one year.  It was in this context that the leftist and rightist cinemas in 
Hong Kong systematically took shape. 
The leftist and rightist cinemas, which were hostile to each other in ideology 
and political stance, both drew up their ‘united front’ in the cultural battlefield and 
were guided, supported and funded by either the CPC or the KMT regimes.  The 
leftists described their comrades in the film industry as ‘progressive’ filmmakers, and 
the rightists described their fellow travellers in the film industry as ‘free’ filmmakers.  
In both cinemas, there were film people who pronounced themselves patriots with 
the difference that they were either patriots of the PRC led by the CPC or the ROC 
led by the KMT.  The rightists disagreed with the CPC’s ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ and feared the Communist confiscation of private property while the 
leftists hated the corruption of the KMT.  What the authentic leftist and rightist 
filmmakers shared in common was their advocacy of nationalism and democracy 
(albeit their own versions).  However, paradoxically both the regimes they 
embraced, supported and were loyal to, were later proved to be totalitarian since they 
both used violent repression and political persecution against the people under their 
                                                 
114 The “Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and the ROC” was terminated on 1 January 
1980, a year after the US established diplomatic relations with the PRC.  However, diplomatic relations 
between the US and Taiwan was de facto maintained under the Taiwan Relations Act enacted on 10 
April 1979. 
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governance.  By and large, the leftist cinema front line took shape about a couple of 
years earlier than the rightist cinema.   
In the 1950s and 1960s, the leftist cinema in Hong Kong was mainly led by 
three companies, namely, Great Wall (also known as Changcheng) Movie Enterprises 
Limited, Feng Huang (also known as Phoenix) Motion Picture Company and Sun 
Luen Film Company.   
In mid-1949, film producer Zhang Shankun, who was usually considered 
rightist, teamed up with former Shanghai lawyer Yuen Yang-an (also known as Yuan 
Yangan) and founded the Great Wall Pictures Corporation (also known as ‘old Great 
Wall’) with the financial support of the leftist shipping magnate, Lu Jiankang.  The 
company’s debut film was A Forgotten Woman (Dang Fu Xin, 1949, an adaptation of 
Tolstoy’s Resurrection) starring the popular star, Bai Guang, and directed by Griffin 
Yue (also known as Yue Feng).115  As Zhang Shankun cared a great deal about 
publicity, he held a gala ceremony for the premiere of the film at the King’s Theatre 
in Central with Governor Alexander Grantham as the guest of honour (Fu 2003: 150).  
Other popular and successful productions of Great Wall included Ma Xu Weibang’s 
The Haunted House (Quion Lou Hen, 1949) and Griffin Yue’s The Flower Street 
(Hua Jie, 1950) starring the golden voice of Zhou Xuan.116  However, the financial 
situation of Great Wall deteriorated when it could not sell its productions to China 
after the CPC won the civil war.  In this instance, Foucault’s theory of author 
function matters: As Zhang Shankun was formerly close to the KMT and an active 
film producer in the previously Japanese-occupied Shanghai, the CPC considered 
                                                 
115 For more about A Forgotten Woman, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. II (1998: 347). 
 
116 For more about The Haunted House, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. II (1998: 418); for 
more about The Flower Street, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. III (2000: 68-9). 
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him an enemy and ‘traitor to the Chinese nation-race’ (hanjian), and, thus, prohibited 
his company’s productions.   
In the wake of the CPC’s prohibition, Zhang Shankun argued that Great Wall 
should give up the Chinese Mainland market and develop the Taiwan market instead.  
However, his partner Yuen Yang-an disagreed.  According to Huang (2009: 73), it 
was also at this time that the CPC began to consolidate its pro-communist films and 
set up a studio in Hong Kong.  In 1950, the Communists made contact with Zhang 
Shankun via Ouyang Yuqian, advising him to return to China to declare his stance 
and then get back to Hong Kong to continue the work of Great Wall.  Zhang 
Shankun refused to step foot in China because he was afraid of the Communist 
‘political liquidation’.  Zhang Shankun’s wife Tong Yuejuan (2000: 41) recalls the 
incident:  
[W]e were approached by members of the Communist Party who asked 
us to join the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.  We 
refused. . . . So we made some enemies there.  Later, we left on a 
trip . . . on the pretext of promotion, and went to countries like 
Singapore, Thailand.  We didn’t come back until two months later, and 
we found out that Great Wall had been turned into a kind of leftist study 
centre.  We were booted out.  That year should be around 1950. 
The Great Wall without Zhang Shankun was restructured, renamed Great Wall Movie 
Enterprises Limited, and managed by Yuen Yang-an (see Huang 2009: 73).  Yuen 
Yang-an brought in Lu Jiankang again to support him (Shen 2001: 305).117  
However, after making a few films, Yuen Yang-an ran out of money again.  The 
son-in-law of Yuen Yang-an, George Shen (ibid) writes, “To Beijing, after Great Wall 
ran out of money, Yuen’s major and only asset was his reputation.  In 1956, he was 
                                                 
117 For more about the founding of Great Wall, see Wong (2001: xviii-xix), Yu (1998: 205-8), Fu 
(2003: 150-2), Fu (2003: 150-2) and Huang (2009: 73). 
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invited to lead a group of Hong Kong filmmakers to visit Beijing, and was received 
by Premier Zhou Enlai.  But from that time onward, Mainland cadres would watch 
his every move at Great Wall.  It was no longer his company.”  Although George 
Shen has not made it clear, it is understood that Great Wall was funded by the CPC 
after Yuen Yang-an’s visit to Beijing.  Yuen Yang-an left Great Wall the following 
year.  Jarvie (1977: 29) remarks, “Perhaps the left’s greatest success was the 
infiltration and eventual take-over of the Great Wall Motion Pictures Co. . . . The 
name was varied to the Great Wall Film Production Company Limited [also known 
as ‘new Great Wall’] and was Communist in outlook.”   
As mentioned earlier, before founding the old Great Wall Zhang Shankun 
established Yonghua Motion Picture Industries Limited with the financial support by 
Li Zuyong, and recruited many filmmakers who were previously based in Shanghai, 
such as Shen Ji, Shu Shi, Gu Eryi, Liu Qiong, Ouyang Yuqian, Zhu Shilin, Bu 
Wancang, Li Pingqian, Cheng Bugao, Wu Zuguang and so on (Law 1997: 16).   
Many of them had worked for Zhang Shankun’s joint Sino-Japanese venture, China 
United Productions Limited (Zhonglian), when Shanghai was occupied by the 
Japanese military.118  After The Soul of China and Sorrows of the Forbidden City, 
Zhang Shankun left Yonghua in 1948.  When Yonghua fell into severe financial 
difficulties, a group of employees left and formed their own co-operative enterprise, 
the 50TH Year Motion Pictures, with their labour force serving as investment capital.  
They produced The Fiery Phoenix (Huo Feng Huang, 1951) directed by Wang Weiyi 
                                                 
118 ‘Zhonglian’ was the short form of ‘Zhongguo Lianhe Zhipian Gufen Gonsi’ (China United 
Productions Ltd).  The establishment of Zhonglian in 1942 was facilitated by Zhang Shankun’s 
cooperation with the Japanese to centralize film production by merging twelve film companies in 
occupied Shanghai.  As Zhang Shankun was also the managing director of Zhonglian, nationalist 
discourse usually depicted him as a ‘typical collaborator’ who betrayed his country for the sake of 
personal gain.  For more about the occupation cinema of occupied Shanghai from 1941 to 1945, see Fu 
(2003: 93-132). 
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and Witch, Devil, Man (Shen Gui Ren, 1952) which was comprised of three stories 
directed by Gu Eryi, Bai Chen and Shu Shi respectively.119  The success of the two 
films encouraged the filmmakers to believe that the ‘co-operative’ mode was a viable 
means of running a film production business.  In spite of their confidence, 50TH 
Year Motion Pictures could not carry on with its productions and was forced to close 
after the government deported the company’s core founding personnel such as Shu 
Shi, Liu Qiong and Bai Chen in 1952.  But the idea continued and the co-operative 
mode in turn inspired Zhu Shilin to form Feng Huang later.  During the early 1950s, 
Zhu Shilin was working for Dragon-Horse (Loon-Ma) Films, which was founded in 
1950, financed by businessman Wu Xingzai and managed by director Fei Mu.  
After Fei Mu died of heart attack in 1951, Zhu Shilin took over the company when 
Wu Xingzai left the next year.120  In 1953, Zhu Shilin, together with the filmmakers 
of Dragon-Horse and the former members of 50TH Year, formed Feng Huang and 
operated the company in co-operative mode, yet the company also received support 
from the CPC.121   
Sun Luen, the only one among the three major leftist film companies that was 
devoted to Cantonese film productions, was founded in 1952 and headed up by the 
former editor of Wen Wei Po, Liu Yet-yuen (also known as Liao Yiyuan).122  The 
company was nominally financed by overseas Chinese patriots, but was, in fact, 
                                                 
119 For more about 50TH Year Motion Pictures, see Yu (2000: 21-3) and Wong (2001: 37-40); for 
more about The Fiery Phoenix and Witch, Devil, Man, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. III (2000: 
198-9 and 496-8). 
 
120 For more about Dragon-Horse, Wu Xingzai and Fei Mu, see Yu (2000: 39-44) and Shen (2001: 
261). 
 
121 For more about the founding of Feng Huang, see Wong (2001: xix-xx, 84) and Zhou (2009: 
24-5). 
 
122 Wen Wei Po was first published in Shanghai in 1938.  Its Hong Kong eidtion was launched in 
1948 and serves as the mouthpiece of the PRC in Hong Kong. 
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funded by the Central People’s Government of the PRC (Zhou 2009: 25 and Lo: 
2000: 130).  Its mission was to unite the ‘progressive’ Cantonese filmmakers in 
Hong Kong.   
Great Wall, Feng Huang and Sun Luen shared the same guiding principles in 
both their productions and political stance, and recognized the PRC as their mother 
country.  According to Chinese Mainland scholar Zhou Chengren (2009: 25), these 
companies were directly under the State Council of the PRC and seen by Zhou Enlai, 
the Premier of the PRC from October 1949 to January 1976.123  After its entry into 
the Korean War, the PRC was isolated from the rest of the world because of the total 
embargo on trade of any kind imposed by the US and the strategic embargo imposed 
by the United Nations.  The US embargo did not cease with the end of the Korean 
War but lasted until the early 1970s.  Under such conditions, setting aside the 
‘Question of Hong Kong’ became the pragmatic national policy of the PRC.  In the 
1950s and 1960s, Hong Kong served as a strategic window for closed-door China as 
well as a crucial, complex, cultural and politico-economical link between the PRC 
and the outside world (see Qi, Pengfei n.d.).  Meanwhile, the leftist cinema in the 
colony functioned as a cultural means to propagate New China and was primarily 
targeted at the worldwide overseas Chinese communities, including Hong Kong.   
In order to strengthen the influence of New China on Hong Kong, 
China had to support the leftist cinema.  Hong Kong’s leftist cinema 
had countless ties with China, in social, cinematic or people-to-people 
relationships.  In importing leftist films into the country, China was 
showing mutual support in moral and economic terms, apart from 
allowing China to exert direct ideological influence on Hong Kong’s 
culture.  (Hu Ke 2000: 19) 
                                                 
123 After the Cultural Revolution, the Xinhua News Agency dealt with the leftist film 
undertakings in Hong Kong. 
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However, since Great Wall, Feng Huang and Sun Luen were based in Hong Kong, 
they had to satisfy Hong Kong and overseas audience’s taste for entertainment, and, 
therefore, may not have entirely matched the contemporary socio-political 
sensitivities of the Chinese Mainland.  However, before 1964, the Chinese 
Government imported some of the Hong Kong leftist films that agreed with the 
literature and art policy set by the CPC (see Chapter 5).   
The import of Hong Kong films into China was directly connected 
to the political atmosphere inside China.  When the political situation 
was more volatile, the number of films imported decreased.  Those 
that were imported were limited to the products of the Chang-Feng-Xin 
companies [Great Wall, Feng Huang and Sun Luen], whose styles were 
more sedate.  When the political situation stabilized and became more 
relaxed, the numbers increased and the styles and contents of films 
imported varied greatly, to the delight of film fans.   
The import of Hong Kong films reached a peak between 1960-62. 
11 features were imported in 1960, five in 1961, and 17 in 1962.124  
(Hu Ke 2000: 23) 
Nonetheless, from 1964 to 1977, no Hong Kong films were exported across the 
northern border because of the extreme left prohibition policies in the Chinese 
Mainland at that time and the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(commonly known as the Cultural Revolution) in 1966. 
As for the rightist cinema, its formation was, in fact, more market-oriented 
than politics-driven.  From the 1930s onwards, China was a significant market for 
Hong Kong films, in particular, the Mandarin films, but the situation changed when 
the PRC was founded.   
                                                 
124 According to Hong Kong Film Archive, Hong Kong produced eight hundred and ten films 
between 1960 and 1962, which implies that only a very small portion of Hong Kong films were 
imported into the Chinese Mainland in the three years even though it was already at a ‘peak’ in that era 
according to Hu (2009: 23). 
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New China adopted Soviet-style management to administer the country.  
The government created a special institution to govern the film industry.  
On 11 July 1950, the State Administrative Council of the Central 
Government promulgated . . . the “Provisional Measure for the Import 
of Foreign Films” which authorized a state institution to uniformly 
import, distribute and exhibit foreign films, including those from Hong 
Kong.  The state was in total control of the import and export of films 
based on the country’s political, economic and cultural needs.  The 
pre-1949 policy of free enterprise in handling film imports no longer 
existed.  (Hu Ke 2000: 19)   
In addition, the newly established PRC implemented strict film censorship to prohibit 
films that were not in line with the CPC’s ideology, in particular, all films from the 
capitalist territories except a limited number of titles produced by the leftist film 
companies in Hong Kong.125  In view of the new situation, the Hong Kong film 
industry gradually explored, valued and relied on the Taiwan market because of its 
population, economic prosperity and having Mandarin as a standard language.  In 
point of fact, the Communists were not as cunning as they might have thought with 
their censorship.  History has shown that the development of the Taiwan film 
industry and, thus, its film market in the 1950s and 1960s was indirectly facilitated 
by the exclusionism and strict censorship of its antagonist CPC.  In addition, after 
the PRC took part in the Korean War in late 1950, the anti-Communist atmosphere 
and general fear of communism was getting intense in Hong Kong.  All these 
conditions provided an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend their influence over 
the Hong Kong film industry.   
In order to consolidate existing supporters and attempt to recruit more ‘free’ 
filmmakers to join the Nationalist camp and recognize the ROC as their mother 
                                                 
125 During the Cold War years, cultural exchanges between China and the UK were not possible; 
the export of Hong Kong leftist films to China obviously circumvented normal procedures of 
Sino-British relations. 
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country, the ‘Hong Kong & Kowloon Union of Free Workers in the Film Industry’ 
was founded in 1953.  As membership had expanded to include workers in the 
Chinese opera undertakings by 1956, the union was renamed to ‘Hong Kong & 
Kowloon Union of Free Workers in the Cinema and Theatrical Enterprise’.  In 1957, 
it was renamed once again this time as ‘Hong Kong & Kowloon Cinema & 
Theatrical Enterprise Free General Association’ (commonly known as the Free 
General Association) since capitalists were also accepted as members after the 
association’s statutes were amended (see Tso 2009: 271-3, Lee 2009: 87).126  Such 
renaming signified the association’s transformation from a labour-oriented to a 
profession-oriented one, a characteristic that differentiated it from the leftist labour 
organizations that usually upheld proletarian solidarity and rivalry with the capitalists.  
According to Huang (2009: 74), the permanent site of the association was donated by 
Run Run Shaw, the boss of Shaw Brothers Studio.  One of its founders Tong 
Yuejuan recounts in her monograph: 
At that time, the number of members added up to a few thousand, 
including Shaw Brothers.  Before any film was made, they had to 
register with us.  We would then issue a certificate stating when the 
film was shot and sent it to Taiwan for approval.  No films could be 
shown in Taiwan without the certificate.  The Taiwan market was 
formidable at that time, and had many activities, such as the Double 
Ten Day [Shuang Shi Jie, also known as the Double Tenth Day; the 
national day of the ROC], film festival . . . and members could apply for 
the competition [the Golden Horse Award] with us.  (2000: 37; my 
translation)  
                                                 
126 The association was registered as a limited company in 1984 and renamed to HK & Kowloon 
Cinema and Theatrical Enterprise Free General Association Ltd.  In 1996, it was renamed to Hong 
Kong Cinema & Theatrical Enterprise Association Ltd.  In 1999, it was renamed one more time as 
Hong Kong & Macau Cinema and Theatrical Enterprise Association Ltd.  For more about the founding 
of the Free General Association, see Huang (2009: 73-5) and Tso (2009: 272-3). 
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Other than membership fees, the Free General Association was financially supported 
by the Government Information Office of the ROC (Huang 2009: 75).  The 
association claimed to lead the works of ‘free’ filmmakers and served as a 
communication channel between the Hong Kong film industry and the Taiwan 
Government.  It asked Hong Kong filmmakers to differentiate themselves from the 
Communists and to embrace freedom and the ROC by action (see Du 1988: 515-6).  
It boycotted and isolated the leftist filmmakers; films which had involved the artistes, 
directors, screenwriters, cinematographers and so forth that had collaborated with the 
leftist film companies would not be allowed to be exhibited in Taiwan.  It also 
forbade its members to work for the leftist companies and make any films within the 
PRC territories.  By means of market restriction, the association functioned as a 
united front apparatus as well as a regulatory and censorship organ of the KMT 
stationed in Hong Kong during the cold war era.  Not only were the films produced 
by its members censored, but also the political stance of the filmmakers.  The 
constraints set by the association affected the Hong Kong film industry until the 
mid-1990s.  For instance, in 1988, I served as the cinematographer for Taylor 
Wong’s box-office success The Truth (Fat Noi Ching), starring Andy Lau and Deanie 
Ip.  Since my debut directorial work No Regret (Leng Mui Jing Juen, 1987), which 
was released in Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland a year before the release of 
The Truth, was financed by Sil-Metropole Organization Limited, a state-run company 
of the PRC, the Free General Association blacklisted me and prohibited me from the 
Taiwan market.127  Therefore, not only my name could not appear in the front 
credits of The Truth, the cinematography was credited to a fake name in the end 
                                                 
127 Sil-Metropole Organization Limited was founded in 1982 with the merger of Great Wall, Feng 
Huang, Sun Luen together with another leftist company, Chung Yuen Motion Picture Company.  For 
more about the formation of Sil-Metropole, see Sil-Metropole 2010: 364. 
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roller too.  At the end of the day, many of the filmmakers whom the Free General 
Association reckoned to be ‘free’ were essentially not free; they were wrapped 
around by pre-set restrictions.  The so-called ‘free’ filmmakers sympathized with 
the Nationalist political stance in appearance only; many of them were neutral or 
apolitical but presented themselves as rightist for the sake of their livelihood and a 
better income.  However, this type of ‘opportunist’ not only existed in the rightist 
camp, but in the leftist camp as well.  This was what ‘politics’ meant for filmmakers 
in the heat of the cold war. 
After the establishment of the Free General Association, Hong Kong cinema, 
in a broad sense, significantly and distinctly divided into the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ 
which competed with each other in political ideologies and poaching renowned 
filmmakers.  Furthermore:  
The American intervention in the KMT-CCP conflicts across the 
Taiwan Strait had the consequence of turning both Hong Kong and 
Taiwan into a strategic bulwark against the spread of communism over 
Southeast Asia.  In order to contain the spread of communism on 
cultural fronts, American dollars came pouring into East Asia in 
support of academic, educational, and other cultural activities that 
might possibly impede the growth of radical ideologies.  
The Asia Foundation, which was the chief American agent for such 
funding, supported three major publishing houses: You Lian [Union 
Press], Jin Ri Shi Jie [World Today], and Asia Press.  The Asia 
Foundation was connected with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); 
Jin Ri Shi Jie was a branch office of the United States Information 
Service (USIS). . . . While all of these institutions supported 
anti-communist intellectuals — be they essayists, philosophers, or 
moviemakers — by subsidizing their research projects or study plans, 
the You Lian [Union] Press also established a research institute to 
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gather information about Communist China.  (Law, Wing Sang 2009: 
132-3) 
As for targets other than publishing houses, the rightist film production company 
Asia Pictures Limited, founded in 1953 by former China correspondent for United 
Press Chang Kuo-sin who also headed up Asia Press, was also funded by the Asia 
Foundation.128 
The cold war between the leftist and rightist cinemas appeared to hinge on 
whether or not a certain Hong Kong film, even one without political content, was 
permitted to access the Taiwan market.  Actually the political struggle was 
superficial and the real aim was to compel Hong Kong filmmakers to declare, or to 
lie about, their positive stance towards the KMT and break with the CPC.  However, 
the struggle was much less distinct in the Cantonese cinema than in the Mandarin 
cinema.  In a broad sense, the Cantonese cinema tended to be bound by 
commercialism.  It was mostly concerned with making fast money, catered 
principally to the audiences seeking simple entertainment and paid little attention to 
quality and the pursuit of the aesthetic.  Most of the Cantonese films were 
multifarious and messy in ideology and did not fall into the categorization of left or 
right, but survived and made their fortune amid left and right.   
Nonetheless, there were some remarkable and respectable filmmakers in the 
Cantonese cinema that cared about their works’ quality and positive influence on 
their audience, and also their contribution to the well-being of society.  The most 
                                                 
128 “[Chang Kuo-sin] was first to report the conclusions of the six agreements between the 
Nationalists and Communists under General Marshall’s mediation in 1946, Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek’s decision to step down in December 1948, and the fall of Nanking in 23 April 1949 [sic]” 
(Lau, C. K. 22 February 2006).  He came to Hong Kong in December 1949 and was the Head of the 
Communication Department of the Hong Kong Baptist College from 1978 to 1985.  For more about 
Asia Pictures, see Yung, Sai Shing (2009: 125-144) and Wong and Lee (2009: 256-8). 
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noteworthy and outstanding among them were the filmmakers of Union Film 
Enterprise Limited, a co-operative enterprise without investment from a wealthy 
capitalist or a consortium headed by Ng Cho-fan.  From 1953 to 1964, the company 
produced forty-three films, all black and white and all in Cantonese; many of them 
inherited the legacy of the May Fourth Movement and were serious dramas with a 
critical stance on social issues.129  Although Ng Cho-fan had participated in a 
number of leftist films and had constant contact with the leftist filmmakers, Union 
Film had no support from Great Wall, Feng Huang or Sun Luen.  However, Union 
Film was often seen as leftist because the leftist newspapers such as Wen Wei Po had 
regular reports and reviews on its productions since its first film while the rightist 
newspapers such as Sing Tao Daily never mentioned its films.  In addition, the 
advertisements of the Union Film titles always occupied a large space in Wen Wei Po 
but a small space in Sing Tao Daily.  Yet only four to five Union Film titles entered 
the Communist China market, and all Union Film titles were rejected by the 
Nationalist Taiwan market (see Liu, Chi Keung 2001: 111-3).  Therefore, besides 
the local market, the company relied very much on the overseas markets in Nanyang 
and North America to survive.  In the light of this, it did not make sense to 
categorize Union Film as a leftist or rightist company.  
 
Filmmakers in Politically Sensitive Era: Left, Right, or Otherwise?       
The simple dichotomous categorization of Hong Kong filmmakers in the cold 
war years into leftist and rightist is, indeed, reductionist.  One should not ignore the 
fact that there were also filmmakers who did not trust the CPC or the KMT and 
                                                 
129 For a filmography and introductions of the films by Union Film, see Liu 2001: 115-186. 
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chose to reside in Hong Kong so as to avoid living in either of the two parties’ 
totalitarian states.  They just took up a political stance to maintain their 
livelihood.130  For example, director Evan Yang (also known as Yieh Veng), one of 
the founders of the Free General Association, and Yao Ke, who was supposed to be a 
rightist, wrote screenplays for Great Wall under aliases (Reeve 2010: 15).  
Jarvie (1977: 27) maintains that politics were unavoidable in the Hong Kong 
film industry: 
Politics have been a factor in the Hong Kong film industry from its 
beginnings . . . . After 1927, politics in China means Communists 
versus the KMT.  The Japanese invasion and later World War II 
interrupted what was in effect a protracted civil war, but never stopped 
it.  Twentieth century Chinese intellectuals, like many intellectuals the 
world over, have tended towards the left in varying degrees.  Dr. Sun 
Yat Sen was himself a radical and a socialist.  The May 4th Movement 
was also a radical one.  But many things continued under the KMT that 
radicals had hoped China was rid of.  This is why novelists, poets, 
playwrights, journalists, students and film directors tended to be 
radicals.  It would be a long time before simple mistrust of the extreme 
radicalism of the Communists would create anything like a right-wing: 
most of the time there were Communists and fellow-travellers, and 
non-Communists.   
Jarvie here briefly explains why most of the intellectual filmmakers before and after 
the war were, or tended to be, leftist and also indirectly suggests that the word 
‘rightist’, as it is used to describe the filmmakers (and the personnel in other cultural 
professions as well) in the cold war years, does not necessarily signify ‘Nationalist’, 
‘sympathetic to the KMT’, or ‘anti-Communist’.  No matter whether it is a 
                                                 
130 According to the monographs of veteran filmmakers in the 1950s and 1960s, many of them did 
not identify themselves as either leftists or the rightists and stated that they were just labelled as such by 
the opposing camp.  See Wong (2001) for the veteran filmmakers’ monographs.  See also Reeve 
(2010: 15-6). 
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descriptive modifier or a pronoun, the word ‘rightist’ is usually used in a loose sense 
and is just a term relative to ‘leftist’.  The people who were regarded as ‘rightists’ 
during the cold war also included the non-Communists, the apolitical and the de 
facto non-KMT sympathizers.  Above all, it should be noted that the usage of the 
terms ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ to describe filmmakers in the cold war years was just 
product of Cold War reasoning, under which the dichotomy of adversaries reigned, as 
in the Soviet Union versus the US, communism versus capitalism, friend versus 
enemy, and, thus, the ‘leftist’ versus the ‘rightist’.   
Regarding the categorization of the left and the right, Liu Yet-yuen, former 
head of Sun Luen and a significant representative of the Hong Kong leftist cinema, 
said in an interview on 19 August 1987: 
We would not claim ourselves to be leftist.  Those who are neither 
anti-Communist nor anti-Chinese are friends.  Therefore, there is a 
broad sphere of unification.  We did not consider Shaw Brothers as 
rightist for there was almost no anti-Communist works in their 
productions.  We would not reject them just because they led 
filmmakers to Taiwan every year to celebrate the Double Ten Day.  
Their productions were serious (though some were erotic). . . . Other 
than our own, we needed amicable companies too.  We saw from their 
works; the Shaw Brothers did not tie in with the ‘counter-attack on 
mainland’ theme but just catered to the backward audience.  (Cited in 
Zhou 2009: 28; my translation) 
In point of fact, the leftist and rightist filmmakers in Hong Kong were not total rivals 
in relation to business and trades.  From their establishment up to June 1966, that is, 
around the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the three major leftist film 
companies produced two hundred and sixty-two films (Liao [Liu] et al. 15 May 1997: 
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15).131  According to Liu Yet-yuen (15 October 1997: 9-10), the two leading and 
representational companies of the rightist cinema, the Shaw Brothers and the Cathay 
Organization Limited, were once the buyers and distribution agents of the Feng 
Huang and Great Wall titles in Southeast Asia respectively while Sun Luen sold its 
productions to Shaw Brothers, Cathay and also Kong Ngee Company (see also Lee, 
Pui-tak 2009: 86).132  Furthermore, veteran screenwriter and actor Chu Hak gives 
further evidence of the links: 
Did you know that most of Great Wall’s funding and outlet of 
productions depended on Shaw Brothers?  Shaw Brothers once 
contracted with Great Wall that the latter made ten films a year, and the 
former handed over one hundred and twenty thousand Hong Kong 
dollars for each of them, including the distribution rights in the 
Singapore and Malaysia markets.  With one hundred and twenty 
thousand dollars, Great Wall could make one film.  The local 
box-office takings plus the purchase fees from the US, Africa and other 
overseas markets, which added up to about one hundred thousand 
dollars, would be used to support Great Wall’s overheads.  Therefore, 
some people once said: Great Wall was a leftist company but supported 
by Shaw Brothers.  This paradox also illustrated one point, that is, 
Shaw Brothers owned many theatres in Malaysia, and it needed 
substantial film supplies.  (Wong and Lee 2009: 254; my translation)   
In March 1968, Shaw Brothers, Cathay and Kong Ngee signed an agreement that 
they would not buy and distribute any Communist movies (Huang 2009: 78), but it 
was an agreement with little meaning because the leftist film companies had almost 
stopped all their productions after the Cultural Revolution was set in motion 
                                                 
131 From 1966 up to the establishment of Sil-Metropole in 1982, Great Wall, Feng Huang and Sun 
Luen produced one hundred and seventeen films (Liao [Liu] et al. 1997: 15).  
 
132 Kong Ngee ranked behind Shaw Brothers and Cathay to be the number three in film 
distribution in Southeast Asia.  Shaw Brothers and Cathay were keen competitors in the 1950s and 
early 1960s; for more about their business in Southeast Asia, see Chung (2011: 190-201) and Law and 
Bren (2012: 188-195).  For more about Kong Ngee, see Chung (2011: 151-4). 
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nationwide in Maoist China in May 1966.  What can be deduced from all these is 
that, in terms of investment and commerce, the investors, as well as many 
filmmakers, no matter whether leftists or rightists, were primarily faithful to capital 
and profits rather than a political creed.  This shows how reductionist it can be to 
evaluate filmmakers in a politically complex and sensitive era simply by their surface 
political stance while overlooking the complexity of contradictory motives and 
self-rationalizations.  It is clear that politics was a deep and dirty business as 
illustrated by the fact that, at one level, the Communists’ openly engaged in serious 
political struggle and at another, underneath, they were clandestinely collaborating 
with their adversaries.  It is hard to make any sense of the Communist rationale 
given Liu Yet-yuen’s statement that, “We would not reject [Shaw Brothers] just 
because they led filmmakers to Taiwan every year to celebrate the Double Ten Day” 
(my translation).  Everybody knows that the celebration of the Double Ten Day in 
Taiwan is also the celebration of the ROC National Day, and participation in such a 
celebration is an admission that there exists a political entity named the ROC situated 
in Taiwan, which is another ‘China’.      
In the light of such a complexity, and as discussed earlier in this chapter, it 
would be shallow to conclude that the founders of Yonghua, Zhang Shankun and Li 
Zuyong, were stern anti-Communists or Nationalist loyalists for they were also 
businessmen seeking an advantageous position to safeguard their investments and 
gain the largest possible profit.  When the PRC market was closed to them, they 
turned to Taiwan and became ‘anti-Communists’.  By the same token, one can 
suppose that if they were living in Hong Kong today, they would probably be in the 
guise of ‘pro-Communist’.  Adopting a political camouflage is a means to an end; 
the films the investor has invested in and the filmmakers are devoted to have one 
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destination — the market.  Liu Yet-yuen, Lo Dun and the renowned film master 
Chang Cheh all said that filmmaking was a commercial and artistic pursuit, not really 
related to left or right (cited in Lee 2009: 91).133  Chang Cheh wrote:   
The new Great Wall . . . together with the later Feng Huang and so forth 
were customarily addressed as the ‘leftist companies’, which stood 
opposite to the so-called ‘rightist companies’ under the Free General 
Association.  In fact, they had no distinguishing ideological left or 
right, and made commercial films primarily; only that the ‘leftist’ might 
get certain support in funding in liaison with the Chinese Mainland.  
From what I can see as an outsider, the liaison was not close.  Its 
condition of funding was similar to that of Singapore to Motion Picture 
& General Investment Company Limited and seemed modest.134  
(1989: 23-4; my translation) 
Despite Chang Cheh’s observation that the liaison between the leftist film companies 
and the Chinese Mainland was not that close, many leftists in Hong Kong, including 
a number of filmmakers, did conform to the ultra-left line of the Gang of Four in 
China during the Cultural Revolution.   
The tragic Cultural Revolution not only induced a wave of illegal immigrants 
to flee across the border into Hong Kong, it also prompted the 1967 Hong Kong 
Leftist Riots, in which a considerable number of leftist film workers took part, 
including Fu Che and Shek Hwei.135  The violent political turmoil in China and 
Hong Kong not only had a severe social impact, it was also a disaster for Hong Kong 
                                                 
133 Such a statement is contrary to the CPC’s fundamental literature and art doctrine that will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
134 Motion Picture & General Investment Company Limited (MP & GI), founded in Hong Kong 
in 1956, was a constituent company under the Cathay Organization Limited that concentrated on film 
productions.  The company was renamed Cathay Organization (HK) Limited in 1965 after the death of 
the founder of the Cathay Organization, Loke Wan Tho, in 1964.  For more about MP & GI and its 
competition with the Shaw Brothers, see Law and Bren (2012: 162-164) and Chung (2011: 190-211). 
 
135 For more about the 1967 Hong Kong Leftist Riots, see Cheung Ka Wai’s Inside Story of 1967 
Riot in Hong Kong (2000). 
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leftist cinema, and leftist production came to an almost complete halt (Shen 2001: 
278).  As Chung (2011: 120) remarks, from the late 1950s on, the struggle between 
the leftist and the rightist cinemas was not as intense as it had been.  Productions 
gradually became less political.  Chung attributes the easing in hostility to the 
power of the market which had replaced political films with commercial ones.  In 
the course of their rivalry, at best, the Nationalists just weakened the leftist cinema; 
they did not succeed in killing it.  In the last half of the 1960s, it was the Cultural 
Revolution that revolted against and inflicted serious damage on the patriotic (to the 
PRC) film industry in Hong Kong.  Liu Yet-yuen recalls: 
We are patriotic.  Our country offered us some help; our films were 
also distributed in the country. . . . Who would have thought that when 
the Cultural Revolution came, we were criticized as the 
anti-revolutionary revisionist line in literature and art?  We were said 
to have spread poison outside; what we had done was not good, but 
bad. . . . Our productions were works of patriotism.  (15 October 1997: 
14; my translation) 
Leftist actress Chu Hung (also known as Zhu Hong) also says: 
We were asked to make films about workers, peasants and soldiers, and 
to create heroic figures.  But films of the Cultural Revolution era made 
the mistake of creating heroes that were divorced from reality, whom 
audiences couldn’t accept.  We ended up in a creative dead end.  
Towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, our hearts were tormented.  
The culture of a people, the Chinese culture with a 5,000-year history, 
should not be negated like this.136  (Wong 2001: 243) 
                                                 
136 According to Hu Ke (2000: 24): “Even though the Hong Kong leftist companies tried to 
conform to the Mainland’s political agenda by making pictures of the extreme left line, these pictures 
were never imported into the Mainland either during or after the Cultural Revolution.  [Great Wall, 
Feng Huang and Sun Luen] were terribly shaken up and suffered such losses in Hong Kong that made 
their futures untenable.” 
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The most pitiful filmmakers were those loyal leftists who returned to the Chinese 
Mainland to serve their mother country.  Although they were once seen by the CPC 
as patriotic and ‘progressive’ filmmakers in their heyday, they were criticized, 
denounced, beaten and tortured by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution for 
the ‘errors’ they had made in their film undertakings, ‘errors’ that were once regarded 
as something splendid and desirable for the country.  Film directors Cai Chusheng 
(mentioned in Chapter 2), He Feiguang and Gu Eryi (mentioned earlier in this 
chapter) were persecuted to their deaths.  
Director Li Han Hsiang once bantered, “If Jiang Qing had not died, Boss 
Shaw [Run Run Shaw] should confer a medal on her” (my translation), which means 
that if Jiang Qing, Mao’s last wife, had not destroyed the Chinese film industry to a 
degree beyond redemption, Shaw Brothers could not have developed rapidly over 
some ten years and dominated the overseas Chinese markets for so many years (Shu 
2005: 90).  Similarly, the disastrous Cultural Revolution also benefitted the Taiwan 
film industry and the rightist film companies by providing an opportunity for them to 
expand and grow in strength without external competition.  This is another example 
of the cunning of history. 
 
Colonial Film Censorship Strengthened in Response to Cold War 
While Communist China was exercising ideological censorship of film and 
funding the leftist cinema in Hong Kong and Nationalist Taiwan was indirectly 
extending its censorship power by means of the Free General Association’s 
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restrictive measures to interfere with the Hong Kong film industry, the colonial 
government also implemented political censorship.      
In the 1950s and 1960s, colonial political film censorship was seemingly 
directed mainly against the Communists, and was relatively lenient towards the 
Nationalists supported by the US.  For instance, while the newsreel on Chairman 
Mao in Moscow was banned, the Taiwanese newsreel about the counterattack on the 
Mainland was allowed (see Yu 2000: 24-5).  However, according to the 
documentation of the British National Archives (cited in Faure 2009: 14-5), the task 
of the colonial government in the early Cold War years was not to cope with the 
problem of ‘left’ and ‘right’, but in what way the British Government would be 
willing to hold the colony.137  Back in 1947, when the Chinese Civil War was still in 
full spate, American officials suggested to London that it should return Hong Kong 
to China at an appropriate time because they saw Hong Kong as a potential source of 
further trouble and a constant irritant in Anglo-Chinese relations.  When the 
Communists seized Nanjing from the Nationalists and seemed certain to win the 
Chinese Civil War in mid-1949, the destiny of Hong Kong was still at issue in the 
UK Parliament (see Welsh 1997: 437-9).  It was not until 1950, the year the Korean 
War broke out, that Britain made it clear that it would not return Hong Kong either to 
Taiwan or Beijing (British National Archives, cited in Faure 2009: 14-5).  Later on, 
after the Korean War was over, a group of the British Labour Party representatives 
paid a visit to Beijing.  Before their visit, the PRC’s Premier Zhou Enlai brought up 
the policies of advancing the Anglo-Chinese relations and endeavouring peaceful 
collaboration with Britain at a preparation meeting of the cadres on 12 August 1954.  
                                                 
137 There were successive waves of anti-colonialism movements around the world in the first half 
of the twentieth century.  After Britain had let go of India and Pakistan in 1947 and Ceylon (now Sri 
Lanka) in 1948, it was uncertain how long Britain would hold Hong Kong as its colony.   
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He also pointed out that Hong Kong was part of China but the opportune moment to 
resolve the question of Hong Kong was not ripe (Zhou Enlai 1990: 83).  By that 
time, London knew well that Beijing did not intend to reclaim sovereignty over Hong 
Kong until the ‘1997 Question of Hong Kong’ was officially laid on the table in the 
early 1980s.  Thus, in order to maintain a stable social environment and to prevent 
any infringement of British rule and interests, competent governance became 
essential to the colonial administration in the midst of the political, economic and 
ideological struggles between the Nationalists and Communists and between 
capitalism and communism.  While the PRC opposed and the US supported the 
KMT in Taiwan, a politically significant objective of colonial censorship during the 
Cold War years was to prevent any explicit offence against the PRC, which was “too 
important politically,” and the US, which was “essential economically” (Welsh 1997: 
442).  Competent censorship of films by the colonial government had to avoid open 
rupture with either the PRC or the US.  However, in true colonial style, the 
machinations over how that censorship was to be imposed were carried out behind 
closed doors.   
Since the recovery of the local film industry after the war, movie-going had 
become a very popular activity among the population in Hong Kong, which was one 
of the reasons why Hong Kong cinema would, inevitably, become the site that both 
the leftists and rightists would contest every inch of.138  In response to the 
popularity and possible socio-political influence of film and the political propaganda 
in the leftist and rightist cinemas, the colonial government began to strengthen its 
                                                 
138 According to an article published in the Oriental Daily of 1 January 1992 (cited in Cheng 1995: 
434), when the aftermath of the Tung Tau fire caused a riot in Kowloon in March 1952 (see Chau (2009: 
86-90) for more about the riot), the Hong Kong Police Force called on the off-duty policemen to return 
to their duties by projecting a notice in the form of subtitles in all the Hong Kong movie houses.  Such 
an incident demonstrates how popular movie-going was in Hong Kong during the 1950s.   
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control over film.  Article 177 under Part VII of the “Places of Public Entertainment 
Regulations, 1934”, mentioned in Chapter 2, states: 
All cinematograph films and posters . . . shall be censored by a board of 
censors, or by a member of such board, or by some other persons 
authorized in that behalf by the board in writing with the approval of the 
Governor.  No film or poster shall be exhibited unless it has been 
censored and passed by the board of censors or by a member of such 
board or by some other person authorized as aforesaid.  (University of 
Hong Kong Libraries) 
Using the authority warranted by the 1934 legislation, the Governor in Council 
formulated the “Film Censorship Regulations, 1953” (now abolished, replaced by 
“Film Censorship Ordinance”).  Under Section 2 of the regulations, film censorship 
was to be administered by a Panel of Censors, with the Government Public Relations 
Officer as its secretary and members appointed by the Governor.  All films and their 
associated advertising materials had to be submitted to the panel for censorship.  
After viewing a film and referring to other related materials, censors were authorized 
to conclude whether or not the film was suitable for public exhibition, or approve the 
film with mandatory amendments or cuts, or approve the film but order it to be 
handled within specified terms.  Upon request, censors were obliged to give a brief 
explanation of the censorship decision to the owner or hirer of the film within four 
days.  A Board of Review was also formed in accord with the regulations.  The 
owner or hirer of a film who refused to accept the censorship decision could appeal 
to the board within twenty-eight days after the issue of the initial decision.  Under 
Section 11, any member of the public who regarded a film as not suitable for public 
exhibition because of ethical, religious, educational or other reasons could write to 
the Colonial Secretary to request a re-examination.  After considering the 
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application, the Colonial Secretary could ask the Board of Review to re-censor the 
film and prohibit the film from exhibition before the re-censoring result was granted.  
Contravention of the regulations was an offence and the offender was subject to a 
fine or imprisonment (see Cheng, King 1995: 434-5).  Since the request for a 
re-examination from any member of the public could easily be staged, Section 11 de 
facto provided the government the power to ban any approved films when the 
occasion arose.  It was the first time in Hong Kong that a dedicated official 
institution was established to administer film censorship though it was revealed to be 
unlawful thirty-four years later (see Chapter 4).   
Three years later, in accordance with the “Film Censorship (Amendment) 
Regulations, 1956”, the Board of Review was given the power to defer any appeal 
from six months to not more than two years, in effect a two-year ban in disguise 
(Cheng, King 1995: 436).  On 5 August 1959, the Attorney General moved a bill 
entitled “An Ordinance to Amend the Indecent Exhibitions Ordinance, Chapter 150” 
in the Legislative Council, which was to give increased powers of seizure in the case 
of indecent cinema shows and similar exhibitions.  The bill was passed on 19 
August 1959 (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1959 Session 5, 19 August 1959: 183, 203-4).  
Neither this nor any of the related ordinances and regulations stated, or just did not 
make public, any objective criteria or guidance for the censors; censorship thus relied 
solely on the censors’ subjective view.  In other words, it left unlimited power for 
the government to control public film exhibitions.  The vagueness of the regulations 
also enabled the government to exercise political censorship clandestinely and to 
adjust its censorship criteria expediently in view of the contemporary socio-political 
context in a way that favoured the colonial rule.  Many years later, the 
declassification of the previously confidential government documents preserved at 
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the British National Archives corroborate such deductions and analyses.139  The 
colonial government did practise political censorship without making it public during 
the Cold War years.   
According to an internal document from the Public Relations Officer to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (File Number: HKRS 160-1-51) dated 11 August 
1952, because of the political circumstances at that time, the colonial government 
was badly in need of an official institution to impose the political censorship of film.  
It had to strictly forbid the exhibition of the films that were, for instance, about the 
US troops in the Korean War, or those eulogising the courage of the Nationalist and 
Communist armies or depicting the racial conflict between the American black and 
white.  Politically sensitive films were deemed more hazardous and more likely to 
destroy the stability of the colony than those that were obscene, morally corrupt or 
violent.  The document also emphasizes that Hong Kong could not emulate the 
censorship system of, for example, Britain or the US and let any non-government 
personnel or organization of the film industry handle censorship.  In the interest of 
the effective governance of the colony, censorship work had to be unified and 
legislated for the government and guarded by a small group of appointed officials.  
As this document’s suggestion, or advice, was based on political conditions at that 
time, the formulation of the “Film Censorship Regulations, 1953” can be understood 
as a political measure in response to the Cold War and cold war tensions.  Another 
declassified document, however, reveals that the colonial government had, de facto, 
carried out political censorship since 1950 at least.  A 1950 document titled “Terms 
of Reference for Film Censors” (File Number: HKRS 934-5-34) states that besides 
                                                 
139 Unless otherwise stated, the declassified documents in this chapter are cited from Ng 2009: 
53-69. 
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paying attention to a film’s influence on social ethics, criminal activities and 
religious power, film censors should pay particular attention to films that: (i) 
Reinforced a political adversary and induced strong political sentiment; (ii) Triggered 
ethnic or national enmity; by, for example, introducing anti-foreign propagandist 
slogans, encouraging the misunderstanding produced by a comparison between 
different political systems, the unnecessary display of an army in order to encourage 
a military spirit and make people feel the military of a certain country was superior to 
that of other countries; (iii) Incited a certain section of the population to overthrow 
the current government; (iv) Included matter that affected and was not favourable to 
relations with friendly countries or teased or ridiculed the heads of another State who 
is in good relations with the British Government.  These documents show that the 
colonial authorities were anxious about political sedition and the outbreak of social 
violence in the colony during the Cold War era. 
 
Britain Recognizes PRC, Colonial Censorship Rejects Communist Propaganda  
The Southern Film Corporation (Hong Kong) was founded in 1947.  It is 
subordinate to the PRC regime and was a major leftist distribution company during 
the Cold War years.  Besides serving as the sole distributor of the films produced in 
the Chinese Mainland since the foundation of the PRC till the mid-1990s, it 
distributed Soviet films too.  According to Shu Don-lok who worked for Southern 
Film from 1948 to 1965, the distribution of Soviet films in Hong Kong was 
facilitated by Zhou Enlai (Shu 2005: 19).  From 1946 to 1953, the company 
distributed about one hundred Soviet films, including some revolutionary and 
propagandistic ones such as the Vasilyev brothers’ Chapaev and Mikhail Romm’s 
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Lenin in 1918 and Lenin in October (Shu 2005: 20, 23), more than half of which 
were released before the PRC was founded.  In 1947 and 1948, fifty-four Soviet 
films were submitted for censorship, only Vsevolod Pudovkin’s Admiral Nakhimov 
was banned and two others were slightly cut (Shu 2005: 25).  The data shows that 
censorship of the Soviet films was lenient at first.  However, in the wake of the 
establishment of New China and the Cold War, the colonial government banned more 
and more Soviet films, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War (ibid).   
In 1953, Southern Film distributed its first New China film, When the Grape 
is Ripe (Pu Tao Shou Liao De Shi Hou, 1952).  The following year, the Yue Opera 
film The Butterfly Lovers (Liang Shan Bo yu Zhu Ying Tai, 1953) was distributed and 
achieved impressive box-office success in Hong Kong (Shu 2005: 33-7).  From 
1953 to 1956, Southern Film submitted fifty-nine films including features and 
documentaries and thirty-four shorts, comprised of newsreels, educational shorts and 
cartoons to the Panel of Censors, but only five features, six Chinese opera films, six 
documentaries and some shorts were approved (Shu 2005: 33).  According to the 
explanatory notes on the censorship certificates, the bans and cuts were usually 
because the films contained political propaganda, matters that would obstruct or 
affect the diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries or matters that would 
impede public interests and so on.  Although there was an appeal system, the Board 
of Review usually maintained the initial censorship decision.  Illustrative examples 
of political bans on New China feature films in the 1950s include:  
(i) Tang Xiaodan and Cheng Yin’s From Victory to Victory (Nan Zheng Bei 
Zhan, also known as Fighting North and South, 1952), which is about the 
Chinese Civil War, and Sha Meng and Lin Shan’s Shangganling Mountain 
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(Shang Gan Ling, 1956), which is about the participation of the Chinese 
People's Volunteer Army in the Korean War.  Both were banned because 
of their display of the People’s Liberation Army and for other political 
reasons (Shu 2005: 43-4).140  
(ii) Xie Jin’s Girl Basketball Player No. 5 (Nu Lan Wu Hao, 1957), which is 
about the different fates of the athletes of two generations before and after 
the establishment of the PRC.  It was banned because of the Chinese 
athletes’ crying scene at a national flag-raising ceremony (ibid).141 
(iii) Shui Hua and Wang Bin’s White-Haired Girl (Bai Mao Nu, 1950), an 
adaptation of a ballet opera of the same name.  In July 1948, the ballet 
opera was performed on stage in Hong Kong, where the wife of Governor 
Grantham was among the audience.  The movie was banned in Hong 
Kong but released in Macau in September 1952 and was screened in 
London (Chau 2009: 185-6).  The story of White Haired Girl is about the 
People’s Liberation Army’s rescue of a peasant girl who was previously 
cruelly oppressed by the landlord.  The ban was probably due to the 
film’s display and glorification of the People’s Liberation Army. 
(iv) Sang Hu’s The New Year’s Sacrifice (Zhu Fu, 1956), an adaptation of Lu 
Xun’s novel, was approved with many cuts when it was submitted for 
censorship in 1957.  According to the explanatory notes written on the 
censorship certificate provided by Southern Film (cited in Ng 2009: 58), 
                                                 
140 The From Victory to Victory (1952) here is a black and white film.  There was another film of 
the same Chinese title directed by Cheng Yin, but in colour and produced in 1981.  According to the 
filmography of the Southern Film (Shu 2005: 222-6), Shangganling Mountain (Shang Gan Ling, 1956) 
was renamed Battle on Shangganling Mountain (Shang Gan Ling Zhan Yi) and released in Hong Kong 
in 1977, some twenty years after the initial ban. 
 
141 According to the filmography of the Southern Film (Shu 2005: 222-6) Girl Basketball Player 
No. 5 was released in Hong Kong in 1980, twenty-three years after the initial ban. 
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the cuts were because of the extreme brutality towards the poor in some 
scenes.   
(v) In the notable musical The East is Red (Dong Fang Hong, 1965) produced 
by Zhou Enlai (as credited in the film), the first scene was cut because of 
the national flags of the US, the UK and Japan in the background.  In the 
fifth scene, the shots in which the flags having ‘get down with Chiang 
Kai-shek’ (dadao Chiang Kai-shek) written on them, the fleeing of the US 
army and the KMT officials and the shooting down of the KMT flag and 
so on were not permitted (Chau 2009: 186).   
A number of documentaries on scenery and the social and industrial developments of 
New China were also banned (Chau 2009: 185).  Furthermore, the “Film 
Censorship Regulations, 1953” empowered the colonial government to ban any films 
which were already approved.  For instance, the documentary Democracy in the 
Northeast (Min Zhu Dong Bei), which is about the land reform in the Northeast of 
China after the Chinese Civil War, and Ling Zifeng and Zhai Qiang’s Daughters of 
China (Zhong Hua Nu Er, 1949), which is a feature about eight women who resisted 
the enemy during the anti-Japan war, were initially approved, but were ordered to be 
re-censored and were banned afterwards (Shu 2005: 43). 
By and large, films about the Korean War, the Chinese Civil War and the 
anti-Japan war were taboo, and the films, usually documentaries, that bragged about 
the ‘glory’ and ‘beauty’ of New China were considered political propaganda; all 
these films were seen by the censorship authority.  According to the filmography of 
the Southern Film distributions in Hong Kong (Shu 2005: 222-6), starting from When 
the Grape is Ripe in 1953 up to 1958, Southern Film had successfully distributed 
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fifty-nine PRC films, including features, Chinese opera films and documentaries, 
among which forty-four of them were released in 1957 and 1958.  The data 
illustrates that colonial censorship of PRC films was getting more lenient towards the 
late 1950s.  However, Chau (2009: 186) remarks that the colonial government 
banned seventy-two PRC films and required cuts on twenty-six PRC films before 
public exhibition.    
Although Britain was one of the first countries to recognize the PRC in 
January 1950, the British Hong Kong Government did not allow any images 
symbolizing the PRC in films; all the shots that contained the PRC’s national flag, 
national anthem, national emblem, national leaders and the People’s Liberation Army 
had to be deleted or otherwise the whole film would be banned.  From 1950 to 1964, 
all the documentaries on the celebration of the PRC national day and the 
International Workers’ Day were on the list of banned films (Shu 2005: 44).  
However, in May 1958, the colonial government approved two documentaries from 
Taiwan, Formosa Today – Taiwan (Jin Ri Bao Dao) and The Voice of Free Front (Zi 
You Zhen Xian Zhi Sheng), in which the national flag of the ROC, the picture of 
Chiang Kai-shek and the slogan of ‘counter-attack on Mainland’ (fangong Dalu) 
appeared.  Such lopsided censorship agitated the leftists who considered the 
colonial government was playing a political game juggling ‘two Chinas’.  The 
Foreign Minister of the PRC, Chen Yi, held a press conference in Beijing to urge the 
British Government to see the situation clearly, or otherwise the PRC would take all 
necessary measures in response.  London was alerted to Chen Yi’s statement and 
asked for a report from the colonial officials.  Southern Film also held a press 
conference in Hong Kong to make public a great quantity of data about the bans and 
cuts on the PRC films.  After a series of denouncements of the unfair censorship, 
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the colonial government started to approve the films that contained the national 
anthem, flag and emblem of the PRC (see Shu: 2005: 47).   
In September 1965, the leftist newspapers launched a vigorous propaganda 
campaign against the Hong Kong Government, claiming that the official censors’ 
handling of Mainland films was discriminatory.  The Wen Wei Po of 10 September 
maintained that the Panel of Censors implemented unreasonable restrictions on the 
Chinese Mainland films, leading to the bans on the feature film The Red Detachment 
of Women (Hong Se Niang Zi Jun, 1961) and the documentary A Glorious Festival 
(Guang Hui Di Jie Ri, also known as National Day of 1964; 1965).  The Wen Wei 
Po also stated that many outstanding Chinese films were banned in Hong Kong but 
were allowed in Macau (cited in Ng 2009: 59).  On 11 September, Ta Kung Pao 
devoted a whole page to claiming that more than thirty films had been banned in the 
past ten years, and the shots of the People’s Liberation Army and the scenes of the 
head of the State at the military parade had been cut (ibid).  At the same time, 
Southern Film made appeals to and negotiated with the colonial government.  
According to Shu (2005: 47), the colonial government eventually lifted the ban on A 
Glorious Festival without any cut but maintained the ban on The Red Detachment of 
Women.  However, according to the records of the Television and Entertainment 
Licensing Authority (TELA), A Glorious Festival was approved for public screening 
after excision.142  As for the ban on The Red Detachment of Women, a document 
from the Panel of Censors to the Board of Review (File Number: HKRS 1101-2-13) 
dated 24 September 1965 states that it was due to the film’s description of the war 
                                                 
142 The functions of the former TELA have been taken up by the Office for Film, Newspaper and 
Article Administration (OFNAA) since 1 April 2012.  The record of TELA here is cited from Hansard: 
LegCo Meeting (12 March 2003: 4458-4472).  
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between the KMT and the CPC and its anti-KMT dialogue, which the censors 
deemed very likely to induce turbulence and give rise to disputes among audiences 
without a uniform political stance.  According to Shu (2005: 47), three more films 
were submitted for censorship together with A Glorious Festival and The Red 
Detachment of Women.  They were Red Guards of Lake Hong (Hong Hu Chi Wei 
Dui, 1961), Song of the Red Flag (Hong Qi Pu, also known as Keep the Red Flag 
Flying, 1960) and Sing Praise of the Revolution (Ge Ming Zan Ge, 1965).  All three 
were propaganda films about communism and armed struggle.  The latter two got 
approved in their entirety after a nine-month delay and suppression by the 
government while The Red Detachment of Women finally got approved in 1971 after 
cuts and Red Guards of Lake Hong got approved in 1977 (Ng 2009: 65; Shu 2005: 47, 
232, 234).  All in all, 1965 was a remarkable year for the films imported from the 
PRC.  Out of the seventy-nine films comprised of features and shorts that Southern 
Film submitted for censorship, fifty-eight of them passed, including the features and 
documentaries showing the contrast between the new and old societies.  The 
approval of A Glorious Festival was particularly significant because the documentary 
is about the celebration of the PRC’s fifteenth anniversary and contains images of 
national leaders and the People’s Liberation Army.  It was the first time that such 
images were allowed for public exhibition in Hong Kong since the foundation of the 
PRC (Shu 2005: 46-7), which signified a further easing of the colony’s censorship of 
New China films in the mid-1960s.  In 1966, sixty-one out of seventy-five films 
consisting of features and shorts submitted for censorship passed (Shu 2005: 47).  
In 1967, From Victory to Victory was submitted again for censorship together with 
Cheng Chung-li’s Lin Ze Xu (1959), a film about the Opium War and the Sino-British 
relations that led to the cession of Hong Kong to Britain from the Qing Empire.  
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According to Shu (2005: 47-8), although Southern Film tried hard to negotiate for 
the distribution of these two films, the government maintained the bans.143  About 
eighteen years later, Lin Ze Xu was renamed The Opium War (Ya Pian Zhan Zheng) 
and was approved for public screening without excision in 1985.  The film was 
released in Hong Kong in August 1985, when was about three months after the 
ratification of the Sino-British Joint Declaration which stated that the Chinese 
Government would “resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect 
from 1 July 1997”.144  As Sze Yeung Ping, the editor of Shu’s book on the fifty 
years of Southern Film, says, “The distribution of the Chinese [PRC] films in Hong 
Kong was obviously not the same as that of ordinary films.  It was not an ordinary 
commercial activity, but had a particular political connotation” (Sze 2005: 8; my 
translation).  In much the same way, colonial censorship of PRC films during the 
Cold War era had a particular political connotation too. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, censorship by the colonial authorities seemed hard on 
PRC films and relatively lenient towards Taiwanese films.  Firstly, this was due to 
the anti-Communist sentiment and the fear of communism during the Cold War.  
Secondly, the colonial government also considered the public exhibition of 
Communist propaganda films might agitate the Nationalists and cause disturbances.  
Thirdly, the films from the PRC were more political and propagandist than those 
                                                 
143 According to the records of TELA provided by the Secretary for Economic Development and 
Labour in the LegCo meeting on 12 March 2003, From Victory to Victory was approved upon excision 
in 1967 (Hansard: LegCo Meetings Year 2002-2003: 4461).  However, the film was not in the list of 
films distributed by Southern Film (see Shu 2005: 222-243) probably because Southern Film refused 
the cuts. 
 
144 The Sino-British Joint Declaration was formally known as the ‘Joint Declaration of the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong’. 
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from Taiwan.  The rightist filmmakers were more interested in making commercial 
films that were, at least on the surface, apolitical and aimed to entertain. 
During the ten years of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, 
censorship of PRC films in Hong Kong became more lenient.  Even explicit 
propaganda features and documentaries were approved and the appearance of Mao 
Zedong on screen was no longer extraordinary.145  According to the previously 
mentioned declassified document dated 24 September 1965 (File Number: HKRS 
1101-2-13), the colonial government knew well that the opportunity for showing 
Communist propaganda films was limited in Hong Kong, and the vast non-leftist 
local audience seldom went to watch such films.  As can be seen in the box-office 
records, the films imported from the PRC were not as popular among the local 
populace as those before the Cultural Revolution.146  In point of fact, other than 
documentaries, just a handful of films were produced in the PRC during the Cultural 
Revolution and all were adaptations of the eight ‘model operas’ (yangbanxi) — 
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (Zhi Qu Wei Hu Shan), The Red Lantern (Hong 
Deng Ji), The Red Detachment of Women (Hong Se Niang Zi Jun,), Sha Jia Bang, 
Raid on the White Tiger Regiment (Qi Xi Bai Hu Tuan), On the Dock (Hai Gang), 
Ode of the Dragon River (Long Jiang Song) and White-Haired Girl (Bai Mao Nu).  
These ‘eight’ titles were all about the recent revolutionary struggles of China against 
foreign and class enemies, with a central theme of glorifying and boasting about the 
achievement and leadership of Mao Zedong.  They were repeatedly remade and 
were produced mainly between 1970 and 1972.  Later, Chinese people would say: 
                                                 
145 For a filmography of the Southern Film distributions in Hong Kong, see Shu 2005: 230-4. 
 
146 For the box-office takings of the films distributed by Southern Film in Hong Kong, see Shu 
2005: 222-243. 
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‘Eight hundred million people watched eight shows’ (Bayi ren kan bage xi).  
Southern Film also distributed some of these films in Hong Kong but all were coldly 
received, if not ignored, by the Hong Kong populace.  
 
Peculiarities of Colonial Censorship – Creating Balances amidst Left and Right 
The colonial government started to strengthen the colony’s film censorship at 
a particular historical conjuncture when the CPC gained sovereignty over China and 
anti-communism became a momentous and strategic ideology of the Western bloc 
against the backdrop of the Cold War.  However, it would be an over-simplification 
to assume the political regulatory measures embedded in the censorship system were 
solely directed against Communist infiltration and propaganda.  In point of fact, the 
Nationalists also troubled the colonial government; for example, the violent Double 
Tenth Riot (also known as the Hong Kong 1956 Riot) initiated by the Nationalists in 
1956.147  As leftist film star Chu Hung puts it:   
The colonial government was good at creating balances.  When the 
Taiwan side was up, it propped up the left-wing to fight it.  Vice versa 
when the left became powerful.  People might not notice but we were 
very aware when it tightened and when it loosened.  (Wong 2001: 241) 
According to Taiwanese film historians Huang and Wang (2004: 116), if the Taiwan 
film industry was to make a substantial profit it could not ignore Hong Kong and the 
Nanyang region which were significant markets.  In 1951, the Taiwan Government 
produced an explicitly anti-Communist propaganda film, Bad Dreams (E Meng Chu 
                                                 
147 For more about the Double Tenth Riot, see Welsh (1997: 456-8), Liu (2009: 378-380) and 
Chau (2009: 123-134). 
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Xing), directed by Chung Yiu.148  Besides the ban by the Hong Kong Government, 
Taiwan failed to sell the film to the Nanyang markets because the mainly British 
rulers there had diplomatic relations with the PRC and prohibited such propaganda 
films.  The experience taught Taiwanese filmmakers to avoid explicit 
anti-Communist elements for the sake of smooth distribution in the overseas markets 
including Hong Kong.  Thus, Taiwanese filmmakers in that era rarely made films 
that contained sensitive political issues.  A noteworthy anti-Communist title was the 
Taiwan-Hong Kong co-production 14,000 Witnesses (Yi Wan Si Qian Ge Zheng Ren, 
1962) directed by Wang Hao, which was nominated for the Golden Bear Award at the 
Berlin International Film Festival in 1961 and was one of the three winners of ‘Best 
Film of Merit’ award at the first Golden Horse Awards in 1962.149  According to the 
records in Hong Kong Filmography published by Hong Kong Film Archive, 14,000 
Witnesses was not released in Hong Kong. 
According to Law’s analysis (1997: 18-20), among the nine films produced 
by Asia Pictures, a rightist company based in Hong Kong funded by the Asia 
Foundation of the US, only one film could be considered even mildly 
anti-Communist and politically conscious.150  The film, Tu Guangqi’s Halfway 
Down (Ban Xialiu Shehui, 1957), was about a group of homesick, middle-class 
intellectuals and entrepreneurs and their struggle to exist as refugees from the 
Communist Chinese Mainland in Rennie’s Mill (known later as Tiu Keng Leng).151  
                                                 
148 For more about Bad Dreams, see Du 1988: 465-9. 
 
149 For more about 14,000 Witnesses, see Du 1988: 492-3. 
 
150 According to the Taiwanese film historian Huang Ren (Wong and Lee 2009: 258), Asia 
Pictures also produced a film in Taiwan, which was a Taiwan-American co-production titled The 11th 
Commandment (1960), an anti-Communist film shot on location in Kinmen; however, the film was 
banned in Taiwan due to the display of the portrait of Mao Zedong and the red flags.  
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Another production of Asia Pictures, Life with Grandma (Man Ting Fang, 1957) 
directed by Tang Huang, also had anti-Communist elements but it was a satirical 
comedy and the elements were not explicit.152  By and large, the filmmakers of the 
rightist cinema were pragmatic, were well aware of commercial considerations and 
knew well that the Hong Kong Government as well as the governments of Singapore, 
Malaya, Indonesia and so on were very sensitive about the struggle between the left 
and right, and would prohibit all explicitly anti-Communist films.  In addition, most 
of the Chinese audiences were not interested in politics.  Under those circumstances, 
rightist films were consciously made to entertain rather than educate the audience.  
Serious rightist films stressed the importance of embracing Chinese culture and 
ethics but only criticized the Communists in a veiled manner.  Examples of such 
films include The Fishermen’s Song (Remake) (Xin Yuguang Qu, 1955) and Swallows 
Come Home (Yan Gui Lai, 1958), both directed by Ma Xu Weibang.153  This 
explains why the Taiwanese films and the Hong Kong rightist films were not much 
troubled by colonial censorship.     
In effect, colonial film censorship served not only as a repressive apparatus 
and technique of the colonial government directed against the expansion of 
communism, but also served to balance the powers of the participants in the Cold 
War.  In 1954, the colonial government banned the American film On the Waterfront 
(1954) but lifted the ban three years later (Ng 2009: 53).154  According to a 
                                                                                                                                          
151 Starting from 1950, Rennie’s Mill was a refugee village in Hong Kong where the former 
officials and followers of the KMT lived.  The colonial government demolished the village in 1996.  
Today, the area has been re-developed and become part of the Tseung Kwan O new town.  For more 
about Halfway Down, see Du 1988: 526-8. 
 
152 For more about Life with Grandma, see Du (1988: 526) and Law (1990: 19).  
 
153 For more about The Fishermen’s Song (Remake), see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. IV 
(English edition) (2003: 135). 
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declassified document from the Public Relations Officer to the Colonial Secretary 
(File Number: HKRS 160-1-50 [PRO209/1C]) dated 5 July 1956, the government 
was uneasy about the film and expected its public exhibition would induce labour 
disputes or even riots.  Censors considered the film about labour protests to be 
crude and brutal, and thus ruled the film not suitable for public exhibition in Hong 
Kong in 1954.  According to another internal document from the Secretary for 
Chinese Affairs to the Colonial Secretary dated 27 July 1956 in the same file, the 
government worried that if the film were screened in cinemas, it would probably 
incite the leftist unions to support the contemporary tramway workers by launching a 
series of strikes.  As mentioned earlier, the colonial government was very sensitive 
about labour movements.  Industrial disputes between the Hong Kong Tramways 
and its workers started in December 1949 and continued for years.  By 1 September 
1952, Hong Kong Tramways had fired one hundred and eighty-four workers, 
including the chairman of the union.155  In the second half of 1954, more and more 
trade unions from other industries expressed their support for the tramway workers 
and a radical wave of industrial action was brewing.  The fear of further crippling 
strikes and the censorship rhetoric of that a film about industrial disputes might incite 
further action, as seen in the declassified documents mentioned above, led to the 
colonial government’s banning on On the Waterfront.   
Paradoxically, the film On the Waterfront itself did not laud trade unions or 
advocate action by the labour movement but rather exposed the violence and 
corruption of the union leaders.  As the declassified document also reveals, the 
                                                                                                                                          
154 For more information about On the Waterfront, see Nash and Ross 1986: 2251-2.  
 
155 For more about the industrial disputes of the Hong Kong Tramways and the industrial action 
of the tramway workers, see Chau 2009: 110-8. 
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Secretary for Chinese Affairs thought that the Chinese audiences would perceive the 
film’s corrupt union leaders as the capitalists.  This shows the political 
hyperaesthesia of the government officials and their reasoning during a time of Cold 
War tension.  However, when the film was released on-screen in Hong Kong in 
February 1957, the leftist newspaper Ta Kung Pao (15, 16, 17 February 1957; cited 
in Ng 2009: 54) repeatedly criticized the film for purposely defaming unions as 
mob-controlled and ignoring the fact that most of the unions in the US were 
controlled and operated by big capitalists, politicians and the Mob.  Their criticism 
implied that the leftist union leaders in Hong Kong had no connection with such 
people and were not like those in the US.  Clearly, the government and the leftists 
read the film entirely differently; they employed what Stanley Fish terms a different 
‘interpretive strategy’ (see Chapter 1).  In fact, the colonial government overlooked 
the anti-communist ‘nature’ of On the Waterfront.  The film’s director (author) Elia 
Kazan had been a member of the American Communist Party in New York for about 
eighteen months in the mid-1930s but then, in 1952, in the middle of the McCarthy 
era, he became a ‘friendly witness’ and identified eight communists before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities.  His behaviour was widely considered 
anti-communist and had made him an anti-communist.  In this regard, according to 
Foucault’s theory of author function (discussed in Chapter 1), the author [in film, the 
director is the author] is defined as a constant level of value and a field of conceptual 
or theoretical coherence, and at the same time conceived as a stylistic unity and seen 
as a historical figure at the crossroads of a certain number of events (Foucault 1998: 
214).  Moreover, “the author is a particular source of expression that, in more or 
less completed forms, is manifested equally well, and with similar validity, in works, 
sketches, letters, fragments, and so on” (Foucault 1998: 214-5).  In the light of 
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Foucault’s discourse, since Elia Kazan was regarded as an anti-communist, his works 
would quickly be perceived as an anti-communist, which explains why On the 
Waterfront is generally perceived as an anti-communist film.   
Perhaps, the initial ban on On the Waterfront indicated that the colonial 
government, although over-sensitive, was primarily neutral in the leftist-rightist 
struggle.  Given that neutrality, the ban could be regarded as a preventive measure 
against any possible socio-political conflict that it might provoke thus ensuring a 
stable political and business environment for the wealthy capitalists.  In reality, the 
colonial government, on one hand, prohibited Communist propaganda and, on the 
other, guarded against anti-communist propaganda so as not to enrage the leftists.  
In 1963, the Hong Kong Government banned John Frankenheimer’s The Manchurian 
Candidate (1962), starring Frank Sinatra and Janet Leigh, a Hollywood film about 
the Korean War, brainwashing and the dangers inherent in the spread of communism 
(Ng 2009: 61).156  A 1963 document titled “General Principles for Guidance of Film 
Censors and the Film Censorship Board of Review” (File Number: HKRS 934-5-34) 
indicates that the film might be interpreted as an overtly political attack on the 
Chinese Communists.  However, the film was later released in Hong Kong in 
September 1965 (IMDb).  In April 1966, the production crew of Robert Wise’s The 
Sand Pebbles came to Hong Kong to film a few scenes.157  However, the film was 
banned in Hong Kong due to its anti-Chinese content.  An article in the Wen Wei Po 
of 3 December 1968 (cited in Ng 2009: 63) criticizes the way the Chinese were 
represented in the movie.  They were depicted as ignorant and incompetent, inferior 
even to the ‘sick man of East Asia’ (dung ah beng fu), and their brutality and cruelty 
                                                 
156 For more about The Manchurian Candidate, see Nash and Ross 1986: 1865-6. 
 
157 For more about The Sand Pebbles, see Nash and Ross 1986: 2728-2730. 
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was worse than the barbarians.  In 1968, American director J. Lee Thompson 
brought his crew to Hong Kong and intended to shoot some scenes for his movie, 
The Chairman, starring Gregory Peck.158  The incident caused an uproar and strong 
objections by the leftists.  The leftist newspapers Wen Wei Po (25 September 1968, 
cited in Ng 2009: 62) and Ta Kung Pao (4 December 1968, cited in Ng 2009: 62) 
reported with large headlines that the film was a conspiracy of the anti-Chinese and 
an insult to the Chinese.  It also vilified the Red Guards, opposed the Chinese 
Communists’ Cultural Revolution and defamed Chairman Mao.  The leftists called 
on leftist organizations to take action with the intention of holding a rally to oppose 
the production of the film.  The leftists also warned the colonial government that it 
would have to take the consequences if it connived in the production of such an 
anti-Chinese film.  The radical leftists warned that if the film was shot or shown in 
Hong Kong, they would make trouble.  An English newspaper, The Star, reported 
on 28 November 1968 (cited in Ng 2009: 62) that the Red Guards in Guangdong held 
rally to condemn The Chairman and burnt pictures of the then American President 
Lyndon B. Johnson and the lead actor Gregory Peck.  Under pressure from the 
leftists, the colonial government prohibited the filming of The Chairman in Hong 
Kong.  According to the The Star published on 30 November (ibid), the director 
was angry about the colonial government’s ‘shameful’ decision and accused it of 
succumbing to a handful of unruly Communists.  The American crew then shifted 
filming to Taiwan.  In 1969, when the finished film was about to be released, the 
Hong Kong Government placed a ban on it (Ng 2009: 61).  Ironically, The Sand 
Pebbles and The Chairman were also banned in Taiwan.  Although Taiwan was 
controlled by Nationalists who were strongly opposed to the Communist and its 
                                                 
158 For more about The Chairman, see Nash and Ross 1986: 389. 
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state-operated companies had produced some anti-Communist films (as mentioned 
earlier), the Nationalist Government banned strongly anti-Communist films too.  
According to Taiwanese film historian Huang Ren (see Wong and Lee 2009: 258), 
the Nationalist Government prohibited the display of the portrait of Mao Zedong, the 
five-star red flag and even the Communist hat badge for three decades after the 
KMT’s retreat to Taiwan owing to the fear-of-Communist psychology.  That is to 
say, although the Taiwan populace disliked the Communist, they, at the same time, 
feared the Communist as well.  Furthermore, the Taiwan Government, on one hand, 
promoted anti-Communist propaganda, and on the other, rigidly prohibited all the 
PRC emblems in all movies, including the anti-Communist films. 
Other than prohibiting Communist and anti-Communist propaganda, the 
Hong Kong Government was, unsurprisingly, very strict in the censorship of the 
films that were critical of colonialism too.  For instance, censors banned the Italian 
film The Battle of Algiers (La battaglia di Algeri, 1966) directed by Gillo Pontecorvo 
in 1970 because of its excessive violence and anti-colonialist theme (Ng 2009: 60).159  
The ban was lifted in 1974 but screenings were restricted to private film clubs only.  
As previously mentioned, the initial ban on Cheng Chung-li’s Lin Ze Xu (1959) in 
1967 was also due to the film’s anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist message.   
According to TELA’s records, provided by the Secretary for Economic 
Development and Labour at the Legislative Council meeting on 12 March 2003 
(Hansard: LegCo Meeting Year 2002-2003: 4458):  
[A] total of 357 films were banned from public screening upon first 
submission between 1965 and the end of 1974.  Among them, 71 films 
                                                 
159 For more information about The Battle of Algiers, see Nash and Ross: 148. 
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were approved for public screening subsequently (46 of them were 
approved for screening upon excision, while the remaining 25 were 
subsequently approved for screening without excision).  The reasons 
for banning these films from public screening are summarized as 
follows: 
Major reasons for banning 
the film from public 
screening 
Number of 
films banned 
from public 
screening 
Number of 
films approved 
for public 
screening upon 
excision
Number of films 
subsequently 
approved for 
public screening 
without excision
A: Corrupt morals, cause 
deep shock or disgust, 
encourage crime, 
particularly crimes of 
violence 
314 31 20 
B: Provoke hatred 
between persons in 
Hong Kong of 
differing race, colour, 
class, nationality, creed 
or sectional interests 
18 10 4 
C: Damage good relations 
with other territories 16 2 - 
D: Unwarrantably offend 
religious bodies 9 3 1 
Total 357 46 25 
The banned films came from various continents except Africa and Australia, and 
among the four reasons listed in the above table, reasons ‘B’ and ‘C’ could serve 
political purposes.  American films were at the top of the list of first submissions 
for censorship, having seventy-five films banned because of reason ‘A’, three banned 
because of ‘B’ and the other three banned because of ‘C’.  Of those coming from 
Europe, forty-two Italian films were banned, the most among those with a European 
origin; West Germany came next, with thirty-nine films banned, followed by the UK 
with thirty-eight films banned, all because of reason ‘A’ except three films.  Of the 
Asian films, fifty-one Japanese films were banned because of reason ‘A’ and two 
other Japanese films were banned because of reason ‘D’.  Taiwan had two films 
banned because of reason ‘A’ and the other two banned because of reason ‘D’.  The 
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PRC had one film banned because of reason ‘A’, eleven and four films banned 
because of reason ‘B’ and ‘C’ respectively, making it the country with the most films 
banned because of political reasons.  It has to be noted that the bans were executed 
between 1965 and 1974, which largely overlapped with the period of the Cultural 
Revolution, a time when China only produced films adapted from the eight ‘model 
operas’.  As for Hong Kong’s own films, seventeen were banned upon first 
submission; fourteen of them were produced after 1970.  All of the seventeen films 
were banned because of reason ‘A’ except one, that is Tong Shu-shuen’s China 
Behind (Zai Jian Zhongguo), which was banned because of reason ‘C’ (see Hansard: 
LegCo Meeting Year 2002-2003: 4459-4472).  This shows that the Hong Kong film 
industry rarely produced explicit films on sensitive political issues or films having 
explicit political implication between 1965 and 1974.  
 
Faceless Censorship Force Operates Outside Official Colonial Film Censorship  
As mentioned in the above section, the only Hong Kong film banned between 
1965 and 1974 because of transgressing the criterion “Damage good relations with 
other territories” was Tong Shu-shuen’s China Behind.  The film tells the story of 
four college students and a middle-aged doctor’s attempt to escape from China to a 
new life during the Cultural Revolution.  Three of them eventually make it to Hong 
Kong but get lost in the city’s capitalist society.  The film was entirely shot in 
Taiwan and is the first Hong Kong film to tell a story against the backdrop of the 
Cultural Revolution directly.160  As Teo puts it: “[China Behind] was perhaps the 
                                                 
160 At that time, it was very risky for Tong to shoot such a film in Taiwan.  First of all, she had to 
smuggle into Taiwan the prohibited props such as the Little Red Book, the five-star red flag, the portrait 
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most prominent victim of censorship in the territory. . . . [It was] the first to criticize 
[the Cultural Revolution’s] madness and to see it as having catastrophic implications 
for a whole generation of young people” (2007 [1999]: 215).  Since the film 
criticizes the Chinese Mainland under the leadership of the CPC, it was commonly 
and crudely seen as anti-Communist.161  Therefore, when the film was first 
submitted for Hong Kong censorship in 1974, government censors considered the 
film “damaging good relations with other territories”, which carries the implication 
that ‘other territories’ refers to the Chinese Mainland.   
According to a friend of Tong Shu-shuen, Cheuk Pak Tong (personal 
communication), the Xinhua News Agency invited Tong Shu-shuen over for a ‘chat’ 
about China Behind after the film had been submitted for censorship.  Xinhua asked 
about the aim behind making such a film, and if the source of funding was from 
‘Soviet Revisionism’.  How could Xinhua have seen the film which had not been 
released?  How could they get a copy for their viewing?  In fact, Hong Kong 
filmmakers at that time were well-aware of the covert negotiation and collusion 
between the colonial government and representatives of the CPC in Hong Kong (see 
a more detailed examination in Chapter 4).  As it is listed in the records of TELA, 
the film was approved for public screening upon excision in 1980 (Hansard: LegCo 
Meeting Year 2002-2003: 4471); however, it was not publicly released but only 
shown in a screening activity organized by the Hong Kong Film Culture Centre, a 
film society, in March 1981.  In 1984, the Hong Kong International Film Festival 
selected China Behind as one of the films on its programme (HKIFF 2002 [1984]: 
                                                                                                                                          
and badge of Mao Zedong, etc.  The highest punishment for possessing such taboo things could be 
either life imprisonment or the death penalty. 
 
161 It is reductionist to conclude that China Behind is an anti-Communist film; for a brief but 
in-depth discussion of China Behind, see Ip, Iam Chong (2009).  
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150).  Finally in 1987, the film came out on the commercial cinema circuit in Hong 
Kong.  The Taiwan Government also banned China Behind for its display of the 
portrait of Mao Zedong and the Little Red Book (Mao Yulu, also known as 
Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong) (Liang 2004: 200).  The ban was lifted in 
1989, and the film was shown in Taiwan theatres for one week from 27 May to 2 
June, at the same time as the 1989 Democracy Movement was taking place in Beijing 
(Diu 2004: 48-9).162 
The Plague (Wan Yik, 1970) directed by Patrick Lung (also known as Lung 
Kong) was another prominent victim of censorship.  Nonetheless, no record of the 
ban on The Plague, or Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (Jok Tin Kam Tin Ming Tin) as the 
film was renamed in public exhibitions, can be found in the records of TELA.  The 
film is about the social turmoil in Hong Kong that results from an outbreak of plague.  
Lung explains: 
The film was inspired by Albert Camus’s The Plague, but I set the story 
in Hong Kong swept by an epidemic.  There was a great social divide 
between the rich and the poor, the former taking residence in posh 
Mid-Levels mansions and the latter living in overcrowded ramshackle 
squatter settlements.  There was the ongoing story of unequal yet 
inevitable conflicts between the haves and the have-nots to tell.  (2010: 
29)    
The Plague was a large-scale production featuring a stellar cast from both the 
Cantonese and Mandarin camps.  Its production was supported by the Hong Kong 
Government, particularly assisted by the then Medical and Health Department, and 
involved mobilizing members of the Civil Aid Service and the Hong Kong Police 
                                                 
162 For more about China Behind, see Lau (2002: 108-9) and Liang (2004: 198-200). 
 
168 
Force to take part.163  Lung shot the film in actual locations such as emergency 
rooms, medical wards and the airport.  Although Lung did not admit it 
unequivocally in his monograph (2009: 10-49), the film was said to be alluding to the 
Hong Kong 1967 Leftist Riots and it condemned the violent leftist extremists and 
commended the colonial officials for their contribution to settling the turmoil.  
According to the reports of the leftist newspaper Wen Wei Po (12 December 1969 and 
14 December 1969, cited in Shing and Lau 2010: 246-8), the leftists had known 
about the story and the characters in The Plague since it was in production.  They 
were enraged and severely criticized and attacked the film.  An article in the Wen 
Wei Po of 14 December 1969 gave Lung a warning: “Whoever is antagonistic to the 
compatriots of Hong Kong and Kowloon, whoever will run into bloody trouble.  
Better to draw the lesson from others’ mistakes; hope you can take care of yourself” 
(Shing and Lau 2010: 248; my translation).164  According to Lung (2010: 30), after 
The Plague was completed and right before sending it to the censors, the production 
manager of the film, Lee Ka-yan, was badly frightened when he saw the dead rat that 
had been sent to Eng Wah (Eng Wah & Co. H.K.), the film company that invested in 
The Plague and employed Lee and Lung.  Lung recalls the incident: 
Lee told me that the leftist had left a message warning him that 
Lung was a British agent (‘Not again!’ I thought) and the The Plague 
was made with and for the Hong Kong British government.  The film 
was not only to be banned; it had to be destroyed. . . . 
                                                 
163 In 1989, the Medical and Health Department was restructured and split into the Hospital 
Services Department and the Department of Health.  On 1 December 1991, the Hospital Authority was 
established to take over the function of the former Hospital Services Department. 
 
164 During the Hong Kong 1967 Leftist Riots, the leftists planted bombs in the city and killed the 
popular anti-leftist radio commentator Lam Bun.  These were what “to draw the lesson from others’ 
mistakes” in the warning referred to.  
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Staying calm and composed, I explained, ‘Let’s put the question of 
me being an agent aside first.  As both you and I know, The Plague 
was not funded by the Hong Kong government but made with Eng 
Wah’s money.  There’s no dispute of that.  Second, the film has yet to 
be released and doesn’t it strike you as odd that the leftists are blasting 
it as reactionary without actually having seen it?’  As to why the 
government granted filming permission, the reason I gave was ‘I 
applied for it and they accepted my application.’  ‘Before The Plague, 
both The Story of a Discharged Prisoner [Ying Hung Boon Sik, 1967] 
and Teddy Girls [Fei Lui Jing Juen, 1969] had filming done on 
government premises.165  It seemed futile for me to defend myself if I 
was called a spy working for the Hong Kong British government on the 
ground that I was granted permission to film on government locations,’ 
I decided.  ‘As the person who only wrote the film and directed it, I 
had no right to interfere with your decision.  The fate of the film is 
solely in your hands,’ I suggested to Lee.  (Ibid) 
After the conversation, Lee handed the film over to the faceless authorities (‘them’) 
and let ‘them’ edit the film in whatever way ‘they’ deemed necessary.  When the 
film was returned, the original two-hour long film was reduced to only some seventy 
minutes and had to be renamed to Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow because ‘they’ did not 
allow the original title.  After all these years, Lung still does not know what criteria 
were used when the film was cut.  Nevertheless, he says,  
[Forty] years on, I still didn’t know and didn’t want to know whom 
Lee talked to. . . . Although hardly new to the business, it wasn’t until 
then I saw the invisible hand at work higher up the hierarchy. 
Later on, the Cultural Revolution was officially proclaimed 
catastrophe that had brought serious disaster and turmoil to the 
Communist Party and the Chinese people, but I had yet to redress the 
grievances against The Plague.  (Lung 2010: 30-1) 
                                                 
165 For Lung’s recall of The Story of a Discharged Prisoner and Teddy Girls, see Lung (2010: 
25-6 and 27-9). 
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In the 1960s, George Shen was responsible for the editorial work of the leftist 
magazine The Great Wall Pictorial and had connections with the leftist film industry.  
About Lung’s unresolved question, Shen provides some more information:  
1967 saw many homemade grenades going off in Hong Kong and, 
for a time, the lefties ran [wild] in the city.  The world was watching.  
Eng Wah Film Company, a left-wing company, sent out a camera crew 
to capture the riot scenes in Kwun Tong and other areas, to be used as 
background materials in the movie The Plague . . . . The film invited the 
wrath of the left.  A mob even tried to charge into Eng Wah’s office to 
beat up its boss Ng Eng-wah. 
The office of Eng Wah was inside Wah Ying Cheong Building on 
Nathan Road, right above the office of Feng Huang.  Some Feng 
Huang staff members were sympathetic to the mob; others thought 
otherwise.  Eng Wah was afraid that if the movie didn’t pass the 
censors, the investment would go down the drain.  It decided to seek 
advice from the Southern Film Corporation and sent a print to its office 
in the Bank of China Building. 
The Southern people looked at the movie but didn’t pass any 
judgment.  They only casually mentioned that “there should be some 
excisions”.  So Eng Wah found out that Southern did not endorse the 
film, and brought in a third party to re-edit the movie.  (Shen 2001: 
310)  
Lung and Shen’s accounts explain why TELA has no record of the ban on The 
Plague.  It was, in fact, censored not so much by the lawful and independent 
authority as by an authority under threat from the leftists who used tactics similar to 
those of triads.  The incident also shows that while the objective of film censorship 
is to control the possible effects a film might have on audiences; it can also be 
subject to those in power who are close-minded and not brave enough to face 
criticism.  Such features are still familiar today.  
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Chapter 4 
Film Censorship Evolves 
 from High-Handed-Colonial to Rule-of-Law Style  
as the ‘1997 Question of Hong Kong’ Surfaces 
 
Official film censorship was used by the British colonial government as an 
effective tool to control the dispersal of ideologies, avoid openly offending political 
entities and bodies and, most importantly, to enhance security.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the British Hong Kong Government proclaimed a neutral position in the 
Nationalist-Communist conflict and one of the political objectives of the colonial 
censorship during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s was to balance the powers 
of the leftist and rightist cinemas and limit their political propaganda.  It also used 
censorship to help prevent the expansion of communism thus reducing any potential 
threat against its governance and securing British international relations.  However, 
the leftist cinema in Hong Kong became dormant soon after the outbreak of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (commonly known as the Cultural Revolution) in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1966, leaving the leftist film companies to exist 
in name only for more than ten years and the rightist film companies in charge of 
Hong Kong cinema.166  As the struggle between the leftist and rightist cinemas 
subsided, the problem of whether a film was too left or too right became irrelevant 
for censors.  The colonial rulers’ attention was diverted by more important matters.  
                                                 
166 Although the struggle between the leftist and rightist cinemas has come to an end, the rightist 
Free General Association’s restrictive measures against Hong Kong filmmaker’s connection with the 
PRC (see Chapter 3) survived till Taiwan’s economy and film market melted down as one of the results 
of the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997.   
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The Cultural Revolution had also instigated the violent 1967 Leftist Riots, an 
organized, violent struggle against the British colonial rule involving the leftists’ 
terrorist bomb, resulting in fifty-one deaths and more than eight hundred wounded, 
which dealt the colony a heavy blow (see Cheung 2000).  In the wake of the riots, 
the leftists became a perpetual annoyance in Hong Kong, and underscored the 
deep-seated fears about the Communist Party of China (CPC).  The Hong Kong 
population was alienated from all things of the ‘left’ and the limited number of leftist 
films, mostly re-run titles which were not entertaining, were coldly received by 
movie-goers.167  In this socio-political context, film censorship’s task of guarding 
against the expansion of communism became very much less significant.  However, 
film censorship still had to serve other in the new political climate, particularly when 
the Question of Hong Kong, as it was called in the “Joint Declaration of the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong” 
(Sino-British Joint Declaration), and the expiry of the lease on the New Territories in 
1997 surfaced. 
 
Film Censorship Evolves as Result of Political Changes 
In the early 1970s, the PRC saw a great change in its international relations 
and global political status as American support for Taiwan diminished.  On 25 
October 1971, the PRC replaced Taiwan to become the only lawful representative of 
China at the United Nations and took a permanent seat in the United Nations 
                                                 
167 See also the section ‘Britain Recognizes PRC, Colonial Censorship Rejects Communist 
Propaganda’ in Chapter 3. 
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Security Council.  About three months later, the United States of America (US) 
lifted its sanctions against China, and that was followed by the visit of the then 
president of the US, Richard Nixon, to China.  Richard Nixon dubbed his one-week 
visit to China “the week that changed the world” after the Joint Communiqué of the 
USA and the PRC (also known as the Shanghai Communiqué) was issued on 28 
February 1972 which confirmed the ‘one China’ policy of the US.  
It certainly changed the face of Hong Kong, since in reference to 
Taiwan the communiqué announced: ‘The United States acknowledges 
that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but 
one China and that Taiwan is part of China.  The United States does 
not challenge that position.’  If the United States agreed that Taiwan, 
their own protectorate, was to be part of China, there was not much 
hope that Hong Kong, always looked upon askance as a ‘colony’, and 
thus anachronistic and deplorable, should be treated differently.  It 
should therefore have been no surprise when, only five days later, the 
United Nations Committee on Decolonization was asked by the 
Chinese representative, Huang Hua, to remove Hong Kong from the list 
of colonial territories.    
[O]n 13 March [1972] — a joint Anglo-Chinese communiqué was 
issued establishing embassies in London and Beijing, and agreeing 
‘principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity’.  
This was the culmination of twenty years’ negotiations, and taken in 
conjunction with Britain’s tacit acquiescence in the removal of Hong 
Kong from the list of colonies, made it clear that the die had been cast. 
(Welsh 1997: 472-3) 
Later, in October 1972, Alec Douglas-Home became the first Foreign Secretary of 
Britain to visit Beijing since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.  According to a 
report by Associated Press on 7 November, the United Kingdom (UK) promised 
China that Hong Kong would not be used as a base for anti-Communist activities 
(cited in Cheng 1995: 450).   
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The year 1972 represents a significant turn in Anglo-Chinese relations as the 
two countries agreed to the “principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity” and Britain tacitly acquiesced that Hong Kong was an integral 
part of China and not a colony.  Such an agreement and acquiescence implied that 
Britain was not determined to keep Hong Kong and it would only be a matter of time 
before the PRC took back Hong Kong although the Question of Hong Kong was not 
yet officially and openly on the negotiation table.  However, according to British 
historian Frank Welsh: 
[I]n July 1989, [the former Prime Minister of the UK Edward Heath] 
confirmed that in his first meeting with the Chinese Government in 
1972 he “obtained from Mao Tse-tung [also known as Mao Zedong], in 
the presence of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofang, an 
undertaking that nothing serious would happen in Hong Kong and that 
the changeover in 1997 would be peaceful” [sic].168 . . . Even though by 
1996 . . . [Heath] never regained office after his electoral defeat in 1974, 
he continued to be held in high esteem by the Chinese leadership, and in 
that world where personal relationships count for so much, he was able 
to speak more authoritatively than British Ministers.  When in 1974, 
visiting Hong Kong . . . , Heath confirmed that Hong Kong would 
indeed be handed back to the Chinese in 1997, his statement should 
have been taken as definitive; it also strongly suggested the existence of 
a previously arranged understanding.  (Welsh 1997: 473; emphasis 
added)   
Later, in 1976, the official title of the head of public service, ‘Colonial Secretary’, 
which had been used by the colonial government since Hong Kong was ceded to 
Britain in 1842, was renamed ‘Chief Secretary’.  In the light of Welsh’s account and 
                                                 
168 According to China Daily (19 July 2005) and LBC/IRN (n.d.), Heath visited the PRC 26 times 
in 27 years, and the first visit was in May 1974 which was about two months after he stepped down from 
the British premiership.  
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analysis, the new title signifies a change of the British attitude towards the Question 
of Hong Kong from being merely acquiescent manner to making an open gesture.  
In order to tie in with the newly developed Anglo-Chinese relations and to 
cope with the ‘arranged understanding’ on the Question of Hong Kong, changes in 
the old colonial mode of governance in British Hong Kong in the ensuing years was 
inevitable, which in turn affected the population and affairs of Hong Kong, including 
Hong Kong cinema.  Inevitably, colonial film censorship was also modified and 
evolved into something seemingly capable of surviving the new political 
relationships and the subsequent political conditions.   
Although the Governor in Council had formulated the “Film Censorship 
Regulations, 1953”, the Hong Kong Government did not make the censorship 
standards public until May 1973, when the Television and Film Division of the 
Secretariat for Home Affairs published a booklet of fifteen pages titled Film 
Censorship Standards - a note of guidance (to be discussed in the next paragraph).  
In 1976, membership of the Film Board of Review was increased from four to seven 
persons.  Besides having the Commissioner for Television and Films as the 
chairman, the board consisted of two unofficial members and four official members.  
It was decided that the two members drawn from a larger group selected by the 
Director of Home Affairs should be invited to attend each censorship screening and 
be asked to make their comments on record for the information of the authority 
(Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1975-1976 Session: 994).  In 1977, the Television and 
Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA) was set up to take over the entertainment 
regulatory works including film censorship and the control of obscenity and 
indecency in the media. 
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The publication of Film Censorship Standards - a note of guidance was 
significant since it was the first time that the colonial government had made public 
its film censorship criteria in the form of explanatory sections.  However, only 
general and vague principles and standards are stated.  Section 3 of it explains:   
Film censorship has no rigid norm.  In order to make good use of these 
standards, a film will be looked upon as a whole during the examination 
of every film, and attention has to be paid to the story line and 
theme . . . . When a censor finds it difficult to make a decision, it is best 
to have it cut or banned from public screening and let the Board of 
Review decide whether the policy in force is appropriate or not during 
the hearing of the appeal.  Regarding how to determine the taste of the 
audience and whether or not the interpretation of the film censorship 
standards has changed, film censors will take the principle illustrated in 
the decision of the Board of Review as their paradigmatic reference.  
The aim of censors is to reflect in their work what they consider is the 
present opinion of the ordinary human beings.169  (Television and Film 
Division 1973: 2; my translation)  
According to the principles and criteria stated in the note of guidance, vilifications of 
religion and judicature, subversion of public order and security, crime provocation, 
violence, sex and nudity were the main objects of censorship (Television and Film 
Division 1973: 5-9).  Among such concerns, the issue of violence occupies most 
space, almost five whole pages.  The note of guidance also expresses much concern 
about the influence and impact of the film on children in the audience.  The four 
reasons provided in the record of TELA for banning films between 1965 and the end 
of 1974, given in Chapter 3, are also included under Section 5 (Television and Film 
Division 1973: 3-4).  Films could be censored or banned because they might: (A) 
                                                 
169 Such an explanation is problematic as it implies that the censors’ work has to be based on 
“what they consider is the present opinion of ordinary human beings”.  The term ‘ordinary being’ is 
similar to the concept of ‘reasonable person’ in common law, which is a variable subject to contextual 
changes and never has been technically well-defined.  Moreover, whether or not an ‘ordinary human 
being’ can guarantee reasonable opinion is another unsolved question. 
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Corrupt morals, cause deep shock or disgust, encourage crime, particularly crimes of 
violence; (B) Provoke hatred between persons in Hong Kong of differing race, colour, 
class, nationality, creed or sectional interests; (C) Damage good relations with other 
territories; and (D) Unwarrantably offend religious bodies.  This evidently proves 
that the note of guidance existed long before it was made public and political 
censorship has been implemented in accordance with the clauses on “[provoking] 
hatred between persons in Hong Kong of differing race, colour, class, nationality, 
creed or sectional interests” and “[damaging] good relations with territories outside 
Hong Kong”.  For the latter clause, the Chinese version of it varies a little in 
meaning; it literally means: Damage friendly relations with the neighbouring 
territories outside Hong Kong (emphasis added).  Hong Kong people would easily 
associate the faceless neighbouring territories with China, Taiwan and Portuguese 
Macau.  However, in light of the fact that Britain had established full diplomatic 
relations with China in 1972, the word ‘friendly’ narrows down the association to, 
probably, China.  The phrase ‘friendly relations’ could be a British open expression 
of goodwill to Beijing on cultural aspects and, by the same token, it could cover a 
much broader area of association by virtue of its vagueness.  Since the UK had 
promised the PRC that Hong Kong would not be used as a base for anti-Communist 
activities, the colonial government accordingly prohibited all anti-Communist films 
from public exhibition but also censored Communist propaganda.   
 
Colonial Censorship Tangled Up with Communist and Anti-Communist Films  
According to the information provided by the Government Secretariat (cited 
in Lo, Li and Ng 1987a), from 1975 to 1986, there were twenty films banned because 
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of the political censorship measure to prevent damaging good relations with 
territories outside Hong Kong.170  Other than two from Hong Kong, these banned 
films came from North Vietnam, North Korea, the US, Italy, France, the PRC and 
Taiwan.  The Soviet-Japanese co-production Dersu Uzala (1975) directed by Akira 
Kurosawa and shot on location at the Sino-Soviet border is also on the list.  
Significantly, Taiwan, led by the CPC’s adversary the KMT, was the top of the list, 
having eight films banned, perhaps because there were more Taiwanese-made films 
exported to Hong Kong as a major market or perhaps because Taiwan made more 
films criticizing the PRC and communism.  Films from North Vietnam and North 
Korea are explicit communist propaganda films, including Victory on Road 
9-Southern Laos (Chien Thang Duong 9—Nam Lao) and The Destiny of Keum-hee 
and Eun-hee (1974).  A spokesman of TELA said that censors banned the North 
Vietnamese films for the sake of good trade relations with the US, which implies that 
economic reasons also played a part other than political considerations (cited in Lo, 
Li and Ng 1987a).  It might possibly be true, but the rhetoric around censorship 
avoids broaching anything related to the suppression of communism to avoid 
offending Communist China.  Also, it is well-known that government officials 
always downplay, hide or deny political considerations in governmental decisions 
and attribute the cause of social problems and conflicts to economics.  This is still a 
familiar practice of the Hong Kong government officials today, particularly when a 
problem involves Beijing’s concerns and interference.   
                                                 
170 The article by Lo, Li and Ng (1987a) states that there were 21 films banned from 1974 to 1986.  
I purposely counted the banned films from 1975 to 1986 so that the subsequent discussion would not 
overlap with that in Chapter 3, and the film banned in 1974, China Behind, is mentioned and discussed 
in Chapter 3.  
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The Taiwanese films banned between 1975 and 1986 included Chang 
Tseng-chai’s The Battle of Guningtou (Guningtou Da Zhan, 1980), Wang Tung’s If I 
Were for Real (Jia Ru Wo Shi Zhen De, 1981) and Portrait of a Fanatic (Ku Lian, 
1982), Wang Chu Chin’s On the Society File of Shanghai (Shang Hai She Hui Dang 
An, 1981), Pai Ching-jui’s The Coldest Winter in Peking (Huang Tian Hou Tu, 1981) 
and The Sunset in Geneva (Ri Nei Wa Di Huang Hun, 1986; also known as Twilight 
in Geneva).171  These Taiwanese films are related to the depiction of conditions in 
the Chinese Mainland, unveiling the dark side of Maoist China to a great extent.   
In the late 1970s, a new genre of Chinese Mainland literature emerged soon 
after the death of Mao Zedong, portraying the tragic experiences and sufferings of 
intellectuals and cadres during the traumatic and oppressive Cultural Revolution.  
Critics categorize this work as ‘scar literature’ (shanghen wenxue).  Soon after the 
emergence of scar literature, a number of films were made on the same theme, 
leading to an equivalent genre of Chinese film, namely, the ‘scar film’ (shanghen 
dianying).  Among the banned Taiwanese titles mentioned above, The Coldest 
Winter in Peking, If I Were for Real, Portrait of a Fanatic and On the Society File of 
Shanghai belong to this category.  In these films, emblems of the PRC, such as the 
portrait of Mao Zedong, the five-star red flags and the Maoist songs that were 
previously prohibited by the Taiwan Government, always appear, but they met no 
censorship problem when they were released in Taiwan. 
                                                 
171 On the Society File of Shanghai had a sub-title The Right of a Maiden’s First Night (Shao Nu 
Chu Ye Quan).  For more about If I Were for Real, Portrait of a Fanatic and On the Society File of 
Shanghai, see Liang (2004: 243-7).  
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The Coldest Winter in Peking was financed by the KMT-run Central Motion 
Picture Corporation.172  It was made at a time when diplomatic relations between 
the US and Taiwan had just been severed and a wave of patriotism swept the 
Taiwanese populace.  The film, perhaps the first scar film made in Taiwan, aimed to 
expose political catastrophe and inhumanity under the CPC regime.  It features a 
top cast of the time, including Charlie Chin, Sibelle Hu, Rose Kuei, Chang Chung 
and Tien Feng.  On its public release in Taiwan on 5 February 1981, the film caused 
a sensation and became a box-office smash (Liang 2004: 243).  The Coldest Winter 
in Peking initially won censorship approval in Hong Kong, and its public screening 
took place on 25 March 1981.  But then the Hong Kong Government suddenly 
proclaimed that the film was overtly political propaganda and would affect Hong 
Kong’s relation with neighbouring territories.  It withdrew the certificate for public 
exhibition and banned the film after it was publicly screened for one day.   
The Chief Film Censor Pierre Lebrun said the film was passed as an 
entertainment based on well-known facts . . . “but it has now come to 
my attention that the film has political overtones and thus falls within 
the category normally banned in the circumstances of Hongkong.”  
Ming Chi, . . . the producer, said the film is strictly “commercial, 
artistic and factual.”  (Taiwan Info 1 June 1981) 
The distribution company of the film in Hong Kong, Shaw Brothers, raised an 
objection but it was rejected by the government.  Hong Kong citizens generally 
believed that the ban was due to pressure from the Xinhua News Agency.  However, 
when The Coldest Winter in Peking was submitted for censorship again on 7 June 
1989 (ibid), that is the third day after the June Fourth Massacre that marked an end to 
                                                 
172 Central Motion Picture Corporation became a private company when the KMT withdrew from 
it in December 2005 under the ‘Political Power out of Media’ policy.  It was renamed to Central 
Pictures Corporation in 2009. 
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the 1989 Democracy Movement began in April 1989, the government censors 
approved the film, and the film was released again in Hong Kong on 22 June 1989 
(Hong Kong Film Archive’s Online Catalogue).173  Prior to the re-distribution of 
The Coldest Winter in Peking, If I Were for Real also successfully passed the Hong 
Kong censorship and was released on 4 May 1989 (ibid).   
No matter whether the re-submissions of these two films were owing to an 
opportunistic business motive during the 1989 Democracy Movement, the colonial 
government’s approvals of of the two previously banned films undoubtedly had a 
political motive.  Although the government did not make public the reason for its 
approvals, it was probably nothing more than a British political move during the 
white-hot Anglo-Chinese negotiations over the Question of Hong Kong to stir up 
public opinion against Communist China and to gain more bargaining power.  In 
point of fact, the June Fourth Massacre together with the memories of the Cultural 
Revolution induced by the The Coldest Winter in Peking did boost an intense fear of 
the CPC and worries about the future of Hong Kong among its citizens.  The drastic 
increase in emigration in the ensuing several years clearly showed their sense of 
hopelessness.   
Year Number of Emigrants from Hong Kong Year Number of Emigrants from Hong Kong
1980 22,400 1988 45,800 
1981 18,300 1989 42,000 
1982 20,300 1990 62,000 
1983 19,800 1991 60,000 
1984 22,400 1992 66,000 
1985 22,300 1993 53,000 
1986 19,000 1994 62,000 
1987 30,000  
 Data are obtained from the Hong Kong Council of Social Service, http://www.swik.org.hk
(Assessed 12 December 2006) 
                                                 
173 For more about The Coldest Winter in Peking, see Liang 2004: 241-3. 
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Although it is not included in the Government Secretariat’s information, 
another film produced by the Central Motion Picture Corporation of Taiwan, The Gift 
of A Fu (A Fu De Li Wu, 1984), was also not distributed in Hong Kong due to 
censorship problems.  The film consists of three independent parts, sub-titled as 
Hong Kong, Mainland and Taipei directed by Mak Tai-kit, Luo Weiming and Li 
Chi-hwa respectively, and told the stories of three Chinese men of the same name, A 
Fu, but living in the three different places.  The film was not wholly banned but 
approved upon the excision of the entire part on the A Fu living in the Chinese 
Mainland and all the foul language in the part on the A Fu in Hong Kong.  Since the 
film owner considered that the cuts would ruin the film as a whole, it was not shown 
in Hong Kong.  However, the part Hong Kong, which is about A Fu and his friends 
“mulling over their future as 1997 casts a shadow of uncertainty over all their lives” 
(HKIFF 1998 [1988]: 127), was approved by the authority a few years later, but 
restricted to the Hong Kong International Film Festival in 1988 only.  The ban on 
the part set in Mainland China was also mainly due to breaking the censors’ rules 
about films that could “damage good relations with territories outside Hong Kong”.   
Besides subjects that were considered anti-Communist, worries over the 
Question of Hong Kong were also considered taboo by censors.  In mid-1983, less 
than a year after Deng Xiaoping told Margaret Thatcher bluntly on 24 September 
1982 that the PRC’s sovereignty over Hong Kong after 1 July 1997 was not 
negotiable, King Hoi-Lam’s The Home at Hong Kong (1983) starring Andy Lau was 
approved for public screening upon excision of about seven hundred feet of footage, 
that is, about eight minutes of the film’s running time.  Censors considered the 
excised parts excessively violent but the Hong Kong International Film Festival 
introduces the film in this way: “The social and political uncertainties which hang 
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over the [film’s] characters undoubtedly reflect the shadow of 1997” (HKIFF 1998 
[1988]: 126), insinuating that people were panicking over the future of Hong Kong 
as 1997 was approaching.174  Such panic showed a lack of reliance on, and negative 
view of, the future Communist rule, and was thus commonly understood as 
anti-Communist too.  
 
The Reinforcement and Institutionalization of Film Censorship in Hong Kong 
Before 10 November 1988, TELA would state in the censorship certificate 
whether or not an approved film was suitable for children.  Although it was 
mandatory for film owners, hirers and cinemas to indicate to the public that 
particular films were not suitable for children, there was no law to prevent children 
and underage audiences from entering cinemas to watch any film that was not 
suitable for them.  The issue was the subject of continual debate which started in the 
early 1970s and lasted for more than ten years.  However, history is cunning — in 
the course of the debates in the Legislative Council and discussions among 
professionals and other stakeholders, the issue grew into a political and legal one 
leading to an ‘unintentional’ legal formalization and institutionalization of the 
colonial film censorship.  The change marked a transition from censorship behind 
closed doors in true colonial style to a more transparent version of censorship which 
was responsive to community standards in a rule-of-law style which survived after 
1997 (which, however, seems deteriorating since Leung Chun-ying became the Chief 
Executive of Hong Kong SAR). 
                                                 
174 For the synopsis of The Home at Hong Kong, see HKIFF 1998 [1988]: 126. 
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Back in June 1971, the issue was brought to the Legislative Council because 
of the increasing number of films that featured sensational graphic violence, crimes, 
sex and horror that had been appearing in Hong Kong films since 1967, of which 
Shaw Brothers was the leading player.  In answering a question by a Legislative 
Council member of whether it would be possible to introduce regulations prohibiting 
children from seeing films marked with ‘Not Suitable for Children’, the Secretary for 
Home Affairs answered: 
[U]nder the present Film Censorship Regulations, when the Chief 
Film Censor considers that a film is suitable for public exhibition in 
Hong Kong to adult audiences but not suitable for screening to young 
audiences he directs that the distributors should advertise the film as 
‘Not Suitable for Children’.  It is thereafter a matter for discretion for 
the parents or guardians to decide whether they should be permitted to 
attend such public screenings whatever their age.   
The Secretary of the Panel of Censors, in conjunction with other 
interested Departments, has recently considered whether or not it would 
be more effective to recommend a change in the law whereby this 
advisory system of classification could be changed to a compulsory 
system of classification, under which young persons below a certain 
age could be excluded by law from a cinema where films ‘Not Suitable 
for Children’ were being screened.  His preliminary conclusion is that 
in the light of the family viewing habits which still persist in Hong 
Kong whereby many parents and their young children attend cinema 
shows together, it is better to leave discretion in this matter to the 
parents. 
If a compulsory system of film classification were to be introduced 
with any hope of effective enforcement, it would be necessary for 
young people around the accepted age to carry valid documents 
testifying to their age and to be individually identified from such 
documents.  The introduction of such a system would present a 
number of practical problems. 
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[A] short pilot public opinion survey has been conducted in 
different districts.  This indicates that a majority of sample of some 
600 people did think that regulations to prohibit children under 16 from 
seeing films containing scenes of a violent or sexual nature should be 
introduced into Hong Kong.  The question posed did not however 
indicate that there would be any practical difficulties and the possibility 
even of rising prices.  But the subject is certainly one which is under 
study and will remain so.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1970-71 Session: 
665-6) 
Legislative Council member Ko Siu-wah raised the issue again on 7 July 1976: 
During the period from January 1 to August 31 last year, 417 films 
were submitted by distributors for censorship.  Of this figure, 182 or 
47% were classified as unsuitable for viewing by children.  The 
figures for 1976, from January 1 to the end of June, show that 341 films 
were submitted for censorship and that 178 or 52% of them were 
classified as unsuitable for viewing by children. . . . I have mentioned 
before my concern regarding the increasing number of children and 
young people viewing films which have been classified as unsuitable 
for their age.  I urge Government to reconsider very carefully the 
possibility of legislating to restrict entry to specified films to persons 
over a particular age. . . . [O]ne of the reasons for our increasing crime 
rate is the ready availability of films which make crime and violence 
appear the norm.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1975-76 Session: 1049) 
The Secretary for Home Affairs replied: 
[O]n the question of restricting admission of viewers to films 
according to their age . . . , the problem of enforcement is a difficult one.  
The Commissioner for Television and Films has recently discussed 
with the film industry the possibility of cinema managements taking up 
enforcement responsibilities but the response has not been 
encouraging. . . . I doubt if we will be able to find a satisfactory solution 
until the problems relating to enforcement have been resolved as it 
would be undesirable at the present time to place the extra burden on 
the Police Force.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1975-76 Session: 1050) 
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However, by the late 1970s, when Hollywood titles with youth as their subject, for 
example, Saturday Night Fever (1977) and Grease (1978), became a popular film 
genre, the Hong Kong film industry also produced a number of such films, albeit not 
musicals, which included Yim Ho’s The Happenings (1980), Rachel Zen’s Cream, 
Soda and Milk (1981), Ng Siu Wan’s Once Upon a Rainbow (1982) and Clifford 
Choi’s Teenage Dreamers (1982).175  
In 1979, Tsui Hark made Dangerous Encounter - 1st Kind (also known as 
Don’t Play with Fire), initially entitled The Gang of Four, which contains teen 
violence and bomb-planting and tells the story of four youngsters’ destructive and 
aberrant behaviour.  The film was banned because the government considered that 
the film encouraged xenophobia, contained a strong anti-social sentiment and an 
apparent inclination to anarchism; and that its public screening would cause 
uneasiness and harm to the local community.  Although a considerable number of 
critics and film workers expressed their opposition, the government maintained the 
ban.176  In order to pass the censorship, Tsui Hark re-shot some scenes, removed 
some over-violent shots and re-edited the whole film with a new storyline.  The 
film’s Chinese title was changed from Dai Yat Lui Ngai Him to Dai Yat Lui Ying Ngai 
Him, with the former being the Chinese technical term for ‘Category 1 Dangerous 
[Goods]’ that refers to explosive ordnance while the latter literally means ‘the first 
type of danger’ without any specific references but simply the possibility of a 
cognitive association.  The film was finally released in 1980 but also caused 
                                                 
175 For more about The Happenings, Cream, Soda and Milk, Once Upon a Rainbow and Teenage 
Dreamers, see Li Cheuk-to 1990a: 62-8. 
 
176 For some of the opinions against the ban, see City Entertainment, Issue 43 (September 1980), 
Issue 55 (January 1981).  
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concern about the influence of the film on impressionable teenagers.177  Although 
the censorship style of rhetoric emphasized the film’s negative influence on youth, it 
probably masked the government’s political concern.  As suggested by the film’s 
initial title The Gang of Four, which shares the same tag as the political faction led 
by Jiang Qing during the Cultural Revolution in the Chinese Mainland, the original 
idea could have been an allegory of the Cultural Revolution and the contemporary 
violence of the 1967 Leftist Riots in Hong Kong, which are still issues that the CPC 
would like to silence in order to suppress the possible ‘transdiscursive’ effect incited 
by such a film (see Chapter 1 for more about the term ‘transdiscursive’, see also 
Foucault 1998: 205-222).  
Later in 1982, two highly controversial films on troubled youth were released, 
namely, Lonely Fifteen produced by Johnny Mak and Patrick Tam’s Nomad.178  
While the former provoked hot debates and discussions on youth and film censorship 
problems in Hong Kong, the latter was caught in real trouble and was attacked by 
educational circles for its obscenity and the harm it would do to impressionable 
youth.  In the real world of course, there are various forces that mete out criticism 
and discipline such as the educational and the religious networks that exist within a 
secure social structure.  They are not licensed in the lawful sense, but in the cultural 
and ideological sense, to denounce anything infringing the social norms or code of 
conduct.  Regarding Nomad, two scenes of the film seriously irritated the moralists.  
The first one was a love scene between the characters Louis and Tomato (played by 
Leslie Cheung and Cecilia Yip) on the first day they met.  Another one was also a 
                                                 
177 For more about the ban on and reviews of Dangerous Encounter - 1st Kind, see Cheuk (2008: 
89-91), Chang (2006: 139-140) and Li (1990a: 11-9).  
 
178 For more about Lonely Fifteen, see Li 1990a: 69-77. 
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love scene but between the characters Kathy and Bon (played by Pat Ha and Kent 
Tong), in which the lovemaking starts on a moving tram and is carried on in a street.  
After the film’s first Saturday mid-night shows, eighteen educational organizations 
and the principals of twenty-six schools jointly signed a letter of complaint to the 
Chief Secretary about the film.  The film was then taken down from screens and 
re-censored.  Later, after removing more than two minutes of the total running time, 
the film was allowed to be released again.179  This is just an overt example of 
unofficial censorship, demonstrating that legislation is not the only means to make 
censorship legitimate.     
However, Nomad also provoked intense disputes over the existing film 
censorship in Hong Kong.  Oriental Daily reported on 12 December 1982 that one 
hundred and eighty teachers from primary schools, secondary schools and tertiary 
education institutes issued a joint statement, expressing their view that the censorship 
standards at that time were too lenient and should be reviewed comprehensively 
(cited in Cheng 1995: 440).  Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) held two 
seminars on the issue in its programmes too.  As reported by Ming Pao on 20 
December 1982, film director and producer Ng See-yuen said at a seminar that once 
the ‘certificate of approval’ was issued, the film owner would prepare prints for 
distribution, launch promotions and arrange cinemas for screening, a process which 
would cost three hundred to five hundred thousand Hong Kong dollars.  It was 
unfair to the film industry if the government banned the film after citizens’ 
complaints when all these procedures had been carried out.  
                                                 
179 For more about the controversy over and review of Nomad, see Cheuk (2008: 129, 131) and 
Ming Pao Weekly (25 Sept 2010, Vol. 2185) and Chang (2006: 137-8). 
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On 27 January 1983, Ta Kung Pao reported that Hong Kong film workers 
formed a provisional committee in response.  The committee presented to the Chief 
Secretary a joint declaration signed by some one thousand film workers opposing the 
re-censoring system and pointing out that the re-censoring of Nomad had exposed a 
loophole in the then censorship regulations and requesting a review of them (cited in 
Cheng 1995: 441).  According to the January 1983 issue of the monthly magazine, 
The Seventies, the chairman of the committee, Koo Siu-fung, stressed that the 
re-censoring regulation should be abolished and that before the regulation was 
amended, re-censoring and immediate banning of any film which had already been 
approved should not be carried out at the same time, which meant that a film 
undergoing re-censoring process should be allowed to continue its on-going 
screening (ibid).  Despite the filmmakers’ protests, their demands received no 
substantive response from the government.   
In another similar instance later in September 1983, Bad Boy, an American 
film starring Sean Penn with troubled youth as its subject, passed the Hong Kong 
censorship and was granted a certificate of approval, yet the Commissioner of Police 
asked the Chief Secretary to ban the film because he considered it exaggerated 
violence too much.  The film was, thus, re-censored, but TELA’s Board of Review 
maintained the original ruling and allowed the film for public screening (Ming Pao 
16 September 1983).  Although such re-censorings were prompted by concern 
about sex and violence issues, they could also be used as a means to suppress 
freedom of speech and expression; that would, in turn, suppress freedom of creativity 
if an initially approved film was banned under a re-censoring order until the 
re-censoring result was issued.  
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In early 1984, the government eventually amended the unfair regulations of 
re-censoring.  According to the Hong Kong Government Gazette 1984, No. 7 (cited 
in Cheng 1995: 441), any film that was already theatrically released would not be 
banned during the period that the Chief Secretary ordered it to be re-censored upon 
any person’s application.  However, if the film distribution company did not follow 
the instruction to submit the film for re-censoring, the authority would place a ban 
and forbid the film from continuing its public screening.     
According to the monthly magazine, The Mirror (March 1982; cited in Cheng 
1995: 452-3), between November 1981 and January 1982, TELA commissioned a 
market research company to conduct a public opinion survey of the influence of 
motion pictures on the young.  The result of the survey, announced on 6 February 
1982, indicated that ordinary civilians believed censorship was lenient and 
inappropriate owing mainly to the inability to restrict certain audiences from entering 
cinemas.  Eighty-six percent of the interviewees considered the aim of the advice, 
‘Not Suitable for Children’, had not been achieved.  Most of the interviewees said 
that if underage filmgoers could be prohibited from watching certain ‘adult only’ 
films, the contemporary criteria of film censorship were acceptable.  Wah Kiu Yat 
Pao (28 February 1982, as cited in Cheng 1995: 453) reported that a control officer 
of the censorship authority said at a seminar, held by the Communication Department 
of Hong Kong Baptist College (now Hong Kong Baptist University) on 27 February, 
that a film classification system, or in its slang term ‘three-tier ratings’ that refers to a 
system consisting of three levels of ratings, would be implemented in early 1983.  
However, while Hong Kong citizens were anticipating a new film-rating system, it 
remained under consideration for several years and the implementation was 
adjourned again and again for unknown reasons although the progress of its 
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formulation was questioned closely by the Legislative Council members (City 
Entertainment, Issue 210 1987: 4).  Three years later, on 6 November 1985, the 
Chief Secretary David Akers-Jones forecast its introduction again at a Legislative 
Council meeting: 
[T]he proposal to introduce a new film classification system is expected 
to be submitted to the Governor in Council in about a month. Assuming 
approval, a draft bill will be gazetted for public information and 
comment, and for examination by this Council.  On the assumption 
that the bill becomes law, the system could be introduced by mid-1986.  
With regard to enforcement, it is proposed that the onus be placed on 
cinema operators to ensure that only persons aged 18 or above are 
admitted to certain films.  The Film Censorship Authority would make 
spot checks on cinemas showing such films.  The level at which 
censorship standards is eventually set will depend upon the findings of 
an independently conducted public opinion survey.  (Hansard: LegCo 
Sittings 1985-86 Session: 47) 
However, by May 1986, even though “detailed drafting instructions were issued in 
March 1985 and no less than eight drafts of a film censorship Bill were produced” 
(Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 1262), no relevant legislation was 
enacted.  The Chief Secretary explained later in 1987:  
In the course of drafting the Bill, difficulties were encountered over the 
expression of the principles of film censorship.  There were indeed 
differences with the Administration as to how the problem should be 
tackled but there was no lack of will . . . to deal with it.  (Ibid)   
That is to say, while everyone agrees it was difficult, no one could agree how to fix it, 
and, thus, the issue was adjourned and adjourned.  Nonetheless, it was revealed later 
in 1987 that although the original intent to introduce a new classification system of 
film was provoked by social concern about impressionable youth, the adjournment of 
 
192 
the system was, in fact, owing to the government’s embarrassment and a hidden 
agenda that the Chief Secretary had been trying to keep back (to be discussed in the 
next section). 
In May 1986, the renowned and influential biweekly film magazine of the 
1980s and 1990s, City Entertainment (Issue 188: 3-5), published an interview with 
the then Chief Film Censor Pierre Lebrun.  Lebrun said that the classification of 
films (the three-tier system) was a new system, not a set of new standards.  He 
further said that discussion about the question of film censorship began in the 1970s.  
In 1971, the focus of the question was on how to put in place the ‘Not Suitable for 
Children’ instruction aimed at preventing children from watching films that were not 
suitable for them.  However, the discussion ended up with nothing definite because 
not many people were concerned about the issue, and it would have been difficult to 
check ages because it was not mandatory for Hong Kong residents to carry their 
identity cards in public areas in the 1970s.180  While film people were very 
concerned about the new censorship system and complained that the relevant 
authority had not consulted them enough, Lebrun said that the new system would 
address the concerns of the public first, not filmmakers’.  He remarked that the 
authority had consulted the film industry three times and had conducted one public 
survey since 1982.  Whether there is enough discussion or not enough is subjective 
but three consultations and one survey in four years were what Lebrun saw as 
technically ‘enough’.  He also contended that the essence of the imminent three-tier 
censorship system was liberal; it would be the most liberal system in the whole of 
                                                 
180 When the Touch Base Policy was abolished on 24 October 1980, it was made compulsory for 
Hong Kong residents over the age of fifteen to carry their identity cards in public areas.  The Hong 
Kong Government implemented the Touch Base Policy in 1974 in an attempt to reduce the influx of 
illegal immigrants escaping from the Cultural Revolution in the Chinese Mainland during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.  Under the policy, any immigrants who crossed the border and reached the urban area 
could stay in Hong Kong. 
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Asia when it was implemented.  However, he also considered that Hong Kong 
people were not liberal to the extent of allowing a completely relaxed censorship 
system.  When talking about the details of the classification system, Lebrun 
commented that the Film Censorship Standards: a note of guidance published in 
1973 was a bit ‘Victorian’ but maintained that the eight basic standards stated in it 
were a matter of principle and would not be changed.  The set of standards were 
that films should not:  
1. Cause deep shock or disgust. 
2. Corrupt morals or encourage crime, particularly crimes of 
violence or encourage drug taking. 
3. Provoke hatred between persons in Hong Kong of differing race, 
colour, class, nationality, creed or sensational interests. 
4. Unwarrantably offend religious bodies or other local famous 
organizations. 
5. Vilify the judicature. 
6. Incite the audience to hate or despise the government. 
7. Damage good relations with territories outside Hong Kong. 
8. Encourage damage to public security.181  (My translation) 
Lebrun said that the aim of the three-tier system was to protect the interests of 
audiences and it would keep certain standards to protect them against violence, 
pornography, bad language, storylines with negative political connotations, and while 
political jokes would be tolerated, films that would damage relations with territories 
outside Hong Kong would definitely be banned.   
However, society’s patience to wait for the new film censorship system must 
have been sorely tried by another incident.  After Derek Yee’s The Lunatics was 
premiered in the form of weekend mid-night shows on 31 May 1986, the Hong Kong 
                                                 
181 Although the seventh standard in the list is commonly regarded as political, the last four 
standards can be political too. 
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Council of Social Service criticized it and complained that the film’s message was 
irresponsible and not constructive as it distorted the image of mental patients and 
deepened society’s misunderstanding of and prejudice against mental patients.  On 
5 June, the Chief Secretary placed a re-censoring order on the film.  Nonetheless, 
the Board of Review ruled on 6 June that the film could continue with its public 
exhibition, but it had to be indicated to the public that it was not suitable for 
children.182  The commissioner of the board maintained that if the film was banned, 
it would be tantamount to strangling creative freedom.  The Lunatics incident 
further catalysed demands for the long-awaited film classification system. 
 
Dark Side of Colonial Rule – Illegal Censorship  
When the long-awaited film classification system was still at issue, The Asian 
Wall Street Journal published a prominent front-page article on 17 March 1987 titled 
“Hong Kong Plays Political Censor for China – Colony Government Retains Illegal 
Powers to Block Films That Might Offend Beijing”, written by Frank Ching.  The 
article disclosed that the colonial government had been censoring films without legal 
authority for thirty-four years since 1953.  It also revealed that a classified 
document for the Executive Council discussion on 3 March 1987 showed that the 
government practiced film censorship without legislative support and also 
meticulously banned the films that would displease Beijing and affect Sino-Hong 
Kong relations.  According to the article, the Attorney General had sent a letter to 
the Secretary for Home Affairs in 1972, pointing out that regulations which did not 
stipulate the grounds for censoring a film were not legal.  In 1977, the Attorney 
                                                 
182 For more about the re-censoring of The Lunatics, see City Magazine, Issue 190 1986: 4-6. 
 
195 
General further indicated to the Secretary for Home Affairs that the so-called Film 
Censorship Standards: a note of guidance, promulgated in an administrative way in 
1973, was fundamentally internal administrative guidance and not part of the lawful 
film censorship regulations.  The Secretary for Home Affairs still did not take any 
remedial action.  In short, the article showed that the government had been 
exercising illegal film censorship knowingly and hiding its illegality deliberately.  
Furthermore, it uncovered the fact that the Deputy Governor David Akers-Jones had 
decided at the Executive Council meeting on 20 February 1987 to have the three-tier 
censorship system introduced through government administration instead of normal 
legislation.   
Frank Ching’s article triggered fiery reactions and instant controversy 
throughout the city.  On the very night of the day the article was published, the 
Information Services Department issued a press release.  It did not address the issue 
of illegal censorship but only reaffirmed the eight reasons for censorship in the Film 
Censorship Standards: a note of guidance.  It did, however, admit that, in order to 
combat the bad influence of pornography and violence on young people, the 
government was considering having the three-tier film censorship system formulated 
within a short period.  Significantly, the press release did not deny the illegality of 
colonial film censorship (City Entertainment (1987), Issue 210: 4).   
On 18 March 1987, Ming Pao also said: 
According to a memorandum obtained by this newspaper, which was 
submitted to the Executive Council for discussion on 3 March, the 
Hong Kong Government knows perfectly well that the film censorship 
regulations by which the authority has been practising political 
censorship are short of legal efficacy.  In order to divert public 
 
196 
attention, the government still defers amending the film censorship bill 
to redeem this legal flaw, but would rather continue to carry out 
censorship through its own administration which is poor in legal terms.  
The document indicates that the Hong Kong Government still thinks 
that it is vital to continue censoring films that would “damage good 
relations with territories outside Hong Kong”.  However, if it is to pass 
the film censorship bill to entrust the censorship authority with the 
power to carry out such censorship, it must get involved in convincing 
the public of the indispensability of the principles of the film censorship 
in legislation, including the principle of maintaining relations with 
territories outside Hong Kong.  This may yet result in the Legislative 
Council calling for a relaxation in such censorship.  In order to avoid 
disputes, the Hong Kong Government has decided to achieve its aim 
through administrative procedures that do not need to be legislated.  
(My translation)  
According to another article, published in Ming Pao on 19 March 1987, by Margaret 
Ng, a barrister and a member of the Legislative Council, the “Film Censorship 
Regulations” only delegated the authority to censor films to the censorship body and 
Hong Kong had been without lawful censorship standards since 1953 (see also 
Chapter 3).  While the film rating system which the public had been eagerly 
demanding was still at issue, the government had no intention of bringing the 
question of the legal loophole in film censorship regulations to the level of legislative 
discussion.  Instead, the government recommended that the Executive Council 
adopt measures other than the normal legislative course.  The intention behind 
introducing the rating system via administrative means was, on the one hand, to 
by-pass the risk of being seriously challenged about the illegality of the current film 
censorship regulations when the legislation was raised anew in the Legislative 
Council and, on the other, to shield the government from criticism by the public as 
well as law and media circles when the illegality was made public.  It seems evident 
that the government was also aware of the possible lawsuits that would be filed by 
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the film owners, hirers and distributors who had their films illegally banned by the 
authority in the previous years.  Its worst fears must have been realised after the 
illegality of its film censorship was revealed.  On 20 March 1987, a number of local 
newspapers reported that Ng See-yuen, whose production titled Without a Promised 
Land was banned in 1980, planned to sue the government for his losses resulting 
from the illegal censorship of the government.   
The subject of film censorship was continually and extensively covered by 
City Entertainment for more than a year from 1986.  Articles included film people’s 
comments, criticisms and discussions on the then anticipated film classification 
system and pieces about the illegal censorship of the government.183  Such coverage 
was very often in the form of features reflecting the film industry’s concerns about 
the issues.  According to City Entertainment (1987, Issue 210: 4), a government 
spokesman said that the government cared a great deal about the leak of the 
classified document and did not understand the aim of the person who revealed the 
document.  In response to the question of legality about the film censorship 
regulations, the Chief Secretary Robert Ford, the successor of David Akers-Jones, 
admitted that the current regulations were not satisfactory because they were made 
under an omnibus ordinance governing places of public entertainment.  Legal 
advice had been given expressing doubts about their legality, and “the regulations 
under which the Film Censor was then currently operating were not defined legally 
and with due authority” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 1263-4).  He 
                                                 
183 For more about the discussions on the film classification system before its implementation and 
the subsequent discovery of the government’s illegal censorship, see City Entertainment Issue 187: 30, 
Issue 188: 3-5, Issue 189: 3 and Issue 190: 4-6 published in 1986; Issue 209: 3-4, Issue 210: 3-6, Issue 
213: 27-42, Issue 214: 5-6, Issue 217: 7, Issue 218: 3-4, Issue 219: 20 and Issue 228: 3 published in 1987; 
and Issue 235: 3-4 published in 1988.   
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gave an explanation, which he admitted was “not a very satisfactory one”, at the 
Legislative Council meeting on 25 March 1987: 
Doubts about the legality of the existing film censorship regulations 
were first brought to the attention of the Administration in 1972.  
During the 10 years between 1972 and 1982, no action was taken to 
remedy the law.  File records of the period show that there was very 
little discussion of the subject.  I find it very difficult therefore . . . to 
comment on the matter as to why no action was taken to provide a 
tighter legal framework for censorship although there was indeed a 
legal framework.  In trying to second guess the reasons for those 
concerned in reaching their decision, I can only make assumptions; I 
cannot verify them.  But it would seem . . . that with a system operating 
to the apparent satisfaction of the public and the cinema operations, 
there was very little pressure on the Administration to raise what would 
obviously have been a rather delicate political problem.  I suppose it is 
sometimes tempting to put off until tomorrow what it is difficult to have 
to do today.  This . . . is not a very satisfactory explanation as I am sure 
Members will be quick to point out, but at least it has the merit of being 
honest!  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 1262)    
However, City Entertainment (1987, Issue 210: 5) commented that Robert Ford’s 
claim that “at least it has the merit of being honest” was both funny and embarrassing.  
About the progress of the motion picture rating system, Robert Ford said: 
The Administration has now proposed a system whereby films 
intended for public exhibition would be classified into three categories.  
The categories are: (I) films which may be shown to persons of any age; 
(II) films which may be shown subject to conditions relating to their 
viewing by persons under 18 years; and (III) films which are only 
suitable for viewing by persons who are 18 years or over.  The 
classification system has been designed in response to public demand to 
protect impressionable young people from films with sex and violence 
which may have an undesirable influence on the personality 
development and the social behaviour of young people.   
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. . . In drafting the legislation, problems were encountered in finding 
an appropriate expression of the principles of film censorship which 
would adequately guide the film industry as to what was acceptable.  
Difficulties were found in circumscribing the powers of the censors and 
safeguarding against possible abuses.  It was recognized that the 
public could be sensitive to the criteria for censoring films, currently 
embodied in the administrative ‘Note of Guidance’, being confirmed by 
statute. 
Consideration was then given to identifying an alternative method 
of introducing a system of film classification within the existing 
framework.  This could have been achieved by amending the ‘Note of 
Guidance’ to include a provision for film classification.  (Hansard: 
LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 1262-3) 
Robert Ford also said that he understood that it would be difficult for 
cinema-operators to restrict a certain age group from entering a cinema without 
appropriate legislative backing.  He added that the members of the Legislative 
Council were firmly in favour of a legislative approach (ibid).  The fact that film 
distributors knew that the current censorship system lacked legislative support might 
lead to a situation where uncensored films were shown to the public before 
appropriate legislation was enacted.  In order to tackle that possibility, the Chief 
Secretary said that the existing scheme would continue in force until a court decided 
that the regulations were without effect or until it was replaced by legislative 
arrangements that were free from doubt (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 
1264).  The revelations about illegal censorship effectively made the “Film 
Censorship Bill” a high priority on the government agenda and hastened the 
implementation of the film rating system.  By stepping back into such an episode of 
Hong Kong history, it can be seen that rule of law was being produced dynamically, 
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illustrating a change of the colonial rule after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was 
signed on 19 December 1984 and ratified on 27 May 1985. 
Significantly, when The Asian Wall Street Journal exposed the fact the 
government was censoring films without legal authority, there was another vehement 
dispute in Hong Kong caused by the passing of the “Public Order (Amendment) Bill, 
1986” at the Legislative Council on 11 March 1987.  The objective of the bill was 
to integrate Section 6 of “The Control of Publications Consolidation Ordinance”, 
which made it an offence to publish maliciously in any local newspaper false news 
that was likely to alarm public opinion or disturb public order, into the “Public Order 
Ordinance” to become a new Section 27 of it.  The government had no consultation 
with the district boards at all before the second and third readings of the bill at the 
Legislative Council even though the bill had generated much public concern (see 
Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 992, 1118).  After a long and heated 
debate, the bill was passed with amendments.  The new Section 27 was enacted as 
the following: 
1) Any person who publishes false news which is likely to cause alarm 
to the public or a section thereof or disturb public order shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall be liable –  
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine of $100,000 and to  
imprisonment for 2 years; and 
(b)  on summary conviction, to a fine of $30,000 and to 
imprisonment for 6 months. 
2) It shall be a defence to a charge under subsection (1) for the 
person charged to prove that he had reasonable grounds for 
believing that the news to which the charge relates was true. 
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3) No prosecution for an offence under this section shall be 
commenced without the consent of the Attorney General.184 
(University of Hong Kong Library) 
As former member of the Legislative Council, Chan Kam-chuen, said during the 
debate at the council meeting: 
[T]he shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant — it is very much 
against British justice, as every defendant is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty by the prosecution.  Also, no defendant shall be 
compelled to be a witness against himself or herself in any criminal 
case.  It is also very much against universal journalistic ethics for 
reporters to produce the source of information.  Even if they do, the 
informer may deny what had been said and the poor reporters would be 
left holding the bag.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 
1025) 
As 1997 was approaching, there was extreme concern about any legislation which 
could have the effect of infringing any freedoms of the Hong Kong people.  The 
enactment of the “Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986” was a suppression 
of the freedom of the press, inducing misgivings among Hong Kong citizens because 
it was in fact an instrument to secure the government’s power and a weapon for the 
government to kill dissents in the name of social stability.185  After the press, film 
could be the next.  Such an ordinance made the overdue film classification system a 
                                                 
184 For detailed documentation of the Legislative Council members’ debate on the “Public Order 
(Amendment) Bill, 1986”, see Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1986-87 Session: 1016-1084 and 1086-1115. 
 
185 Section 27 is not found in the present “Public Order Ordinance”.  According to an article by 
Lee Yee (2006), after the Legislative Council had passed the “Public Order (Amendment) Bill, 1986”, 
no government official took part in the forums related to the ordinance, which implied that they had no 
intention of trying to convince the public to accept it.  After the bill was passed, there was no 
prosecution against the promulgation of false news.  Lee Yee elaborates, “Although the bill was passed 
by the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, the Queen did not sign it when it was sent to London.  This 
was the reason why the ordinance was not put into practice.  In principle, under the system of 
constitutional monarchy, the monarch would sign all the bills passed by legislative bodies.  However, 
the monarch has the power to defer the signing, which is equivalent to having the bill adjourned.  Why 
did the Queen defer signing the “Public Order (Amendment) Bill, 1986”?  The only reason was that the 
ordinance by which the press has to reveal their source of information was against her personal view on 
the value of freedom of speech” (my translation).  
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politically sensitive issue in due course.  Although the Chief Film Censor said that 
the film classification system would be liberal, his statement did not ease concerns 
that the government would conspire with Beijing and would de facto tighten control 
over freedom of speech and expression during the transitional period of Hong 
Kong’s return to China and beyond.  As it turned out, after the ratification of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong citizens were kept isolated from, and 
ignorant of, the negotiation details about the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong 
in 1997 and the policy change in Hong Kong after 1 July 1997.  Hong Kong citizens 
were, at best, accepted as spectators and were rejected as participants.  Moreover, 
there was uncertainty about the part that Xinhua News Agency had played.  Had it 
been involved and, in effect, dominant in Hong Kong censorship and the formulation 
of the film censorship regulations?  Hong Kong citizens did not know when the 
official censors referred a film to their political consultants, whether or not 
representatives of Beijing were among those consultants.  Moreover, there was a 
strong suspicion that the Xinhua News Agency and the leftists were involved in the 
cases of Tong Shu-shuen’s China Behind and Patrick Lung’s Plague (see Chapter 3).  
The editor of City Entertainment, Li Cheuk-to, once said that the ultimate 
goal was to object to the current compulsory film censorship system and the film 
censorship authority should only be responsible for the classification of films and 
should have no power to ban or cut any film.  This was the essential and progressive 
purpose behind the implementation of the three-tier censorship system (City 
Entertainment (1986), Issue 189: 3).  However, the “Public Order (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1986” was a forewarning that the new film censorship system would be 
far from such a goal.   
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Political Concern about the “Film Censorship Ordinance 1988” Legislation 
On 3 April 1987, the “Film Censorship Bill” was published in the Hong Kong 
Government Gazette, and the government pronounced a consultation period of six 
weeks (City Entertainment (1987), Issue 210: 5).   
[The bill was] to provide for the establishment of a Film Censorship 
Authority, a panel of censors and a panel of advisers, and for regulating 
and imposing restrictions on the exhibition of films; for the approval 
and classification of films; for the establishment of a Board of Review; 
for the creation of offences; to make consequential and other 
amendments to other Ordinances; and for matters connected therewith.  
(Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 894-5)   
Besides introducing a three-tier system that classified films into three categories, the 
principles and standards in the Film Censorship Standards: a note of guidance of 
1973 were also brought into the bill.  Nevertheless, the government still preserved 
the power to exercise political censorship because the bill included the clause — 
“whether there is a likelihood that the exhibition of the film would seriously damage 
good relations with other territories,” a modification of the previous clause “damage 
good relations with other territories” — by consideration of which the government 
could ban a film from public exhibition.  Filmmakers worried that it would threaten 
freedom of creativity and expression, and expressed their concern about whether or 
not the Chief Secretary would have the power to suspend the screening of films 
pending the result of re-censoring.  At the same time, cinema operators worried that 
they would be unable to control underage audiences from entering cinemas to watch 
films that they were prohibited from watching.   
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While the “Film Censorship Bill” was still under consultation, the 
government gazetted the “Film Censorship Regulations 1987” on 5 June 1987.  It 
was as an interim measure before the enactment of the lawful “Film Censorship 
Ordinance”, providing a legal status to the existing Film Censorship Standards: a 
note of guidance so as to remove the legal loopholes during the interim.  According 
to Hansard (LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1964-2000), on 8 July 1987, Martin 
Lee initiated an intense debate on political censorship at the Legislative Council 
when he moved a motion to delete from the “Film Censorship Regulations, 1987” the 
‘good relations clause’, that is the clause empowering the censor to cut or ban a film 
when he/she was of the opinion that the showing of a film would damage good 
relations with other territories.  Martin Lee, backed by the views of legal experts 
Eric Barendt, the Goodman Professor of Media Law at University College London, 
and Nihal Jayawickrama, professor of law at Hong Kong University, argued that the 
good relations clause was in violation of the Article 19 of the United Nations’ 
“International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, which had been enshrined in 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary:  
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
 
205 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals.   
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United 
Nations) 
Although Marin Lee did not point out that the previously mentioned “Public Order 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1986” could be employed as an instrument for political 
censorship of the press, he asked (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1967), 
“If we allow political censorship of films to exist today, what safeguard can there be 
that political censorship will not in the future be extended to cover television, theatre, 
as well as the print media?”  Martin Lee emphasized that the good relation clause 
could only be necessary “unless it [had] been established that there is ‘a pressing 
social need’ for it” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1968).  He also 
doubted that whether or not the exhibition of one or more political films would really 
bring about instability in Hong Kong (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 
1969).  However, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had previously expressed 
its opinion justifying the existence of the good relations clause provision: 
Restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, etc. may be justified 
in the case of particular films on the basis of at least three criteria in 
Article 19(3).  These are: 
(i) ‘rights or reputations of others’, which may be relevant in the 
case of films attacking public figures in another country; 
(ii) ‘the protection of national security’ which should be interpreted 
as covering the security of Hong Kong which may be exposed 
to either external or externally-inspired threat.  The degree of 
such a threat and the need to anticipate such a possibility are 
matters of perception by the Government concerned; and there 
is, as I have earlier said, a margin of appreciation. 
(iii) ‘the protection of … order’ would also be available if there was 
reason to suspect that a particular film could lead to public 
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disturbances or public disquiet leading to disaffection on the 
part of local public officials.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 
1987-88 Session: 1965) 
As the debate went on, Martin Lee and other council members, either 
consciously or subconsciously, pointedly connected the good relations clause to 
relations with the PRC.  Referring to the banned films, The Coldest Winter in 
Peking (1981) and If I Were Real (1981) (discussed in earlier section) that more than 
ten members of the Legislative Council had watched together before the meeting, 
Martin Lee said: 
I completely fail to see how each of these two films can be said to 
damage the good relations with the PRC.  Indeed, it may be thought by 
the people of Hong Kong, rightly or wrongly, that it is the PRC 
Government that does not wish them to see these films and it would put 
China in an unfavourable light with the people of Hong Kong.  And 
during this transition period [of the regime change in Hong Kong], our 
Administration must not second guess China and ban a film merely 
because it thinks that China would be embarrassed by its exhibition in 
Hong Kong.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1969) 
In relation to the two films . . . , neither constituted an attack upon 
the reputation of public figures in the PRC as the principal characters 
were all fictional; nor do they expose Hong Kong ‘to an external or 
externally-inspired threat’ from the PRC. 
Nor can it be argued that the exhibition of either of these films 
‘could lead to public disturbance or public disquiet leading to 
disaffection on the part of local public officials’. 
[I]s it being suggested by the Administration that the PRC is so 
bankrupt in self-confidence that she would not allow the people of 
Hong to be told about the dark years of the Cultural Revolution or the 
excesses of some of her cadres?  By second guessing the PRC, does 
the Administration realize that it is unwittingly putting the PRC in a 
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very unfavourable light with the people of Hong Kong?  (Hansard: 
LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1969-1970) 
Martin Lee also questioned whether the decision to ban a film was really made by the 
censor independently, or it was made by the political adviser.  He said: 
I asked expressly for the reasons why the two films . . . were banned.  
The Political Adviser’s Office gave me a prepared answer over the 
phone and it is this: ‘It is not our practice to disclose details of 
confidential discussions between our office and officials of other 
governments, including consular representatives in Hong Kong and the 
New China News Agency.’  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 
Session: 1996) 
Under the “Film Censorship Regulations 1987”, film would be the only medium, or 
the only content carrier, that was subject to censorship prior to public exhibition.  In 
view of this, Martin Lee expressed his concern: 
[T]he issue . . . is not whether the public should have a wider choice 
of films to see, for most people in Hong Kong would not mind if that 
choice is somewhat narrowed down.  But it concerns a much wider 
principle — the pre-publication censorship of films. . . . Where are we 
going from here?  Are we going forward towards a government with a 
high degree of autonomy or are we entering an era when a nod or a 
shake of the head from someone in the New China News Agency 
[Xinhua] will decide what the people of Hong Kong may or may not 
see?   
Further, once we allow pre-publication censorship in films, there is 
no way to arrest the tide of political censorship from overflowing to the 
theatre, television and to the print media.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 
1987-88 Session: 1970) 
Desmond Lee, who supported Martin Lee’s motion, maintained that there should be 
no pre-publication censorship on any form of expression including film.  He said: 
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Any form of control should be exercised through punitive measures 
which are imposed by law after the event.  In order to obviate the risk 
of being punished, the publisher or producer may, if he so wishes, 
submit the publication or production to advance scrutiny or 
classification on a voluntary basis.  This principle is used in the 
Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance and should be 
applied to the Film Censorship Regulations.  (Hansard: LegCo 
Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1984) 
Szeto Wah supporting Martin Lee’s motion said that it was most regrettable that the 
government had been censoring films on political grounds unlawfully for many years 
when Hong Kong people cherished the rule of law.  He also said that it was a matter 
of principle to guard against any breach of freedom of expression.  He argued: 
Before a certain period of time, we banned only films produced by 
China, and then after that period, mainly films produced by Taiwan 
were banned.  During a certain period, even documentaries on the 
celebration of the national day of PRC were banned.  Since time 
immemorial, China has been a neighbouring country to Hong Kong.  
When such a film was banned the United Kingdom Government had 
already established formal diplomatic relationship with China.  And 
the banning of such a documentary film has indeed damaged good 
relationships between Hong Kong and a neighbouring country.  Why 
was such a film banned?  People use good relationship as an excuse.  
What they have in mind is just the preference of a certain country.  
What kind of standard is that? 
The Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission of the PRC, Mr. 
DENG Xiaoping said that after 1997, Hong Kong citizens can still 
criticize the Communist Party, and of course they can do so before 
1997. 
It takes tremendous courage to introduce the concept of one country 
two systems.  And if we want to implement this great concept we 
would also need tremendous courage.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 
1987-88 Session: 1988-9, capital letters in original) 
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Lam Kui-shing considered that the themes of the two banned films mentioned by 
Martin Lee reflected history and human nature.  He supported the deletion of the 
good relations clause from the film censorship regulations and said: 
In fact, in the development of human history, we have the bright side as 
well as the dark and ugly side.  If we report only on happy incidents, 
but omit all the sad events, or if we do the opposite, this is 
inappropriate. . . . There are a lot of films portraying the violence of 
Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan during the Second World War.  
People who are sensible and unbiased will not be prejudiced against 
modern Germany and Japan just because they have watched those films.  
So we should not exercise any favouritism.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 
1987-88 Session: 1983) 
Nevertheless, the Attorney General maintained that the good relations clause 
was compatible with the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” and 
argued that the rights in Article 19 to express views and the right to receive them in 
the form of films or otherwise could never be absolute, could never be unlimited 
(Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1970-1).  Only a handful of the 
Legislative Council members expressed their support for Martin Lee’s motion; the 
rest opposed it without demur, although, as Martin Lee remarked, they paid lip 
service to the enormous value of freedom of expression (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 
1987-88 Session: 1995).  Cheong Kam-chuen said that if the “Film Censorship 
Regulations 1987” had been introduced before the Sino-British negotiations, no one 
would have raised a murmur.  He also said that some people cleverly used the issue 
as a tool to sow seeds of distrust of the then current administration and the post-1997 
administration in Hong Kong (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1976, 
1978).  By so saying, Cheong Kam-chuen overlooked, or otherwise purposely 
ignored, the fact that the Sino-British negotiations were carried out in a confidential 
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manner and were opaque to the public; it was not surprising that there was a distrust 
of the Hong Kong administration when the local citizens were kept in the dark.  Fan 
Hsu Lai-tai also expressed her opposition to Martin Lee’s motion: 
Hong Kong is a trading centre.  We need to maintain very good 
relationships with other countries so as to foster trade. . . . What we 
need is stability. . . . If we are to ban political censorship we will gain 
the applause from people in the film industry as well as the general 
public.  However, the deletion of the provision might enable some 
people to make use of films to achieve political and economic goals.  
And this move might cause Hong Kong to be a forum for political 
struggle between foreign influences.  It might also place Hong Kong in 
political turmoil thereby damaging our good relations with other 
countries and affecting our trade and economy.   
We cannot just talk about principle and overlook the realistic 
situation.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1980, 1981) 
Other members echoed Fan Hsu Lai-tai’s view and supported the preservation of 
political censorship as the safeguard of stability and economic prosperity.  Helmut 
Sohmen criticized political censorship in retrospect by saying that history was full of 
examples of political censorship, and pressures to conform had not and never would 
stimulate progress nor increase happiness; history had proven that suppression of 
unorthodox ideas had produced the very opposite effects.  However, he 
contradictorily supported the good relations clause: 
Hong Kong . . . is in a rather peculiar situation, claiming an 
economic, social, political and cultural background quite different from 
the country to which ethnically and geographically the Territory is very 
close and of which it legally soon will be an integral part.  The 
maintenance of good relations with China, especially during the 
transition period leading up to the change in sovereignty, is of 
paramount importance to Hong Kong.   
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[I]n this context we are dealing not only with a domestic perception 
of what expressions are obviously, or possibly, prejudicial or not 
prejudicial but have to face the possibility that the interpretation, or 
misinterpretation, put upon them externally could also give rise to 
unwanted friction.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1985, 
1986)  
So Helmut Sohmen, indeed, agreed with Martin Lee and his supporters’ view that the 
good relations clause was on behalf of and directed to the likes and dislikes of China, 
which the colonial government had been continuously denying or dodging from 
answering directly.  The Chief Secretary only spoke of the characteristics of the 
film: “The impact of films is more immediate and more vivid and because they are 
shown to large audiences gathered together in one place, the reactions that can be 
provoked by them can be quite dramatic” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 
1993).186  Daniel Tse added that he had heard from someone who had been in the 
film industry for a long time that Lenin saw films as the most influential tool for 
inciting the general public.  Films could reflect the actual situation and create reality 
but could also distort the actual situation and create falsity (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 
1987-88 Session: 1994).   
Among the fourteen Legislative Council members who had made speeches in 
the long debate, only three expressed their support for Martin Lee’s motion.  It was 
to be expected that the motion would be defeated, and no amendment was made on 
the “Film Censorship Regulations 1987” that would be in effect until the “Film 
Censorship Ordinance” was finally enacted later. 
On 9 March 1988, a revised draft of the “Film Censorship Bill” was brought 
to the Legislative Council sitting after consultations, discussions and debates with the 
                                                 
186 See also Walter Benjamin’s discourse on film discussed in Chapter 1. 
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film industry, the public and the Legislative Council members.  When the Secretary 
for Administrative Services and Information move the second reading of the bill, he 
said: 
A draft or White Bill was published on 3 April 1987 for public 
information and comment.  A revised draft was subsequently 
published on 3 November last year for further comment.  The draft Bill 
was formally discussed by 11 district boards.  We have had numerous 
meetings with the Legislative Council ad hoc group and with 
representatives of the film industry.  We have received written 
submissions from interested groups and individuals and the proposed 
provisions, particularly the issue of censorship, have been the subject of 
considerable public debate and commentary. 
. . . Few, if any, societies are devoid of censorship and there is 
strong evidence that the local community supports, indeed, demands 
constraints on what may be publicly viewed.   
The Bill seeks to incorporate some of the present censorship criteria 
which are embodied in the Film Censorship Regulations made under 
the Places of Public Entertainment Ordinance and to introduce a 
three-tier system of film classification. 
Our discussions with the ad hoc group have focussed on the issue of 
political censorship to a significant degree.  At their instigation, we 
have modified our earlier proposals to a narrower formulation which 
now provides censorship where ‘there is a likelihood that the exhibition 
of the film would seriously, which is a new word, damage good 
relations with other territories’.  There has been considerable legal 
debate as to whether this provision is compatible with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  We have consulted the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the question and we are satisfied 
that the proposed formulation is not incompatible with the covenant. 
There is no doubt that censorship on grounds of sex and violence 
reflects our community’s expectations at large.  It may also be claimed 
with justification that political censorship is necessary for the 
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protection of the well-being of our community.  That is why political 
censorship has always been part of the film censorship process, even 
under the existing legislation.  The Bill merely seeks to continue this 
provision with a tighter criterion. 
It does not make sense to me to jeopardise our good relations with 
any territory for the sake of screening the odd film — and I mean ‘odd’ 
since only 21 films have been banned on political grounds over the past 
15 years, that is, 10 549 films were submitted, of which 21 were banned 
or 0.2 per cent. 
Hong Kong must not allow itself to be used as a base for 
propagating propaganda.  I believe this point is well understood and 
accepted in Hong Kong. 
The ad hoc group have suggested that the Bill should specifically 
require the censor to have regard to freedom of expression.  This 
proposal presents problems.  First, as the proposal gives guidance to 
the censor it may be more appropriate to include it in the guidelines to 
be issued . . . rather than in the Bill itself.  Secondly, as the proposal 
adds nothing to the freedom which already exists it is unnecessary [sic].  
Consequently no such provision has been made in the Bill. 
 [A]s for the future system for film classification . . . [i]t will allow 
the exhibition of films which might be enjoyed by mature or restricted 
audiences and which have hitherto had to be banned, or severely cut 
often to the detriment of the story flow. 
The proposed three-tier system will make it possible for more than 
one version of a film to be approved for exhibition to different 
audiences. 
It is also proposed that the appeal mechanism be revamped by 
replacing the official dominated review board with a board comprising 
a majority of nonofficial members, from whom a chairman will be 
appointed.  This provides a greater public input at this important level 
of control. 
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. . . Provision is made . . . for the establishment of a panel of advisers 
to be appointed by the Film Censorship Authority.  These advisers will 
be representative of a cross-section of our community.  They can be 
called upon to advise the censors.  This arrangement will allow for a 
further community input into the censorial process. 
. . . In addition to the prescribed censorship criteria the censor will 
be obliged to take into account the matters . . . [that] include the effect 
of the film as a whole, its artistic and scientific merit, its cultural value 
and the circumstances of its intended exhibition. 
. . . The Board of Review will have the power to review any 
decision of the authority or a censor upon the request of the person who 
has submitted the film for examination. 
In addition if a person is aggrieved by the exhibition of a film upon 
moral, religious, educational or other grounds he may request the Chief 
Secretary to direct the board to review the film. 
Earlier proposals to give the Chief Secretary the power to suspend 
the screening of films pending their review have been reconsidered and 
dropped. 
. . . I acknowledge the concern of the industry on the practical 
problems of enforcing the underage rule but I would point out that the 
exhibition of Category III films is optional.  Those operators who are 
content to exhibit films which conform with current censorship 
standards will not have to accept the extra responsibility of ensuring 
that underage persons are excluded. 
The authority will have power . . . to appoint inspectors to undertake 
checks of all cinemas to enforce the film classification system and to 
initiate prosecutions against offending operators.   
Transitional provisions are provided whereby certificates of 
approval for films granted prior to the commencement of the proposed 
legislation would remain valid for the duration of the validity of their 
existing certificates. 
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In summary . . . , this Bill proposes to put increased constraints on 
censorship criteria and to introduce a classification system which will 
allow more mature audiences to see films which hitherto could not be 
approved.  It expands the community involvement in the censorial 
process, thus ensuring that censorship standards better reflect the 
community’s views on what is acceptable or otherwise.  (Extracted 
from Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 895-8) 
After the second reading of the bill, the inclusion of the political censorship clause in 
the bill remained a contentious issue.  By the end of March 1988, the Legislative 
Council Ad Hoc Group on Film Classification and Censorship finally arrived at a 
common consensus that the clause of political censorship could be included in the 
bill, but Article 19 of the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” that 
deals with the principle of freedom of expression also had to be added as a provision.   
When the “Film Censorship Bill” was brought to the Legislative Council 
again on 18 May 1988, Martin Lee continued his attempt to safeguard the freedom of 
expression and said, “[I]f one freedom is violated today, then no freedom is safe 
tomorrow” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1445).  He moved an 
amendment that the administration had to allow a High Court Judge or a District 
Judge to chair the Board of Review whenever the ground of complaint related to the 
good relations clause, that is in relation to political censorship, because it was quite 
likely that authorities would be cited to the tribunal based on decisions in the 
European of Human Rights, and it would require a chairman with good experience in 
law to fully appreciate these submissions (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 
1426).  In relation to the inclusion of Article 19 of the “International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights” in the bill, Martin Lee also proposed the formulation of 
‘comply with’ rather than that of ‘take into account’ based on a joint representation 
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by the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society of Hong Kong.  The 
reasoning behind the proposal was that merely requiring the censor to take Article 19 
into account, without requiring him to comply with it, would result in a situation 
where a film could legitimately be banned under the good relations clause even 
though it contravened Article 19 (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 
1439-1440).187  However, the council finally agreed to add Article 19 of the 
“International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” as a clause but adopted the 
‘taking into account’ formulation.   
The “Film Censorship Bill 1988” was the first piece of legislation preceded 
by two white bills in Hong Kong history, passing through committee with 
amendments, and was then read the third time and passed into law (Hansard: LegCo 
Sittings 1987-88 Session: 1421, 1453-4).  In relation to censorship standards for 
excision and banning of a film, Section 10 of the “Film Censorship Ordinance 1988” 
states: 
(2) The censor shall as soon as practicable view the film and 
consider the following matters for the purpose of making his decision 
under subsection (4) - 
(a)  whether the film portrays, depicts or treats cruelty, torture, 
violence, crime, horror, disability, sexuality or indecent or 
offensive language or behaviours; 
(b) whether the film denigrates or insults any particular class of 
the public by reference to the colour, race, religious beliefs or 
ethnic or national origins or the sex of the members of that 
class; and 
                                                 
187 For the details of Martin Lee’s argument, see Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1987-88 Session: 
1439-1445. 
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(c) whether there is a likelihood that the exhibition of the film 
would seriously damage good relations with other territories. 
(3) The censor shall, in viewing the film and considering the 
matters referred to in subsection (2), also take into account the 
following matters – 
(a)  the effect of the film as a whole and its likely effect on the 
persons likely to view the film; 
(b) the artistic, educational, literary or scientific merit of the film 
and its importance or value for cultural or social reasons; 
(c) in relation to the intended exhibition of the film, the 
circumstances of such exhibition; and  
(d) article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (which deals with the principle of freedom of 
expression).  (University of Hong Kong Library; emphasis 
added) 
Furthermore, Section 12 of the “Film Censorship Ordinance 1988” states: 
(1) Where a censor approves a film for exhibition under section 
10(4)(a), he shall classify it as - 
(a)  approved for exhibition to persons of any age; 
(b)  approved for exhibition to persons of any age subject to the 
condition that any advertising material which relates to the 
film shall contain the following notice, or a notice to the like 
effect, in block letters and Chinese characters prominently and 
legibly displayed – 
“NOT SUITABLE FOR CHILDREN. 
不不不不不         ”; or 
(c)  approved for exhibition only to persons who have attained the 
age of 18 years. 
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(2) The classification of a film under subsection (1) shall be 
designated by such symbols for each of the classifications under that 
subsection as are prescribed. 
   
Category I Category II Category III 
(Ibid) 
 
Enforcement of Film Classification System and Abolishment of Political Clause 
From 10 November 1988, when the “Film Censorship Ordinance 1988” came 
into effect, until the end of the year, fifty-seven out of the one hundred and 
twenty-one films submitted for censorship were classified as ‘category III’ according 
to the record of TELA (cited in Cheng 1995: 454-5).  Mou Tun-Fei’s Man Behind 
the Sun, presented by the state-run Sil-Metropole of the PRC and released in 
December 1988, marked the first public exhibition of a category III movie in Hong 
Kong.188  The film is a graphic depiction of the atrocities by the Imperial Japanese 
military during the Second Sino-Japanese war.  Although Man Behind the Sun 
consists of extremely nauseating images and graphic violence, it was officially 
approved and released in the Chinese Mainland because of its ‘political correctness’.  
In 1989, five hundred and eighty-two out of one thousand two hundred and eight 
films were classified as category III movies (ibid).  In 1990 and 1991, the 
proportion of category III movies dropped, but still constituted the largest portions 
among the three categories.   
                                                 
188 For a review of Man Behind the Sun, see Li (1990b: 102-4). 
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Category III movies were usually pornographic, exploitative, shocking or 
used excessive violence; notable ones include Michael Mak’s Sex and Zen (1991) 
and one of my works, The Untold Story (1993).189  Nevertheless, category III films 
were still subject to excision, for example, The Untold Story was approved after more 
than four minutes of its content was cut.  As the rating of category III is an 
indication of films which are not suitable for underage audiences, there are not only 
constraints and limitations at work, but also positive incentives at the business level 
to make certain kinds of films rather than others.  On one hand, some filmmakers 
would rather avoid their films being classified as category III, or even category II, so 
that they can have a higher chance of achieving the biggest possible box office, for 
example, those who make the Chinese New Year celebration films.  On the other 
hand, some other filmmakers, especially those who make low-budget films, would 
purposely make category III films and see the rating of category III as a selling point 
in the market.  As seen from movie publicity, such a censorship result is always 
used as a marketing strategy and product packaging, particularly during the early 
implementation of the film classification system.  However, while underage 
audiences are prohibited from watching category III movies in cinemas, such movies 
ironically become more alluring to them.  In fact, category III titles can always 
guarantee good sales in the video market and are always at the top charts of video 
shops.    
But as the new category system took effect, the dispute over political 
censorship continued.  A documentary by the Taiwanese photographer Zhang 
Zautang, Mainland 1989, was scheduled to be shown at the Hong Kong Arts Centre 
                                                 
189 For more about Sex and Zen, see Hammond (2000: 143-5).  For more about The Untold Story, 
see Chan and Li (2007: 78). 
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on 8 December 1989.  However, the Film Censorship Authority only approved the 
film after a cut of seventeen minutes of its content, which covered the interviews 
with Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi, both politically sensitive people after the June Fourth 
Massacre.  The cut was ordered because “there is a likelihood that the exhibition of 
the film would seriously damage good relations with other territories”.  The Hong 
Kong government was once again criticized for its fear about displeasing Beijing 
(Cheng 1995: 451).  Frank Ching, the journalist who revealed the illegal film 
censorship of the Hong Kong Government in the Asian Wall Street Journal in 1987, 
argued that since Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi’s interviews took place before the June 
Fourth Massacre and there were no sensitive content, the government was over 
sensitive about the matter (Hong Kong Economic Journal 20 January 1991, as cited 
in Cheng 1995: 451-2).   
In 1994, Martin Lee introduced a private member’s bill to amend the “Film 
Censorship Ordinance” by deleting the good relations clause.  When he moved the 
second reading of the bill at the Legislative Council on 16 November 1994, he said: 
The censorship power conferred on the Government by this 
provision [the good relations clause] is against the principle for citizens 
to enjoy the freedom of expression.  That a government wants to have 
control on people’s speech in fact indicates its lack of trust in its people 
and that it directs the people’s thinking in a ‘patriarch’ state of mind.  
In fact, this is an infringement upon basic civil rights.  Therefore, to 
uphold the principle of freedom of speech, this provision ought to be 
deleted.   
On policy grounds, although the Government has seldom exercised 
the power conferred by this provision in censoring films, it does not 
mean that adverse effect has not been brought forth by the provision.  
This is because its existence is meant to be awe-inspiring so that film 
producers will discipline themselves and dare not make politics the 
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subject of their films.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1994-95 Session: 
1008; emphasis added) 
According to my experience and what I witnessed in the film industry, Martin Lee 
was accurate about what was happening in the film industry in those days, and it is 
still a familiar phenomenon today.  In order to secure distribution and make a profit 
in various markets, particularly local and major overseas markets, film makers 
usually comply with the relevant censorship regulations and self-censor their 
productions.  At the sitting on 7 December 1994, there were twenty-nine votes in 
favour of Martin Lee’s motion and no vote against it.  The president of the 
Legislative Council declared that the “Film Censorship (Amendment) Bill 1994” was 
carried (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1994-95 Session: 1349) and the good relations 
clause that was widely seen as a clause of political censorship was finally removed 
from the “Film Censorship Ordinance”.  The amendment came into effect after the 
regime change in Hong Kong in 1997 and has continued to the present.  
On 18 January 1995, the Secretary for Recreation and Culture moved the 
“Film Censorship (Amendment) Bill 1995” at the Legislative Council and said:  
The object of the Bill is to give effect to the policy changes arising from 
the public opinion survey conducted by the Television and 
Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA) in 1994, as well as to make 
minor amendments to the Film Censorship Ordinance to improve its 
operation.  (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1994-95 Session: 1675)   
The Legislative Council passed the bill on 19 July 1995 with amendments, which 
brought about two significant changes.  Firstly, since the previously existing 
spectrum of the category II films was too wide, the category II films were further 
split into two sub-categories, namely, category IIA films that were not suitable for 
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children and category IIB films that were not suitable for young persons and children.  
The Secretary for Recreation and Culture said, “These two new sub-categories are 
advisory in nature.  The aim . . . is to let movie-goers, in particular parents, have 
more information so that they can decide whether the film concerned is suitable for 
viewing by their children” (Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1994-95 Session: 5577).  
Secondly, in order to bring in a wider range of community views into the Board of 
Review, the number of non-official members was increased to nine from six by 
replacing the three official members, namely, the Secretary for Home Affairs, the 
Director of Social Welfare and the Director of Education.  The Secretary for 
Recreation and Culture remained as the ex officio member to advise on matters of 
policy (see “Film Censorship Ordinance” and Hansard: LegCo Sittings 1994-95 
Session: 5578).190   
Triad (underground society) movie is a film genre that the Hong Kong film 
industry never gets tired of.  Taylor Wong’s Triads the Inside Story (1989), starring 
Chow Yun-fat, for which I served as cinematographer, was the first ‘triad film’ rated 
category III.  Even though it was rated category III, the Film Censorship Authority 
approved it after cuts of more than five minutes of footage, including scenes and 
shots displaying triad ceremonies, rituals and cryptic poems.  In order to include 
audiences under eighteen, Cinema City Company Limited, the company that invested 
in and produced the film, had tried to cut the film regardless of plot and artistic 
integrity just so that it could be rated as category II.  Nevertheless according to the 
censorship authority, in order to have the film rated as such, the three Chinese 
characters, hak se wui, in the Chinese title that literally means ‘triad’ or ‘underground 
                                                 
190 The present post of the ex officio member of the Board of Review is taken up by the Secretary 
for Commerce and Economic Development. 
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society’ had to be removed.  After deliberations, Cinema City decided to keep the 
Chinese title.  In the light of this, one can understand that explicit graphics and 
language of the triads were not permitted under the three-tier system although such a 
standard was not stated in the censorship regulations.  However, on 3 December 
1999, TELA promulgated the “Film Censorship Guidelines for Censors 1999” 
endorsed by the Secretary for Information Technology and Broadcasting K. C. 
Kwong, in which it stated (1999: 5-6): 
With regard to the depiction of triad, the censor should consider the 
following:- 
(a)  scenes showing triad ceremonies, rituals, hand signs and 
paraphernalia including cryptic poems and icons should 
only be permitted in Category III films; 
(b)  triad expressions not generally accepted in, or in the 
process of being absorbed into, daily language should only 
be permitted in Category III films; 
(c)  promotion or endorsement of triad society, triad activities 
or values should only be permitted in Category III films; 
and  
(d)  glorification of the power of triads and membership in a 
triad society should not be permitted. 
The emergence of these guidelines was believed to be largely owing to the 
remarkable popularity of Andrew Lau’s Young and Dangerous series (1996-2000), 
which achieved admirable box-office successes when the rest of the local film 
industry was heading for its downfall because of the decline of movie-going activity 
in the 1990s.191  After the success of the first instalment of the series, a considerable 
number of filmmakers were eager to make more and more similar films of the same 
                                                 
191 For more about the Young and Dangerous series and some of the Hong Kong movies of the 
triad genre in the last half of the 1990s, see Stokes and Hoover (1999: 79-88), Chang (2006: 196-205) 
and Hammond (2000: 72-5). 
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genre, resulting in successive screenings of triad movies in cinemas for about three 
years.  The community of Hong Kong, particularly parents and those in the 
education circle, expressed their deep concern about the influence of such films on 
young people.  Thus, the Film Censorship Authority overtly tightened the 
censorship criteria on triad genre films in response.  I made a film titled War of the 
Underworld in 1996, starring Tony Leung Chiu-wai and Jordan Chan, which was 
also a triad film.  When the film was submitted for censorship, it was classified as a 
category III film.  A number of idioms in the dialogues that previously were 
acceptable under category II were not allowed.  The Film Censorship Authority said 
that those idioms were triad expressions that could only be approved under category 
III.  In point of fact, many of the idioms that the authority regarded as triad 
expressions were actually in use in daily language.  Such an incident shows a 
tightening of the authority’s control over the triad genre although the “Film 
Censorship Guidelines for Censors 1999” was not yet issued.   
Filmmakers had been complaining since the early 1990s about the growing 
trend of the government to demand more and more cuts in category III movies, 
which connoted a continual tightening of film censorship during the sensitive 
transition period before 1997.  It was behaviour which suggested a suspicious 
collusion with Beijing.  However, the Film Censorship Authority always denied 
there was such a trend and maintained that their work was carried out in response to 
the reactions and requests of the public.  However, there is now a new trend.  What 
can be seen today is that, since the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 
1997, the PRC’s control over films is not achieved simply by local censorship laws 
and regulations, rather it is carried out by means of underlying political and cultural 
united front tactics masked by alluring economic benefit.  The popularization of the 
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Chinese Mainland-Hong Kong (Mainland-HK) joint production of film is a 
significant product of such tactics.  Film censorship as an apparatus and a technique 
of governmentality for government has transformed into something very different 
from that conventional approach. 
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Chapter 5 
Chinese-Foreign Co-Produced Film and Its Problematics 
 
‘Chinese Mainland-Hong Kong (Mainland-HK) co-produced film’ has been a 
common term in the Hong Kong film industry since the beginning of the millennium 
and even the general public in Hong Kong is no stranger to it.  Such co-produced 
films were a product of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s ‘reform and 
opening-up’ (also known as ‘Chinese economic reform’) policy.  There are in fact 
technically three forms of co-production with China (see next section for a detailed 
examination).  The commonly recognized ‘Mainland-HK co-produced film’ is 
officially called the ‘Chinese Mainland-Hong Kong joint production of films’ and is 
officially a ‘joint production’ under the “Provisions on the Administration of 
Chinese-foreign Cooperative Production of Films” (SARFT Order No. 31).192  
Although such joint productions are not confined to Hong Kong and are open to 
other foreign countries and regions, Mainland-HK co-produced films prevail over all 
others.  At one level they are numerous because they are economically facilitated by 
the continuous booming demand in the huge Chinese Mainland film market over the 
past decade, and, at another, because they are geo-politically benefited and catalysed 
                                                 
192 The ‘State Administration of Radio, Film and Television’ (SARFT) was established in June 
1998 by reorganizing the former Ministry of Radio, Film and Television.  In March 2013, SARFT 
merged with the General Administration of Press and Publication to form the ‘State Administration of 
Press and Publication, Radio, Film, and Television’ (SAPPRFT).  
All the laws and regulations of the PRC are originally in Chinese.  There is no unified archive of 
official English translation available.  Inconsistent (e.g., the use of Sino-foreign and Chinese-foreign, 
provisions and measures, order and decree, etc.) and expired English versions are documented in 
scattered official and unofficial databases.  The English translations cited in this text are selected from 
databases of various official and law-related academic institutions.  The Chinese Government states 
that, in any case of discrepancy, the Chinese version shall prevail.  When no authoritative English 
translation is accessible, translations are by the writer as indicated. 
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by the implementation of the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA; the ‘Mainland’ refers to the entire customs territory of China) 
signed in 2003.  Although the PRC has been a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) since December 2001, the People’s Central Government of the 
PRC (Chinese Government or Central Government) keeps its film market only 
partially open to the outside world in order to protect its domestic film industry from 
keen competition with foreign films and to prevent its population from the influence 
of foreign cultures, values and ideologies in imported films.  In contrast, 
Mainland-HK co-productions are officially allowed to be distributed in the Chinese 
Mainland and are not limited by any quota which makes them commercially viable 
and valuable.  In fact, Mainland-HK co-productions also enable Hong Kong film 
investors to enjoy a larger share of box-office takings.  In addition, they provide 
more job opportunities for Hong Kong filmmakers who have seen their local film 
industry declining continuously since the early 1990s.  But, co-productions also 
have a political function and serve as a regulatory apparatus and technique (dispositif 
and techne, see Chapter 1) for the Chinese Government to suppress Hong Kong 
filmmakers’ freedom of expression and subsume Hong Kong cinema under the 
Chinese Mainland cinema mantle much in the way the Nationalist Government of 
Taiwan did during the cold war between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and 
Kuomingtang (KMT).  Stepping back into the latter half of the last century, the 
Taiwan Government, with the Free General Association as its agent, made use of its 
profitable market to lure Hong Kong filmmakers and encourage them to break any 
connection with the PRC, deny the legitimacy of the CPC regime and subsume the 
Hong Kong cinema under the rightist camp (see Chapter 3).   
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From the historical account discussed in the previous chapters, it can be seen 
that film productions and the manner and standards of film censorship plus the 
contemporary political conditions, always wrestle together in an interactive triangle 
that, in turn, shapes the characteristics and struggles of the Hong Kong cinema in a 
particular era.  After Britain transferred soverignty over Hong Kong to the PRC in 
1997, the Hong Kong cinema, on the one hand, appears to be none of the PRC 
administration’s business under the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, and, on the 
other, it is regulated and censored by Beijing via various techniques, significantly 
through the mode of Mainland-HK co-produced film over the past decade.  In the 
2010s, Mainland-HK co-produced film, which is subject to the Chinese Mainland 
censorship and the tastes of the Chinese Mainland audience, has become a 
problematic phenomenon vis-à-vis the identity of Hong Kong cinema — Hong Kong 
cinema is being Sinicized and is losing its cultural characteristics and sense of place 
under the sea change of market ecology and the cultural conflict between the Chinese 
Mainland and Hong Kong.  If successful business merely means one that brings in 
the greatest revenue, then Mainland-HK co-produced films are thriving but their 
success is achieved at the expense of the Hong Kong cinema’s integrity.  
 
Why is Chinese-foreign Co-Produced Film So Tempting? 
In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping put an end to the PRC’s closed-door 
policy by putting forward the ‘reform and opening-up’ national policy at the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC.  After that, China 
has set out on the road to what the CPC termed the ‘socialist market economy’, 
involving not only socio-economic reforms, but also signifying a ‘right turn’ of the 
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Communist regime.  On 11 October 2000, the CPC leadership adopted a document 
titled “The Central Committee of the CPC’s Suggestions Regarding the Formulation 
of the Tenth Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development” 
(Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Zhiding Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Dishige 
Wunian Jihua de Jianyi; my translation), in which the concept of ‘cultural industries’ 
was introduced into the PRC’s national policy for the first time.193  The document 
repeats Deng Xiaoping’s mantra: ‘Development is the absolute principle and the key 
to solve all the problems of China.’  It also urges the relevant personnel to perfect 
the policies on cultural industries, strengthen the construction and management of the 
cultural market and to push forward development of cultural industries (News of the 
CPC n.d.a), as part of the marketizational development of the Chinese economy 
under the ‘reform and opening-up’ policy.  Accordingly, a series of policies 
favouring the development of cultural industries were promulgated in the ensuing 
years.  Under such a national economy plan, cultural products were brought in line 
with the market that meant film was commodified, and pure entertainment films and 
their target consumer market have become possible and legitimate in the Chinese 
Mainland.  According to the data from the previous SARFT, the nationwide 
box-office grossed about nine hundred million RMB in 2003, and there were less 
than two thousand movie screens in the whole country at that time (K618.Cn 23 
January 2014, China-Consulting.Cn 2012).  After ten years, China has developed 
into an immense market enticing in the world’s movie businessmen.   
On 13 January 2014, China Film News, an official weekly magazine 
supervised by SAPPRFT, published a seemingly self-congratulatory article reviewing 
                                                 
193 For more about ‘cultural industries’, see Adorno and Horkheimer (1972: 120-167) and 
Hesmondhalgh, David (2002). 
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the Chinese Mainland cinema industry in 2013 (cited in SAPPRFT’s Administration 
Center of Digital Film Content website).  The article says that the ten years, up until 
2013, saw a period of development in the Chinese Mainland cinema, characterized 
by the relaxation of the government’s monopoly and control and the move to allow 
private enterprises to produce films and run relevant businesses such as movie 
houses and the distribution of domestic films under the supervision and guidance of 
the Central Government.  It also provides some roundup data for the year 2013: (i) 
about six hundred and forty feature films were produced; (ii) there were more than 
six hundred million attendances of moviegoer in the cities, an increase of one 
hundred and fifty million person-times from 2012; (iii) the number of movie screens 
has increased by more than five thousand nationwide, at a rate of about fourteen per 
day making the total movie screens in the country to exceed eighteen thousand; (iv) 
the nationwide box-office gross takings indicate a growth of about thirty-three 
percent from 2012 adding up to almost twenty-two billion RMB, of which sixty 
percent were contributed by domestic titles; (v) thirty-three domestic and 
twenty-nine foreign titles each attained box-office gross takings of over one hundred 
million RMB.194   
According to the statistics released by the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) in March 2013, China has overtaken Japan to become the world’s 
                                                 
194 Chinese Government officials have a habit of sweeping bad news under the carpet.  The 
roundup article in China Films News does not say how many films out of the approximately 640 films 
made in 2013 could not get a theatrical release.  According to Mtime.Com (2013), in 2013, there were 
a total of 352 films released theatrically in the Chinese Mainland, including 58 imports consisting of 
mainly Hollywood titles (see also M1905.Com 10 February 2014).  Such figures imply that more than 
half of the domestic titles produced could not get a theatrical release.  The article also does not mention 
that 40% of the yearly box-office gross takings were contributed by the 58 imported films.  According 
to Yin (2014), the total worldwide box-office gross takings in 2013 was 36 billion US dollars, of which 
20 billion was achieved by American titles while Chinese titles only achieved box-office gross takings 
of less than two billion US dollars in its domestic market and have no significant overseas market.  
However, SAPPRFT criticized movie houses for stealing box-office income and estimated that an 
average of 10% of the yearly gross takings were stolen via the ticketing system; thus, the announced 
data only reflected ‘discounted’ box-office gross takings (K618.Cn 23 January 2014). 
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second-largest box office territory, and the biggest outside the United States of 
America (US) (Guardian.Com 22 March 2013).195  Nevertheless, the Chinese 
Government, film businessmen and filmmakers all consider that there is still great 
potential for the film market to grow by referencing the US as a well-developed 
paradigm.  For instance, when there were only about four thousand and five 
hundred screens in the Chinese Mainland in 2010, Feng Xiaogang said that there 
were about one hundred and thirty screens per million people in the US while there 
were only less than seven screens per million people in China, but China had a total 
population of one billion more than the US (People’s Daily – Overseas Edition 29 
January 2010).  Chinese Mainland scholar Yin Hong (2014) further remarks that 
while there are six hundred million person-times of moviegoers per year in China, 
the US has an average of nearly five moviegoing-times per citizen per year.  In 
addition, while the North American market has an average yearly growth of only 
three to four percent in the past decade, the Chinese Mainland has sustained an 
annual growth of more than thirty percent for twelve consecutive years.  A report 
issued in 2012 by the world’s third largest global professional services firm, Ernst & 
Young, suggested that the Chinese box office at the current rate of expansion was set 
to pass the US in seven years (Guardian.Com 22 March 2013).   
Confronted by the tempting, huge and continuously expanding Chinese 
Mainland film market, a lot of overseas filmmakers and businessmen are trying to 
get into it.  However, the Chinese Govenment has been tirelessly implementing 
strict control over its cultural industries and censorship on cultural products on all 
                                                 
195 “The MPAA’s Theatrical Market Statistics 2012 show China’s cinema audience is worth 
$2.7bn (£1.7bn), up from $2bn in 2011, taking it past Japan, whose total increased only slightly from 
$2.3bn to $2.4bn.  The US was still the biggest by some distance, with a value of $10.8bn in 2012, a 6% 
rise on 2011” (Guardian.Com 22 March 2013).   
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fronts ever since its establishment.  During the Cold War years, it prohibited all 
films from the Western bloc, in particular, the American films.  However, when the 
PRC was paving its way for WTO membership and trying to revive its declining 
domestic film industry in the 1990s, a breakthrough occurred.  On 12 November 
1994, the Hollywood film Fugitive starring Harrison Ford attained public exhibitions 
legally in the Chinese Mainland with box-office success and became the first 
revenue-sharing imported film in the PRC.  Starting from 1995 on, the Chinese 
Government permitted a yearly quota of ten revenue-sharing imports of film, but the 
lucrative business of the national distribution of such films was exclusive to the 
state-owned China Film Group Corporation.  After the PRC obtained WTO 
membership in December 2001, the quota was enlarged to twenty (Tong, Po 2008; 
Yang, En Pu 2008).  In February 2012, the then Vice President of the PRC, Xi 
Jinping, together with the Vice President of the US, Joe Biden, announced in Los 
Angeles with immediate effect that the PRC further expanded the annual quota for 
revenue-sharing imports of foreign films from twenty to thirty-four, with the extra 
fourteen films allocated to ‘enhanced’ films made in three-dimensional (3-D), Image 
Maximum (IMAX) or animations, and such films’ two dimensional (2-D) equivalents 
were also to be allowed.  Under the new scheme, the rental, that is the share of 
revenue the rights owner can get, was increased to twenty-five percent of the total 
revenue from the previous share paid on a sliding scale ranging from fourteen to 
seventeen percent (Frater, Patrick 2012).  Since the revenue-sharing films are 
usually hotly anticipated Hollywood titles, their theatrical release date in the Chinese 
Mainland is usually synchronous or close to that in other major markets of the world.   
Other than the revenue-sharing quota, there is another quota system, namely, 
the flat-fee quota.  Under this system, the purchase of foreign film is open to 
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domestic private corporations but importation work still has to be handled by China 
Film Group and national distribution must be handed over to China Film Group or 
Huaxia Film Distribution Company Limited.196  The Chinese Government has never 
made public the exact number of the flat-fee quota.  By examining the 
filmographies of the released films in the past ten years, the yearly quota was not a 
fixed one and is estimated to be around thirty to forty consisting of foreign titles that 
were not so popular in demand.  Films imported via the two quota systems can 
usually secure theatrical release and their revenues largely rely on the box-office 
takings while “piracy means there is no legitimate DVD market” (Economist 21 
December 2013).  However, importing for television and online video is another 
option, which is currently officially unlimited in number but very limited in terms of 
revenue.197  Therefore, as the quota systems can usually bring larger revenue, they 
remain the preference for foreign film rights owners.  In addition to the quota 
systems putting a limit on the yearly imports of film to be released theatrically (of 
which Hollywood mega productions have monopolized a large proportion), the State 
Council also stipulates that all movie houses have to allocate two thirds of the 
screening time to domestic titles (see State Council 21 January 2010).198  As a 
                                                 
196 The national distribution of imported films was exclusive to China Film Group until Huaxia 
Film Distribution Company Limited (Huaxia Film) was established in 2003 and became the second 
corporation having the right to distribute imported films in the Chinese Mainland 
(Finance.Sina.Com.Cn 16 November 2005).  However, the right of importing films is still 
monopolized by China Film Group, and all the 19 shareowners of Huaxia Film are state-owned 
corporations including China Film Group (Huaxia Film Distribution Co., Ltd 25 May 2012). 
 
197 The movie channel of CCTV (China Central Television) Channel 6 is the biggest buyer of 
imports for TV in the Chinese Mainland.  It can usually offer a better price than the other Chinese 
Mainland TV stations. 
 
198 The General Office of the State Council issued “The General Office of the State Council’s 
Guidance Opinion Regarding the Advancement of Prosperous Development of the Film Industry” 
(Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Cujin Dianying Chanye Fanrong Fazhan de Zhidao Yijian; my 
translation) on 21 January 2010 in the wake of the recording-breaking box-office success of Avatar (1.3 
billion RMB, equivalent to more than one-fifth of the nationwide yearly gross).  Although the 
document reminds movie house executives of the central government’s requirement of an allocation of 
at least two thirds of the screening time to domestic films, many movie houses do not abide by the 
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matter of course, all the films that are going to be released in the Chinese Mainland 
have to pass the Chinese Government’s censorship.  
Under the Chinese Government’s administration of film, other than the 
gateways mentioned above, there is still a last but not least way for foreign films to 
enter into the huge and growing Chinese Mainland market.  It is by means of 
‘cooperative production’.  The Chinese Government claims that permitting the 
Chinese-foreign cooperative production of films serves to enhance the creation and 
production of film and to promote Sino-foreign exchanges of films.  According to 
the latest “Provisions on the Administration of Chinese-foreign Cooperative 
Production of Films” (SARFT Order No. 31) promulgated on 6 July 2004: 
Article 2  ‘Sino-foreign cooperation in film production’ refers to 
the joint and coordinated production of films, and the production of 
films by appointment, inside or outside China, by a domestic film 
producer that has obtained a Film Production Permit or a Film 
Production Permit (Single Film) (Chinese Party) in accordance with the 
law and a foreign film producer (Foreign Party). 
Article 7  The State shall implement a licensing system for 
Sino-foreign cooperation in film production. 
Domestic work units or individuals that have not obtained a Permit for 
Sino-foreign Cooperation in Film Production or an approval document 
may not produce films in cooperation with foreign work units or 
individuals.  Foreign work units or individuals may not produce films 
independently in China without approval.  (Ningbo Bureau of Culture 
Radio & TV, Press and Publication 27 April 2011; emphasis added) 
According to Article 5 of the provisions, Chinese-foreign cooperation in film 
production has three forms:  
                                                                                                                                          
stipulation for the sake of better business because Hollywood titles usually have very much better 
box-office takings than domestic titles.  During the era of Hu Jingtao and Wen Jiabao, there was a 
popular saying in the Chinese Mainland, that is, ‘decree gets no further than Zhongnanhai’.   
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1. joint production, namely the form of production by which the 
Chinese and foreign parties invest jointly (including investment of 
funds, labour or physical objects), produce jointly, and share the 
interests and bear the risks jointly; 
2. coordinated production, namely the form of production by which 
the Foreign Party contributes capital and carries out filming in 
China, and the Chinese Party assists by providing equipment, 
apparatus, sites, labour, etc. for consideration; or 
3. production by appointment, namely the form of production by 
which the Foreign Party appoints the Chinese Party to carry out 
production in China on its behalf.  (Ningbo Bureau of Culture 
Radio & TV, Press and Publication 27 April 2011) 
The films commonly regarded as Chinese-foreign (or Sino-foreign) co-production (or 
co-produced film) usually come under the first type, that is the joint production 
which is the preference of foreign film businessmen.  By Article 14 of the 
provisions: 
A Putonghua language version shall be produced for jointly-produced 
films, and its subtitles must be in standardized Chinese characters 
[simplified Chinese].  According to the needs of film distribution, the 
production of corresponding language versions for countries, regions 
and ethnic minorities based on the Putonghua version is permitted.  
(Ibid) 
The joint production form differs from the coordinated production and production by 
appointment forms in significant ways.  Firstly, it can enjoy the same treatment and 
benefit as the domestic production in its distribution in the Chinese Mainland.  
Secondly, it is quota free and tariff exempted while the other two forms are treated as 
imports that are restrained by the quota systems and subject to tariffs.  Thirdly, 
although the rights owners of joint productions have to take care of the marketing 
and promotion costs, they can get forty-three percent of the allotment of box-office 
takings as revenue, whereas those of the other two forms can only get about 
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twenty-five percent.  Thus, the joint production form is not only a viable means for 
foreign businessmen to get access to the Chinese Mainland film market, it may also 
bring attractive profits.   
As the President and Managing Director of the Asia-Pacific Region for the 
Motion Picture Association (MPA) and Motion Picture Association International 
(MPA-I) Michael C. Ellis said, the joint production form has many aims, the 
foremost is to make more money (see Mtime.Com 13 November 2013), which is 
generally true of foreign film investors and enterprises, including those in Hong 
Kong.  As it is stated in the “Provisions on the Administration of Chinese-foreign 
Cooperative Production of Films”: 
Article 3  These Provisions shall apply to the cooperative 
production of fictional films, art films, science and educational films, 
documentary films and special features films (including films, digital 
films, films for television, etc.) of Chinese and foreign film producers 
inside and outside China. 
Article 22 These Provisions shall apply to the cooperative 
productions of films in China by film producers from the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, the Macao Special Administrative 
Region and Taiwan.  (Ningbo Bureau of Culture, Radio and TV, Press 
and Publication 27 April 2011) 
It can be seen here that the Central Government still regards Hong Kong as a 
‘foreign’ region even though it has gained sovereignty over Hong Kong.  
Nonetheless, the joint production kind has its political role to play too; it serves other 
aims for Beijing in various ways such as foreign relations and affairs, particularly in 
regard to its ‘indirect’ governance over Hong Kong after 1 July 1997.   
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Mainland-HK Cooperation in Film Production as United Front Tactic  
In fact, before the Chinese-foreign cooperative production of films became a 
popular trend, cross-border cooperation with other regions, whether in the form of 
co-finance, co-production or just providing assistance, was not new to the Hong 
Kong film industry.  Such collaboration provided many advantages, such as tax 
concession, a way through regional quota restriction and trade barrier, lower 
production costs, a larger distribution network, more revenue, a new aesthetic and so 
forth.    
As mentioned in Chapter 3, soon after the establishment of the PRC, the CPC 
began to strengthen the control over the imports of film, including those from 
colonial Hong Kong.  According to Hu Ke, only about ninety Hong Kong films, 
mainly productions by the three leading leftist companies, Great Wall, Feng Huang 
and Sun Luen, were officially imported into the PRC from 1949 to 1979 (Hu 2000: 
16); whereas Hong Kong produced about five thousand and six hundred films within 
the period (Hong Kong Filmography).199  The Hong Kong film industry in the 
1950s relied more on the Nanyang markets than before and also started to explore 
other markets.  Taiwan was the obvious first target of Mandarin film production 
companies because of its population (about ten million in the 1950s) and standard 
language, Mandarin.  In the mid-1950s, a number of film companies based in Hong 
Kong such as Wong Cheuk-hon’s Liberty Film Company (also known as Freedom 
Company) and Zhang Shankun’s Hsin Wha Motion Picture began to set up branch 
offices and co-produced films with their counterparts in Taiwan (Tso Kuei-fang 2000: 
32-5).  For instance, Wang Hao’s 14,000 Witnesses (mentioned in Chapter 3) was a 
                                                 
199 For more about Great Wall, Feng Huang and Sun Luen, see Chapter 3. 
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co-production of Huaqiao Film Corporation of Taiwan and Haiyan Film Company of 
Hong Kong.  But it was not only collaboratons with Mandarin regions, there was 
also a marked shift towards co-productions with non-Chinese-language regions.  
For example, Zhang Shankun collaborated with Toho Company Limited in Japan to 
produce a number of films such as Blood Will Tell (Haitang Hong, 1955) and 
Madame Butterfly (Hudie Furen, 1956), both were directed by Evan Yang and 
featured Teresa Li (also known as Li Lihua).200  Shaw and Sons Limited invited 
Yamaguchi Yoshiko, widely known as Li Xianglan in China, to Hong Kong to star in 
three films, namely, Chin Ping Mei (1955), The Lady of Mystery (Shenmi Meiren, 
1957) which was directed by Japanese director Wakasugi Mitsuo and An 
Unforgettable Night (Yi Ye Fengliu, 1958),201  Cathay Organisation Limited’s 
subsidiary Motion Picture & General Investment Company Limited (MP & GI) 
collaborated with Shochiku Company Limited to make Hong Kong-Tokyo 
Honeymoon (Xianggang Dongjing Miyue Luxing, 1957), directed by Japanese 
director Nomura Yoshitarou and starring Linda Lin.202  These are just some of the 
notable examples of that era, and such co-productions could usually achieve higher 
box-office takings than the Cantonese and Mandarin films in Hong Kong.  Other 
than Taiwan and Japan, there were also co-productions with Korea, the Philippines 
and Thailand during the 1950s, and the wave of co-productions with Taiwan, Japan 
                                                 
200 For more about Blood Will Tell and Madame Butterfly, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. IV 
(2003: 133, 185) 
 
201 Li Xianglan was a Japanese born in China, a famous singer and movie star in China during the 
1930s and 1940s.  For more about her legendary life, see Zai Zhongguo de Ri Zi – Li Xianglan: Wo de 
Ban Sheng (literally The Days in China – Li Xianglan: Half a Life Time of Mine, 1988).  For more 
about Chin Ping Mei, The Lady of Mystery and An Unforgettable Night, see Hong Kong Filmography 
Vol. IV (2003: 110, 253, 287). 
 
202 For more about Cathay Organization Limited and MP & GI, see Law and Bren (2012: 
162-164).  For more about Hong Kong-Tokyo Honeymoon, see Hong Kong Filmography, Vol. IV 
(2003: 239). 
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and Korea lasted till the 1970s.203  In the 1960s and 1970s, Shaw Brothers Studios 
also co-produced films such as Five Golden Dragons (1967), Legend of the Seven 
Golden Vampires (1974) and Cleopatra Jones and the Casino of Gold (1975) with 
overseas counterparts in Europe and the US (see Law and Bren 2012: 216).204    
Mainland-HK cooperation in film production, in fact, began as early as the 
late 1950s, but was confined to the Hong Kong leftist companies and the productions 
were mainly Chinese opera films in different Chinese dialects such as Cantonese 
opera Butterfly Beauty (Choi Dip Seung Fei, 1959) and Yueju opera Dream of the 
Red Chamber (Hong Lou Meng, 1962) (see Hu 2000: 23).205  In the 1960s, Great 
Wall co-produced popular Chinese opera films such as Hu Siao-fung and Lin Huan’s 
Bride Hunter (Wang Lao Hu Qiang Qin, 1960) and Li Pingqian’s Three Charming 
Smiles (San Xiao, 1964) with their counterparts in the Chinese Mainland (see Pai, Ti 
2010: 67), and Hongtu Film Company, a subsidiary of Sun Luen, also co-produced 
films such as the popular Cantonese feature The House of 72 Tenants (Chat Sap Yi Ka 
Fong Hak, 1963) with the Pearl River Film Studio based in Guangzhou.206  
However, such co-productions were interrupted and not able to further develop due 
to the political turmoil in the Chinese Mainland and the extreme left policy of the 
CPC during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Cultural Revolution) that 
broke out in 1966.  The development of the present wave of Mainland-HK 
                                                 
203 For more about the co-productions between Hong Kong and other Asian regions in the 1950s, 
see Law and Bren (2012: 196-205, 210-7), Tso Kuei-fang (2000: 32-5). 
 
204 For more about Five Golden Dragons, Legend of the Seven Golden Vampires and Cleopatra 
Jones and the Casino of Gold, see IMDb. 
 
205 For more about Butterfly Beauty, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. IV (2003: 362).  For more 
about Dream of the Red Chamber, see Hong Kong Filmography Vol.V (2005: 210). 
 
206 Lin Huan was another pseudonym of Louis Cha.  For more about Bride Hunter, Three 
Charming Smiles and The House of 72 Tenants see Hong Kong Filmography Vol. V (2005: 14-5, 284-5, 
307).  
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co-produced film can be traced back to the implementation of the PRC’s ‘reform and 
opening-up’ policy in 1979.  However, in the early stages, it was not simply 
initiated and pushed forward because of business demands, it was also taken as a 
means to rebuild the international image of China, to improve China’s foreign 
relations and, in particular, to enhance the united front image of joint productions 
with the regions of Hong Kong and Macau and the ‘province’ of Taiwan.  In July 
1979, the China Film Co-Production Corporation (CFCC) was established in 
accordance with a suggestion by Hu Yaobang, the head of the Central Propaganda 
Department (now renamed the Publicity Department) of the PRC at that time.  The 
Ministry of Culture stipulated that all the administrative and coordinating affairs of 
Chinese-foreign film cooperation had to be subject to the unified management of the 
CFCC.  According to the “Measures for Control over Imported Films, 1981”:    
Article 7  Business activities with respect to the joint production 
of films by China and foreign countries and the joint production of 
films by China’s mainland and the regions of Hong Kong and Macao 
or by the mainland and Taiwan Province shall all be subject to the 
administration of the China Films Joint Production Corporation [China 
Film Co-Production Corporation], with the exception of the business 
activities of the three Hong Kong films companies of the Great Wall, 
the Phoenix [Feng Huang] and the Sunlin [Sun Luen] when they come 
back to shoot films on the mainland [sic], where the Office of Hong 
Kong & Macao Affairs under the State Council shall directly 
approach the regions and units concerned for matters in this respect.  
With respect to the import of the films jointly produced, the China 
Films Joint Production Corporation [China Film Co-Production 
Corporation] shall fulfil the formalities of import Customs declaration 
with the Customs.  If, among these films, there are some that are to 
be released nationwide, the China Films Corporation shall, in 
accordance with the relevant regulations, fulfil the formalities with the 
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Beijing Customs for retroactive payment of Customs duties.207  
(Laws and Regulations Database, People.Cn; emphasis added) 
Under these measures, the priority of Mainland-HK cooperation in film production 
was firstly given to the three major leftist companies (Great Wall, Feng Huang and 
Sun Luen), which had a historical connection with the CPC, as they were under 
different administration.  In fact, before the promulgation of such measures, Feng 
Huang had already produced Johnnie To’s cinematic debut, The Enigmatic Case 
(1980), which was shot in Yuebei, a region of northern Guangdong province.208  It 
was followed by Cheung Sing-yim’s The Shaolin Temple (1982), Jet Li’s debut.  
The idea of making The Shaolin Temple was initiated by Liao Chengzhi, former 
Minister of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office of the State Council as well as former Vice-Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), at a meeting with the personnel 
of Great Wall, Feng Huang and Sun Luen in the late 1970s.  The Shaolin Temple 
was produced by Great Wall and Sun Luen but in the name of Chun Yuen Film 
Production Company.  It was entirely shot in the Chinese Mainland and took two 
years to complete.209  When the film was released in 1982, it became an instant hit 
and achieved a great box-office success.  However, the cooperative and liaison 
work for The Enigmatic Case and The Shaolin Temple were not handled by the 
CFCC.  The managing director of Southern Film, Dixon Lau, pointed out that, 
                                                 
207 “Measures for Control over Imported Films, 1981” was approved by the State Council on 13 
October 1981 and promulgated by the Ministry of Culture and the General Administration of Customs.  
The English translation of the document here comes from the “Laws and Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China Governing Foreign-related Matters” (July 1991) compiled by the Bureau of 
Legislative Affairs of the State Council of the PRC and published by the China Legal System Publishing 
House (Laws and Regulations Database, People.Cn).  It should be noted that there is no standardized 
official English translation for the documents of many government bodies.  
 
208 For more about The Enigmatic Case, see Sil-Metropole 2010: 328-9. 
 
209 For more about the making of The Shaolin Temple, see Sil-Metropole (2010: 359-362) and Pai 
Ti (2010: 142-7). 
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based on the records of the CFCC, the first Mainland-HK film cooperation under the 
CPCC’s coordination and assistance was Yeung Chi-hsiao’s Out of Danger, which 
was shot in 1981 but released in 1985 (Wen Wei Po 10 October 2006). 
In March 1982, the business-savvy and innovative filmmaker, Li Han-hsiang, 
went to the Chinese Mainland to co-produce two films with the CFCC, namely, The 
Burning of the Imperial Palace and Reign behind a Curtain, both were about the 
modern history of China.  The CFCC provided full support, taking no account of 
financial risk and revenue.  Since Li Han-hsiang was a renowned non-leftist film 
director who spent eight years in Taiwan making movies with his Grand Motion 
Picture Company from 1963 to 1970, the Chinese Government at that time 
considered that co-productions with him were a political task, a means to present the 
work as a united front which was much more significant than any financial gain (Yin 
and He 2009: 36).210  The Burning of the Imperial Palace and Reign behind a 
Curtain, both credited as co-productions of Li Han-hsiang’s New Kwun Lun Film 
Production Company Limited of Hong Kong and the CFCC of the Chinese Mainland, 
were the first joint projects between a non-leftist Hong Kong film company and 
Communist China since the CPC seized power over the Chinese Mainland in 1949.  
In addition to the official backing of the Chinese Government, these two films were 
also partly sponsored by Macau tycoon Ho Yin (Zhao 2007: 127), who was a 
member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at that time.  When the two 
films were released in 1983, both were quite well-received and achieved box-office 
success not only in Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland, but also in other overseas 
                                                 
210 For more about the career of Li Han-hsiang and his works, see Wong Ain-ling (2007). 
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markets such as Japan.211  As both Li Han-hsiang and his New Kwun Lun Film 
Production Company Limited’s names had Foucault’s ‘author function’ in that the 
director and his company are the assigned ‘authors’ of the films and contribute to its 
meaning (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed examination), these two co-productions 
demonstrated to the world a breakthrough of the Chinese Government’s ideology — 
socialist China’s door is open to the capitalist world.  The unique historical relations 
and geopolitical connections of the Hong Kong cinema with the PRC (see Chapters 2, 
3 and 4) subsequently sparked the 1980s trend of Mainland-HK co-productions.212  
Notable titles include Yim Ho’s Homecoming (1984), Tsui Siu-ming’s Holy Robe of 
the Shaolin Temple (1985) and Mirage (1987), and Ann Hui’s Romance of Book and 
Sword (1987) and Princess Fragrance (1987).213 
However, even though the early co-productions were not commercial 
ventures for the Chinese Government, they did provide Hong Kong filmmakers with 
more job opportunities — and more creative opportunities.  It also helped boost the 
investors’ share of the profits by lowering production costs thanks to the cheap 
labour and other resources of the Chinese Mainland.  Such co-productions, 
characterized by Hong Kong filmmakers as the chief creative staff, also served as a 
rehearsal for the marketization of Chinese Mainland cinema.   
 
                                                 
211 For more about how the productions of The Burning of the Imperial Palace and Reign behind 
a Curtain were accomplished, see Sil-Metropole (2010: 369-371).  For a review of the two films, see 
Li (1990: 129-135). 
 
212 For more about the effect of Li Han-hsiang’s The Burning of the Imperial Palace and Reign 
behind a Curtain, see Zhao 2007, 126-135. 
 
213 For more about Homecoming, see Cheuk (2008: 153-5).  For a review of Homecoming, see 
Li (1990: 190-2).  For more about Romance of Book and Sword and Princess Fragrance, see 
Sil-Metropole (2010: 387-9), Cheuk (2008: 65-6) and Erens (2002 [2000]: 185-6).     
 
244 
Politics in Early Mainland-HK Co-Production of Film 
Although the Mainland-HK cooperation in film production started with the 
political aim of rebuilding the international image of China, improving its foreign 
relations and encouraging Taiwan and Hong Kong to present a united front with the 
PRC as filmmakers, there could be difficulties.  The release of Ann Hui’s Boat 
People (1982) is an example.  
The producer of Boat People Hsia Moon was formerly a movie star, 
nicknamed the ‘Big Princess’ of Great Wall during the 1950s and 1960s.  As she 
did not agree with and was upset by the traumatic Cultural Revolution in the 
Chinese Mainland, she moved to Canada suddenly and quietly in 1967, in the white 
heat of the revolution.  She came back to Hong Kong in 1969 and ran a garment 
factory with her friends.  In 1978, Hsia Moon became a member of the National 
Committee of the CPPCC keeping the seat until 2003, that is from the fifth session 
to the ninth session.  In the late 1970s, Liao Chengzhi encouraged her to return to 
the film industry, but she chose to stay behind the scenes and formed Bluebird 
Movie Enterprises Limited, with herself as producer (see Wong 2001: 130-140).   
Ann Hui’s Boat People (1982) was the debut of Bluebird, entirely shot in 
Hainan with the full cooperation of the Pearl River Studio and the Chinese 
Government.  The film was financially supported by the Hong Kong tycoon Henry 
Fok who was also a member of the National Committee of the CPPCC at that time 
and became the vice-chairman in 1993.  The story of the film takes place in Da 
Nang, one of the major port cities in Vietnam, and is about a Japanese photo 
journalist witnessing the social miseries and political persecution under communist 
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rule after North Vietnam’s victory in the Vietnam War.214  The film was made not 
long after the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War at a time when the PRC and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam were still hostile to each other, which explains why Beijing 
permitted Hong Kong filmmakers to make a film ‘bad-mouthing’ communist 
Vietnam within its territory.  Boat People was released in Hong Kong in October 
1982, less than one month after the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
visit to China in September that marked the start of the formal negotiation between 
the United Kingdom (UK) and the PRC on the Question of Hong Kong.  Because of 
the sensitive timing of the film’s release, Hong Kong audiences ‘read’ the film as an 
analogy between the fate of Vietnam and Hong Kong after 1 July 1997.  They 
substituted the communist Vietnam Government for the Chinese Government and the 
plight of Vietnamese residents for the possible plight of the future Hong Kong 
residents.   
Li Cheuk-to referred to such interpretations as ‘the China factor’.  
Looking back on the films of the 1980s from the perspective of 1990, 
he observed, “The China Factor resurfaced with a vengeance.  Hong 
Kong movies were infused with allegorical treatments of 1997 and 
were obsessed with themes of destiny and fate.”  Certainly, Boat 
People falls squarely within this category.  (Erens 2002 [2000]: 185) 
Another film critic Reeve who wrote a film review column for the leftist newspaper 
Wen Wei Po during the 1980s, recalls that an editor told him via a phone call that 
only the technique and skill of Boat People could be commented on, but not the 
content.  When Reeve asked the editor why, the editor only said it was the request 
of the newspaper’s leader (Reeve 2009: 64).  The incident indicated that the internal 
personnel of the CPC were suspicious of the film.    
                                                 
214 For more about Boat People, see Liang (2004: 248-9) and Erens (2002 [2000]: 183-5). 
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Although Ann Hui has repeatedly stated that she is not political and does not 
understand politics (Erens 2002 [2000]: 179 and 184), and although the producer 
Hsia Moon and the financial supporter Henry Fok were ‘close friends’ of the PRC, 
Boat People was banned in the Chinese Mainland.  The banning was probably 
owing to the censors’ reading of the film as a political act, a subversive criticism of 
the CPC with its partial resemblance to the Cultural Revolution.  Boat People was 
watched and interpreted in such a way that, at all its level, the director (Author) was 
absent, which meant that, with the removal of the director, the meanings and 
interpretations given to the film by its audiences, including the censors, was not up to 
the director’s explanation.  Here, Barthes’ theory of ‘the death of the author’ wins 
over Foucault’s theory of ‘author function’ while the latter is problematic in this case 
(see Chapter 1).  
Ironically, although Boat People was widely regarded as anti-communist, it 
was also banned in Taiwan because the Government Information Office of Taiwan 
rigidly conformed to the prohibition of any film that was filmed on PRC soil or had 
any Chinese Mainland actor (Qi Mengshi of the PRC in Boat People) playing one of 
the lead roles.215  Moreover, the lead actor of the film, George Lam of Hong Kong, 
had been blacklisted by the Taiwan Government until he made it clear to the Taiwan 
Government that he had not turned communist but was only fulfilling his obligations 
in accordance with his acting contract.216 
                                                 
215 Taiwan Government lifted the ban in 1997.  However, Boat People was only distributed in 
the video market in Taiwan (Liang 2004: 250). 
 
216 Many film crew members of Boat People used fake names in the credits out of fear of being 
blacklisted by the Government Information Office of Taiwan. For instance, Chiu Kang-chien used his 
wife’s name Dai An-ping as the screenwriter’s name. 
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Boat People achieved record-breaking box-office success in Hong Kong and 
became an award-winning film later at the second Hong Kong Film Awards held in 
1983.217  After its first theatrical run, the film disappeared in Hong Kong for about 
ten years without any distribution in the form of audio-visual products.  Its 
suspicious disappearance was probably owing to the film owner’s withdrawal 
because of the controversy stirred up by the film and the disappointment of the 
Chinese Government.  As Reeve (2009: 64) remarks, if it were not for the 
exceptional relationships of the investors, Hsia Moon and Henry Fok, and the fact 
that the power of the CFCC was not as centralized as it is today, Boat People would 
not have been made.  It was an exceptional co-production which came out under 
exceptional circumstances and interpersonal relationships of the CPC’s senior cadres.    
In another instance, in 1986, Yim Ho’s Buddha’s Lock (released in Hong 
Kong in 1987) co-produced by Shenzhen Film Enterprise and Highland Films 
Enterprises (HK) Limited, a film based on true events, also got caught up in 
censorship trouble in the Chinese Mainland.  The film was about the Yi people, an 
ethnic minority group that the Chinese Government recognizes as part of the Chinese 
nation.218  As the Chinese Government is always sensitive about the issue of ethnic 
minorities, the film was banned because the censors were afraid that the film would 
induce the Yi people’s misunderstanding or even stir up discontent (see Reeve 2009: 
74-5).   
                                                 
217 Boat People earned gross box-office receipts of HK$15.5 million in its first theatrical run in 
Hong Kong.  The film won five awards at the 2nd Hong Kong Film Awards, including Best Film, Best 
Director and Best Screenplay. 
 
218 For more about Buddha’s Lock, see Cheuk (2008: 151-2). 
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The bans on Boat People and Buddha’s Lock illustrate that Mainland-HK 
co-productions put Hong Kong filmmakers’ freedom of expression, speech and 
creativity at stake.  All in all, the CPC regime is far from liberal and democratic, 
and politics always matters when the Communist ideolgy holds sway. 
 
Hong Kong Cinema Rescued Chinese Mainland Cinema 
There were reasons, other than political, for the Chinese Government to 
favour Mainland-HK co-productions.  The Chinese Mainland film industry needed 
Hong Kong cinema’s commercial experience to rescue its film industry from any 
awkward situaions during the early days of marketization after the implementation of 
the ‘reform and opening-up’ policy.  
On 20 October 1984, the CPC adopted “The Central Committee of the CPC’s 
Decision on Economic System Reform” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jingji Tizhi 
Gaige de Jueding; my translation), by which all state-owned enterprises, including 
those of film undertakings, would have a separate account and would have to assume 
sole responsibility for their profits and losses (The Central People’s Government of 
the PRC 2008).219  The new policy placed all the film studios at the time in a 
predicament, and the cause can be traced back to decades ago.   
Soon after the establishment of the PRC, film undertakings in the Chinese 
Mainland were under the unified control and operation of the CPC.  Film — a 
                                                 
219 Other than a small private sector that lasted for a short period of time in Shanghai during the 
early 1950s, film production before the adoption and implementation of the “Regulations on the 
Administration of Movies, 1996” was monopolized by state-owned and state-run studios; no private 
enterprise was permitted to produce films in the Chinese Mainland (see Hu 2000: 20).   
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communication medium and a form of art that even the illiterate can ‘read’ — was 
considered a functional propaganda instrument under the guidance of Mao Zedong’s 
literary and art doctrines, which asserts that literature and art are for the people, in 
particular, the workers, peasants and soldiers.  In 1942, Mao Zedong delivered a 
speech at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art: 
[L]iterature and art fit well into the whole revolutionary machine as a 
component part that they operate as powerful weapons for uniting and 
educating the people and for attacking and destroying the enemy, and 
that they help the people fight the enemy with one heart and one mind.  
(Mao Zedong 1942; transcribed by the Maoist Documentation Project) 
In his speech, Mao Zedong combines the fundamental guiding principle of Marxism 
and the specific circumstances of the Chinese revolution.  He employs the world 
view and methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism to 
explain the CPC’s fundamental principles on ‘literature and art’ (wenyi) and to 
discourse on a series of important problems of ‘literature and art’ in relation to the 
people, politics, life and the era, as well as the relationship between content and form, 
inheriting and to innovating, the popular and the transcendent, a world view and the 
creation of ‘literature and art’, and so on.  He emphasizes that ‘literature and art’ 
should serve the masses and that the correct stance of ‘literature and art’ workers 
should be that of the proletariat.  In short, the central idea of Mao Zedong’s speech 
is: ‘Literature and art’ have to be in the service of politics (see Mao Zedong 1942).   
Starting from the establishment of the PRC up to the early 1980s, the Chinese 
Mainland cinema was entirely under a socialist planned economy, and film 
enterprises and studios were all state-owned, state-funded and state-run.  While film 
production was under the CPC’s planned-quota system and was required to follow 
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and serve the needs of politics and ideology (see Yin 2007), film distribution was 
under the unified management of the Central Government.  Under such a system, 
the Central Government was the only investor as well as market agent.  The 
assessment of films was based neither on profit nor on box-office takings, but on 
political and propaganda effects — the concept of market was null and out of context.  
After living under such conditions for decades, film studios lacked the experience 
and ability to cope with the market and to run their business with a sense of what the 
market wants. 
After the promulgation of “The Central Committee of the CPC’s Decision on 
Economic System Reform”, by which said film studios should be responsible for 
their profits and losses and learn to deal with the market economy, entertainment 
films became a hot topic for discussion in the Chinese Mainland. 
Since 1986, the Chinese Mainland film industry and film theorists, and 
even the government officials, were all discussing, valuing and 
advocating ‘entertainment films’ in order to revive the Chinese cinema 
by entertainment genre films. . . . According to the statistics at that time, 
starting from 1988, commercial genre films occupied over sixty percent 
of the total yearly productions.  (Yin and He 2009: 37; my translation) 
During the late 1980s, a number of the renowned filmmakers who had emerged after 
the Cultural Revolution, known as the Fifth Generation directors, who were widely 
regarded as famous for making art films also turned to entertainment films.  Notable 
titles included Tien Zhuang-zhuang’s Rock Kids (1988) and Zhang Yimou’s 
Codename Cougar (1989; also known as Operation Cougar or The Puma Action).  
However, most of the commercial attempts were badly received and turned out to be 
box-office losers resulting in financial losses for the studios.  Furthermore, the 
political unrest resulting from the June Fourth Massacre in 1989 also led to the rise 
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of the formalist faction within the CPC that halted the further economic reform until 
early 1992 when Deng Xiaoping reinforced the ‘reform and opening-up’ policy via 
his southern inspection tour.  During the tour, Deng Xiaoping visited southern cities 
such as Shenzhen, Wuchan and Zhuhai and delivered a series of talks in which he 
successfully reasserted the value of economic reform and brought the policy back on 
track (Deng 1993: 370-383).  However, by that time, film studios knew well that 
they were incapable of producing any film that would appeal to a mass audience and 
were afraid to launch any productions.  In addition, the growing popularity of 
television, video-players and video tapes also impacted on the Chinese Mainland 
cinema.  In fact, many other enterprises were also not able to cope with the market 
and were in the same predicament as the film industry.  From the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, many state-owned enterprises, including film studios, had ceased 
business or closed down, leading to millions of laid-off workers across the country.  
In contrast, the Hong Kong film industry was thriving and adept at making 
entertainment films.  In terms of quantity, Hong Kong at that time was the world’s 
third largest film production region after the US and India and the world’s second 
largest film exporter after the US (see Chung 2011: 27-9).  The Hong Kong cinema 
momentarily became a paradigm of entertainment film production for the Chinese 
Mainland cinema.  Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Mainland cinema, which was in dire 
need of its Hong Kong counterpart’s commercial skill and experience, was eager to 
work with Hong Kong film enterprises and filmmakers to produce entertainment 
films.  The cooperation between the Chinese Mainland and Hong Kong took off in 
the early 1990s.  Many genre films were made and attained box-office success both 
in Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland.  Notable titles included Zhang Yimou’s 
Raise the Red Lantern (1991), Raymond Lee’s Dragon Inn (1992), Chen Kaige’s 
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Farewell My Concubine (1993), Corey Yuen’s Fong Sai-yuk (1993), Lee Lik-chee’s 
Flirting Scholar (1993).220  However, some of these titles were actually funded by 
Taiwanese investors but in the names of Hong Kong companies so as to bypass trade 
restrictions imposed because of the political and historical relations across the 
Taiwan Strait.  For instance, Raise the Red Lantern was financed by Era 
International (H.K.) Limited, which was actually a subsidiary of the Era International 
Limited based in Taiwan, and Farewell My Concubine was financed by Tomson 
International Entertainment Distribution (HK) Limited which was also a subsidiary 
of the Tomson International Entertainment Distribution Limited based in Taiwan. 
In order to further the marketization of Chinese Mainland cinema, the 
Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (Ministry of RFT, the predecessor of SARFT) 
published a notice on 5 January 1993 titled “Some Opinions Regarding the Current 
Deepening of the System Reform of Film Industry” (Guanyu DangQian Shenhua 
Dianying Hangye Jizhi Gaige de Ruogan Yijian, widely known as “No. 3 Document”; 
my translation).  Other than reaffirming that censorship on domestic and imported 
films had to be continued and grasped firmly (Article 7) and that films inclined to 
bad political thoughts had to be eliminated (Article 8), the notice relaxed the 
administrative regulations of film distribution.  Before the issuance of the notice, 
China Film Corporation (the predecessor of China Film Group Corporation before 
1999) had the monopoly on the national distribution of all films.  It operated by 
buying copies of films from production units and distributed them to various 
provinces, cities and autonomous regions.  The price of each copy was fixed, and 
there was no such thing as price negotiation.  Thus, the film studios’ revenue relied 
                                                 
220 For more about Dragon Inn, Fong Sai-yuk and Flirting Scholar see Wang (2002: 30, 40-2, 
48-9).  For more about Raise the Red Lantern, see Dai (1999: 233-5).  For more about Farewell My 
Concubine, see Dai (1999: 261-277) and Berry (2008: 106-113).  
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solely on the number of copies that China Film Corporation would buy.  However, 
with the issuance of the “No. 3 Document”, conditions changed.  Article 2 of it has 
two main points.  Firstly, China Film Corporation was no longer to be the sole 
unified distributor of domestic feature films, and domestic production units could 
negotiate directly with the regional distribution units, although China Film 
Corporation was to remain the country’s only importer and distributor of foreign 
films.221  Secondly, the control over film ticket prices should be lifted in principle.  
In addition, under Article 3, production units and local distribution companies would 
be allowed the economic freedom of selling regional distribution rights, contracted 
‘production of a single film’ (a term under the Chinese Government’s licensing 
system of film), sharing box-office takings, and serving as distribution agents and so 
forth (Chinaacc.Com).  Tsui Hark’s blockbuster Once upon a Time in China III 
(1993), a co-production of Film Workshop Company Limited of Hong Kong and 
Beijing Film Studio of the Chinese Mainland, became the first revenue-sharing film 
of Chinese-foreign cooperation to benefit from the policy change (see Yin and He 
2009: 38-41).222  Nonetheless, there were, concurrently, a significant number of 
‘cooperations’ that were in fact pseudo co-productions — some state-owned studios 
did not invest in any co-production at all but simply sold their production quotas to 
Hong Kong film companies so as to lessen their financial difficulties.  Such studios 
were not involved in any creative, core production or distribution aspects but were 
only responsible for the official application for the production and submission for 
censorship.223  However, the foreign investors and filmmakers of co-productions at 
                                                 
221 See footnote 196. 
 
222 For more about Once upon a Time in China III, see Teo (2007 [1997]: 172-3) and Cheuk (2008: 
99-104). 
 
223 In point of fact, Tsui Hark’s Once upon a Time in China III was also a ‘pseudo co-production’. 
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that time did not consider the Chinese Mainland their target market but were just 
attracted by its scenery, architecture and cheap labour.  For Chinese Mainland 
cinema, co-productions served the purpose of rescuing the film industry and market 
that had been withering since the mid-1980s because of the domestic studios’ lack of 
funds and marketing experience.   
 
Development of Mainland-HK Co-Production Disturbed by PRC Policy 
Since cultural industries in Communist China are always a matter of political 
concern, the marketization of the Chinese Mainland cinema and the development of 
Mainland-HK co-production was not free and undisturbed.  The Chinese 
Government is always afraid of letting the people and economy under its governance 
go their own way, thus, the reform of the economy is always wrestling with the 
socialist planned economy in a constant cycle of easing and tightening of policies.   
When the PRC was paving its way for WTO membership in the mid-1990s, 
the Chinese Government led by Jiang Zemin started to formalize the PRC’s 
administration of film by promulgating a series of provisions and regulations.  On 5 
July 1994, the Ministry of RFT promulgated the “Administrative Measures 
Regarding Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Film Production, 1994” (Guanyu 
Zhongwai Hezuo Sheshi Dianying De Guanli Guiding; my translation) (Ministry of 
RFT Order No. 14; expired), which was the first official open document fully 
devoted to the administration, examination, approval and so forth regarding 
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Chinese-foreign co-produced films.224  The document states some typical but vague 
principles of censorship, for example: (i) conforming to the PRC’s Constitution, laws 
and relevant provisions; (ii) beneficial to the propagation of the outstanding 
traditional culture of the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu); (iii) beneficial to the 
Chinese economic and cultural construction and social stability; (iv) beneficial to 
Chinese-foreign cultural exchange and cannot harm the interest of third country.  It 
also specifies: (i) the administrative procedures regarding the importation of filming 
materials and exportation of filmed material; (ii) screenplay has to be submitted for 
examination and ‘project initiation’ (lixiang); (iii) the principal creative personnel 
such as director and cinematographer have to be approved by the authority and 
should, in general, consist mainly of citizens within the Chinese borders; (iv) all 
finished co-productions have to pass the Chinese Government’s censorship before 
any release inside and outside the borders; and so forth (Laws and Regulations 
Database, People.Cn).   
On 29 May 1996, the State Council adopted the “Regulation on the 
Administration of Films” (State Council Order No. 200; expired), which was 
promulgated on 19 June upon the signature of the Premier Li Peng and came into 
force on 1 July the same year.225  It was the first official, dedicated and open legal 
document to make clear the officially unified management and regulations governing 
the Chinese Mainland film industry.  Article 23 of it makes it clear and definite that 
the State adopts a film censorship system.  Some six months later, the PRC’s very 
first formal, specialized legal document on film censorship, the “Provisions on Film 
                                                 
224 The document was later replaced by SARFT’s “Administrative Measures on Chinese-Foreign 
Cooperation in Film Production” in 2003, which was in turn replaced by “The Provisions on the 
Administration of Chinese-foreign Cooperative Production of Films” in 2004.  
 
225 The latest amended version is the “Regulations on the Administration of Movies, 2001” (State 
Council Order No. 342) promulgated on 25 December 2001. 
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Censorship” (Dianying Shencha Guiding; my translation) (Ministry of RFT Order 
No. 22; expired), was promulgated and took effect on 16 January 1997, although the 
Ministry of RFT had implemented the “Interim Provisions on Film Censorship” 
(Dianying Shencha Zanxing Guiding; my translation) (Ministry of RFT Order No. 9; 
expired) on 4 June 1993 and a few notices about film censorship measures before 
(see Chinalawedu.Com n.d.).226  It can be seen that the Chinese Government’s 
administration of films and its implementation of film censorship had not been based 
on any legislation or legal authority for almost half a century since the founding of 
the PRC.  Censorship had been carried out arbitrarily by the administration rather 
than by rule of law (cf. the colonial Hong Kong Government’s illegal film censorship 
discussed in Chapter 4).227   
Another important document to regulate co-production of film, the 
“Provisions Regarding the Constitution of Chief Creative Personnel of Domestic 
Feature and Co-Production Film” (Guanyu Guochan Gushipian, Hepaipian 
Zhuchuang Renyuan Guocheng de Guiding; my translation) (Ministry of RFT 
Release Dianzi (1996) No. 465; abolished), was promulgated on 4 November 1996.  
The Ministry of RFT proclaimed that the provisions aimed to eliminate the 
unfavourable influence brought about by ‘pseudo co-productions’.  Other than 
being a reminder of the previous stipulation that the chief creative personnel of 
co-productions should consist mainly of citizens within the Chinese borders, the 
provisions further stipulate that not less than fifty percent of the leading characters 
                                                 
226 The latest film censorship criteria are included in the “Provisions on the Archival Filing of 
Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the Administration of Films, 2006” (SARFT Order No. 52), which was 
promulgated on 22 May 2006 and took effect on 22 June 2006. 
 
227 In the 1990s, the PRC was paving the way for admission to the WTO; the Chinese 
Government promulgated a series of laws and regulations regarding various trades in order to fulfill the 
admission requirements.  
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should be played by the Chinese domestic artistes (Flssw.Com).  However, in 1998, 
I directed a film titled Fascination Amour, starring Andy Lau and Hikaru Ishida, 
which was distributed in the Chinese Mainland as a Chinese-foreign co-production.  
However, it was, strictly speaking, a pseudo one.  In order to comply with the 
provisions set by the Chinese Government, Fascination Amour had two fairly 
popular Chinese Mainland actors playing significant roles.  When the film was 
released in the Chinese Mainland in 1999, my name in the front credits was paired 
with and placed after the name of a Chinese Mainland director whom I knew nothing 
about and had never met before.  Such a pairing also happened to the other chief 
creative personnel such as the screenwriter and cinematographer.  This is, perhaps, a 
demonstration of the Chinese civil tactic: ‘The higher ups have policies while the 
lower downs have their own ways of getting around them’ (shang you zheng ce, xia 
you dui ce). 
With the implementations of the regulations and provisions mentioned above, 
which replaced the past stipulations that were not formulated through legislative 
procedures, the Chinese Government’s administration of film seemed to transform 
into a more lawful system.  However, in actual practice, such regulations and 
provisions are not only subject to the arbitrary interpretations of the governmental 
bodies’ leaders, but also serve as a tool to suppress dissidents, the freedom of 
expression and other human liberties in a legalistic fashion, implying a development 
of the CPC regime’s rule-by-law governance in the guise of a rule-of-law one.  
Moreover, the rule-of-man culture of governance did not fade away.  The Chinese 
Government did not give up administering its control over film by delivering guiding 
principles through the speeches of relevant authorities’ leaders on public occasions.  
Such guidances which are without lawful ground but always understood and taken by 
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the subordinates as lawful orders.  For instance, significant guidance on film 
production was delivered at the Changsha Conference, a national working conference 
on the Chinese Mainland cinema held in Changsha from 23 to 26 March 1996.  In 
the conference, the CPC leadership brought up their orthodox doctrines on cinema 
again.  According to the documentation of the CPC (News of the CPC n.d.b), the 
head of the Publicity Department (formerly known in the West as the Propaganda 
Department) Ding Guangen, indicated at the conference: 
Our films should unfold the sublime ideal and good style of the 
Party and the outstanding tradition and virtue of the Chinese nation to 
the audience; should unfold the artistic image that reflects the thought 
and spirit of patriotism, collectivism and socialism to the audience; 
should unfold the state, style and manner of the heroic example figure 
who promotes social righteousness and arduously begins his 
undertakings to the audience; should arouse people’s passionate 
feelings to share a common fate and to throw in their lot with the 
mother country and nation; should cultivate people’s sentiment of 
sublime morality and the emotional appeal of a healthy aesthetic; so as 
to render edification, enlightenment and joy to the people.  
. . . In order to do the film works well, one has to carry through the 
Party’s guidelines on ‘literature and art’: (1) to insist on Deng 
Xiaoping’s theory of the construct of Chinese-style socialism and the 
Party’s fundamental line, fundamental guiding principle; (2) to insist on 
the direction of serving the people and serving socialism; (3) to insist 
on the guideline of ‘let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of 
thought contend’ [baihua qifang, baijia zhengming], to make the past 
serve the present, to make the West serve the Chinese and to push out 
the old and bring in the new;228 (4) to insist on the principle of ‘focus 
                                                 
228 In Communist China, ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend’ 
(baihua qifang, baijia zhengming) was originally a policy launched by Mao Zedong in 1956, which 
aimed to promote the arts and scientific progress.  Lu Dingyi, the head of the Central Propaganda 
Department at that time, said that the policy was to advocate the freedom of independent thought, debate, 
creativity and criticism, as well as the freedom to voice, to insist on and to keep one’s own opinion 
(News of the CPC n.d.c).  The intellectuals welcomed the policy.  Nevertheless, those who responded 
to the policy with criticism of the regime were regarded as rightists and were persecuted and prosecuted 
in the Anti-Rightist Movement launched by Mao Zedong in 1957.  The ‘let a hundred flowers bloom, a 
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on construction, establishment as principle’ [zhong zai jianshe, yi li 
weiben];229 (5) to insist on promoting the ‘major theme’, to advocate 
diversification; (6) to insist to go deep into life, go deep into reality, 
relating closely to the masses; (7) to insist firstly on social benefit, to 
strive to achieve the unification of economic benefit and social benefit; 
(8) to insist on grasping prosperity on one hand and grasping 
management on the other hand; (9) to insist on going on the road of 
reform and opening-up.  
. . . Our films should derive source materials from Chinese history 
and reality as the sources of creation, reflect the spirit of the Chinese 
nation and take the need of the Chinese [Mainland] audience as the 
fundamental need.   
. . . We will implement the ‘9550 project’, that is to make fifty 
outstanding films during the ‘ninth five-year plan’ period, having ten 
per year.  (News of the CPC n.d.b; my translation)            
Five months later, on 25 August, the Film Bureau convened a conference on the 
works of film co-production during the Changchun Film Festival.  The Film Bureau 
emphasized that co-production had to insist on the principle of ‘based on me 
principally’ (yiwo weizhu; my translation) (Yin and He 2009: 42).  Here, the word 
‘me’ (wo), in its precise sense, refers to the Chinese Mainland, but my experience in 
the industry tells me that the interpretation of such a ‘me’, in actual practice, was 
subject to the ideological and political preference of the authority at the time, which 
is still a familiar feature today.  What the ideological state apparatus wanted to 
convey through the two conferences was clear; they were not only about the 
                                                                                                                                          
hundred schools of thought contend’ policy is generally considered an entrapment orchestrated by Mao 
Zedong to flush out dissidents.  Although Ding Guangen harked back to the policy, there were, in 
reality, still many taboos against the freedom of speech.  
 
229 ‘Focus on construction, establishment as principle’ (Zhong zai jianshe, yi li weiben) is the 
CPC’s slogan for the construction of spiritual civilization under the ‘reform and opening-up’ policy.  
‘Focus on construction’ precisely means taking construction as the starting point and basis of work, and 
‘establishment as principle’ refers to the emphasis on the preciousness of practicality and the demand of 
real progress.  In another sense, the whole slogan, on one hand, encourages construction, and, on the 
other, ignores criticism.  
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economy, but, more importantly, they were political.  As in Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality, the conferences were all about the disposition of the Chinese 
Mainland film industry organized around the theme of ‘reason of the State’ (raison 
d’Etat), and it aimed to arrange the Chinese Mainland cinema in such a way that, 
through a certain means, certain ends could be achieved (see Chapter 1 and Foucault 
1991: 95): Firstly, the aim was to enhance the planned economy component in the 
film industry and integrate it into the system of political unification, thus enforcing a 
link between socialism and the market economy through cinema.  This link can be 
understood as part of the construction of the Chinese-style socialist market economy.   
Secondly, it was to instruct filmmakers to make more ‘patriotic’ and ‘nationalistic’ 
films with a positive attitude to the CPC regime, praising the CPC leadership and the 
goodness of the country and the Chinese nation.  Thirdly, it aimed to confine film 
subjects to only those relevant to China or, more precisely, the Chinese Mainland.  
Fourthly, it aimed to pull back film production to comply with the guidance on 
‘literature and art’ that Mao Zedong delivered at the Yenan Forum in 1942.  In short, 
film had to be in the service of politics.  Fifthly, it reaffirmed that film is the ruling 
power’s ideological, functional and propaganda instrument, which aims to instill into 
the governed population a sense of national superiority conceived and perceived as 
the CPC leadership’s achievement and lull the population into governable docility. 
The two conferences resulted in a drastic drop in the number of domestic film 
productions, especially entertainment movies and Chinese-foreign co-productions.230  
Film investment was subject to policy risks far greater than market risks.  The 
original intention behind the Chinese Mainland studios’ co-productions had been to 
                                                 
230 The number of the Chinese Mainland domestic productions dropped from 110 in 1996 to 82 in 
1998, while that of the Mainland-HK co-productions dropped from 29 to 7 in the same period (Yin and 
He 2009: 44). 
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revitalize the domestic film industry and market by making more entertainment films, 
but it was then halted by the authorities after about ten years of development.  The 
principle of ‘based on me principally’ significantly limited the scope of Hong Kong 
filmmakers’ creativity and artistic integrity.  And there were a lot of taboos about 
those things that would cause censorship problems.  Those things and their 
relevance were subject to the authority’s interpretation which was deeply political.231  
However, while Mainland-HK co-production were stuck in a creative impasse, the 
‘healthy’ and ‘politically correct’ domestic films, which are, indeed, propaganda 
films, particularly the big productions of ‘major themes’ that the authorities 
advocated were a step back in time and were not welcomed by audiences.  Chinese 
Mainland cinema was once again in decline and remained so until the PRC became a 
member of the WTO in December 2001.  As a new member, it needed to relax its 
restrictive administration so as to revive its film industry and to gain audiences’ 
confidence in its domestic cinema in order to counteract the ‘invasion’ of entertaining 
Hollywood films that, while not large in number, strongly appealed to the mass 
audience.  In the wake of the relaxation of the Chinese Government’s provisions 
and the speeding up of the development of the market economy in the new 
millennium, the Chinese Mainland film market saw the start of an unprecendented 
boom.  Meanwhile, the once vibrant Hong Kong film industry has been in a 
perpetual decline since the early 1990s.  The yearly number of film productions 
dropped from more than two hundred in the 1980s to less than one hundred by the 
end of the 1990s.  During the first decade of the new millennium, the yearly number 
further dropped to fifty something (see Chung 2012: 3).  The decline was owing to 
a number of causes such as rampant piracy, loss of audiences due to massive 
                                                 
231 For what the ‘things’ refer to, see Chapter 1 and Foucault (1991: 93) for reference. 
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diversification of entertainment offerings, bad quality of a large portion of Hong 
Kong films, vanishing of hot money from Taiwan and Korea, rise of neighbouring 
competitors, incompetence with Hollywood mega-productions of advanced 
technology and so forth.  Above all, the Asian financial crisis had made many fully 
convertible Asian currencies such as the Indonesian rupiah and Malaysian ringgit 
suffer heavy devaluation, while the economy of Hong Kong was dealt a severe blow, 
but its currency remained pegged to the US dollar.232  Hong Kong films, thus, 
became excessively expensive, compelling their rights owners to lower selling prices 
and making conventional Asian overseas markets hardly guarantee any profits, or 
even a break-even.  In such a context, in order to make film production a profitable 
business again, Hong Kong films, especially those of medium to big budget, have to 
acquire distribution in the booming Chinese Mainland market, which was not a 
significant, or even not a market, before the twenty-first century.  However, as it 
booms, it also helps Beijing to extend its control over the declining Hong Kong 
cinema, encouraging self-censorship among Hong Kong filmmakers. 
 
Hong Kong Cinema Impeded by Chinese-Style Socialism 
In accordance with the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the PRC (Basic Law) and the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) remains outside the PRC’s socialist 
system and the previous capitalist system and Hong Kong way of life can remain 
unchanged for fifty years after 1997.  Theoretically and in law, Hong Kong films 
                                                 
232 In the aftermath the Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong had suffered from economic deflation 
for sixty-eight months from 1999 to 2004. 
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are not bound by the PRC’s problematic censorship system unless they are going to 
be distributed in the Chinese Mainland.  For half a century after the end of the 
Pacific War, and particularly after the CPC seized power in 1949, the Hong Kong 
film industry had no need to rely on the Chinese Mainland market because the local 
market together with the other overseas markets could provide enough revenue for its 
survival and prosperity (see Chapter 3).  Although a relatively small number of 
Hong Kong films, particularly the Sil-Metropole productions, were exported to the 
Chinese Mainland during the first two decades after the implementation of China’s 
‘reform and opening-up’ national policy, they made little money for the investors and 
sometimes resulted in losses for the Chinese Mainland buyers.  However, while the 
declining Hong Kong film industry was still suffering a great deal in the aftermath of 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the Chinese Mainland film market began to boom, 
and there was a rapid and enormous increase of movie houses and screens across the 
the PRC (broached in previous section).  In the light of the geopolitical relations of 
Hong Kong with the PRC, Hong Kong film enterprises saw the booming market in 
the north as a business opportunity and hoped for the revival of the Hong Kong film 
industry.  Significantly, after the promulgation of the economic agreement, CEPA, 
more and more film people turned to the north to explore opportunities to take part in 
Mainland-HK cooperation, in particular, joint productions.   
The Government of Hong Kong SAR and the Central Government of the 
PRC signed the “Main Text” of CEPA on 29 June 2003.  The year 2003 was both a 
special and a tragic year for Hong Kong.  In that year, there was the devastation 
caused by ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’ (SARS) epidemic.  There was also 
the a large-scale demonstration march on 1 July, a day that was supposed to celebrate 
the transfer of the sovereignty over Hong Kong from the UK to the PRC and the 
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establishment of the Hong Kong SAR.  More than five hundred thousand Hong 
Kong citizens turned out to express their resentment and anger about the proposed 
legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law and the poor performance, 
ineffectiveness and incapability of the Hong Kong SAR Government.  CEPA was 
announced against such a backdrop.  The Hong Kong Government describes CEPA 
as follows: 
CEPA is a win-win agreement, bringing new business opportunities to 
the Mainland, Hong Kong and all foreign investors.  For Hong Kong, 
CEPA provides a window of opportunity for Hong Kong businesses to 
gain greater access to the Mainland market.  CEPA also benefits the 
Mainland as Hong Kong serves as a perfect ‘springboard’ for Mainland 
enterprises to reach out to the global market and accelerating the 
Mainland’s full integration with the world economy.  Foreign 
investors are also welcome to establish businesses in Hong Kong to 
leverage on the CEPA benefits and join hands in tapping the vast 
opportunities of the Mainland market.  (Trade and Industry 
Department, the Government of Hong Kong SAR 2014) 
Under the terms of CEPA, the huge Chinese Mainland market was opened up to 
Hong Kong goods and services.  On the surface, CEPA was a means for Beijing to 
boost the economy of Hong Kong.  Although offically in public it is always claimed 
that the citizens’ resentment was due to the economic recession, it cannot hide the 
fact that it was always Beijing and the Hong Kong Government’s intention to 
disguise political resentment as entirely down to poor economic conditions.  The 
research by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, City University of Hong 
Kong (see Online CyberLaw and Telecommunications Policy in Greater China), 
points out that the political implications of the introduction of CEPA are more 
important than its economic implications.  CEPA was a ‘gift’ from Beijing to save 
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the inadequate administration of Tung Chee Wah, the then Chief Executive of Hong 
Kong, in the aftermath of SARS and the July 1 demonstration.   
As it is stated in the “Main Text”, the objectives and principles of CEPA 
are:233 
Article 1  To strengthen trade and investment cooperation 
between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region . . . and promote joint development of the two sides, through the 
implementation of the following measures: 
1. progressively reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff 
barriers on substantially all the trade in goods between the two 
sides; 
2. progressively achieving liberalization of trade in services through 
reduction or elimination of substantially all discriminatory 
measures; 
3. promoting trade and investment facilitation.   
Article 2  The conclusion, implementation and amendment of the 
CEPA shall adhere to the following principles: 
1. to abide by the ‘one country, two systems’ principle; 
2. to be consistent with the rules of the World Trade Organisation; 
3. to accord with the needs of both sides to adjust and upgrade their 
industries and enterprises and to promote steady and sustained 
development; 
4. to achieve reciprocity and mutual benefits, complementarity with 
each other’s advantages and joint prosperity; 
5. to take progressive action, dealing with the easier subjects before 
the more difficult ones.  (Trade and Industry Department, the 
Government of Hong Kong SAR 2014) 
                                                 
233 According to the Trade and Industry Department of the Hong Kong Government, the 
Mainland and Hong Kong submitted to the WTO a joint notification on the CEPA on 27 December 
2003 and joint communications regarding the provisions of the subsequent Supplements in the 
corresponding ensuing years.  The English translation of the CEPA text and the Supplements 
submitted are posted on the Trade and Industry Department’s website.  It is noted on the webpage that 
CEPA was signed in the Chinese language and only the Chinese text is authentic. 
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Through CEPA, Hong Kong can enjoy preferential access to the Chinese Mainland 
market.  As a matter of fact, much of the preferential treatment goes beyond the 
PRC’s compliance upon its accession to the WTO.  Up to the present (September 
2014), CEPA has undergone eleven stages with ten supplementary documents, 
making nearly one thousand and eight hundred goods of Hong Kong origin that 
fulfilled the requirement of CEPA’s rules of origin that entitle them to zero tariffs.  
While CEPA has approved more than one hundred and thirteen thousand Certificates 
of Hong Kong Origin that cover twenty product types, the Chinese Government 
relaxed and liberalized the market access in forty-seven service sectors including 
accounting, legal services, mining, insurance, logistics, medical services, 
telecommunications and audio-visual (ibid).  
With regard to film production that is included in the audio-visual services, 
the significant liberalization measures stated in CEPA’s “Annex 4” of the “Six 
Annexes” signed on 29 September 2003 include: 
[1] Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong may be 
imported for distribution in the Mainland on a quota-free basis, after 
vetting and approval by the relevant Mainland authority.   
[2] Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong refer to 
those motion pictures made by production companies which are set up 
or established in accordance with the relevant laws of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, and which own more than 75% of the 
copyright of the motion pictures concerned.  Hong Kong residents 
should comprise more than 50% of the total principal personnel in the 
motion pictures concerned.234 
                                                 
234 “Principal personnel includes personnel performing the roles of director, screenwriter, leading 
actor, leading actress, supporting actor, supporting actress, producer, cinematographer, editor, art director, 
costume designer, action choreographer, and composer of the original film score” (Trade and Industry 
Department, the Government of Hong Kong SAR 2014). 
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[3] Motion pictures jointly produced by Hong Kong and the Mainland 
are treated as Mainland motion pictures for the purpose of distribution 
in the Mainland.  Translated versions of the motion pictures in 
languages of other Chinese ethnic groups and Chinese dialects, which 
are based on the Putonghua version, are allowed to be distributed in the 
Mainland.   
[4] For motion pictures jointly produced by Hong Kong and the 
Mainland, there is no restriction on the percentage of principal creative 
personnel from Hong Kong, but at least one-third of the leading artistes 
must be from the Mainland; there is no restriction on where the story 
takes place, but the plots or the leading characters must be related to 
the Mainland.235  (Trade and Industry Department, the Government of 
Hong Kong SAR 2014; emphasis added)  
Before CEPA, the import of Hong Kong titles to the Chinese Mainland was under the 
quota system of foreign films; clause [1], mentioned above, indicates a liberalization 
of the previous distribution.  Clause [2] defines ‘Chinese-language motion pictures 
produced in Hong Kong’.  Clause [3] is more or less the same as before CEPA, but 
it states clearly that translated versions of Mainland-HK co-productions in languages 
of other ethnic groups and Chinese dialects can be distributed in the Chinese 
Mainland.  Clause [4] relaxes the requirement of the principal creative personnel 
when compared with SARFT’s requirement before CEPA that the principal creative 
personnel should, in general, consist mainly of citizens within the Chinese borders, 
and the leading roles played by the Chinese domestic artistes should not be less than 
fifty percent (as previously pointed out in this chapter).  However, in respect of film 
                                                 
235 (i) The numeration in this text regarding the measures stated in the CEPA documents is not the 
same as that in the original; it is just for the convenient referencing of the related discourse. 
(ii) “[Principal] creative personnel refers to personnel performing the roles of director, screenwriter, 
cinematographer and leading artistes.  Leading artistes refer to leading actor, leading actress, leading 
supporting actor and leading supporting actress” (Trade and Industry Department, the Government of 
Hong Kong SAR 2014). 
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content and subject matter, the clause still adheres to the principle of ‘based on me 
principally’ (yiwo weizhu; my translation) that the Film Bureau advocated in 1996. 
Under “Supplement II to CEPA” signed on 18 October 2005: 
[1] The Cantonese version of motion pictures co-produced by Hong 
Kong and the Mainland is permitted to be distributed and screened in 
Guangdong Province, after obtaining the approval of the relevant 
authorities in the Mainland; the Cantonese version of motion pictures 
produced by Hong Kong and solely imported by the Film Import and 
Export Corporation of the China Film Group Corporation is permitted 
to be distributed and screened in Guangdong Province, after being 
examined by and obtaining the approval of the relevant authorities in 
the Mainland. 
[2] The import of Chinese language motion pictures made by 
production companies which are set up in accordance with the relevant 
laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and which own 
more than 50% of the copyright of the motion pictures concerned is 
exempted from quota restrictions for distribution in the Mainland, after 
being examined by and obtaining the approval of the relevant 
authorities in the Mainland.236  (Trade and Industry Department, the 
Government of Hong Kong SAR 2014) 
Before the signing of “Supplement II to CEPA”, imports of Hong Kong films, which 
are usually in Cantonese and are not Mainland-HK co-productions, had to be dubbed 
into Putonghua for distribution in the Chinese Mainland.  However, under clause [1] 
above, the original Cantonese version of imported Hong Kong films can be 
distributed and screened in Guangdong Province where Cantonese is the common 
language.  Clause [2] above relaxes the definition of ‘Chinese language motion 
                                                 
236 “Hong Kong residents should comprise more than 50% of the total principal personnel in the 
motion pictures concerned.  Principal personnel includes personnel performing the roles of director, 
screenwriter, leading actor, leading actress, supporting actor, supporting actress, producer, cinematographer, 
editor, art director, costume designer, action choreographer, and composer of the original film score” (Trade 
and Industry Department, the Government of Hong Kong SAR 2014). 
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pictures produced in Hong Kong’ that can be distributed in the Chinese Mainland on 
a quota-free basis by lowering the Hong Kong production company’s share of 
copyright ownership from the previous seventy-five percent to fifty percent.  The 
clause enables Hong Kong film companies to incorporate more foreign investment.   
“Supplement VI to CEPA” signed on 9 May 2009 makes further concessions: 
To allow post-production of domestic films (including co-productions) 
to be processed in Hong Kong after obtaining approval of the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television [SARFT] on applications 
initiated by the principal production entity in the Mainland.  (Trade 
and Industry Department, the Government of Hong Kong SAR 2014) 
In fact, before the signing of “Supplement VI to CEPA”, some domestic films and 
co-productions already had part of, and sometimes the whole of their post-production 
done in Hong Kong or some other foreign regions such as Thailand.  Some of them 
got official approval, but the others just smuggled the necessary materials abroad.  
Such smuggling was usually not difficult because bribing is always effective in 
corrupt regimes.  In general, the post-production of film, particularly in the colour 
grading process, always involves all the dailies, that is, the raw and unedited footage.  
Before CEPA, it was mandatory that all the dailies shot within the Chinese Mainland 
had to be kept in the domestic film processing laboratory and post-production had to 
be done within the Chinese Mainland territory.  For any completed film, only its 
interpositive, internegative and the sound duplicates, after the examination and 
approval of the relevant authorities, were allowed to be exported, but not the original 
camera negative, the unused footage, the original sounds and the unprocessed 
negative.  Older Hong Kong people know well that in the early 1980s and before, 
foreign tourists, including those from Hong Kong, were not allowed to bring 
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unprocessed film out of the Chinese Mainland territory when they left.  They were 
required to have all the photographed film processed before passing through customs, 
otherwise the film would be confiscated.  Furthermore, customs officers would 
perform a random check on tourists’ pictures to prevent any images that were 
undesirable to the PRC, especially those classified under national security, such as 
pictures of the People’s Liberation Army’s camps, being brought to the outside world.  
Such a practice is commonly perceived as a traditional means for national security of 
the regime behind the bamboo curtain.     
Further liberalization enabled by “Supplement X” signed on 29 August 2013 
includes: 
[1] To allow Mainland motion pictures and motion pictures 
co-produced by Hong Kong and the Mainland to be processed in Hong 
Kong. 
[2] To allow motion pictures produced by Hong Kong to screen the 
original sound track of the dialects spoken in the motion pictures when 
it is contextually required, on the condition that standard Chinese 
subtitles are provided on screen. 
[3] To allow the dialect version of motion pictures co-produced by 
Hong Kong and the Mainland to be distributed and screened in the 
Mainland, after obtaining the approval of the relevant authorities in the 
Mainland, on the condition that standard Chinese subtitles are provided 
on screen. 
[4] To allow the dialect version of motion pictures produced by Hong 
Kong and solely imported by the Film Import and Export Corporation 
of the China Film Group Corporation to be distributed and screened in 
the Mainland, after being examined by and obtaining the approval of 
the relevant authorities in the Mainland, on the condition that standard 
Chinese subtitles are provided on screen. 
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[5] To allow contractual service providers employed by Hong Kong 
service suppliers, in the mode of movement of natural persons, to 
provide services under the specific liberalization commitments of this 
sector or sub-sector in the Mainland.  (Trade and Industry Department, 
the Government of Hong Kong SAR 2014) 
Clause [I] above is actually getting less relevant day by day as digital technology has 
almost replaced analogue technology in filmmaking.  By clause [2], only Chinese 
dialects are allowed but not foreign languages.  Moreover, the phrase ‘contextually 
required’ is problematic since it depends on how the PRC’s censors comprehend the 
context and how the CPC’s ideology is involved in their comprehension.  For 
instance, it is quite a common phenomenon that Chinese citizens today, particularly 
the young people, have English names, but when I submitted the screenplay of a film 
that is tentatively titled Shock Wave for project initiation in early 2014, CFCC 
recommended me to avoid using English names for the movie characters and avoid 
using English dialogue even when the characters are talking to foreigners.  Instead, 
CFCC preferred that the foreigners spoke Mandarin.  Clause [3] and [4] is a further 
relaxation in that it allows the dialect version of Hong Kong films and Mainland-HK 
co-productions to be imported not just to Guangdong Province, but to the entire state. 
CEPA was introduced and is still regarded by Beijing and the Hong Kong 
Government as an economic arrangement that aims to promote the joint economic 
prosperity and development of the Chinese Mainland and the Hong Kong SAR, and 
to facilitate the further development of economic links between the two sides and 
other countries and regions (ibid).  Hong Kong citizens, particularly the 
businessmen and tycoons, generally welcome such an arrangement.  However, as 
far as film is concerned (and the products of other cultural industries as well), CEPA 
is also an institution designed to embody political purposes.  It makes use of the 
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huge and booming market of the Chinese Mainland to extend the Chinese 
Government’s censorship to Hong Kong so as to regulate the content and ideology 
carried in film which the CPC conventionally sees as a powerful, functional 
propaganda instrument.  Although CEPA enables Hong Kong film investors 
preferential access to the Chinese Mainland market, in order to enjoy the financial 
benefits, all films have to fulfill the condition of “being examined by and obtaining 
the approval of the relevant authorities in the Mainland” as is stated frequently in the 
CEPA documents.  In actual practice, every film to be officially released in the 
Chinese Mainland market has to comply with the PRC’s censorship procedures.  
According to the latest amended “Provisions on the Administration of 
Chinese-foreign Cooperative Production of Films, 2004” (SARFT Order No. 31): 
Article 15 Sino-foreign cooperatively-produced films that have 
been completed shall be submitted to the film examination commission 
of SARFT [now SAPPRFT] after the opinion on the preliminary 
examination has been submitted by the local radio, film and television 
administrative department at the provincial level.  Films for which the 
project has been applied by film production work units under the 
central government and State authorities and work units that hold a 
Film Production Permit (Single Film), and whose production has been 
completed, shall be directly reported to the film examination 
commission of SARFT [now SAPPRFT] for examination. 
Article 16 Jointly-produced films may only be distributed and 
screened publicly inside or outside China after they have passed 
examination and obtained a Permit for Public Screening of Films issued 
by SARFT [now SAPPRFT]. 
Article 19 Where a jointly-produced film needs to participate in 
Chinese or foreign film festivals (exhibitions), it shall be reported to 
SARFT [now SAPPRFT] for record filing according to the provisions 
on the holding of and participation in Chinese and foreign film festivals 
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(exhibitions).  (Ningbo Bureau of Culture Radio & TV, Press and 
Publication 27 April 2011) 
Article 6 lists six principles that Chinese-foreign cooperation in film production shall 
abide by:  
1. it shall be in accord with the Constitution, laws, regulations and 
the relevant provisions of China; 
2. it shall respect the customs, religions, beliefs and living habits of 
all ethnic groups in China; 
3. it shall facilitate the propagation of the refined indigenous culture 
and traditions of China; 
4. it shall facilitate economic, cultural, and thought and moral 
construction, and the social stability of China; 
5. it shall facilitate Sino-foreign exchanges of films; and 
6. it may not harm the interests of a third country.237  (Ibid)  
In addition, all the co-productions are also governed by other laws, regulations, 
administrative orders and Chinese custom (see the account of the making and release 
of The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake in Chapter 6 for example), particularly the 
censorship criteria set by the authorities.   
The “Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the 
Administration of Films, 2006” (SARFT Order No. 52) adopted on 3 April 2006 at 
the Administrative Meeting of SARFT was promulgated on 22 May 2006 and took 
effect on 22 June 2006.  It is the latest main legal document controlling film 
production and contains the major administrative procedures for censorship and a list 
                                                 
237 These principles, except the second one, are more or less the same as the previous version of 
the provisions.  The second principle is not found in the “Administrative Measures Regarding 
Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Film Production, 1994” (Ministry of RFT Order No. 14).  It was 
added in the “Administrative Measures on Chinese-foreign Co-operation in Film Production, 2003” 
(SARFT Order No. 19), the predecessor of “Provisions on the Administration of Chinese-foreign 
Cooperative Production of Films, 2004” (SARFT Order No. 31).   
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of censorship criteria.238  Article 1 of it states: “These Provisions are formulated in 
accordance with the Regulation on the Administration of Films for the purpose of 
regulating and improving the archival filing of film scripts (abstracts) and the 
administration of films” (Peking University Center for Legal Information).239  The 
“Regulations on the Administration of Movies, 2001” (State Council Order No. 342) 
mentioned in the article was promulgated on 25 December 2001 and came into force 
on 1 January 2002.  Article 25 of it lists a set of “contents prohibited from being 
recorded in a movie”: 
1. That which defies the basic principles determined by the 
Constitution; 
2. That which endangers the unity of the nation, sovereignty or 
territorial integrity; 
3. That which divulges secrets of the State, endangers national 
security or damages the honor or benefits of the State; 
4. That which incites the national hatred or discrimination, 
undermines the solidarity of the nations, or infringes upon 
national customs and habits; 
5. That which propagates evil cults or superstition; 
6. That which disturbs the public order or destroys the public 
stability; 
7. That which propagates obscenity, gambling, violence or 
instigates crimes; 
8. That which insults or slanders others, or infringes upon the lawful 
rights and interests of others; 
9. That which endangers public ethics or the fine folk cultural 
traditions; 
                                                 
238 The “Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the Administration of 
Films, 2006” is described here as a ‘main’ legal document because it is the usual practice for the 
relevant authorities to issue follow-up and subsidiary notices, reminders, suggestions, supplementary 
provisions in the subsequent course of the implementation of any regulation, provision and order.   
 
239 The “Regulation on the Administration of Films” mentioned in Article 1 of the “Provisions on 
the Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the Administration of Films, 2006” is not the same as 
the one mentioned earlier in this chapter that was adopted in 1996 and catalogued as “State Council 
Order No. 200” (expired).  The one mentioned here refers to the latest amended version catalogued as 
“State Council Order No. 342” adopted on 12 December 2001.   
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10. Other contents prohibited by laws, regulations or provisions of 
the State.   
 (Ministry of Culture of the PRC) 
However, the “Regulations on the Administration of Movies, 2001” does not exhaust 
the censorship criteria.  As the “Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts 
(Abstracts) and the Administration of Films, 2006” aims to serve as a specialized 
order covering the matters related to film censorship, it contains a longer list of the 
latest amended criteria:     
Article 13 Films may not contain content which: 
1. Violates the basic principles of the Constitution; 
2. Threatens the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
state; 
3. Divulges state secrets, threatens national security, harms the    
reputation and interests of the state; 
4. Instigates national hatred and discrimination, undermines the 
harmony among ethnic groups, or harms ethnic customs and 
practices; 
5. Violates state policies on religion, and propagates cult religion or 
superstition; 
6. Disrupts social order or social stability; 
7. Propagates obscenity, gambling, violence, or abets criminal 
activities; 
8. Insults or defames others, or infringes upon others’ legitimate 
rights and interests; 
9. Corrupts social morality, or defames the superiority of national 
culture; 
10. Other contents prohibited by state laws and regulations. 
Article 14 Films containing any of the following content must be 
cut or altered: 
1. Distorting Chinese civilization and history, seriously departing 
from historical truth; distorting the history of other countries, 
disrespecting other civilizations and customs; disparaging the 
image of revolutionary leaders, heroes and important historical 
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figures; tampering with Chinese or foreign classics and 
distorting the image of the important figures portrayed therein; 
2. Disparaging the image of the people's army, armed police, public 
security organ or judiciary; 
3. Showing obscene and vulgar content, exposing scenes of 
promiscuity, rape, prostitution, sexual acts, perversion, 
homosexuality, masturbation and private body parts including 
the male or female genitalia; containing dirty and vulgar 
dialogues, songs, background music and sound effects; 
4. Showing contents of murder, violence, terror, ghosts and the 
supernatural; distorting value judgment between truth and lies, 
good and evil, beauty and ugliness, righteous and unrighteous; 
showing deliberate expressions of remorselessness in committing 
crimes; showing specific details of criminal behaviours; exposing 
special investigation methods; showing content which evokes 
excitement from murder, bloodiness, violence, drug abuse and 
gambling; showing scenes of mistreating prisoners, torturing 
criminals or suspects; containing excessive horror scenes, 
dialogues, background music and sound effects; 
5. Propagating passive or negative outlook on life, world view and 
value system; deliberately exaggerating the ignorance of ethnic 
groups or the dark side of society; 
6. Advertising religious extremism, stirring up ambivalence and 
conflicts between different religions or sects, and between 
believers and non-believers, causing disharmony in the 
community; 
7. Advocating harm to the ecological environment, animal cruelty, 
killing or consuming nationally protected animals; 
8. Showing excessive drinking, smoking and other bad habits; 
9. Opposing the spirit of law. 
Article 15 The spoken and written language used for the film title 
and subtitles should comply with the regulations set forth in China’s 
Copyright Law and Law on Standard Spoken and Written Language.240  
                                                 
240 The English translation of the “Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) 
and the Administration of Films, 2006” is by Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC, 1 
April 2008). 
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(SARFT 22 May 2006, emphasis added; see also SARFT 16 January 
1997) 
When compared with the PRC’s first formal, specialized legal document on film 
censorship mentioned earlier, that is the “Provisions on Film Censorship” (Ministry 
of RFT Order No. 22; expired) promulgated in 1997, the list of criteria in the 2006 
edition is much longer; other than covering all the criteria stated before, the italics 
above indicate the added terms while Clause 7 and 10 of Article 13 and Clauses 3, 4 
and 6 of Article 14 are either an expansion or rewording of the previously existing 
criteria.  It is essential to take note of Clause 10 of Article 13, that is “Other 
contents prohibited by state laws and regulations” (SARFT 22 May 2006), which is a 
rewording of Clause 9 of Article 9 in the 1997 edition, which is: “Other contents 
prohibited by the stipulations of the State” (SARFT 16 January 1997; my translation).  
The rewording is more legalistic, which suggests a contextual and political change in 
the PRC governance over the ten years from a rule-of-man style to a rule-of-law style, 
although it is actually a ‘rule-by-law’ style.  Regarding the other principles and 
prohibitions mentioned above, it can be seen that in their vagueness they share a 
resemblance to the Hong Kong film censorship standards (see Chapter 4).  It also 
seems that they are quite broad too and driven heavily by ideology.   
As for the technical aspect, Article 25 of the “Regulations on the 
Administration of Movies, 2001” states: “The technical quality of movies shall be in 
conformity to the State standards” (Ministry of Culture of the PRC), while Article 16 
of the “Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the 
Administration of Films, 2006” states: “The technical quality of films should be 
censored according to relevant national standards” (SARFT 22 May 2006).  Such 
censorship is sometimes carried to the point of absurdity.  For instance, when 
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Barbara Wong made Tears in a Fallen City (2011), she purposely employed a digital 
effect to make the last part of the film extraordinarily grainy for aesthetic reasons.  
When the film was submitted for the Chinese Mainland censorship, censors ruled 
that the technical quality of the grainy images was not up to the State standards.  In 
order to avoid trouble, Barbara Wong reluctantly restored the grainy part to the 
original visual version (personal communication). 
With respect to censorship procedures, Article 6 of the “Provisions on the 
Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the Administration of Films, 2006” 
states that only an abstract of not less than one thousand words is needed for the 
archival filing procedure.  However, it also states: 
For those films whose main characters and plots are related to the 
aspects of foreign relations, ethnicities, religion, military affairs, public 
security, judicature, famous historical figures, famous cultural figures 
and so forth, a literature screenplay must be submitted in triplicate, and 
the opinions of the relevant provincial level department in charge or the 
central authorities and State organs have to be sought.  (SARFT 22 
May 2006; my translation) 
The provisions further mentions a category of film described as ‘major revolutionary 
and major historical theme films’.  Article 9 of the provisions states: 
For the production of ‘major revolutionary and major historical theme 
films’, submission of screenplays are required for examination upon the 
application for screenplay initiation, and to be handled in accordance 
with the SARFT’s provisions on screenplay initiation regarding ‘major 
revolutionary and major historical theme films’.  (Ibid; my translation)  
When a film is about the modern or contemporary history of China, or any Chinese 
historical or political figures, censorship is particularly strict and inspection is 
specifically handled by appointed specialists (Chapter 6 gives an example of how 
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such films get approval for production and public exhibition in the Chinese 
Mainland).241  It is well known that the CPC implements strict control over any 
discourse on history. 
The “Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the 
Administration of Films, 2006” seems to provide the reason for the censorship 
criteria.  Article 12 coming right before the three articles that contains the criteria 
says:   
The state calls for efforts to produce good movies that are creative, 
artistic, entertaining, and close to reality, life and people, which can 
protect the healthy development of minors.  Action will be taken to 
develop advanced culture, support healthy and constructive culture, 
transform backward culture, and eliminate corrupt culture.  (Ibid; my 
translation) 
However, experience has taught filmmakers the contrary.  After more than enough 
censorship authority refusals, filmmakers understand that much subject matter that is 
close to reality, life and people is, in fact, not allowed.  The underlying meaning of 
such an article is that all the bad things about China, all the past errors of the CPC 
and all the criticisms of the ruling regime are prohibited even though such things and 
errors can serve as lessons for a better future.  Filmmakers also know well what can 
be made into a film and what would be banned.  From what I have learnt and 
                                                 
241 The historiography of China is quite different from that of the West.  Chronically, while the 
traditional schematic periodization of European history divides the European history into Antiquity (or 
the Classical World), Middle Ages, Modern Times and then the contemporary, contemporary Chinese 
historians, based on a historical materialist interpretation, divide Chinese history into the ancient, the 
modern and the contemporary.  However, the period of modern Chinese history does not match up with 
the same timeline as the modernity of the West.  Some Chinese historians prefer to regard modern 
Chinese history as the period that falls between 1840 (the year the first Opium War started) and 1919 
(the year of the May Fourth Movement).  However, roughly around 1998, the Chinese Government 
defined modern Chinese history as a history of revolution and national revival, which should refer to the 
period from 1840 to 1949, the year New China, under the leadership of the CPC, was founded (see 
Zhang Haipeng 20 Nov 2009; Gov.Cn, Chinese version). 
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understood from the experiences of my career, reality, life and people that are 
actually taboo subjects for film include:  
 spoofs involving CPC leaders and members;  
 the problem of land reform;  
 the injustice in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries from December 
1951 to October 1952;  
 the mistakes in the ‘Three-Anti’ (anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti- 
bureaucracy), the ‘Five-Anti’ (anti-bribery, anti-theft of state property, 
anti-tax evasion, anti-cheating on government contracts and anti-stealing 
state economic information) and the ‘thought reform’ campaigns in 1951 
and 1952;  
 the Anti-Rightist Movement from 1957 to 1959;  
 the Three Years of Great Chinese Famine (also known as the Three Years 
of Natural Disasters or Three Years of Difficult Period) and the Great Leap 
Forward from 1958 to 1961;  
 the Three Red Banners advocated as the core works of the second five-year 
plan of the PRC under the leadership of the CPC;  
 the Four Cleanups Movement in the 1960s;  
 the ten years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution;  
 the Anti-bourgeois Liberalization Campaign in the 1980s;  
 the 1989 Democracy Movement and the June Fourth Massacre;  
 Falun Gong in the 1990s;  
 the corruption of the Public Security (the police force in the Chinese 
Mainland), Procuratorate and Courts;  
 
281 
 the problems of the China Armed Police Force and the People’s Liberation 
Army;  
 the major wicked social incidents;  
 the grievances of peasants;  
 the impasse in the sitution of laid-off workers;  
 the miserable plight of the poor;  
 opposition between the rich and the poor;  
 depiction of prostitutes;  
 casinos, gamblers and gambling;  
 child labour;  
 child and woman stealing;  
 social polarization;  
 worker strikes and disturbances;  
 the worsening of social order;  
 ghosts;  
 homosexuality;  
 triads;  
 smuggling of armaments;  
 drug trafficking and drug abuse.  
Of course, it is not an exhaustive list of all the taboo subjects that Chinese Mainland 
censors forbid or find too risky.  Although the Chinese Government leaders and 
spokesmen always encourage filmmakers to make films that reflect social reality, 
they are just paying lip-service to the idea as the actual work of the official censors 
attests.  Notable examples of banned films that are based on reality and are close to 
life and people include: Tien Zhuang-zhuang’s Blue Kite (1993), Zhang Yimou’s To 
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Live (1994), Jia Zhangke’s Xiao Wu (1997, also known as The Pickpocket) and 
Platform (2000) and Ying Liang’s When the Night Fall (2012).  These films are 
either social dramas or having their stories set against a historical backdrop; they 
involve no religious material, and none of them involve graphic violence or sex.  
The bans on such films more or less demonstrate the temperament and mindset of the 
PRC censors.  The CPC regime rejects criticism, any mention of past errors and any 
depiction of scandal about China.  They are also scared of the ‘transdiscursive’, or 
overarching, effect that certain films may bring about so that they prefer silencing 
those films.  All in all, the PRC is a country where politics is always placed higher 
than human liberty.   
Since the implementation of CEPA, the number of Mainland-HK co-produced 
films has been increasing each year.  In 2009, fifteen out of the totally forty-eight 
Hong Kong films released in Hong Kong were Mainland-HK co-productions, and it 
was thirty out of fifty-six in 2010 and thirty-eight out of sixty in 2011 (cited in Today 
Literary Magazine 2012: 81).  It is a matter of fact that CEPA does provide the 
Hong Kong film industry with access to the booming Chinese Mainland market.  
But, at one level, Hong Kong filmmakers are lured to make films which are relevant 
to the Chinese Mainland (see the PRC authorities’ principle of ‘based on me 
principally’ mentioned earlier), and at another, in order to cope with the Chinese 
Mainland market, the Hong Kong film industry gradually turns to catering to the 
taste of Mainland audiences instead of Hong Kong audiences.  Both are at the 
expense of the identity of Hong Kong cinema and the integrity of Hong Kong 
filmmakers.  At the same time, the Chinese Government blacklists any filmmaker 
who badmouths or acts against the PRC and the CPC.  It does so without any public 
announcement, but by means of a boycott advocated by the ‘fifty cents party’.  The 
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effect is to make the filmmaker unemployable in any Mainland-HK co-production as 
happened, for example, to the Hong Kong actor Chapman To in 2014.  In the light 
of such phenomena, CEPA is not simply a trading arrangement, but also a politcal 
move to extend the PRC’s governance over Hong Kong filmmakers.  It is a bond 
that ties Hong Kong filmmakers and the PRC censorship together as well as being a 
‘colonizing instrument’ making Hong Kong filmmakers succumb to the censorship 
system of the Chinese Mainland, self-censor their creative works, discipline 
themselves and transform themselves into Chinese Mainlanders.  It can be seen 
from CEPA that the actual realization of censorship today has gone beyond the 
conventional definition of censorship.  Recapping Sue Curry Jansen’s definition of 
censorship mentioned in Chapter 1: 
The term [censorship] encompasses all socially structured proscriptions 
or prescriptions which inhibit or prohibit dissemination of ideas, 
information, images and other messages through a society’s channels of 
communication whether these obstructions are secured by political, 
economic, religious, or other systems of authority.  It includes both 
overt and covert proscriptions and prescriptions.  (1991: 221) 
In short, by means of CEPA, together with Mainland-HK co-production, Beijing is 
able to suppress Hong Kong filmmakers’ freedom of expression with its power, tame 
Hong Kong filmmakers with the Chinese Mainland market and buy Hong Kong 
filmmakers’ integrity with the promise of good box office receipts.   
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Chapter 6 
The Story of a Mainland-Hong Kong Co-Produced Film 
 
In the course of my career in the Hong Kong film industry, I have made a 
number of Mainland-Hong Kong (Mainland-HK) co-produced films.  Through one 
of them, The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake (Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin, 2011), I 
believe, I encountered almost all of the problems embedded in Mainland-HK 
co-productions.  However, the making of the movie constitutes a part of my study 
both empirically and ethnographically since I participated in the production as a film 
director, and observed and gathered data as a researcher.  Significantly, it illustrated, 
empirically, what filmmaking is under Chinese-style socialism and what the Chinese 
Mainland censorship means for Hong Kong filmmakers.  It was also an empirical 
way of identifying and understanding the problems of film production in the context 
of the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), 
and perceiving that there is a world of cultural difference between Hong Kong and 
the Chinese Mainland about what constitutes legal authority  
 
Why Film The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake in the Chinese Mainland?  
The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake is about the extraordinary life of a 
remarkable figure in modern Chinese history — Qiu Jin (1875 – 1907).242  Qiu Jin 
advocated the overthrow of the corrupt Qing Dynasty (also known as Empire of the 
                                                 
242 See footnote 241.   
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Great Qing) and was beheaded after a failed uprising.  Although she did not see the 
collapse of the last Chinese feudal monarchy, she is widely recognized by the 
Chinese populace, as well as the two governments facing each other across the 
Taiwan Strait, as a heroine-martyr before the Xinhai Revolution (also known as the 
Revolution of 1911).  Other than being a revolutionary, Qiu Jin was also a 
pioneering women’s rights activist, educator, publisher, poet and writer.  The 
making of The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake was no easy job, but it was not because 
of any difficulties arising from the making of the film per se.  It was because of 
external, contingent factors such as finance, government policy, the way we are 
governed, socio-cultural constraints and regulatory measures to control freedom of 
expression.  Luckily, the film escaped a ban on filming and public exhibition in the 
Chinese Mainland.   
I had been longing to make a biopic on Qiu Jin for years but could not secure 
any investors because the conventional wisdom of Hong Kong cinema is that such a 
historical subject is risky in terms of box-office takings.  Luckily, the year 2011, the 
one-hundredth anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution, provided a turning point.  As 
expected, there was a variety of celebrations and activities in China and other 
overseas Chinese communities of the world.  Given that the anniversary year was 
likely to have a special ambience, I opportunistically pitched the Qiu Jin idea again 
and successfully secured an investor in early 2010.  I then started working on the 
screenplay with screenwriter Erica Li and planned to start the actual filming in the 
Chinese Mainland in early October 2010.  The Qiu Jin film had to be filmed in the 
Chinese Mainland for, at least, two reasons.  Firstly, it is a period film with certain 
inevitable, predetermined, big scenes, which pushed up the budget to a sum that 
would make the Chinese Mainland market the only conceivable place where it could 
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make a profit; secondly, the Chinese Mainland provides filmmakers with various 
locations and scenery essential to Chinese period film.  Therefore, if we were not 
going to spend an awfully large sum of money to build the sets elsewhere, and if we 
were to pursue a realistic aesthetic rather than using an enormous amount of visual 
effects, filming in the Chinese Mainland was a necessary and essential condition for 
the Qiu Jin project.   
Nevertheless, filming activities in the Chinese Mainland are highly regulated 
by the Communist Party of China (CPC).  According to the latest “Regulations on 
the Administration of Movies” (State Council Order No. 342) promulgated in 
2001:243 “No overseas organization or individual may be independently engaged in 
the activity of producing movies inside the territory of the People’s Republic of 
China” (Ministry of Culture, Article 18; emphasis added).  Therefore, in order to 
make the Qiu Jin film possible, the anchor investor, National Arts Film Production 
Limited of Hong Kong, had to produce the film jointly with a Chinese Mainland 
company.  National Arts got Xian Mei-Ya Culture Communication Limited as its 
Chinese Mainland counterpart.244  Thus, the project fell into the category of a joint 
production in accordance with “Order No. 31” of the State Administration of Radio, 
Film and Television (SARFT) under the State Council of the Central People’s 
Government (Chinese Government or Central Government), that is, “The Provisions 
on the Administration of Chinese-foreign Cooperative Production of Films” 
                                                 
243 Government bodies in this chapter are of the PRC unless otherwise indicated.  All the laws 
and regulations of the PRC are originally in Chinese.  There is no unified archive of official English 
translation available.  Inconsistent (e.g., the use of Sino-foreign and Chinese-foreign, provisions and 
measures, order and decree, etc.) and expired English versions are documented in scattered official and 
unofficial databases.  The English translations cited in this text are selected from databases of various 
official and law-related academic institutions.  The Chinese Government states that, in any case of 
discrepancy, the Chinese version shall prevail.  When no authoritative English translation is accessible, 
translations are by the writer as indicated. 
 
244 Xian Mei-Ya is a company set up in Shaanxi province. 
 
287 
promulgated on 6 July 2004.245  Article 7 of it also states: “Foreign work units or 
individuals may not produce films independently in China without approval.”  
Article 5 of the provisions supposes that the Chinese and foreign parties jointly 
invest (in the form of capital, labour or physical objects), co-produce and share the 
benefits and risks of film production (Ningbo Bureau of Culture Radio & TV, Press 
and Publication 27 April 2011) (see also Chapter 5).  However, National Arts was, 
in fact, the sole investor and producer of the Qiu Jin project and the Chinese party 
was just a nominal partner which served as an agent for National Arts. 
 
Obtaining the ‘License for Producing A Movie’ – An Eleven-Month Process 
After securing an investor and having the screenplay done, I started the 
application for filming in the Chinese Mainland.  According to Article 19 of the 
“Regulations on the Administration of Movies” (2001): 
With respect to the production of movies through Sino-foreign 
cooperation, the Chinese cooperator shall propose an application for 
project initiation [lixiang] in advance to the administrative department 
for radio, movie and television under the State Council.  The 
administrative department for radio, movie and television under the 
State Council shall, after soliciting opinions from the relevant 
departments, issue a one-off “License for Producing Movies through 
Sino-foreign Cooperation” to the applicant who is examined to be 
qualified.  (Ministry of Culture n.d.) 
Furthermore, “The Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and 
the Administration of Films, 2006” (SARFT Order No. 52) states: 
                                                 
245 SARFT was established in June 1998 by reorganizing the Ministry of Radio, Film and 
Television.  In March 2013, SARFT merged with the General Administration of Press and Publication 
to form the State Administration of Press and Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT). 
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Article 2  The State implements a system of archival filing of film 
scripts (abstracts) and examination of films.  The film scripts 
(abstracts) that have not been put in the archival files shall not be shot 
into films.   
Article 7  The procedures for archival filing of a film script 
(abstract): 
(1) The film production entity puts forward an application for archival 
filing to the SARFT or the provincial administrative department of 
radio, film and television that implements the territorial censorship; 
and 
(2) The SARFT or the provincial administrative department of radio, 
film and television that implements the territorial censorship issues 
a Return Receipt on Archival Filing of Film Script (Abstract) within 
the time limit prescribed in the Administrative License Law . . . . 
If the administrative department of radio, film and television has 
not put forward opinions within 20 working days, the film 
production entity can shoot the film on the basis of the film script 
(abstract) that is put on archives. 
If the administrative department of radio, film and television has the 
opinions for alteration of the film script (abstract) that is put on 
archives or does not agree to shoot the film, it shall notify the film 
production entity in written form within 20 working days. 
If it is necessary to invite other relevant administrative departments 
and experts to appraise the film script, 20 working days shall be 
prolonged, and the administrative department of radio, film and 
television shall notify it to the film production entity in written form.  
(Peking University Center for Legal Information)  
I called the Qiu Jin film Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin (it did not have an official 
English title at that time) and accordingly submitted the screenplay and other 
necessary documents to the authority for the application of project initiation via Xian 
Mei-Ya in early May 2010.  However, the submission was at a time when new 
policy was about to come into force making the subsequent process go far beyond 
the time frame stated in the provisions.   
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On 24 February 2011, SARFT issued the “Notice on Improving and 
Perfecting Archival Filing of Screenplays (Abstracts) and Film Examination Work” 
(Guanyu Gaijin he Wanshan Dianying Juben (Genggai) Beian, Dianyingpian 
Shencha Gongzuo di Tongzhi, my translation).  The notice said:  
All provincial administrative departments of radio, film and 
television are responsible for archival filing of film scripts (abstracts) 
and preliminary film examination management work in their 
administrative regions, and establishing corresponding management 
organs and film examination organs, which are to be specifically 
responsible for reporting to the higher body and giving the examination 
results of archival filing of film scripts (abstracts), and preliminary 
examination of films and final examination of some films in their 
administrative regions. . . .  
This notice takes effect on the day of issuance.  Exceptional 
provincial administrative departments of radio, film and television, 
which temporarily cannot undertake film examination due to 
technological facilities reasons and so forth, are required to submit a 
written report, but implementation must take place before 30 June 2010.  
(SARFT; my translation) 
Before the issuance of this notice, SARFT administered the unified film regulatory 
system nationwide with the exception of Jilin, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Hubei 
and Beijing where the relevant regional departments and bodies implemented the 
examination of film scripts (abstracts) and film within their own jurisdictions.  
However, with the issuance of the notice, all provincial administrative departments 
of radio, film and television were instructed to be responsible for their respective 
regional film management works, including the archival filing of film scripts 
(abstracts) and part of the examination works.  On 10 May 2010, SARFT named the 
arrangement the ‘one filing, two examinations system’ (yi bei er shen zhi; my 
translation) for films.  Such an arrangement could be regarded as devolution of the 
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power of the Central Government to regional authorities although the final 
examination of project initiation and approval of major revolutionary and historical 
theme films, major historical documentaries and Chinese-foreign co-productions 
would still be conducted by SARFT.  The new arrangement was also prompted by 
the fact that SARFT had been overloaded with work because of the rapid expansion 
of the domestic film industry and the Chinese-foreign co-production of films over the 
past decade.  According to the “Notice on Improving and Perfecting Archival Filing 
of Screenplays (Abstracts) and Film Examination Work”, the aim of the new 
arrangement was to provide a more convenient and highly efficient service for film 
production units.  However, it was, in fact, not so convenient and efficient in 
practice during its initial stage.  Taking Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin as an example, 
it took a very much longer time than before to get the authorities’ reply.   
On 3 August 2010, which was three months after our application for filming, 
we received an e-mail from Xian Mei-Ya.  The e-mail said: 
The Administration of Radio, Film and Television of Shaanxi Province 
already had preliminary examination opinions on the screenplay of Jing 
Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin; they classified the film as a major 
revolutionary and historical themed one.  Now we have to proceed to 
SARFT for project initiation application.  [We] have liaised with 
Teacher Zhong, SARFT’s official-in-charge of major revolutionary and 
historical theme film examination, and heard that China Film [China 
Film Group Corporation, a state-owned enterprise] has already applied 
for project initiation on the same subject [Qiu Jin] and has started its 
shooting.246  SARFT regards the two films ‘clash’ severely into the 
same subject and recommends us to give up the project.  (Personal 
communication, emphasis in original; my translation) 
                                                 
246 Today, ‘Teacher’ (Laoshi) is widely used in the Chinese Mainland as a respectful form of 
addressing experienced betters who are knowledgeable in certain fields. 
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Considering the announcements of various film companies, there would be quite a 
few ‘clashes’ in subject matter in this booming film industry epoch in the Chinese 
Mainland.  However, the recommendation of SARFT still came like a bolt from the 
blue because an authoritative recommendation is almost equivalent to an ‘order’ 
within Chinese custom and the conventional understanding of Chinese bureaucracy.  
Since we had planned to start the actual filming in early October, we had already 
signed contracts with most of the casts and crew and started pre-production work in 
Hengdian, Zhejiang Province.247  I read the e-mail over and over again, pondered 
over the matter and tried to interpret what the recommendation really meant.  
Before the e-mail, I had already read in the entertainment news that China Film 
Group planned to make a movie titled Qiu Jin (Sohu.Com 24 June 2010).  It might 
possibly have been that SARFT was trying to protect the interest of China Film 
Group, but this could not be the official, open reason to reject another project 
initiation application.  The only legitimate reason must have been that our 
screenplay contained prohibited material violating the Chinese laws or regulations, 
although I had already avoided all the sensitive and ‘risky’ content in the screenplay.  
Despite the fact that the recommendation might be an ‘order’, I instructed National 
Arts to write an e-mail to thank Teacher Zhong for kindly reminding us of China 
Film Group’s Qiu Jin and to affirm that we would like to go on with the project 
initiation application.  We got a prompt response on 5 August, requiring us to 
submit our screenplay to Teacher Zhong who would read the screenplay and 
                                                 
247 The order of the State Council on “Regulations on Administration of Movies (2001)” states 
that “no unit or individual shall, without permission, be engaged in the activities of [movie] production”, 
and “a movie production unit shall . . . be responsible for the examination of screenplay before putting 
into filming” (Ministry of Culture, Article 5 and 26; emphasis added).  However, it is a common 
practice of filmmakers to start pre-production work or even to start actual filming before official 
approval if they believe there is no significant prohibited material in the film they are making.  The 
common reasons for filmmakers to go ahead with pre-production work and actual filming ahead of 
approval include the availability of the cast, following a marketing strategy that involves catching a 
favorable exhibition schedule and an unexpected delay obtaining official permission. 
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determine whether or not it was similar to China Film Group’s.  If the two 
screenplays were found very much alike, SARFT would not allow another project 
initiation.  Fortunately, Teacher Zhong notified us on 17 August that we could go on 
with the application procedures.  Hence, Xian Mei-Ya requested the Administration 
of Radio, Film and Television of Shaanxi Province (Shaanxi ARFT) to continue with 
the procedure of reporting to SARFT. 
As required by Shaanxi ARFT, Xian Mei-Ya e-mailed us a list of materials 
which were to be submitted to SARFT for examination.  The materials included:  
(i) the preliminary examination opinion of Shaanxi ARFT;  
(ii) a report consisting of the intended film title, information about chief 
creative personnel, copyright authorization letter from the 
screenwriter, story abstract, scale of production, completion time of 
the screenplay and information about the production units;  
(iii) twenty sets of the screenplay and abstract (for relevant controlling 
authorities and experts to comment and examine); and   
(iv) a letter of consent from a family member of Qiu Jin.   
We had no problems with items (i) to (iii), but item (iv) did put us into a predicament 
because Qiu Jin had passed away more than a century ago and it was difficult for us 
to locate her descendants.  However, I was aware that China Film Group should 
also have had obtained consent from Qiu Jin’s descendants in order to pass the 
project initiation examination.  After some inquiries, the general manageress of Mei 
Ya Chang Cheng Culture Communication Ltd, a Beijing-based company under the 
same parent company as Xian Mei-Ya, claimed that she could communicate with 
some officials of SARFT directly and told us that China Film Group did not obtain 
any consent from Qiu Jin’s descendants, but only got a written consent from the Qiu 
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Jin Museum in Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province.  This sounded odd for we could not 
figure out if there were any connections between the Qiu Jin family and the Qiu Jin 
Museum although the location of the museum was once the home of Qiu Jin.  
However, since SARFT had accepted the written consent from the Qiu Jin Museum 
in the place of consent from a Qiu Jin family member, we could follow China Film 
Group’s example.  Thus, our production manager went to the Qiu Jin Museum.  
The people there knew well that we were going to make a film on Qiu Jin because 
we had visited the museum twice when we were doing research work for the film.  
Nonetheless, the person in charge said that he only managed the museum and was 
not supposed or authorized to sign any consent for such a project.  He also said that 
he did not provide any signed document for China Film Group!  We trusted what he 
said, but we had no intention of finding out who had lied, not only because it would 
not help resolve the issue but also because it might displease some influential persons 
and make everything worse.   
During our pre-production, we were in negotiation with the Hangzhou 
Government about a degree of collaboration.248  With the help of the government 
officials, we found out that the grand-nephew of Qiu Jin (the grandson of Qiu Jin’s 
elder brother), Mr. Qiu Jingwu, was living in Shaoxing at the time.  Our production 
manager and assistant director, armed with our screenplay, went to Shaoxing to visit 
the seventy-four-year-old man.  After reading the screenplay, Qiu Jingwu said that 
there were many problems.  He said that we should show more about the Qiu family, 
for example, by emphasizing that the Qiu family had funded Qiu Jin’s education in 
                                                 
248 In order to promote tourism of the city through popular movies, the Hangzhou Government is 
keen to collaborate with film production units.  They sponsored Feng Xiaogang’s If You Are the One 
(Fei Cheng Wu Rao, 2008) which had a scene shot at Xixi, and one of my films, All's Well, Ends Well 
2010 (Fa Tin Hei Si 2010) which had a scene shot at West Lake.  Since Qiu Jin’s tomb is situated by the 
side of West Lake, the Hangzhou Government was eager to collaborate on a Qiu Jin biopic whose story 
was relevant to the city. 
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Japan and helped a lot in Qiu Jin’s revolutionary undertakings.  He also criticized 
that some parts of the screenplay were not accurate and some notable personages 
were missing.  Last but not least, he expressed dissatisfaction about the 
characterization of Qiu Jin’s husband, Wang Tingjun (1879-1909), whom he 
described as ‘something lower than animal’.  I could sense that Qiu Jingwu and I 
had fundamentally different perceptions about an ‘adaptation’ and I had no 
confidence that I could convince him to share my view.  Moreover, I felt that he 
held a definite biased view on some people and some matters appearing in the course 
of Qiu Jin’s life.  Since I did not want to rewrite the screenplay into Qiu Jingwu’s 
version and did not want to give up the project, I wrote an e-mail to Xian Mei-Ya: 
Qiu Jin passed away more than one hundred years ago; any living 
descendant of hers is probably the third or fourth generation.  Even if 
we can get a written consent from one of her descendants, it does not 
imply a collective consent of all the descendants.  There is still a 
chance that any one of the other descendants may oppose the 
production of such a movie.  Therefore, a written consent from one 
descendant does not seem conclusive and it is difficult and not feasible 
to find out and then identify all the living descendants who are living in 
different parts of China and abroad to concur.  In addition, some of the 
descendants may not be willing to show up or to follow up on any later 
issues derived from the consent. 
Recently, the government of Shaoxing supported and sponsored a 
musical play about Qiu Jin as a celebration event of the one-hundredth 
anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution.  The play has no consent from 
any descendant of Qiu Jin.  A Shaoxing government official told me 
that no descendants of Qiu Jin would oppose a play extolling their 
ancestor. 
The Qiu Jin project has got support from the governments of 
Hangzhou and Shaoxing.  They even asked us to speed up the 
production.  We sincerely hope that SARFT can waive the 
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requirement of consent from any Qiu Jin family member so that a 
patriotic film can be realized.  (Personal communication 24 August 
2010; my translation) 
Xian Mei-Ya forwarded my response to Shaanxi ARFT.  The president of 
National Arts also wrote an e-mail to Mei Ya Chang Cheng querying if SARFT 
would accept a letter of guarantee stating that National Arts, a listed company in 
Hong Kong, would be fully responsible for any lawsuits and claims for indemnity 
that might arise out of our Qiu Jin project.  Mei Ya Chang Cheng replied the next 
day that SARFT had to consult its superior about the matter.  By that time, about 
two hundred crew members, mainly of the art, costume and production departments, 
were working on the pre-production in Hengdian and more and more crew members 
were joining in as the planned schedule of actual filming was approaching.  
However, when we still got no answer from SARFT by 19 September, another 
obstacle came up — we received a call from Mei Ya Chang Cheng, telling us that 
China Film Group objected to our filming of Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin on the 
grounds that they had already filed a movie initiation on the same subject before us.   
China Film Group, as broached in Chapter 5, is a ‘special’ and privileged 
corporation.  It is the largest, the most comprehensive and extensive state-owned 
and state-run film enterprise in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  It has a large 
number of fully funded subsidiaries, proprietary and joint stock companies, joint 
ventures and a movie channel.  Its comprehensive industry chain, which facilitates 
film production, distribution and exhibition, makes it the most influential film 
producer and distributor in the country.  Its dominant position in the market has 
drawn criticism from other industry players.  Zhang Weiping, a film producer and 
partner of Zhang Yimou, once accused China Film Group of exercising its power and 
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influence to monopolize the film market, to restrict and oppress other competitors, 
and everybody was well aware of the problem of corruption (Yangcheng Wan Bao in 
People.Com.Cn 12 December 2009).  Zhang Yimou also expressed that it was a 
known fact that China Film Group was in a dominant class of its own and the abuse 
of its power was inherent in the institution (Tiantian Xin Bao in Sina.Com.Cn 18 Dec 
2009).   
China Film Group’s objection really drove us to despair.  But as Joan Baez 
(n.d.) once said, “Action is the antidote to despair,” and I wrote again, emphasizing 
five points: 
(i) Teacher Zhong of SARFT has reminded us that our project 
might clash with the same subject of China Film Group’s Qiu Jin.  
However, after reading our screenplay, Teacher Zhong, who 
supposedly has also read the screenplay of Qiu Jin, told us that there 
was no substantive problem with our screenplay and green-lighted our 
application procedures.  We, therefore, assume that our film should be 
quite different from that of China Film Group. 
(ii) One more company to make one more film to advocate the 
national spirit should always be preferred to one less in the market. 
(iii) The phenomenon of ‘film clashes’ is usual and is just an 
illustration of benign competition in a healthy and flourishing free 
market.  This has happened in the past and will happen again in the 
near future too, for example: 
 Films on Ip Man - Ip Man [2008] and Ip Man 2 [2010] by Wilson 
Yip, The Legend is Born – Ip Man [2010] by Herman Yau;  
 Films adapted from Journey to the West - both Soi Cheang and 
Stephen Chow are making movies about the Monkey King.   
(iv) Since China Film Group is producing a film titled Qiu Jin, 
we can compromise and avoid using the words ‘Qiu Jin’ in our film title 
if this helps resolve the issue. 
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(v) We have browsed the website of SARFT and could only find 
the approval of another Qiu Jin produced by Zhejiang Yue Opera 
Troupe [Zhejiang Yue Ju Tuan], but not any announcement about the 
project initiation of China Film Group’s Qiu Jin.249  (Personal 
communication, 20 September 2010; my translation) 
Coincidently, there was a news report about many more films with subjects that 
clashed published in Sina entertainment website on 19 September.250  I enclosed the 
news clip in an e-mail to Mei Ya Chang Cheng.     
Although we had still not obtained the ‘License for Producing A Movie’ (sic) 
in accordance with the “Regulations on the Administration of Movies” (2001), we 
took the risk of starting actual filming clandestinely on 3 October 2010 as scheduled.  
One week later, we finally received an official reply consisting of some comments on 
our screenplay and a list of necessary amendments required by SARFT’s ‘Leading 
Group for Major Revolutionary and Historical Theme Film and TV Production – 
Film’ (Zhongda Geming He Lishi Ticai Ying Shi Chuangzuo Lingdao Xiaozu – 
Dianying; my translation), a group composed of relevant controlling authorities and 
experts.  This was a piece of delightful news because the screenplay was basically 
approved and SARFT only required minor amendments.  In my experience, minor 
amendments often imply approval of the project initiation.  Usually, if all the 
amendments are complied with, SARFT will issue a license for filming in two weeks.  
As a matter of course, we complied.  Thus, I burnt the midnight oil with my 
                                                 
249 In accordance with Article 8 of Order No. 52 of SARFT, “Provisions on the Archival Filing of 
Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the Administration of Films (2006)”, SARFT would publicize the film 
scripts (abstracts) filing and project initiation situation at fixed intervals in its official website. 
 
250 According to the news clip, many upcoming films have found their film subjects clash.  For 
instance, The Legendary Amazons by Frankie Chan and Saving General Yang by Ronny Yu are both 
based on the traditional story of Women Generals of the Yang Family (Yang Men Nu Jiang); White 
Vengeance (Hong Men Yan) by Daniel Lee and The Last Supper (Wang Di Shengyan) by Lu Chuan are 
both based on the historical event of the Feast at Hong Gate during Chu-Han Contention (Sina.Com.Cn 
19 Sept 2010). 
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screenwriter to amend the screenplay accordingly, and sent the amended screenplay 
to SARFT the next day.  However, another unexpected problem came up three 
weeks later. 
One day, National Arts forwarded me an urgent e-mail from Mei Ya Chang 
Cheng.  The e-mail said that Qiu Jingwu, the grand-nephew of Qiu Jin, had written 
a letter to SARFT on 25 October, saying that we had not obtained consent from him, 
and had started the actual filming of Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin.  Mei Ya Chang 
Cheng passed on Teacher Zhong’s message, saying that SARFT had accepted earlier 
our request to forego consent from Qiu Jin’s relatives because they accepted our 
explanation of the difficulties and unfeasibility of locating her descendants and that 
no single descendant could represent all the descendants.  However, since Qiu 
Jingwu had already raised unequivocal objection, SARFT required us to get consent 
from him before we could go ahead with the procedure of getting a filming license.  
I responded immediately to the e-mail.  First of all, I replied that we were just 
working on pre-production and having rehearsals in Hengdian; actual filming had not 
started yet (this is the best I could say in view of possible severe punishment).  
Secondly, the screenwriter of the film, Erica Li, went to Shaoxing to approach Qiu 
Jingwu on my behalf as I had to carry on with the shootings because any suspension 
would mess up the production schedule and result in great loss to the investor.  By 
that time, we were about to move to Shanghai to continue with the shooting. 
Qiu Jingwu was difficult; he gave no rooms for negotiation.  As Erica Li 
told me, Qiu Jingwu just repeated what he had said before.  He particularly and 
repeatedly emphasized his acute dissatisfaction that the screenplay had ‘glamorised’ 
the character of Qiu Jin’s husband, Wang Tingjun, who was just ‘something lower 
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than animal’ in his view.  It seemed that he hated Wang Tingjun and his family very 
much.  Qiu Jingwu said that he would not sign the authorization letter unless we 
fixed and corrected the screenplay according to his instruction and direction, but I 
just could not accept the revision and amendments he insisted on.  While he took 
himself as the sole authority on any discourse on Qiu Jin’s life, I just could not see 
any authenticity in his view for several reasons.  Firstly, the screenwriter and I had 
carried out in-depth research on Qiu Jin.  Since information and description from 
different sources often varies, we were aware that we could not rely on any single 
statement or opinion as the basis for any single incident.  Whenever possible, we 
had cross-checked with different sources and materials to verify individual 
documentation of the historical facts.  Secondly, the image of Qiu Jin in the 
screenplay, and later in the film, was a composite constructed from our own 
understanding and interpretation and compiled by comparing different materials in 
different literature including standard histories and anecdotes, and the books edited 
by Qiu Jingwu as well, plus our own imagination and reflexivity.  Thirdly, I 
admitted that the screenplay could not cover everything due to the conventional 
limited length of a feature film.  We had just selected materials we deemed 
appropriate from a sea of data.  Such a screenplay could by no means be entirely 
factual, accurate or fully objective.  It was, after all, a creative work based on 
real-life stories and historical events, and a certain amount of adaptation and artistry 
was essential in order to achieve a narrative which gave a deliberately chosen 
perspective on Qiu Jin’s life.  We had our views too, and the screenplay was written 
to reflect those, but for some momentous matters and incidents, we had been faithful 
to history and humanity.  Fourthly, as for the character of Wang Tingjun, I had 
reflected upon the commonly accepted ‘truth’ and had historical literature and 
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evidence as the grounds for a more sympathetic portrayal of him.  In short, I held 
the view that Qiu Jingwu had a strong bias against Wang Tingjun and his family 
without valid or convincing reasons.  Last but not least, Qiu Jingwu had asked to 
meet me and the boss of the film.   
Since I could not reach a compromise with Qiu Jingwu, I had to seek another 
way out in order to get official approval for filming.  I searched for similar cases in 
the Chinese Mainland film industry as references and researched relevant Chinese 
laws and regulations.  I could not find out if there were any biopics which were 
forbidden or banned from filming because of opposition raised by, or having no 
consent from, a relative or descendant of the subject of the film.  However, there 
were disputes over a few biopics.  When Confucius (Kong Zi, 2010) was about to be 
released, an alleged seventy-fifth-generation descendant of Confucius considered 
some footage of the film offensive to the image of his ancestor after watching the 
trailer.  He issued a public statement requesting some cuts to the film, or else he 
would file a lawsuit against the film (Yule.Sohu.Com 12 December 2009).  
However, the film was not re-edited and no lawsuit was brought to court afterwards.  
My queries were: Does any law entitle Chinese citizens a right to sue someone for 
tort or defamation against a deceased person?  Will the people’s court accept a case 
of dispute over the rights of a deceased person’s reputation?  If yes, who has the 
right to sue?   
The “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Problems Regarding 
the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in Civil Torts, 
2001” states: 
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The people’s court shall accept according to law cases arising from 
any of the following infringements related to the death of a person that 
caused mental suffering to the close relative of the deceased, and 
brought to the court by the [close] relative for claiming emotional 
damages: 
1. infringement upon the name, portrait, reputation or honor of a 
deceased person by insulting, libeling, disparaging, vilifying or by 
other means contrary to the societal public interests or societal 
morality.  (Peking University Center for Legal Information, 
Article 3; emphasis added)  
Then, who is the close relative?  According to the “Opinions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the General 
Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 1988”, the term ‘close 
relative’, as applied in civil procedure, refers to spouse, father and mother, sons and 
daughters, brothers and sisters, grandfathers and grandmothers, grandsons and 
granddaughters (Peking University Center for Legal Information, Article 12).  This 
means that only the lineal blood relatives within three generations have the right to 
raise a lawsuit if infringement or tort against their deceased relative occurs.  Hence, 
it was no wonder that no lawsuit on the case of Confucius was filed; it might 
probably be because the descendant could not legitimately make a libel claim about 
the alleged ‘distorted’ image of his ancestor who died more than two thousand years 
ago.  Yet, in 2006, Ronny Yu’s Fearless (Huo Yuan Jia, 2006) fell into judiciary 
trouble.  A grandson of Huo Yuanjia, aged eighty-one at the time, sued the 
production companies for defamation against his ancestor and the tort of inflicting 
emotional distress because the film shows the massacre of the whole Huo Yuanjia 
family, leading people to doubt his identity as Huo Yuanjia’s descendant 
(ChinaCourt.Org 15 December 2006; NetEase 16 December 2006).  A people’s 
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court in Beijing verified the identity of the alleged grandson of Huo Yuanjia and 
accepted the case.  After the hearing, the court deemed that, although the film 
contained some inaccurate details with respect to history, the fundamental tone of the 
film still commended the patriotic spirit of Huo Yuanjia and showed the profound 
spirit of Chinese martial arts.  The film as a whole did not distort the historical 
status of Huo Yuanjia.  The court finally adjudicated that the film did not constitute 
any defamation against Huo Yuanjia (Yantai Ri Bao in Shm.Com 27 December 
2006).   
In recent years, it has become a common occurrence in the Chinese Mainland 
for relatives and descendants to call into question and protest about biopics.  After 
all, regarding Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin, was it not mandatory to obtain consent 
from a close relative before producing a biopic on a notable figure?  The 
Constitution of the PRC (Gov.Cn 14 March 2004) states that “citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, 
of procession and of demonstration” (Article 35) and that “citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the 
interests of the State, of society or of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and 
rights of other citizens” (Article 51).251  Legally speaking, as long as one abides by 
the latter article, he/she who enjoys the freedoms entitled by the former article is not 
obliged to obtain any consent of others in order to make a biopic even if the subject 
                                                 
251 It is a matter of debate whether Article 35 of the Constitution has ever been realized.  The 
Chinese Government has been persecuting free speech fiercely.  A well known example is the 
eleven-year prison sentence of dissident Liu Xiaobo and the imprisonment of many intellectuals in the 
wake of Liu’s winning the Nobel Prize.  Although the PRC signed the “International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights” adopted by the United Nations on 5 October 1998, it has never ratified the 
covenant up to the moment I am writing this.  Sidney Jones, Executive Director of Human Rights 
Watch’s Asia Division, notes that signing is only the first step to becoming a party to the treaty; it then 
must be sent to the National People’s Congress for ratification, but the Chinese Government announced 
no timetable for doing so.  Only after ratification will China be legally bound by the treaty’s provisions 
(see Human Rights Watch 6 October 1998). 
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is still alive, although strict, extensive and arbitrary censorship through a regulatory 
system are widespread across the Chinese Mainland.  However, if anyone’s freedom 
of speech infringes the lawful rights of others, or constitutes any torts against others, 
the victims can claim compensation or remedy through judiciary means, and that 
applies to the close relatives of famous or notable figures.   
A biopic (or any other forms of biography) connects three parties, namely, the 
director (the author), the film’s central character, and the audience including family 
members and descendants of the central character.  Disputes over the reputation and 
authenticity of the central character are always due to conflicts between different 
aspects, such as perspectives, points of view, frames of reference, focalization and 
positioning of the three parties.  However, the director and the audience are 
subjectively active (though may be influenced by others) while the central character 
is considered passive.  Disputes are also caused by discrepant understandings, or 
misunderstandings, or non-understandings between the director and the audience 
about what a piece of creative work is meant to be or might have been.  Even 
documentaries (which are, indeed, also creative works) can cause disputes because 
there is actually no such thing as fully and purely objective authenticity or truth, and 
that goes for the audience and the director (see Chapter 1 for Barthes’ theory of ‘the 
death of the Author’ and Fish’s theory of ‘interpretive strategy’).  When Ba Jin, one 
of the most prominent and widely read Chinese writers of the twentieth century, 
knew that an author was going to write his biography, he gave the author a free hand.  
He said, “Use my stuff to write your own work” (Xu, Kailei 2003, epilogue; my 
translation).  By so saying, Ba Jin, briefly but distinctly, elucidates his profound 
respect for the author.  He recognizes that the author is not a recording machine and 
that the subject of the biography is not the owner or master of the subsequent work, 
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but just its centre and the work is open to the interpretation of others.  In much the 
same way, any creative work based on actual events, real-life stories or people 
deserves a certain freedom that allows adaptation and artistry.  It also deserves an 
audience that will take a lenient view if the work deviates from individual members’ 
personal idea of historical ‘fact’ or subjective ‘truth’.  At the same time, all 
audiences have every right to appraise, comment, criticize or denounce a work, but 
not the coercive ‘right’ to impose any veto on its making or exhibition.    
Meanwhile, after drawing together the basis of its argument, National Arts 
sought advice from a law professional and then wrote to Mei Ya Chang Cheng: 
Mr. Qiu Jingwu is just the grandson of Qiu Jin’s elder brother. . . .  
He is not a lineal blood relative of Qiu Jin.  We have sought advice 
from Chinese lawyers; they hold the opinion that Mr. Qiu cannot 
represent the lineal descendants of Qiu Jin and her husband by law. 
We hope SARFT can clarify and define whom the terms ‘family 
member’ and ‘lineal descendant’ refer to when we are required to 
obtain the corresponding consent. . . . Lastly, Mr. Qiu said that our 
screenplay has many problems, but the screenplay has been regarded as 
having ‘no big problem’ and only minor amendments were required by 
SARFT.  (Personal communication 4 November 2011; my translation)      
I also wrote another e-mail to Mei Ya Chang Cheng to explain more: 
Our screenplay depicts Qiu Jin’s husband, Wang Tingjun, as a 
negative character created by the feudal society, but Mr. Qiu Jingwu 
considers our depiction of him is ‘too good’ and insists that we have to 
rewrite and portray him as scum, someone who is lower than animal. 
About the depiction of Wang Tingjun in our screenplay, we have 
historical literature such as Huiyi Funu Gemingjia WangQiu Jin Nushi 
[Recalling Woman Revolutionary Madam Wang Qiu Jin, Part 1, 1951; 
Part. 2, 1982] by Hattori Shigeko, Xiangxiang Shi Di Changshi 
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[General Knowledge of Xiangxiang History and Geography, 1935] by 
Tan Rifeng, and so forth as evidence.   
About the fund which Qiu Jin used for her pursuit of education in 
Japan, different historical accounts have different views — some say it 
was from the Wang family, some say it was from her sworn sisters, Wu 
Zhiying and Xu Zihua and others say Qiu Jin sold her trousseau.  Thus, 
in the screenplay, we do not say explicitly where the fund comes from, 
but Mr. Qiu Jingwu insists on that we have to mention it is from the Qiu 
family. 
 Qiu Jin concealed her revolutionary undertakings from her family 
during her lifetime because she did not want to implicate her family.  
After the execution of Qiu Jin, the Qiu family went into hiding in order 
to escape arrest by the Qing government.  The people who took the 
risk of burying Qiu Jin were Wu Zhiying and Xu Zihua.  Wu Zhiying 
lived next door to Qiu Jin in Beijing and knew Wang Tingjun.  When 
Wang Tingjun died, the Wang family wanted to bury Wang Tingjun 
and Qiu Jin together and Wu Zhiying did not object.  We can infer that 
Wang Tingjun was not that bad in the eyes of Wu Zhiying.  
The daughter of Qiu Jin, Wang Canzhi, was very proud of her 
mother.  When she was very young, she imputed the death of her 
mother to her father and changed her last name to Qiu.  However, she 
forgave her father when she grew up and changed her last name back to 
Wang.   
We have considered different aspects of the issue and concluded 
that we should not depict the character of Wang Tingjun in an unduly 
negative way if we do not have concrete evidence.  Otherwise, we 
would upset the lineal descendants of Qiu Jin. . . .    
The grandfather of Mr. Qiu Jingwu, that is the elder brother of Qiu 
Jin, passed away in 1909, two years after the execution of Qiu Jin.  Mr. 
Qiu Jingwu was not associated with any lineal descendants of Qiu Jin 
since his birth in 1936.  His knowledge on Qiu Jin is also obtained by 
research which is in no way more authentic than that of other scholars.  
We cannot figure out the reason why he is more authoritative than other 
 
306 
scholars.  (Personal communication 4 November 2010; my 
translation) 
On 9 November, we got the attorney’s letter from the Guangdong Good 
Comrade Law Office.  Other than further confirmation of the legal support 
mentioned earlier, the letter gives some more legal opinions favouring our situation:  
(iv) In accordance with Article 4 of the “Regulations on the 
Administration of Movies” and Article 4 of the “Provisions on the 
Archival Filing of Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the Administration of 
Films”, the right of examination of film scripts belongs to SARFT. . . . 
There are no laws currently in effect requiring film production units to 
obtain consent from relatives of the historical figure when producing a 
film about a historical figure.  In accordance with Article 15 of the 
“Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China”, a screenplay is a 
work protected by the copyright law; its right of authorship is protected 
by law and exercised by the scriptwriter.  The right of creation should 
belong to the scriptwriter. . . . Mr. Qiu Jingwu has no rights to compel 
the film production unit to amend the screenplay according to his 
notion. 
(v) We deem that the examinations of film scripts and films 
belong to SARFT but not Mr. Qiu Jingwu.  If you create and produce 
the film in accordance with the “Regulations on the Administration of 
Movies” and the requirement of SARFT, Mr. Qiu Jingwu will have no 
right to raise any unreasonable or unlawful requests.  (Personal 
communication; my translation) 
We sent the attorney’s letter to Mei Ya Chang Cheng and got a prompt reply:   
There was, indeed, no requirement of consent from any family 
member in the regulations for project initiation applications, which was 
why SARFT accepted the explanation of ‘could not contact any family 
members’, and let Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin move on without 
inquiring into the matter during the earlier stage of application. 
However, there is an exceptional case, which is, when a family 
member, claiming to be a descendant, initiated a contact with SARFT 
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after having heard of the start of actual filming.  This is the case for Mr. 
Qiu Jingwu who has formally reported to the higher official of SARFT 
in written form that Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin has started filming 
without authorization.   
So far, SARFT cannot ignore the written document and can only 
contact the production company requiring the production company to 
communicate with Mr. Qiu Jingwu.   
SARFT has no right to judge whether or not the weiquan 
[rights-defending] protest of Mr. Qiu Jingwu is reasonable or lawful, 
which can only be resolved by the production company.  SARFT only 
accepts two outcomes: 
(i) The production company reaches a consensus with Mr. Qiu 
Jingwu and has an ‘authorization of descendant’ sent to 
SARFT. 
(ii) The production company and Mr. Qiu Jingwu cannot reach a 
consensus and have to let the judiciary decide the matter.  After 
that, the production company can hand over a statement issued 
by the judiciary department, proving Mr. Qiu Jingwu does not 
possess the qualification of [lawful] descendant and has no right 
to raise any objection. 
Of course, the second outcome is what SARFT wants to avoid.  
SARFT hopes that we can settle the matter in accordance with the 
principle of yi he wei gui [‘to regard harmony as the most valuable’; my 
translation] and communicate with Mr. Qiu Jingwu, endeavoring to get 
an authorization letter.  (Personal communication 12 November; my 
translation) 
The meaning of SARFT’s words was clear.  One of the two ways to resolve the 
issue was already ruled out.  We could still choose the virtually excluded way, but 
this would be more risky and it would not favour our situation if we acted against the 
authorities’ will.  We were all in despair when it dawned on me — in order to 
bypass the regulation about getting consent from Qiu Jingwu, we could try to apply 
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for project initiation again, but with a different film title and all the characters’ names 
in the screenplay changed to some fictitious names, that is, we were going to make a 
‘fictional film’ which would appear as a work of fiction and any resemblance to 
actual persons, living or dead, events or locales would be entirely coincidental.  
This would be not only a reluctant compromise, but also a sacrifice and a shame.  
Although no one knew whether SARFT would accept this ‘trick’ or not, we could 
only try for we had no other way out.  After negotiation with SARFT, Mei Ya 
Chang Cheng asked us to prepare the related documents for a ‘new’ project initiation 
application on 18 November.  We took it as a last resort and proceeded with the 
‘new’ application.   
The ‘clandestine’ shooting of the whole film wrapped on 4 December 2010.  
While I was doing the post-production, I had an on-and-off discussion with the 
investor about how to resolve the discrepancies between us and Qiu Jingwu.  In 
mid-January 2011, we decided to talk with Qiu Jingwu again to make things clear to 
both sides.  Since Qiu Jingwu is a bad-tempered old man, our production manager 
called his son in the afternoon on 1 February and asked him to pass on some words 
of advice to his father: Mr. Qiu Jingwu has no legal right to raise any objection to the 
making of our movie, but in order to show respect for him, we would like to honour 
him as the consultant of the movie and render him an amount of money as his special 
remuneration if he will sign a letter of consent.  Qiu Jingwu called back that night 
and rejected the offer.  He said he wanted to meet me and the boss directly, but our 
production manager replied that we were too busy to spare time for the meeting.  
Qiu Jingwu then said that since he had no legal right to oppose our film, he would 
not support our film too, and he just hoped that our movie would not degrade the 
image of Qiu Jin.  At this point, the struggle with Qiu Jingwu seemed to be settled.  
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On 24 February 2011, we received good news.  After discussion, the 
Leading Group for Major Revolutionary and Historical Theme Film and TV 
Production - Film of SARFT decided that we could continue to use the name of Qiu 
Jin in the film title and as the protagonist’s name in our project initiation application.  
This meant that we did not have to disguise the film as a fictitious one and the film 
could be restored to its original intended appearance, that is, an adaptation of a real 
life story.  On 7 April, we finally got a license for producing Jing Xiong Nu Xia – 
Qiu Jin from SARFT, which was eleven months after our initial application for 
filming.  I gave the film the English title — The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake (The 
Woman Knight). 
 
The Road to Public Exhibitions 
The Chinese Government implements a double licensing system based on an 
examination scheme to regulate movies.  According to the “Regulations on the 
Administration of Movies, 2001”, after obtaining the ‘License for Producing A 
Movie’ (sic), finished movies have to be examined and adopted by the movie 
examination institution of SARFT under the State Council before any public 
exhibition inside or outside the PRC territory.  The examination of movies consists 
of two levels — the content examination and the technical examination.  The 
former examines movies to see if there is any prohibited content.  “The specific 
measures shall be decided by the administrative department for radio, movie and 
television under the State Council” (Article 26).  The technical examination 
examines whether the technical quality of any movie is in conformity with the State 
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standards (see Chapter 5).  If a movie is examined and qualifies, SARFT issues a 
‘License for Public Projection of Movies’.   
Although we had almost finished the post-production of The Woman Knight 
by the time we got the license for filming, we were not going to submit the finished 
work for content examination too soon to avoid any suspicion of jumping the gun.  
Hence, we submitted the film in mid-June and scheduled a public release on 25 
August and a gala premiere at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.  We got an 
examination decision letter from SARFT on 13 July.  The letter stated that the 
Leading Group for Major Revolutionary and Historical Theme Film and TV 
Production – Film, together with the movie examination institution, had adopted our 
film with some required minor amendments.252  I amended the film accordingly and 
hurried it along for the technical examination.  Meanwhile, we were launching a 
promotion campaign.  
The day 15 July 2011 was the 104th death anniversary of Qiu Jin.  The 
producer (he was also the investor), the cast and I went to Hangzhou on that day to 
attend a media conference organized by the Chinese Mainland promotion team.  We 
announced that The Woman Knight was coming to theatres on 25 August.  We also 
went to worship Qiu Jin at her tomb situated by the side of West Lake, Hangzhou.  
A few days after I came back to Hong Kong, I read in a news report that Qiu Jingwu 
had raised an objection to our film again, knowing it was coming out soon.  He 
wrote to SARFT again, asking the authority to ban the film from all screenings.  
Together with his letter, dated 20 July 2011, he enclosed another letter from Qiu Jin’s 
granddaughter, Wang Yanhua, dated 3 February 2011, which states that Wang Yanhua 
                                                 
252 As to the film director, or the author of a piece of artwork, there will be no such thing as 
‘minor’ amendment if such amendment is enforced by coercive power external to the will of the author. 
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authorized him to handle all matters about the protection of Qiu Jin’s reputation as 
well as the related rights and interests.  No one verified the authorization letter, but 
we knew that Wang Yanhua was born in 1935 and was recognized as a close relative 
of Qiu Jin by the Civil Law of the PRC.  Her family emigrated to the United States 
of America (US) in 1992.  Qiu Jingwu told the media that he found Qiu Jin 
portrayed like an aggressive fighter and a gangster in the trailer of The Woman 
Knight.  He also said that he had read the screenplay in which Qiu Jin was depicted 
as a shrew and scenes of husband and wife quarrels covered seventy to eighty pages 
out of a screenplay of some one hundred pages.  He was angry because he 
considered that the film subverted the heroine image of Qiu Jin, was not true to 
history and had no authorization from him.  The media reported widely about this 
incident and Qiu Jingwu kept on making accusations about our film in the follow-up 
interviews.  I admit that the trailer contains plenty of action because of commercial 
considerations.  Conventional marketing wisdom tells us that a historical drama 
would not interest the general public, particularly, young people.  That is why I 
intentionally made the film with more action and packaged it as an action or martial 
arts film.  It is also true that the film had no authorization from any descendants of 
Qiu Jin by that time.  Other than this, I deemed that all the accusations and attacks 
by Qiu Jingwu were neither true nor valid.   
According to Mei Ya Chang Cheng, SARFT had a phone conversation with 
Qiu Jingwu on 21 July 2012.  SARFT told Qiu Jingwu that they had, unanimously, 
come to the conclusion that The Woman Knight was a well-made film which would 
boost Qiu Jin’s image as a martyr and that it would not mar her reputation.  SARFT 
also advised against his seeking a ban on the movie.  Qiu Jingwu told SARFT he 
needed to watch the film.  Hence, SARFT instructed us to communicate with Qiu 
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Jingwu again.  Two senior staff of Mei Ya Chang Cheng went to visit Qiu Jingwu 
on 28 July and invited him to watch the movie.  By the time they arrived Qiu 
Jingwu’s home, some news reporters were there.  Qiu Jingwu refused to watch the 
film and said he wanted to see people from National Arts.  Thus, our production 
manager contacted Qiu Jingwu at once and made an appointment with him in the 
evening of 29 July.  When our production manager arrived at Shaoxing, Qiu Jingwu 
postponed the meeting two times.  Firstly, he postponed it to 30 July and then 
postponed it again to 31 July.  When they finally met, there were TV news and press 
reporters again.  Qiu Jingwu yelled abuse at our production manager when he 
arrived.  He said we had made the film without his authorization and the film had 
degraded the reputation of Qiu Jin.  Our production manager invited him to watch 
the film and said that the film did not degrade Qiu Jin; otherwise, the expert group 
from SARFT would not have approved and adopted the film.  Nevertheless, Qiu 
Jingwu, again, refused to watch the film.  At this point, we knew we were not able 
to reach any reconciliation with him because he fundamentally opposed to any Qiu 
Jin films which had no authorization from him.  We also had a clear picture that 
SARFT still saw consent from Qiu Jin’s descendant as a way of resolving the issue.  
Since it was already August, there was little hope for us to resolve the issue in one or 
two weeks.  We decided to put off the release date of the film to a later time, cancel 
the grand premiere at the Great Hall of the People and drop all the promotion 
activities.  We re-scheduled the release date to 13 October 2012.  In the meanwhile, 
we tried to seek the support of Qiu Jin’s other descendants.  We tried our best to 
find them, especially Wang Yanhua who might be misled by Qiu Jingwu and did not 
know he had instructed us to depict her grandfather as scum and something lower 
than animal, something we thought she would not agree with.   
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The lead actress of our film, Huang Yi, was particularly concerned about the 
situation.  Her assistant, a girl from Wuhan, told us that she might be able to find 
out how to contact some Qiu Jin’s descendants who were living in Wuhan.  About 
one week later, we got the contact details of a woman, Lai Qishan — granddaughter 
of the son of Qiu Jin.  We knew this woman was also not a lawfully qualified close 
relative of Qiu Jin and did not know how she would respond to the film we made, but 
if she were willing to sign an authorization letter for us, we still had a little hope that 
SARFT would accept her consent as a defence against Qiu Jingwu’s opposition.  At 
around the same time, someone in Hangzhou had found the contact address of 
another woman living in Shanghai, named Wang Weici, then aged one hundred and 
three years old.  She is the daughter of Qiu Jin’s sister, also not a lawfully qualified 
close relative of Qiu Jin, but a family member who was more senior and had a higher 
position than Qiu Jingwu in the family tree.  We sent people to approach Lai Qishan 
and Wang Weici respectively.  Our production manager contacted Lai Qishan and 
went to Wuhan to visit her with a DVD of our film on 10 August.  She watched the 
film the next day and was so moved that burst into tears.  She said that the film was 
touching, loyal to history and had glorified her great-grandmother, though the action 
sequences were a little too exaggerated.  She understood that the action material 
was necessary to attract young audiences and that a film without any entertainment 
value would not be audience-friendly today (personal communication; see also 
ChinaNews.Com 20 Sept 2011).  She agreed to sign an authorization letter for us, to 
attend the premiere and to be the ‘honour consultant’ of the film.  Good news also 
came from Shanghai.  Wang Weici and her daughter, Yang Wen (granddaughter of 
Qiu Jin’s sister), were happy to hear that someone had made a film about Qiu Jin.  
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Though Wang Weici had not watched the film, she was willing to write a holograph 
of congratulatory message for us.    
Left:  The original poster of The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake with the original release 
date - 25Aug 2011. 
Right: The authorization letter by Lai Qishan. 
On 2 September, the media reported that Wang Yanhua was very worried 
about Qiu Jin’s male attire and the action footage which she saw in the trailers of our 
film, and that she had written a letter to Premier Wen Jiabao to express her concern.  
At the same time, Qiu Jingwu also told the media that our film was a commercial 
kuso (spoof) as well as a low-brow, low-down and low-class production which had 
no respect for history (People.Com.Cn 2 Sept 2011).  We wondered if Wang Yanhua 
had actually written to Premier Wen Jiabao and, if so, how seriously the Premier 
would view the issue.  We also felt terrible about Qiu Jingwu’s criticism, but we 
chose not to defend ourselves via the media because we did not want to prompt a war 
of words which might embarrass and aggravate SARFT.  We preferred to contact 
Wang Yanhua.  Lai Qishan had her phone number; they had met before at a 
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memorial ceremony of the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Qiu Jin, held in 
2007.  After a phone conversation with Wang Yanhua on 3 September, Lai Qishan 
informed us that Qiu Jingwu had phoned Wang Yanhua many times since mid-July 
and had criticized our film severely and negatively.  Lai Qishan responded with her 
positive views towards the film and the fact that Qiu Jingwu had not watched the 
film at all.  Lai Qishan also asked Wang Yanhua if she had written to the Premier.  
The reply was ‘no’.  We then planned to visit Wang Yanhua with a DVD of the film 
to explain everything, but Lai Qishan said that Wang Yanhua did not want to meet 
strangers.  However, Lai Qishan had no visa to the US and it would take almost a 
month for her to get the visa.  We were running out of time, yet we did not want to 
take the risk of sending a DVD to Wang Yanhua by post because the film had not 
been released.  We sent her the screenplay via e-mail instead, but she was not 
accustomed to computers and could not retrieve it.  We then sent a hard copy to her 
by express mail, along with an invitation to a media conference which was going to 
be held in Hangzhou on 20 September, in which we would show the film to the 
media.  By then it was 8 September. 
We finally got the ‘License for Public Projection of Movies’ on 13 September, 
but also got an e-mail from Mei Ya Chang Cheng the next day: 
The Film Bureau [of SARFT] phoned us this morning and said that 
Wang Yanhua had, indeed, written to Premier Wan Jiabao.  The State 
Bureau for Letters and Calls has passed the letter to the Film Bureau.  
The Film Bureau paid much attention to the letter and has talked with 
Wang Yanhua via a phone conversation to validate the film with many 
explanations.  Wang Yanhua said she wanted to read the script and 
watch the film.  The Film Bureau hopes we can communicate with her 
as soon as possible and arrange a screening for her so as to ensure the 
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film can be released without any hitches.  (Personal communication 14 
September 2011; my translation) 
We did not know whether the Film Bureau had verified with Wang Yanhua that she 
had sent a letter to the Premier.  Since Wang Yanhua told Lai Qishan she had not 
written such a letter, it could either be that Wang Yanhua lied, or Qiu Jingwu faked 
Wang Yanhua’s name and wrote the letter.  Nonetheless, the letter was not important 
by then and we had to follow the Film Bureau’s instructions because we sensed that 
SARFT could withdraw the license if we did not appear submissive.  We sent a 
DVD to Wang Yanhua via express mail on 16 September in a state of trepidation.  
And then there was the e-mail from Mei Ya Chang Cheng:   
I told the Film Bureau that Lai Qishan had had a phone conversation 
with Wang Yanhua and talked about the situation of the film, but Wang 
Yanhua told the Film Bureau that the son of Qiu Jin was sterile.  His 
kids were adopted and that is why the Qiu clan does not acknowledge 
Lai Qishan and her siblings as members.  (Personal communication 14 
September 2011; my translation) 
Meanwhile, Qiu Jingwu, on hearing we had approached Lai Qishan for 
authorization, also told reporters about the sterility of Qiu Jin’s son, Wang Yuande.  
Qiu Jingwu stressed that adopted kids had no right to authorize any filming of Qiu 
Jin’s story.  I was shocked.  I doubted that Wang Yuande would have adopted two 
daughters if he were sterile.253  I could hardly believe a person living in feudal times 
about a hundred years ago would adopt a girl rather than boy.  I could not prove Lai 
Qishan’s consanguinity but the mere word of either Qiu Jingwu or Wang Yanhua 
could disprove it. 
                                                 
253 Historians generally accept that Qiu Jin and her husband, Wang Tingjun, had one son and one 
daughter, named Wang Yuande (1897-1955) and Wang Canzhi (1901-1967) respectively.  Wang 
Yuande who had ten concubines (some say nine) had two daughters, named Wang Jiadong and Wang 
Jialiang.  The latter had five children; Lai Qishan is one of the children.  Some sources say Wang 
Yuande also adopted a son named Wang Xiaomin (1925 –) and a daughter, named Wang Yulin. 
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Since there was not much we could do, we thought the best way to defend 
ourselves against Qiu Jingwu’s accusations was to let the film speak for itself.  
Therefore, we showed The Woman Knight at a media conference held in Hangzhou 
on 20 September.  Lai Qishan and her sister Lai Qixiang, Yang Wen together with 
her husband, Huang Yi, the film producer and I watched the film with the media.  
The film was well received.  The media people saw that the film was faithful to 
history and in no way disgraced Qiu Jin.  We also showed a video in which Wang 
Weici gave a brief speech to express her support for our film.  Lai Qishan affirmed 
her authorization to the media afterwards and asserted in great agitation that she was 
a lineal descendant, a blood relative of Qiu Jin in the direct line of descent.  When 
the news of the conference came out, Qiu Jingwu severely criticized it as a false 
authorization by a false descendant.  He asked for DNA tests on Lai Qishan, himself 
and Wang Yanhua (ChinaNews.Com 23 Sept 2011).  Lai Qishan and Lai Qixiang 
later held a media conference on 5 October, and, in some agitation, said that they 
were not the only ones who suffered from Qiu Jingwu’s defamation.  They said that 
Qiu Jingwu had drawn up a family tree in which he noted that the daughters of Wang 
Yuande were adopted and deleted all the relatives who might be a threat to his 
authoritativeness as the only spokesman about Qiu Jin.  In 1997, the year of the 
one-hundredth death anniversary of Qiu Jin, when the Lai sisters went to Hangzhou 
to offer sacrifices to Qiu Jin with their father, Qiu Jingwu did not acknowledge them 
and made a statement that the Wang family were lower than animals.  Afterwards, 
the cousin of Qiu Jingwu, Qiu Zhongying who was also the president of the Society 
for the Study of Qiu Jin in Shaoxing, wrote a letter of apology to Lai’s father.  The 
Lai sisters showed the letter to the media and stated that they would sue Qiu Jingwu 
for defamation (Sina.Com.Cn 5 Oct 2011).  Meanwhile, in order to undermine all 
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the Wang family members’ support for our film, Qiu Jingwu told the media that after 
the success of Xinhai Revolution, Sun Yat-sen granted a certificate of martyrdom to 
the Qiu family, but not the Wang family; therefore, it was the Qiu family who had the 
right to speak for Qiu Jin (see Sina.Com.Cn 11 Oct 2011).  He also dismissed Wang 
Weici by saying that her mother, the younger sister of Qiu Jin, was abandoned by her 
husband (ibid).  At this stage it seemed that the main effect of The Woman Knight 
was to incite an enormous family row. 
On 23 September, we were informed that the Film Bureau had talked to Wang 
Yanhua again.  Wang Yanhua had watched the movie and acknowledged it.  In 
addition, we received a notice from SARFT, dated 9 September, issued to all the 
film-related institutions.  The notice declared that The Woman Knight was the 
number-two film on the SARFT list of recommendations about celebrating the 
one-hundredth anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution.  It was finally released in the 
Chinese Mainland and Hong Kong on 13 October 2011.  Unfortunately, it ended up 
with disastrous box-office takings although it was generally well received by critics 
and praised by the audiences who had watched it.   
 
A Cultural Translation of the Story of the Making of The Woman Knight 
The above story was a hard experience for a film practitioner but it also 
provided a basis for an in-depth study of the harsh reality of so-called freedom of 
expression in the PRC, of which Hong Kong is a part.  That reality exists alongside 
the constant claims of the Chinese and Hong Kong Governments that the 
implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ policy guaranteed the right of 
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Hong Kong people to self-rule.  Despite the situation, Hong Kong filmmakers and 
the administration of the PRC are brought closely together by both governments by 
means of CEPA.  
In The Friends of Voltaire, Evelyn Beatrice Hall (2005: 199) summed up 
Voltaire’s attitude towards Claude Adrien Helvétius’s controversial book De l'esprit 
(On Mind or Essays on the Mind) in a statement which is always misattributed to 
Voltaire: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to 
say it.”254  The statement has become a celebrated description of the principle of 
freedom of speech.  There is another dubious quote, also attributed to Voltaire, 
which shares the same essence: “I detest what you write, but I would give my life to 
make it possible for you to continue to write.”255  This perhaps not-so-popular 
statement can be regarded as an eloquent defence of tolerance, as well as the right to 
freedom of expression.  Freedom of speech and freedom of expression are 
synonymous in everyday usage, but in the strict sense, the latter encompasses a realm 
beyond literal utterance.  According to the United Nations’ “International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights” (came into force on 23 March 1976), of which the PRC 
is a signatory, the term freedom of expression also includes “freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in 
                                                 
254 The first publication of The Friends of Voltaire in 1906 was under the name S. G. Tallentyre, a 
pseudonym of Evelyn Beatrice Hall.  “The statement was widely popularized when misattributed to 
Voltaire as a ‘Quotable Quote’ in Reader's Digest (June 1934), but in response to the misattribution, 
Hall was quoted in Saturday Review (11 May 1935), p. 13, as saying: I did not mean to imply that 
Voltaire used these words verbatim and should be surprised if they are found in any of his works” 
(Wikiquote 2011).  Voltaire probably never said or penned the words. 
 
255 The editor of A Book of French Quotations, Norbert Guterman, “noted a letter to M. le Riche 
(February 6, 1770) in which Voltaire is quoted as saying [the quote] . . . . This remark, however, does 
not appear in the letter” (Wikiquote 2011). 
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writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” 
(Article 19).256   
The story behind the making of The Woman Knight is an illustration of 
opposition against the principle of free speech and the right to freedom of expression 
under the peculiar governance of the Chinese Government.  In addition, in the 
course of events, I encountered an ethical dilemma because we started to conceal 
transgressions against the official provisions and demands, and bypassed the 
influential individual who was not in favour of us.  At the same time, the producer 
and I ran the risk of being punished.  I, as a filmmaker, was a semi-voluntary 
participant — on one hand I was voluntary because there was no explicit coercive 
power forcing me to initiate and take part in such a project and, on the other, my 
action was involuntary because if I were to give up the filming and distribution in the 
Chinese Mainland, I would have no other options for various practical and realistic 
reasons mentioned earlier.  However, I would like to make it clear that the rules we 
broke were just matters of procedure at the administrative level.  Content-wise, the 
film was shot and executed in a way that followed the official rules and regulations 
and the official orders to make amendments.  The screenwriter and I self-censored 
ourselves; we avoided in the screenplay all the ‘sensitive’ materials, perspectives and 
issues that might have been unwelcome to the Chinese Government.  For instance, 
                                                 
256 “The UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights], together with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols, and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, form the so-called International Bill of Human Rights” 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights n.d.).  China signed the 
“International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” in 1998.  “The US said the move played a part in 
its decision to drop an annual motion criticizing China's human rights record at the UN.  But some 
critics say the biggest change it represents is in China's handling of public relations” (BBC 5 Oct 1998).  
“Human Rights Watch expressed concern that China might attach ‘reservations’, or other exceptions 
known as ‘declarations’ or ‘understandings’, to some of the convenant’s most important provisions, 
including Article 19 . . . (The US attached more exceptions than any other party to the treaty)” (Human 
Rights Watch 6 Oct 1998). 
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during my research, I found that the revolutionaries from Zhejiang and the nearby 
areas were not getting along well with those led by Sun Yat-sen from southern China; 
however, I excluded this in the screenplay.  Also our screenplay did not touch on the 
Three Principles of the People (also known as San-min Doctrine or san min zhuyi) 
and the idea of ‘separation of five powers’ (modified from the trias politica principle 
of the West) advocated by Sun Yat-sen.257  As for the completed film, the 
examination officials asked for a few shots to be cut, which I thought as necessary 
and essential to the film as a whole.  Furthermore, the original version of the film 
included a song by Lowell Lo, but I was asked to remove it because it is supposed to 
be about the June Fourth Massacre.258  I reluctantly but obediently complied with 
all these requests, which were, in effect, official orders.  Even so, the obstacles we 
encountered had already landed us in a predicament.  Since no one knew when we 
would actually get the ‘License for Public Projection of Movies’ or whether we 
would get a licence at all, the publicity plan was disrupted and the promotion 
campaign was hindered because there was no definite release date.   
One of the hindrances in making The Woman Knight may seem quite peculiar 
from a liberal perspective; that is, the influential power of Qiu Jingwu.  There is no 
Chinese law bestowing on Qiu Jingwu the right to censor our screenplay, production 
and ultimately the film.  However, the government officials were concerned about 
his interference.  Why and how does Qiu Jingwu attain such status?  The question 
                                                 
257 The Three Principles of the People (san min zhuyi) are nationalism, democracy, and people's 
livelihood.  “The principle of nationalism called for overthrowing the Manchus and ending foreign 
hegemony over China.  The second principle, democracy, was used to describe Sun's goal of a 
popularly elected republican form of government.  People’s livelihood, often referred to as socialism, 
was aimed at helping the common people through regulation of the ownership of the means of 
production and land” (Rinn-Sup Shinn and Robert L. Worden 1987).   
 
258 The song is Qihei Jiang Buzai Miandui (literally Won’t Face the Dark Again; my translation), 
music by Lowell Lo, lyrics by Gene Lau and performed by Lowell Lo.  The song was included in a 
Lowell Lo album titled 1989. 
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demands some understanding of Chinese culture because film, as a content carrier 
and representation medium, is not being questioned by the authority alone, traditional 
culture also plays a dominant part. 
In China and for most of the Chinese, a significant portion of social values 
are derived from Confucianism (an imprecise translation of Rujia) which is an ethical 
and philosophical system derived from the teachings of the ancient Chinese thinker 
and socio-political philosopher Confucius ((Kong Fuzi, 551-479 BCE).259  
Confucianism has played a central role in shaping Chinese thought and culture, as 
well as in stabilizing the whole socio-political structure of the State.  It is the 
foundation of traditional Chinese morality, disciplining people’s everyday lives and 
governing social order during the long history of feudal imperial China.  Although 
it was overshadowed by other belief systems for several centuries, particularly by 
Buddhism during the Tang Dynasty, it still has a substantial and substantive influence 
on Chinese people today.  “For Confucius, unless there are at least two human 
beings, there can be no human beings” (Ames and Rosemont 1998: 48).  This 
corresponds to the Confucian virtue of ren (benevolence or humanness).  The 
Chinese character of ren is comprised of two parts, with the left side meaning 
‘person’ and the right side meaning ‘two’ showing that the word is about the 
interrelationship of human beings.  Ren is the core moral virtue and the totality of 
all moral virtues of Confucian thought.  According to the foundational text of 
Confucianism, the Analects (Lunyu; also known as Analects of Confucius), ren is the 
                                                 
259 There is no single Chinese term equivalent to ‘Confucianism’.  The term ‘Confucianism’ 
embraces a combination of the Chinese terms, namely, Rujia (Confucian School), Rujiao (Confucian 
Teaching) and Ruxue (Confucian Study).  Note that the Chinese ru, which literally means ‘scholars’, 
can also refer to a Confucian scholar or simply scholar in contemporary daily usage. 
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perfect virtue which primarily means “to love all men” (Bk. XII, Ch. XXII).260  Yet, 
‘to love all men’ in the Confucian sense is bound by a series of doctrines and rules.  
In order to achieve the virtue of ren, Confucianism puts the main emphasis on the 
self-cultivation of morality and harmonious human relationships by asserting the 
values of some key themes.   
One of the important key themes of Confucianism is xiao which primarily 
means ‘being good to parents’, the first duty of every person in the Chinese sense.   
The word [xiao] has been translated since the Jesuits in the 1500s as 
‘filial piety’, but . . . the term . . . denotes a subjective state, i.e. a state of 
mind, a state of worshipful piety, rather than an objective state, i.e. a 
way of conduct, indeed a whole way of living one’s life, as prescribed 
by the sages.  (Feng Xin-ming 2008)   
Xiao Jing (The Classic of Xiao), a work written by Zeng Zi (505-436 BCE) but 
traditionally attributed to Confucius, is the main source of knowledge about xiao.  
According to Xiao Jing, Confucius said, “The body, hair and skin, all have been 
received from the parents, and so one doesn’t dare damage them — that is the 
beginning of xiao” (translation by Feng Xin-ming 2008).  Nevertheless, the scope 
of xiao is not limited to being good to parents, but to ancestors as well.261 
                                                 
260 (i) All the translations of the Analects in this chapter are cited from The Four Books by James 
Legge (1900).   
   (ii) There are distinct interpretations of the Analects among scholars, and Chinese authorities 
interpret it differently in different periods of time.  Legge’s translation of the meaning of ren as ‘to love 
all men’ is not universally accepted.  Another possible meaning can be ‘to love men’.  According to A 
Historical Outline of Chinese Thoughts, Vol. 1 (ed. Hou Wailu 1980: 43-44), the objective of the 
Confucian love embedded in ren is not directed to all men.  Men are divided into classes in hierarchical 
societies.  Confucius further divided men into the junzi (superior man) and the xiaoren (mean man), 
and he opposed the latter resolutely.  He did not suggest any kind of universality for human love.  In 
Chinese societies where slavery was a legitimate institution and the commodity economy was not 
well-developed, it was impossible to produce the thought of ‘universal love’ which was later advocated 
by the bourgeoisie. 
  
261 Thus, the conventional translation of xiao as ‘filial’ is also imprecise. 
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Xiao, as prescribed by Confucius and Zeng Zi, is the very 
foundation of civil society itself.  While most traditional civilizations 
base their civil orders upon divine, religious commandments, 
traditional Chinese civilization has been unique in remaining 
throughout its long history basically secular and not dominated by 
religion. . . . [T]he imperative underlying traditional Chinese 
civilization has been the secular yet idealistic concept of xiao.  (Feng 
Xin-ming 2008)   
Xiao sets the foundation of the notion of Chinese ethics by extending the parent and 
child relationship to four other cardinal human relationships — ruler and subject, 
elder brother and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend 
relationships — altogether they are called the ‘five bonds’ or ‘five relations’ of 
Confucianism (wulun).262  Except for the friend and friend relationship, all these 
relationships infer one’s superiority over another.  With a set of precepts generated 
from xiao, such as loyalty, rightness, reverence, obedience, serving and so forth, 
everyone is assigned specific moral obligations to others based on one’s particular 
situation and position in relation to others.  From the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 
CE) “until the overthrow of the Imperial system itself in 1911, Xiao Jing has been 
one of the most basic, must-read classic texts that every Chinese who considers 
himself educated has studied” (ibid).  In the course of time, the doctrines of xiao 
have matured into an ideology on which the basic traditional Chinese worldview and 
core values rest, even though commoners have no firsthand knowledge of 
Confucianism.  That is why there are two popular Chinese sayings: ‘Xiao is 
fundamental to Chinese culture’ (Zhongguo wenhua yi xiao wei ben; my translation) 
and ‘Xiao comes first among all the moral behaviours’ (baixing yi xiao wei xian; my 
translation).  In the contemporary world, while Western culture, with its heritage of 
                                                 
262 Confucianism is androcentric and patriarchal and Confucius did not teach that all human 
beings are equal. 
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the Enlightenment, values the individualist system of contractual relationships and 
celebrates individuality, Chinese culture values the notion of family more because 
xiao, which starts from family and involves a highly ordered kinship system, still 
plays a significant role in Chinese societies.   
In the context of the tradition laid by xiao, Qiu Jingwu’s interference in The 
Woman Knight was regarded as an act of xiao by the government officials.  As 
mentioned earlier, SARFT once used the term weiquan (rights-defending) in our 
communication to describe his objection, which implies that SARFT considered the 
acts of Qiu Jingwu the duty of a descendant instead of an unreasonable intrusion. 
Xiao, in effect, had vested him with the right to censor our film.  When Qiu Jingwu 
talked to the media, his rhetoric was full of references to safeguarding his ancestor 
and that he was doing what a descendant was obliged to do.  Since xiao also lays 
stress on respect for and the superiority of senior members in the kinship system, Qiu 
Jingwu had to disqualify Wang Weici’s support for our film so that he could retain 
his right as the only spokesman and authoritative agent of Qiu Jin.  In addition, Qiu 
Jinjwu’s continual outbursts in the media had exerted a certain pressure on SARFT 
because he had the widely acknowledged xiao as his ‘weapon’, although Chinese 
Mainland netizens said that what Qiu Jingwu really wanted was money. 
Harmony (he) is another equally significant theme of Confucianism.  It is 
the ultimate goal of the perfect virtue ren.  Harmony is a highly valued virtue in 
Chinese civilization and is celebrated as the highest cultural achievement (see Ames 
and Rosemont 1998: 56-57).  Confucius lived in the Spring and Autumn Period of 
Chinese history, an era of constant warfare between neighbouring states.  His ideal 
was to bring peace and order and strive for harmony among the states.  According 
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to the Analect, another meaning of ren is “to subdue one’s self and return to propriety 
[li]” (Bk. XII, Ch. I).  In order to accomplish harmony, Confucius advocated li (rites 
or propriety), which is the basis of the rules of Confucianism.263   
Li are those meaning-invested roles, relationships, and institutions 
which facilitate communication, and which foster a sense of 
community. . . . They are a social grammar that provides each member 
with a defined place and status within the family, community, and 
polity.  Li are life forms transmitted from generation to generation as 
repositories of meaning, enabling the youth to appropriate persisting 
values and to make them appropriate to their own situations. 
Full participation in a ritually-constituted community requires the 
personalization of prevailing customs, institutions, and values.  What 
makes ritual profoundly different from law or rule is this process of 
making the tradition one’s own.  (Ames and Rosemont 1998: 51). 
The Confucian notion of li, with its embedded idea of ‘what is proper’ and ‘the 
fitness of things’, does not only point to the rites practised by people alone but 
expresses the social customs and culture-specific norms that are meant to govern all 
human relationships (see Legge 1900: 9).  Li work in an inseparable manner with 
xiao; they together suggest an understanding of political principles and every one’s 
proper position embodied in the social order.  They function to preserve the 
harmony of human relationships, and thus the long-term stability of society and the 
State.264  Confucius said, “In practising the rules of propriety [li], a natural ease [he] 
is to be prized” (Analects: Bk. I, Ch. XII).265  Under the widespread influence of 
                                                 
263 The Confucian term li is commonly translated as ‘rites’ or ‘propriety’ which is also imprecise 
translation.  
 
264 Another ancient Chinese school of thought, Taoism (aka Daoism), echoes this Confucian 
thinking.  According to Taoism, the traditional Chinese model of ontology is mutual harmonization of 
yin and yang in the Supreme Ultimate (Taiji, introduced by the Taoist classic Zhuangzi). 
 
265 According to my understanding, Legge’s translation of the term, he, here as ‘natural ease’ is 
more precise than the commonly used translation — ‘harmony’.  Even with the same Chinese term, 
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Confucian thought, Chinese consider harmony [he] the highest goal in all kinds of 
relationships.  Thus, the Chinese embrace Confucianism, hold li in very high regard 
and believe China to be a ‘country of courtesy and morals’ (li yi zhi bang; my 
translation).266   
Today, the leaders of the PRC always maintain at international occasions that 
Chinese culture upholds the principle of harmony, regardless of the fact that the CPC 
induced considerable class struggles and conflicts in the past.  Nonetheless, the 
official pursuit and realization of harmony today connotes the illegitimacy of 
resistance and struggles.  In the Analects, Confucius said, “There is government, 
when the prince is prince, the minister is minister; when the father is father, the son is 
son” (Bk. XXII, Ch. XI; emphasis in original translation).  This hierarchical 
sequence, from ruler down to son, is believed to be the basis of a harmonious society 
in Confucianism.  Li emphasize self-restraint and set the rules of obedience, 
submission and obligation.  They theoretically and then culturally legitimize the 
absolute power of the ruler.  Indeed, traditional Chinese culture, with its embedded 
tendency to harmony, has illegitimized resistance and struggles and has undermined 
the human rights of individuals.  Under the Confucian doctrines, a person who 
suffers for the sake of harmony in the social order is extolled as a good person, and 
any action challenging the authority is not in accordance with li.  This is the 
opposite of Western societies for Western culture values personhood — every 
individual is valued as a subject with human rights who is licensed to struggle for 
his/her inherent rights and to exercise his/her rights to resist suppression.  The 
                                                                                                                                          
Legge uses different translations in accord with specific meanings as it is used in different parts of the 
Analects.  However, I use “harmony” in the rest of the text to cover the broad sense of the term he. 
 
266 To be more precise, yi here means “one’s sense of appropriateness that enables one to act in a 
proper and fitting manner, given the specific situation ([Analects:] 4.10, 9.4, 18.8)” (Ames and 
Rosemont 1998: 54). 
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Chinese, specifically the government and conservatives, see protests in Western 
societies as signs of unrest which would be a sign of impending chaos if they 
occurred in Chinese societies (see Sun, Lung-kee 1983: 140-146).  The Chinese 
Government is now enforcing a policy of ‘stability preservation’ (weiwen) and 
requires societies under its sovereignty to be stable.  The problem is that it believes 
suppression and silencing are the means to harmony.   
As mentioned earlier, the SARFT official mentioned the principle of yi he wei 
gui (‘to regard harmony as the most valuable’; my translation) in our communication.  
We were ‘advised’ to communicate with Qiu Jingwu to resolve the issue and reach 
consensus.  In other words, the aim was to achieve harmony, instead of trying to 
resist, struggle, dispute or make racket.  Although it was Qiu Jingwu who was 
making loud noises in media, it was our ‘duty’ to ease his mind in the light of xiao, 
together with li and harmony.  SARFT also said that they did not want to see any 
lawsuit about our dispute filed in court, in line with the Confucius saying, “In 
hearing litigation, I am like any other body.  What is necessary, however, is to cause 
the people to have no litigation” (Analects: Bk. XII, Ch. XIII; emphasis in original 
translation).  For the Chinese, bringing a case to court always implies a conflict and 
a rupture in a relationship, which are against the principle of ‘to regard harmony as 
the most valuable’.  In Confucianism, harmony is also the objective of li.  Li are 
the key to resolution and the settlement of disputes.   
Literally, Confucianism is a prescription for rule of man instead of rule of law.  
The law is still not regarded as the best institution to resolve disputes in Chinese 
societies.  “Chinese social life was interdependent and it was not liberty but 
harmony that was the watchword — the harmony of humans and nature for the 
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Taoists and the harmony of humans with other humans for the Confucians” (Nisbett 
2003: 19).  Confucius said, “If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to 
be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no 
sense of shame” (Analects: Bk. II, Ch. III).  Confucianism differs from liberalism: 
Confucianism contains no concepts about individuals and emphasizes self-restraint in 
order to achieve harmony, whereas liberalism stresses the realization of the rights of 
the individual and the restraint of the ruler’s power by means of the institution of law.  
Significantly, Confucianism emphasizes the importance of ruling with perfect virtue, 
but does not offer any definitive guidance about poor or bad rulers.  The Analects 
only warns, “In serving a prince, frequent remonstrances lead to disgrace.  Between 
friends, frequent reproofs make the friendship distant” (Bk. IV, Ch. XXVI).  By the 
doctrines of li and the notion of loyalty generated from xiao, people must obey the 
ruler even though the ruler is wrong or bad.  Under the influence of Confucianism, 
there is hardly a hero or heroine who fought for the rights of individuals in Chinese 
history, and Qiu Jin was one of the rare examples.  Chinese history eulogizes people 
who devoted their lives to the ruler or to the state.  In short, Confucianism is not a 
philosophy of human rights, but one that aims to set society and the state in order.  
It constructs hierarchical politics which favour the authorities and the ruler (see Qin, 
Guoji 2008).   
Interestingly, even though Confucianism is so deeply rooted in the minds of 
Chinese people and has been so influential, it has been criticized severely by those in 
authority since the establishment of the PRC. 
One of the more recent ironies regarding the Analects occurred during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in which China’s political 
leadership tried to erase the country’s cultural past.  The 
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‘Anti-Confucius Campaign’ (pikong) orchestrated a nationwide 
critique of Confucius that had the entire literate Chinese population 
studying the Analects in order to call it into question — a strategy that 
did more to reauthorize this classic than to stem its influence.  (Ames 
and Rosemont 1998: 17-18)   
However, there are signs in recent years that the Chinese Government is trying to 
revive Confucianism as the official State ideology.  The erection of a 
nine-and-a-half-meter-tall statue of Confucius at Tiananmen Square on 12 January 
2011 is an indication of its efforts (see IfengCom 25 Jan 2011).  The award of the 
Confucius Peace Prize, China’s first-ever peace prize is another sign although also, 
apparently, a move to counter the Norwegian Nobel committees’ decision to confer 
the Nobel Peace Prize on the imprisoned Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo who was 
charged with inciting subversion.  However, the Chinese Government has denied 
any connection to the Confucius Peace Prize, and “Tan [the chairman of the awards 
committee] declined to give details about his group — other than saying it is a 
non-government organization — or how the five-judge awards committee operated” 
(see CNN.Com 8 Dec 2010).267  Overall, it appears that government officials today 
are abiding by Confucianism.   
China is in fact a country on its way to recapturing and 
rearticulating the Confucian moral and political commitments that lie at 
the foundations of Chinese culture . . . . 
 [Jiang Qing] proposes that contemporary Confucians draw on the 
rich resources of political Confucianism in order to build modern 
                                                 
267 The Confucius Peace Prize (2010) was handed out just one day before the handing out of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to the absent Liu Xiaobo, but the laureate of the Confucius Peace Prize, former 
Taiwanese vice president Lian Shen, was absent from the award ceremony too. 
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Confucian political institutions that can serve as an alternative to 
Western liberal democracy.268  (Fan, Ruiping 2011: 1, 4) 
But, why this alternative?  Although written in 1959, a time when the US and the 
PRC were embroiled in the tensions emanating from the Cold War, prominent 
American historian of China John K. Fairbank’s words could be a well description of 
the PRC policy today: 
That Confucian ideas persist in the minds of Chinese politicians today 
should not surprise us.  Confucianism began as a means of bringing 
social order out of the chaos of a period of warring states.  It has been a 
philosophy of status and obedience according to status, and 
consequently a ready tool for autocracy and bureaucracy whenever they 
have flourished.  (Cited in Schurmann and Schell 1977: 48) 
Such a courageous and self-sacrificing national martyr as Qiu Jin is 
undoubtedly a historical figure in the public mind.  However, the CPC lays 
considerable stress on a ‘correct’ historical view adhering to the party line.  An 
official narrative of modern Chinese history, albeit concise and amended four times 
during the past thirty years, can be found in the “Preamble” of the Constitution.  
Under the CPC’s materialist conception of history, there is a close link between the 
‘historical’ and the ‘political’; ideas and views that diverge from the party line are 
considered undesirable.  Liberal thought sanctions discussion, comment, criticism, 
evaluation, re-evaluation and even making fun of public political figures, but that is 
not the case in the Chinese Mainland.  Political figures, particularly leaders of the 
CPC past and present, as well as controversial incidents in contemporary Chinese 
history, are not open for public discussion, comment or criticism.  To do so always 
means facing the risk of a criminal charge.  Talking about political figures and any 
                                                 
268 Here, Jiang Qing is a scholar of Confucianism, not the last wife of Mao Zedong although the 
two have the same spelling in pinyin. 
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issues related to revolution is always questionable.  Hence, it is not surprising that 
The Woman Knight was also questionable and fell into the category of ‘major 
revolutionary and historical theme films’ which involved the examination of a 
specialist group.  Nevertheless, the story of the making of The Woman Knight 
illustrates that a decision by SARFT may not be final.   
On 26 August 2011, film director Feng Xiaogang delivered a speech in a 
session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference:269 
Film is an industrial product that carries content, in which creation is 
cardinal.  Accompanying the flourishing growth of the Chinese film 
industry is the growing concern of all circles in society.  Criticism of 
film is getting more and more incisive, and unwarranted accusations are 
coming from all walks of life, among which there is too much 
misinterpretation without real understanding as well as negative 
associations.  The phenomenon of unreasonable conjectures, 
bludgeoning and labelling filmmakers is emerging in an endless stream.  
An unverified internal reference, public sentiment about an extract, a 
spoof on the internet or a critique from an irresponsible entertainment 
reporter, all can lead to instruction from official leaders of different 
levels and thereby subvert the legal examination result obtained 
through proper procedures.  All this results in a peculiar 
phenomenon — the Film Bureau examines films, and everyone 
examines the Film Bureau.  (News.Mtime.Com 30 Aug 2011; my 
translation) 
Feng Xiaogang unambiguously described what was happening to the Chinese 
Mainland film industry and, in so doing, helped to explain the real story of the 
                                                 
269 The Constitution of the PRC states: “The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 
a broadly based representative organization of the united front which has played a significant historical 
role, will play a still more important role in the country’s political and social life, in promoting 
friendship with other countries and in the struggle for socialist modernization and for the reunification 
and unity of the country” (Gov.Cn 2004).  
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making of The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake, a Mainland-HK joint production 
promoted by CEPA but placed under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government’s 
film administration body.  Making film was, in short, all about how a peculiar style 
of censorship operates under an autocratic regime in a Chinese way and in the 
context of Chinese-style socialism. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
In the previous chapters, I have attempted to map out the trajectories of the 
evolution and transformation of the film censorship system in Hong Kong from the 
early stages of Hong Kong cinema up to and after the sovereignty change in 1997, 
concentrating on political censorship and the effect of politics on film censorship and 
filmmakers.  Such a study aims to examine the interactive relationships between 
politics, political censorship, film production and filmmakers.  It also looks at how 
formal and informal censorhip affects film production, what effect politics has on 
Hong Kong filmmakers and how film censorship is covertly imposed by political and 
economic systems in the post-1997 era.  In this last chapter, I would like to 
conclude by making several important points under different headings as follows. 
 
Pre-1997 British Colonialism and Post-1997 Chinese Colonialism 
Hong Kong cinema has never broken away from colonialism — British 
colonialism in the pre-1997 era and Chinese internal colonialism in the post-1997 
era.   
When the British colonialists retreated from Hong Kong in 1997, it did not 
become an independent political entity like other former colonies of the world; 
instead it turned into the only one of its kind in the history of colonialism.  Before 
the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong took place in 1997, no one was sure 
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about how it would be governed and what the form of governance over post-1997 
Hong Kong would be.  However, the mother country of Hong Kong did not 
‘liberate’ Hong Kong.  After seventeen years (up to 2014), it is quite evident that 
the former suzerain of Hong Kong, Britain, has just been replaced by a new suzerain, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as Beijing’s governance of Hong Kong via 
the Government of Hong Kong Special Administration Region (SAR) is nothing 
other than that of a colonial master (see Ma, Kwok-ming 2004: 8-10).270  This is 
particularly true of the regime under Leung Chun-ying.  Leung, who took over the 
Chief Executive’s office in 2012, administers Hong Kong affairs in a way that 
mirrors the governors in colonial Hong Kong, but he does so on behalf of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC).  In addition, signs and incidents in the past 
couple of years, also show that Beijing is interfering in Hong Kong affairs in a more 
and more direct and active manner, mainly via the Liaison Office of the Central 
People’s Government in the HKSAR, in spite of the ‘one country, two systems’ 
policy.  The governance of Hong Kong has reverted to the closed-door, high-handed 
colonial style that existed before the 1970s.  It is marked for example, by the sudden 
increase in the high-profile arrests and prosecutions of social activists and dissidents 
over the past two years (up to 2014).  However, Leung overlooks, or simply ignores, 
the political maturity of his subjects, and that has led to the growth of activist groups 
that are radically opposed to government policies.  Recent examples include the 
conflict between the government and citizens induced by the North East New 
Territories Development Plan and the 2014-15 Budget. 
                                                 
270 For example, the consecutive government demolition of the old Star Ferry Pier in 2006 and the 
Queen’s Pier in 2007 were incidents manifesting the suppression of Hong Kong citizens’s collective 
memories of anti-colonial movements during the British colonial period, which echoed the typical 
cultural suppression of colonial rule.  For a more detailed examination about the internal colonialism in 
Hong Kong after 1997, see Yau 2010: 94-115. 
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In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping promised that Hong Kong would retain its 
established political, legal and economic systems for at least fifty years after 1997, 
and his promise was written into the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the PRC (Basic Law).  In these respects, Hong Kong is 
different from the rest of the Chinese Mainland.  Today, it seems that the pledge 
covered not only the pre-1997 capitalist system and Hong Kong way of life but also 
the form of colonial governance.  It is important to note that the meaning of 
colonialism cannot ever be reduced to a matter of sovereignty and, in fact, Beijing 
never mentioned the question of decolonization during its negotiations with the 
British Government over the Question of Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Today, it also seems that the ‘one country, two systems’ constitutional principle is 
also a synonym for internal colonialism, and that what the ‘special administrative’ in 
the ‘Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ refers to is just a kind of colonial 
administration.  In fact, the PRC has been practicing internal colonialism for 
decades before 1997, for example, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and 
the Tibet Autonomous Region, albeit it is a charge which the Central People’s 
Government of the PRC (Chinese Government or Central Government) always 
refutes.271  Perhaps, in the eyes of the Chinese Government today, Hong Kong 
people are also an ethnic minority (see Ma 2004: 114-120).  In his essay “Internal 
Colonialism and the Uyghur Nationality: Chinese Nationalism and Its Subaltern 
Subjects” (1998), Dru C. Gladney describes the Uyghur ethnic group in the PRC as 
“subaltern subjects”, which “are the very groups, individuals, and subjectivities that 
continue to be regarded as somehow less authentic, more peripheral, and farther 
removed from a core Chinese tradition.”  Such a description can also be applied to 
                                                 
271 For more about the internal colonialism in the PRC, see Gladney (1998).   
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the Hong Kong people under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, particularly 
when Hong Kong people are seeking and confirming their own cultural identity in 
the post-1997 era.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, the filmmakers who fled from Shanghai to Hong 
Kong in the 1930s saw the then British colony as a place of inferior, slavish and 
un-Chinese culture.  Fu (2003: 51-92) attributes such a prejudiced elitist view and 
the marginalization of Hong Kong cinema in the PRC’s official narratives to what he 
calls ‘Central Plains syndrome’.  There is no doubt that colonial conditions and 
experiences have made the Hong Kong Chinese a cultural and political ‘other’ to the 
Chinese Mainland Chinese.  Even though Hong Kong is officially a part of the PRC, 
the belief that Hong Kong has an ‘un-Chinese culture’ still persists and is embodied 
as an ideology in the Chinese Government administration.  Fuelled by the growing 
sense of nationalism which has resulted from China’s expanding economic power 
over the last twenty years, the local culture of Hong Kong is still being marginalized 
by the PRC authorities.  As Ackbar Abbas, in his Hong Kong – Culture and the 
Politics of Disappearance, puts it: 
[W]hile 98 percent of the [Hong Kong] population is ethnic Chinese, 
history (both colonial history and history on the mainland) has seen to it 
that the Hong Kong Chinese are now culturally and politically quite 
distinct from mainlanders; two peoples separated by a common 
ethnicity. . . . This has produced many instances of mutual mistrust and 
misunderstanding, with one side demonizing the other. . . . The Hong 
Kong person is now a bird of a different feather.272  (1997: 2; emphasis 
added) 
                                                 
272 Abbas’s Hong Kong – Culture and the Politics of Disappearance was published in 1997.  
According to the 2011 Population Census, 94% of the population are Chinese (ethnically speaking, Han 
Chinese) (Race Relations Unit, the Hong Kong SAR Government). 
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However, the two peoples separated by a common ethnicity have been brought very 
much closer together since 1997.  While the PRC is politically very much more 
powerful and possesses the legitimate right to use force when it deems the occasion 
demands it, Hong Kong people, being its subaltern subjects, are weak in both 
aspects.   
Colonialism is the extension of one power’s control over a weaker political 
‘other’ and, by its nature, always means the cultural subjugation of the colonized 
‘other’.  Hong Kong is under the internal colonial rule of the PRC, ergo, the 
subjugation of Hong Kong cinema is an example of cultural subjugation.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, in 1996, the Film Bureau of the Chinese Government urged 
that Mainland-Hong Kong (Mainland-HK) co-productions should follow the 
principle of ‘based on me principally’ (yiwo weizhu; my translation), in which the 
word ‘me’ (wo) refers to the Chinese Mainland.  By making that differentiation, the 
principle shows that there is an ‘other’ relative to the Chinese Mainland, and that 
other is Hong Kong.  The instruction carried on after the 1997 handover.   
The Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
(CEPA) measure also states that the plots or the leading characters of Mainland-HK 
joint productions of film must be related to the Chinese Mainland (see Chapter 5).  
The Chinese Government also prohibits film content from “distorting Chinese 
civilization and history, . . . disparaging the image of (Chinese) revolutionary leaders, 
heroes and important historical figures” and “disparaging the image of the people’s 
army, armed police, public security organ or judiciary” (SARFT 22 May 2006).  It is 
the authorities that decide whether or not a film is distorting, disparaging or 
reflecting the truth.  The PRC’s censorship is particularly strict with films which are 
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about the modern or contemporary history of China, or any Chinese historical or 
political figures, and those movies are specifically handled by a group of appointed 
specialists (see Chapters 5 and 6).  Such a measure indicates that, under the PRC, 
there is no free speech about history.  Only the official version is legitimate and any 
rewriting of history that deviates from that will be subject to the charge of sedition 
and a stiff penalty.  In its official capacity, the State Administration of Press and 
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television’ (SAPPRFT) forbids criticism and any 
mention of quite a number of episodes of Chinese modern and contemporary history 
in film so as to hide the CPC’s inconvenient past from the public (see the censorship 
taboos listed in Chapter 5), echoing the former British Hong Kong Government’s ban 
on the films about the history of colonization (see Chapter 3).273  Furthermore, the 
Chinese Government states in its provisions that “jointly-produced films may only be 
distributed and screened publicly inside or outside China after they have passed 
examination and obtained a Permit for Public Screening of Films issued by SARFT 
[now SAPPRFT]” (Ningbo Bureau of Culture Radio & TV, Press and Publication 27 
April 2011).  All these measures are typical of colonial governments’ suppression of 
cultural and creative industries. 
The banning of Mainland-HK joint productions of film that contain historical 
discourses that deviate from the official narrative needs special mention because it is 
always an important and characteristic task of a colonial power to implant collective 
amnesia in its governed subjects about certain episodes of the past.  “Colonialism 
[and the autocratic regime as well] creates pasts that need forgetting” (Mageo 2001: 
                                                 
273 The State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) was established in June 
1998 by reorganizing the former Ministry of Radio, Film and Television.  In March 2013, SARFT 
merged with the General Administration of Press and Publication to form the State Administration of 
Press and Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT).   
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5).  What the authorities want people to forget are the pasts that would embarrass 
the Chinese Government or challenge the legitimacy of the CPC leadership.  By 
banning the undesirable historical films, or preventing the production of such films, 
the Chinese Government can build another incomplete or inauthentic history of their 
own and create another collective memory for its people.  Such a false history, and 
collective memory, in turn help to construct ‘knowledge’ of the present 
socio-political environment favouring the ruling body.   
Knowledge refers to any and every set of ideas accepted by a social 
group or society of people, ideas pertaining to what they accept as real 
for them. . . .   
Knowledges are subject to these two distinct processes: they are 
socially produced or generated, and they are socially distributed. . . .  
Knowledge itself is a historical construct, forever changing its 
forms and the ways that it positions people within the worlds they 
inhabit.  Knowledges cannot be divorced from the historically specific 
forms of social intercourse, communication, and organization.  
(McCarthy 1996: 16, 23)   
For these reasons, and because film is an art form designed for mass consumption 
and simultaneous collective experience — making it a strong social generator as well 
as a powerful distributor of knowledge — the Chinese Government wants to master 
the desirable and, at the same time, restrict the undesirable construction of historical 
knowledge by film.  The most important task for the appointed specialist group 
responsible for the examination of ‘major revolutionary and major historical theme 
films’ is to identify if the public exhibitions of those films would result in any 
undesirable historical knowledge among the people (see Chapters 5 and 6).  When 
certain officially constructed knowledge, which can be false knowledge, matures 
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enough, it produces among the governed an ideology that is in line with that of the 
government, which is also the ultimate goal of the ideological state apparatus of the 
Chinese Government.  The CPC is much concerned with ideology because:   
Ideologies claim a position of privilege, a posititon that grants to its 
possessor a claim of universality.  Ideologies are absolutizing voices, 
passing themselves off as natural, as the only way of viewing things.  
All knowledges contain within them the seeds of ideological thinking.  
But some knowledges, because of their totalizing features and their 
ability to naturalize social reality, and to reproduce institutions of 
power, achieve more perfectly the status of ideolgies.  Ideologies 
succeed as ideologies by repressing the constructive function of 
knowledge, by hiding the social histories and circumstances from 
which ideas and systems of knowledge derive their logics.  (McCarthy 
1996: 7) 
Such a rationale is a significant feature of colonial rule, particularly when it is 
engaged in the censorship of Mainland-HK joint productions of films.  This 
explains why film, which is an ideology carrier capable of producing knowledge 
among the mass, is always under the special supervision of the ideological state 
apparatus of the Chinese Government.  The contention under colonial rule is: “For 
those with power [the colonists], collective memories can serve ideological purposes; 
for those without [the colonized], recollecting contrary memories can be a subversive 
act and one constitutive of class consciousness” (Mageo 2001: 3).  Colonial film 
censorship suppresses the recollection of contrary memories and the generation and 
distribution of those memories by film.  However, the contrary memories that were 
suppressed by the Hong Kong Government during the British colonial period are also 
taboo subjects of the Chinese Mainland film censorship which is imposed on Hong 
Kong filmmakers via CEPA.  Such taboo subjects include the historical incidents 
accounted in Chapters 2 and 3, for example, the seamen’s strike and the 
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Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott in the 1920s, the Double Tenth Riot in 1956, 
the Leftist Riots in 1967 and the Cultural Revolution that took place in the PRC from 
1966 until 1976.  Such sameness is not an irony because the transfer of sovereignty 
over Hong Kong in 1997 just signified a transformation of the former British colony 
to a PRC internal colony.    
 
A Production Theory of Hong Kong Cinema 
This study is also an attempt to develop a production theory of Hong Kong 
cinema. 
Technology has made the reproduction of a work of art much cheaper.  
However, generally speaking, film differs from other forms of art such as painting, 
literature and music because its production always costs a much larger sum of money, 
which makes it necessarily and essentially a commodity that relies on a wide 
distribution network and mass appeal in order to survive as a sustainable industry.  
Therefore, it is very hard for filmmakers to neglect the market, except in those states 
whose ruling regime monopolizes film production and takes film as a functional 
propaganda instrument, such as in the PRC before the implementation of the ‘reform 
and openning-up’ national policy put forward by Deng Xiaoping (see Chapter 5 for a 
closer examination).  In addition, filmmakers also have to avoid censorship 
problems and tackle censorship restrictions so that their works will not be banned 
from the market by the authorities.  Therefore, an in-depth cinema study isolated 
from the cultural and socio-political context, which is a dominant factor affecting the 
conditions of produtions, market and censorship, can hardly be a thorough one.  
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This applies particularly to Hong Kong cinema, which is a highly commercial 
industry rooted in a highly commercial city.   
Why is Hong Kong a highly commercial city?  It can be owing to mainly 
two reasons.  Firstly, during the British colonial period, Britain valued Hong Kong 
as a trading centre and an entrepot and encouraged business activities in Hong Kong.  
Secondly, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, because of the social and political unrest, 
the turmoil of wars and the Chinese Communist rule, there were several waves of 
migration from the Chinese Mainland to Hong Kong from the 1930s to the early 
1970s.   
Hong Kong has up to quite recently been a city of transients.  Much of 
the population was made up of refugees or expatriates who thought of 
Hong Kong as a temporary stop, no matter how long they stayed.  The 
sense of the temporary is very strong, even if it can be entirely 
counterfactual.  (Abbas 1997: 4) 
At one level, the refugees saw livelihood, a matter in close relationship with money, 
as the most important thing in the British colony, and, at another, they also pursued 
instant pecuniary reward and wanted to earn and save more money so that they could 
aid their family members in the Chinese Mainland and emigrate to another better 
place someday.  Most of them had no vision about their future in Hong Kong.  It 
was such a psychology and mentality that sowed the seeds of pragmatism and 
utilitarianism in Hong Kong culture, making the colony a city of transients that was, 
and still is, highly commercial.  In fact, since the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
PRC started their negotiation on the Question of Hong Kong in the early 1980s, there 
was a wave of emigration in Hong Kong that lasted for more than ten years, during 
which the June Fourth Massacre had prompted a peak of outflow of Hong Kong 
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residents in the early 1990s (mentioned in Chapter 4).  However, as the post-1980s 
and the subsequent generations grow up, they are more rooted in and see Hong Kong 
as their home city, and are culturally and politically more distinct from the Chinese 
Mainlanders than their older generations, but Hong Kong remains a highly 
commercial city as it is still mastered by the older generations in power.  
In Culture and Society: 1780-1950 (1983 [1958]), Raymond Williams 
examines, and makes sense of, a number of English literatures and the transformation 
of the common use of a number of English words by placing them in the context of 
the cultural and socio-political conditions during the Industrial Revolution.  Being 
enlightened by Raymond Williams, by contextualizing film production and 
articulating it into a relationship with its contemporary cultural and socio-political 
conditions, the production theory of Hong Kong cinema becomes a theory that makes 
sense of the relations between film production, film censorship and the film market, 
which are highly dependent on, and subject to, their contemporary cultural and 
socio-political context, that is, the relations between film production and its 
conditions of production.   
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, in the complex political context of the 
colony during the Cold War (as well as the cold war) years, the business concerns of 
the Hong Kong film industry and decisions of filmmakers were often read as 
‘political’ by critics, whether they were influenced by the colonial government or 
other powers, such as the faceless representatives of the friendly neighbouring 
territories.274  When later scholars adopt such a reading strategy by retrospectively 
                                                 
274 David Faure suggests that there were the major and minor cold wars.  While the major Cold 
War [with capital letters] referred to the contention between the US and the then USSR, which also 
included the confrontation between the ideologies of capitalism and communism, the minor cold war 
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judging and categorizing the politics of particular films and filmmakers, it also 
becomes problematic.  Taking the film producer Zhang Shankun (mentioned in 
Chapter 3) as an example, it tends to be reductionist to presume he was sympathatic 
to the Kuomintang (KMT; also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party), even though 
he was a renowned film producer of the rightist camp in the 1950s, during which 
Hong Kong cinema was divided into the leftist and rightist camps.  Back in the 
early 1940s, when Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese military, he collaborated 
with the Japanese to form China United (Zhonglian) Productions Limited and 
produced a number of entertainment films.  He was then accused by nationalists of 
betraying his country for the sake of personal gain.  When the Pacific War was over, 
he moved to Hong Kong and was recruited by Li Zuyong to establish Yonghua 
Motion Picture Industries Limited, but he left after two big productions, The Soul of 
China (1948) and Sorrows of the Forbidden City (1948).  In mid-1949, Zhang 
Shankun was financially supported by the leftist shipping magnate, Lu Jiankang and 
founded the Great Wall Pictures Corporation (also known as ‘old Great Wall’) that 
would become a major leftist film company in the mid-1950s.  However, after the 
CPC seized power over the Chinese Mainland in late 1949, he had never stepped foot 
in China because he was afraid of the CPC’s political liquidation, even though the 
Communist representatives asked him to join the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference in 1950.  He left Great Wall in 1950 and continued to 
produce films with his own companies, firstly the Far East Company and then Hsin 
Wha Motion Picture.  The latter set up branch office in Taiwan and co-produced a 
number of films with its Taiwan counterparts.  Zhang Shankun died in 1957; his 
wife Tong Yujuan was one of the founders of the rightist Free General Association.  
                                                                                                                                          
[with small letters] referred to the struggle between the CPC and KMT in Hong Kong [particularly 
during the 1950s and 1960s] (cited in Wong and Lee 2009: 5). 
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The founder of Yonghua, Li Zuyong is another example of the kind.  Both the 
Chinese Mainland scholar Cheng Jihua and Taiwanese scholar Du Yunzhi sees him 
as a rightist, but overlook his business concerns (see Chapter 3).  In addition, even 
during the politics sensitive era of the cold war, there were collaborations between 
the rightist and leftist cinemas under the table when business was concerned (see 
Chapter 3 under the heading ‘Filmmakers in Politically Sensitive Era: Left, Right, or 
Otherwise?’).  By and large, the socio-political context at that time just meant a 
business environment for Hong Kong filmmakers, in which filmmakers had to 
endure the rules and censorship standards set by the relevant political powers.  Most 
of them were essentially not stern leftist or rightist sympathizers, but adopted a 
politcal camouflage as a means of livelihood and to continue their careers in the film 
industry.  Indeed, both of the rightist and leftist filmmakers in Hong Kong rarely 
made explicit political propaganda films. 
Another example was the Hong Kong cinema during the late 1930s.  After 
the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, national defence became a main 
genre side by side with the entertainment genres.  It could be driven by the patriotic 
sentiment of Hong Kong filmmakers.  However, one cannot ignore the business 
concerns involved.  As the society was brimming with anti-Japan and national 
sentiment, filmmakers, particularly the producers, highly anticipated that national 
defence would be a genre widely welcomed by the people, especially when the 
earlier films of the genre had attained box-office success.  However, in 1939 and 
1940, there was a decline in the number of such films.  Other than owing to the 
tightening of the colonial government’s political censorship, Zhou and Li (2005: 
234-5) attribute the decline to the previously excessive releases and the commercial 
consideration of investors since the later national defence films could not attain 
 
347 
satisfactory box-office takings (see Chapter 2 under the heading ‘Chinese National 
Cinema vis-à-vis Colonial Censorship’).   
In short, the Hong Kong filmmakers, in the main, just went with the flow in 
politics as they sought opportunities to make profitable films and continue their film 
business.  Such business-orientation motive still persists today and has developed 
into an internal culture and a get-rich-quick mentality of the mainstream Hong Kong 
cinema, which, in addition to the economic and geo-political reality, make CEPA a 
successful institution that embodies the PRC’s film censorship (see Chapter 5).   
 
Reflection 
The world is changing rapidly; this is what I have profoundly experienced 
and felt when I was doing this study.  After researching on the relevant materials for 
a year, I started to write the first chapter (Chapter 6) in 2012.  In the course of the 
writing, there were new research findings as well as new government policies, affairs 
and happenings in both the PRC and Hong Kong.  At one level, I could not ignore 
these because I did not want this study to be too much lagging behind the present 
reality, and, at another, all these would constitute different views and interpretations 
of the past and affect the discourse of this study.  Practically, contextualization as a 
research method is not merely horizontal in its temporal and spatial concerns, but 
also vertical.  I believe that film, as both an art form and a commodity for mass 
consumption, mirrors the filmmakers’ response to the context of the era in which 
they are living.  However, given that I contextualize the past from today, there is 
inevitably an inherent bias because I cannot entirely escape the belief, experience, 
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knowledge and value that I have acquired and understood in the present days, which 
are not the same as those of the past.   
I have been trying to manage this study in an objective manner, but since I am 
a current practitioner in the Hong Kong film industry and there is emotional 
involvement towards the imposed film censorship, I admit that this study can hardly 
be an impartial one.      
Feminists insist that it is not possible for researchers to be completely 
detached from their work: emotional involvement cannot be controlled 
by mere effort of will and this subjective element in research should be 
acknowledged, even welcomed. . . . ‘[H]ygienic research’ is a myth 
which presents a simplistic and often misleading view of research.  
(Letherby 2003: 68)  
My subjectivity is that suppression always exists in the power relations of a society 
and is always legitimised by those in power.  The intention of this study, by taking 
film censorship as a frame of reference, also aims to manifest the socio-political 
changes and transformations of governance in Hong Kong over the past one hundred 
years.  Last but not least, what I have observed from the study is: Some people are 
cunning, but they are not as cunning as history.  History always makes the past pave 
the conditions of the present in a cunning way, which is beyond the expectation of 
those who were in power in the past. 
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Glossary 
English (in alphabetical order) Chinese Romanization Original Chinese 
14,000 Witnesses (film) 
Yi Wan Si Qian Ge Zheng 
Ren 
《一萬四千個證人》 
50TH Year Motion Pictures  五十年代影業公司 
Administrative Measures on 
Chinese-foreign Co-operation in 
Film Production (2003) 
 
中外合作攝製電影片 
管理規定（2003） 
(The) Administrative Measures 
Regarding Chinese-Foreign 
Cooperation in Film Production 
(1994) 
Guanyu Zhongwai Hezuo 
Sheshi Dianying De Guanli 
Guiding 
關於中外合作攝製電影的 
管理規定（1994） 
All’s Well, Ends Well 2010 (film) Fa Tin Hei Si 2010  《花田囍事 2010》 
(The) Analects Lunyu 《論語》 
Anti-Confucius Campaign’  pikong 批孔 
Artland (magazine) Yilin 《藝林》 
Asia Pictures Limited  亞洲影業公司 
At This Crucial Juncture (film) 
Jui Hau Gwaan Tau or  
Zuihou Guantou 
《最後關頭》 
Ba Jin  巴金 
Bad Dreams (film) E Meng Chu Xing 《惡夢初醒》 
Bai Chen  白沉 
Bai Guang  白光 
based on me principally yiwo weizhu 以我為主 
(The) Battle of Changsha (film)  Changsha Huizhan 《長沙會戰》 
(The) Battle of Guningtou (film) Guningtou Da Zhan 《古寧頭大捷》 
(The) Battle of Hong Kong  
(aka The Last Day of Britain or  
The Day England Fell) (film)  
Hong Kong Kung Leuk Jin 《香港攻略戰》 
Battle on Shangganling Mountain 
(aka Shangganling Mountain) (film) 
Shang Gan Ling Zhan Yi or 
Shang Gan Ling 
《上甘嶺戰役》 
aka《上甘嶺》 
Beijing Film Studio  北京電影製片廠 
Beiyang Government  北洋政府 
benevolent (an imprecise translation) 
of Confucianism 
ren 仁 
(The) Blood-stained Baoshan 
Fortress (film) 
Huet Chin Bo Saan Shing 
or Xuejian Bao Shan Cheng
《血濺寶山城》 
Blood Will Tell (film) Haitang Hong 《海棠紅》 
Blue Kite (film)  《藍風箏》 
Bluebird Movie Enterprises Limited  青鳥電影製片有限公司 
Boat People (film)  《投奔怒海》 
Bride Hunter (film) Wang Lao Hu Qiang Qin 《王老虎搶親》 
Bu Wancang  卜萬蒼 
Buddha’s Lock (film)  《天菩薩》 
(The) Burning of the Imperial Palace 
(film) 
 《火燒圓明園》 
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Butterfly Beauty (Film) Choi Dip Seung Fei 《彩蝶雙飛》 
(The) Butterfly Lovers (film)  《梁山伯與祝英台》 
Cai Chusheng (aka Tsai Chu-sang)  蔡楚生 
Cantonese Film Salvation Movement  粵語片救亡運動 
Cathay Organization Limited  國泰機構 
(The) Central Committee of the CPC  中國共產黨中央委員會 
(The) Central Committee of the 
CPC’s Decision on Economic 
System Reform  
Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guanyu Jingji Tizhi Gaige 
De Jueding 
中共中央關於經濟體制改革
的決定 
(The) Central Committee of the 
CPC’s Suggestions Regarding the 
Formulation of the Tenth Five-Year 
Plan of National Economy and Social 
Development 
 
中共中央關於制定國民經濟
和社會發展第十個五年計劃
的建議 
(The) Central People’s Government 
of the PRC 
 
中華人民共和國 
中央人民政府 
(The) Central Politics and Law 
Commission of the CPC 
 中國共產黨中央政法委員會
Cha, Louis   查良鏞 
Chan, Frankie  陳勳奇 
Chan Kam-chuen  陳鑑泉 
Chang Cheh  張徹 
Chang Chung  張沖 
Chang Kuo-sin  張國興 
Chang Tseng-chai  張曾澤 
Cheang, Soi  鄭保瑞 
Chen Jinbo  陳錦波 
Chen Jitang  陳濟棠 
Chen Kaige  陳凱歌 
Chen Yi  陳毅 
Cheng Bugao  程步高 
Cheng Chung-li  鄭君里 
Cheng Jihua (aka Cheng Chi-hua)  程季華 
Cheng, K Leonard  鄭國漢 
Cheng Yin  成蔭 
Cheong Kam-chuen, Stephen  張鑑泉 
Cheuk Pak Tong  卓伯棠 
Cheung, Leslie  張國榮 
Cheung Sing-yim  張鑫炎 
Chiang Kai-shek (aka Jiang Jieshi or 
Jiang Zhongzheng) 
 蔣介石 
Chin, Charlie   秦祥林 
Chin Ping Mei (film)  《金瓶梅》 
China Behind (film)  《再見中國》 
China Film Co-Production 
Corporation 
 
中國電影合作製片公司 
aka 中制公司 or 合拍公司 
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China Film Group Corporation  中國電影集團 
China Film News (magazine)  《中國電影報》 
China Mail (newspaper)  
《德臣西報》 
aka《中國郵報》 
China Movie Studio  中國電影制片廠 
China Sun Film Production Company Man San or Minxin 民新製造影畫片公司 
China United Productions Limited 
Zhongguo Lianhe Zhipian 
Gufen Gonsi 
中華聯合製片股份有限公司
（簡稱「中聯」） 
Chinese (as a language in Singapore 
and Malaysia) 
Huayu 華語 
Chinese-foreign cooperative 
production of films 
 中外合作攝製電影片 
Chinese Mail (newspaper) Wah Dzi Yat Po 《華字日報》 
Chinese nation  Zhonghua minzu 中華民族 
Chinese-style socialism  中國特色社會主義 
Ching, Frank  秦家聰 
Chiu, Joe (aka Joseph Sunn) 
Chiu Shu-sun or  
Zhao Shu-sen 
趙樹燊 
Chiu Kang-chien  邱剛建 
Choi, Clifford  蔡繼光 
Chow Shouson  周壽臣 
Chow, Stephen  周星馳 
Chow Wing-loi   周永萊 
Chow Yun-fat  周潤發 
Chu Hak  朱克 
Chu Hung (aka Zhu Hong)  朱虹 
Chuang Tzu (aka Zhunagzi)  莊子 
Chuang Tzu Tests His Wife  
(aka Zhuangzi Tests His Wife or The 
Defamation of Choung Chow) (film)
 《莊子試妻》 
Chun Yuen Film Production 
Company 
 中原電影製片公司 
Chung Po Yin  鍾寶賢 
Chung Shan Yat Po (newspaper)  《中山日報》 
Chung Yiu  宗由 
City Entertainment (magazine)  《電影雙週刊》 
(The) Classic of Xiao Xiao Jing 《孝經》 
Codename Cougar (aka Operation 
Cougar or The Puma Action) (film) 
 《代號美洲豹》 
(The) Coldest Winter in Peking (film) Huang Tian Hou Tu 《皇天后土》 
Committee for the Establishment and 
Research of a National Language  
Guoyu Biancha 
Weiyuanhui 
國語編查委員會 
(The) ‘common language’ of China 
(aka Putonghua) 
Putonghua 普通話 
Confucian Study Ruxue 儒學 
Confucian Teaching Rujiao 儒教 
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Confucianism Rujia 儒家 (imprecisely equivalent)
Confucius (film) Kong Zi 《孔子》 
Conscience (film) Leung Sum 《良心》 
Copyright Law of the PRC  中華人民共和國著作權法 
counterattack on Mainland fangong Dalu 反攻大陸 
country of courtesy and integrity  li yi zhi bang 禮義之邦 
Cream, Soda and Milk (film)  《忌廉溝鮮奶》 
Dai An-ping  戴安平 
Dangerous Encounter - 1st Kind  
(aka Don't Play with Fire) (film) 
Dai Yat Lui Ying Ngai Him 
aka Dai Yat Lui Ngai Him 
《第一類型危險》 
aka《第一類危險》 
Daughters of China (film) Zhong Hua Nu Er 《中華女兒》 
Decree gets no further than 
Zhongnanhai 
 政令不出中南海 
Democracy in the Northeast (film) Min Zhu Dong Bei 《民主東北》 
Deng Xiaoping  鄧小平 
(The) Destiny of Keum-hee and 
Eun-hee (film) 
 《金姬與銀姬的命運》 
Devils on the Doorstep (film)  《鬼子來了》 
Dhondup Wangchen  當知項欠 
Di Fan  狄梵 
Ding Guangen  丁關根 
Double Ten Day  
(aka the Double Tenth Day) 
Shuang Shi Jie 雙十節 
Dragon-Horse Films Loon-Ma 龍馬影業公司 
Dragon Inn (film)  《新龍門客棧》 
Dream of the Red Chamber (film) Hong Lou Meng 《紅樓夢》 
Du Yunzhi  杜雲之 
(The) East is Red (film) Dong Fang Hong 《東方紅》 
East River Column  東江縱隊 
Eight hundred million people 
watched eight shows 
Bayi ren kan bage xi 八億人看八個戲 
Eng Wah & Co. H.K.  香港永華公司 
(The) Enigmatic Case (film)  《碧水寒山奪命金》 
Era International (H.K.) Ltd  年代國際(香港)有限公司 
Extraordinary President feichang dazongtong 非常大總統 
Fascination Amour (film)  《愛情夢幻號》 
Fan Hsu Lai-tai, Rita  范徐麗泰 
Fang Lizhi  方勵之 
Far East Company  遠東公司 
Fearless (film) 
Foh Yuen Gaap or  
Huo Yuan Jia 
《霍元甲》 
Fei Mu  費穆 
Feng Huang (Phoenix) Motion 
Picture Company 
 鳳凰影業公司 
Feng Qun Feng Qun 鳳群 
Feng Xiaogang Feng Xiaogang 馮少剛 
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(The) Fiery Phoenix (film) Huo Feng Huang 《火鳳凰》 
filial of Confucianism  
(an imprecise translation) 
xiao 孝 
Film Censorship Standards - a note 
of guidance 
 《電影檢查標準指南》 
Film Workshop Company Limited   電影工作室有限公司 
(A) Fisherman’s Honour (film) Hai Shi 《海誓》 
(The) Fishermen’s Song (Remake) 
(film) 
Xin Yuguang Qu 《新漁光曲》 
five bonds (aka ‘five relations’) of 
Confuscianism 
wulun 五倫 
Flames of Lust (film)  《情燄》 
Flirting Scholar (film)  《唐伯虎點秋香》 
(The) Flower Street (film) Hua Jie 《花街》 
focus on construction,  
establishment as principle 
zhong zai jianshe,  
yi li weiben 
重在建設， 
以立為本 
Fok, Henry Fok Ying Tung 霍英東 
Fong Sai-yuk (film)  《方世玉》 
(A) Forgotten Woman (film) Dang Fu Xin 《蕩婦心》 
Formosa Today – Taiwan (film) Jin Ri Bao Dao 《今日寶島 – 台灣》 
From Victory to Victory (aka 
Fighting North and South) (film) 
 《南征北戰》 
Fu Che  傅奇 
General Administration of Press and 
Publication (of Taiwan) 
Xinwen Chuban Zongshu 
中華人民共和國 
新聞出版總署 
General Knowledge of  
Xiangxiang History and Geography 
Xiangxiang Shi Di 
Changshi 
《湘鄉史地常識》 
(The) General Office of the State 
Council’s Guidance Opinion 
Regarding the Advancement of 
Prosperous Development of the Film 
Industry 
Guowuyuan Bangongting 
Guanyu Cujin Dianying 
Chanye Fanrong Fazhan 
de Zhidao Yijian 
國務院辦公廳 
關於促進電影產業繁榮發展
的指導意見 
get down with Chiang Kai-shek  dadao Chiang Kai-shek 打倒蔣介石 
(The) Gift of A Fu (film) A Fu De Li Wu 《阿福的禮物》 
Girl Basketball Player No. 5 (film) Nu Lan Wu Hao 《女籃五號》 
(A) Glorious Festival  
(aka National Day of 1964) (film) 
Guang Hui Di Jie Ri 《光輝的節日》 
Gone are the Swallows When the 
Willow Flowers Wilt (film) 
Lu Hua Fan Bai Yan Zi Fei 《蘆花翻白燕子飛》 
Government Information Office (of 
Taiwan) 
Xinwen Ju （台灣）政府新聞局 
Grand Motion Picture Company  國聯影業有限公司 
Grandland (aka Great Earth) Motion 
Picture Corporation  
Dadi  大地影業公司 
Grandview (US) Film Co. 
Grandview (HK) Film Co., Ltd. 
Daguan or Tai Quon 
大觀聲片（美國）公司 
大觀聲片（香港）有限公司
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Great Wall Movie Enterprises Ltd.  長城電影製片有限公司 
Great Wall Pictures Corporation Changcheng 長城影業公司（舊長城） 
Gu Eryi  顧而已 
Guangzhou-Hong Kong 
Strike-Boycott  
(aka Canton-Hong Kong Strike) 
Sheng-kang Ta-pa-kung 省港大罷工 
Ha, Pat  夏汶汐 
Haiyan Film Company  香港海燕影業公司 
Halfway Down (film) Ban Xialiu Shehui 《半下流社會》 
Han Feizi Han Feizi 韓非子 
(The) Happenings (film)  《夜車》 
harmony he 和 
(The) Haunted House (film) Quion Lou Hen 《瓊樓恨》 
He Feiguang  何非光 
Heartaches (film) Sum Hun 《心恨》 
Heung Tao Daily (newspaper)  《香島日報》 
Heung To Middle School  香島中學 
(The) higher ups have policies while 
the lower downs have their own ways 
of getting around them 
shang you zheng ce, 
xia you dui ce 
上有政策， 
下有對策 
Highland Films Enterprises (HK) Ltd  
海聯影業機構(香港) 
有限公司 
Histoire du Cinema Modial Shijie Dianying Shi 《世界電影史》 
History of the Development of 
Chinese Cinema  
Zhongguo Dianying 
Fazhan Shi 
《中國電影發展史》 
Ho Yin  何賢 
Holy Robe of the Shaolin Temple 
(film) 
 《木棉袈裟》 
(The) Home at Hong Kong (film)  《家在香港》 
Homecoming (film)  《似水流年》 
Hong Kong and Kowloon Cinema & 
Theatrical Enterprise Free General 
Association 
 港九電影戲劇事業自由總會
Hong Kong and Kowloon Union of 
Free Workers in the Cinema and 
Theatrical Enterprises 
 港九影劇從業人員自由工會
Hong Kong and Kowloon Union of 
Free Workers in the Film Industry 
(aka Hong Kong and Kowloon 
Filmmakers Free General 
Association) 
 港九電影從業人員自由工會
Hong Kong & Macau Cinema and 
Theatrical Enterprise Association 
Limited 
 港澳電影戲劇總會 
Hong Kong Cinema & Theatrical 
Enterprise Association Limited 
 
香港電影戲劇事業總會 
有限公司 
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Hong Kong Daily Press (newspaper)  《孖刺日報》 
Hong Kong Film Company  香港影片公司 
Hong Kong News (newspaper)  《香港日報》 
Hong Kong Standard (newspaper)  《英文虎報》 
Hong Kong Telegraph (newspaper)  
《士蔑西報》 
aka《香港電訊報》 
Hong Kong-Tokyo Honeymoon (film)
Xianggang Dongjing 
Miyue Luxing 
《香港東京蜜月旅行》 
Hongtu Film Company  香港鴻圖影業公司 
Hou Wailu  侯外廬 
(The) House of 72 Tenants (film) Chat Sap Yi Ka Fong Hak 《七十二家房客》 
Hsia Moon  夏夢 
Hsin Wha Motion Picture  新華影業公司 
Hu Hanmin  胡漢民 
Hu Jingtao  胡錦濤 
Hu Siao-fung  胡小峰 
Hu, Sibelle   胡慧中 
Hu Yaobang  胡耀邦 
Hua Guofang  華國鋒 
Huaxia Film Distribution Co., Ltd.  華夏電影發行有限責任公司
Huang, Crystal Huang Yi 黃奕 
Huang Hua  黃華 
Huaqiao Film Corporation  華僑影業股份有限公司 
Hui, Ann  許鞍華 
Huo Yuan Jia  霍元甲 
(The) Idiot’s Wedding Night (film) Soh Jai Dung Fong 《傻仔洞房》 
If I Were for Real (film) Jia Ru Wo Shi Zhen De 《假如我是真的》 
If You Are the One (film) Fei Cheng Wu Rao 《非誠勿擾》 
Interim Provisions on Film 
Censorship, 1993 
Dianying Shencha Zanxing 
Guiding, 1993 
電影審查暫行規定（1993）
Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Problems 
regarding the Ascertainment of 
Compensation Liability for  
Emotional Damages in Civil Torts 
 
最高人民法院 
關於確定民事侵權精神損害
賠償責任若干問題的解釋 
Ip, Deanie  葉德嫻 
Ip Man  葉問 
January 28 Incident  一．二八事變 
Jia Zhangke  賈樟柯 
Jiang Qing  江青 
Jiang Qing  蔣慶 
Jiang Wei  蔣偉 
Jiang Wen  姜文 
Jiang Zemin  江澤民 
Jing Xiong Nu Xia – Qiu Jin (film)  《競雄女俠 – 秋瑾》 
joh pai  左派 
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joh yik  左翼 
Journey to the West (film) Xi You Ji 《西遊記》 
King Hoi-lam  敬海林 
Kinmen (aka Quemoy)  金門 
Ko Lei-hen  高梨痕 
Ko Sing Theatre  高陞戲院 
Ko Tim-keung  高添強 
Kong Ngee Company  光藝有限公司 
Koo Siu-fung  古兆奉 
Kuei, Rose   歸亞雷 
(The) Kung Sheung Daily News 
(newspaper) 
Kung Sheung Yat Po 《工商日報》 
Kuo Morou  郭沫若 
Kwan, Moon  Kwan Man-ching 關文清 
Kwan Tak-hing Guan Dexing 關德興 
Kwong, K. C.  鄺其志 
(The) Lady of Mystery (film) Shenmi Meiren 《神秘美人》 
Lai Buk-hoi  
(aka Lai Pak-hoi, Li Beihai) 
 黎北海 
Lai Hoi-shan  黎海山 
Lai Man-wai (aka Li Minwei)  黎民偉 
Lai Qishan  賴啟珊 
Lai Qixiang  賴啟湘 
Lam Bun  林彬 
Lam, George  林子祥 
Lam Kui-shing, Conrad  林鉅成 
Language of the state officials  
(during the Ming and Qing periods) 
Guanhua 官話 
(The) Last Supper (film) Wang Di Shengyan 《王的盛宴》 
Lau, Andrew  劉偉強 
Lau, Andy  劉德華 
Lau, Gene Lau Cheuk Fai 劉卓輝 
Law Kar  羅卡 
Leading Group for Major 
Revolutionary and Historical Theme 
Film and Television Production - 
Film 
Zhongda Geming He Lishi 
Ticai Ying Shi Chuangzuo 
Lingdao Xiaozu – Dianyin 
重大革命及歷史題材 
影視創作領導小組 – 電影 
Leaving Fear Behind (documentary)  《無懼》 
Lee Ching  李清 
Lee, Desmond  李汝大 
Lee Hysan  利希慎 
Lee Ka-yan  李嘉恩 
Lee Lan  李蘭 
Lee, Martin  李柱銘 
Lee, Raymond  李惠民 
Lee Yee  李怡 
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Legalism Fajia 法家 
(The) Legend is Born – Ip Man 
(film) 
Ip Man Chin Juen 《葉問前傳》 
(The) Legendary Amazons (film) 
Yeung Moon Lui Jeung Ji 
Gwan Ling Yue Saan 
《楊門女將之軍令如山》 
let a hundred flowers bloom,  
a hundred schools of thought contend
baihua qifang,  
baijia zhengming 
百花齊放， 
百家爭鳴 
Leung Chiu-wai, Tony  梁朝偉 
Leung Chun-ying  梁振英 
Li Cheuk-to  李焯桃 
Li Chi-hwa  李啟華 
Li, Erica Li Man 李敏 
Li Han-hsiang  李翰祥 
Li, Jet  李連杰 
Li Peng  李鵬 
Li Pingqian  李萍倩 
Li Shaobai  李少白 
Li Shuguang  李曙光 
Li Si  李斯 
Li, Teresa  Li Lihua 李麗華 
Li Yizhuang  李以莊 
Li Zuyong  李祖永 
(The) Liaison Office of the Central 
People's Government in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region
 
中央人民政府 
駐香港特別行政區 
聯絡辦公室 
Lian Shen  連戰 
Liao Chengzhi  廖承志 
Liberty Film Company  自由影業公司 
License for Producing A Movie  攝製電影片許可證（單片）
License for Public Projection of 
Movies 
 電影片公映許可證 
Life with Grandma (film) Man Ting Fang 《滿庭芳》 
Lifeline (film) 
Saang Meng Sin or  
Shengming Xian 
《生命線》 
Lin Huan (real name Louis Cha)  林歡（本名查良鏞） 
Lin, Linda Lin Dai 林黛 
Lin Shan  林杉 
Ling Sing (magazine)  《伶星》 
Ling Zifeng  凌子風 
literary inquisition wénzìyù 文字獄 
Little Red Book (aka Quotations from 
Chairman Mao Zedong) 
Mao Yulu 《毛語錄》 
(The) Little Tiger (film) Siu Lo Fu 《小老虎》 
Liu Qiong  劉瓊 
Liu Shuyung  劉蜀永 
Liu Xiaobo  劉曉波 
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Liu Yet-yuen (aka Liao Yiyuan)  廖一原 
Lo, Lowell Lo Goon Ting 盧冠廷 
Lo Dun  盧敦 
Loke Wan-tho  陸運濤 
Lonely Fifteen (film)  《靚妹仔》 
(The) Lost Bladesman (film) Guan Yun Chang 《關雲長》 
Lou Ye  婁燁 
Lu Chuan Lu Chuan 陸川 
Lu Dingyi  陸定一 
Lu Jiankang  呂建康 
Lu, Sheldon Hsiao-peng   魯曉鵬 
Lu Xun  魯迅 
(The) Luminescent Cup (film) Ye Gwong Booi 《夜光杯》 
(The) Lunatics (film)  《癲佬正傳》 
Lung, Patrick  Lung Kong 龍剛 
Luo Weiming  羅維明 
Ma Kwok-leung  馬國亮 
Ma Xu Weibang  馬徐維邦 
Madame Butterfly (film) Hudie Furen 《蝴蝶夫人》 
Mainland 1989 (film)  《大陸 1989》 
Mak, Johnny  麥當雄 
Mak, Michael  麥當傑 
Mak Siu-ha.   麥嘯霞 
Mak Tai-kit  麥大傑 
Man Behind the Sun (film)  《黑太陽 731》 
Mandarin (national language)  國語 
Mao Dun  茅盾 
Mao Zedong (aka Mao Tse-tung)  毛澤東 
March of the Guerrillas  
(aka March of the Partisans, re-titled 
Song of retribution when it was 
released) (film) 
Yau Gik Jun Hang Kuk or 
Youji Jinxing Qu 
《遊擊進行曲》 
(The) Marco Polo Bridge Incident 
(aka the Incident of 7 July or Logou 
Bridge Incident) 
 七．七盧溝橋事變 
May Thirtieth Movement  五卅運動 
(the) mean man of Confucianism (an 
imprecise translation) 
xiaoren 小人 
Measures for Control over Imported 
Films 
 進口影片管理辦法 
Mei Ya Chang Cheng  
Culture Communication Limited 
 
美亞長城影視文化(北京) 
有限公司 
Ming Pao (newspaper)  《明報》 
Ming Pao Weekly (magazine)  《明報周刊》 
Mirage (film)  《海市蜃樓》 
(The) Mirror (magazine)  《鏡報周刊》 
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English (in alphabetical order) Chinese Romanization Original Chinese 
(The) Mischief Makers (film) Nau Gai Jo Chung 《扭計祖宗》 
(The) Misfortune Young Nobleman 
(film) 
Luonan Gongzi 《落難公子》 
model opera  yangbanxi 樣板戲 
Mok Hong-si  莫康時 
Motion Picture & General Investment 
Company Limited 
 
國際電影懋業有限公司 
（電懋 in short） 
Mou Tun-Fei  牟敦芾 
Movie (magazine) Dian Ying 《電影》 
Mu Shiying  穆時英 
Mukden Incident (aka the September 
18 Incident or the Manchurian 
Incident) 
 九．一八事變 
My Love Comes Too Late (film) Long Gwai Maan 《郎歸晚》 
Nam Yang Motion Picture Co.  南洋影片公司 
Nan Chiao Daily (newspaper) Nan Chiau Jit Pao 《南僑日報》 
National Arts Film Production Ltd  國藝影視製作有限公司 
national cinema  minzu dianying 民族電影 
‘national defence’ film guofang dianying 國防電影 
(The) National Educational 
Cinematographic Society 
 中國教育電影協會 
New Culture Movement Xīn Wénhuà Yùndòng 新文化運動 
New Kwun Lun Film Production 
Company Limited 
 新崑崙影業有限公司 
(The) New Year's Sacrifice (film) Zhu Fu 《祝福》 
Ng Cho-fan (aka Ng Chor-fan)  吳楚帆 
Ng Choy (aka Wu Ting-fan)  伍廷芳 aka 伍才 
Ng, Esther  
(aka Ng Kam-ha or Esther Eng) 
Wu Jinxia 伍錦霞 
Ng, Margaret  呈靄儀 
Ng See-yuen  吳思遠 
Ng Siu Wan  吳小雲 
Ngau Tau Kok  牛頭角 
Nightmare of Fortune (film) Fan Wah Mung 《繁華夢》 
Nomad (film)  《烈火青春》 
Notice on Improving and Perfecting 
Archival Filing of Film Scripts 
(Abstracts) and Film Examination 
Work 
Guanyu Gaijin he Wanshan 
Dianying Juben (Genggai) 
Beian, Dianyingpian 
Shencha Gongzuo di 
Tongzhi 
關於改進和完善電影劇本
（梗概）備案、電影片審查
工作的通知 
Ode of the Dragon River (film) Long Jiang Song 《龍江頌》 
Offbeat (magazine)  《警聲》 
On the Dock (film) Hai Gang 《海港》 
On The Society File Of Shanghai 
(aka Right of the Maiden’s First 
Night) 
Shang Hai She Hui Dang 
An (aka Shao Nu Chu Ye 
Quan)  
《上海社會檔案》 
aka《少女初夜權》 
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English (in alphabetical order) Chinese Romanization Original Chinese 
Once upon a Rainbow (film)  《彩雲曲》 
Once upon a Time in China III  《黃飛鴻之三獅王爭霸》 
one filing, two examinations system yi bei er shen zhi 一備二審制 
Opinions of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Several Issues Concerning 
the Implementation of the General 
Principles of the Civil Law of the 
People's Republic of China 
 
最高人民法院關於貫徹執行
《中華人民共和國 
民法通則》若干問題的意見
(The) Opium War (aka Lin Ze Xu) 
(film) 
Ya pian zhan zheng or 
Lin Ze Xu 
《林則徐》 
Oriental Daily (newspaper)  《東方日報》 
Orphan Island Paradise (film)  Gudao Tiantang 《孤島天堂》 
Out of Danger (film)  《絕處逢生》 
Ouyang Yuqian  歐陽予倩 
Pai Ching-jui  白景瑞 
(The) Pain of Separation (film) Haak To Chau Han or  《客途秋恨》 
Pak Yin (aka Bak Yin)  白燕 
(A) Patriotic Woman (film) Oi Gok Fa 《愛國花》 
Pearl River Film Studio  珠江電影製片廠 
(A) Peasant’s Tragedy (film) Shan He Lei 《山河淚》 
‘Political power out of media’ policy  黨、政、軍退出媒體政策 
Portrait of a Fanatic (film) Ku Lian 《苦戀》 
Preparatory Commission for the 
Unification of the National Language 
Guoyu Tongyi Choubei Hui 國語統一籌備會 
Princess Fragrance (film)  《香香公主》 
project initiation  lixiang 立項 
Provisions on Film Censorship, 1997
Dianying Shencha 
Guiding, 1997 
電影審查規定（1997） 
Provisions on the Administration of 
Chinese-foreign Cooperative 
Production of Films (2004) 
 
中外合作攝製電影片管理規
定（2004） 
Provisions on the Archival Filing of 
Film Scripts (Abstracts) and the 
Administration of Films 
 
電影劇本（梗概）備案、電
影片 
管理規定 
Provisions Regarding the 
Constitution of Chief Creative 
Personnel of Domestic Feature and 
Co-Production Film 
Guanyu Guochan 
Gushipian, Hepaipian 
Zhuchuang Renyuan 
Guocheng De Guiding 
關於國產故事片、合拍片主
創人員構成的規定 
Public Enemy (film) Gung Dik 《公敵》 
(The) Publicity Department of the 
CPC (formerly known as the 
Propaganda Department of the CPC)
 
中國共產黨中央委員會宣傳
部 
（中宣部 in short） 
Putonghua  普通話 
Qi Mengshi  奇夢石 
Qi Wenshao  齊聞韶 
Qin Shi Huang  秦始皇 
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English (in alphabetical order) Chinese Romanization Original Chinese 
Qiu Jin  秋瑾 
Qiu Jingwu  秋經武 
Qiu Zhongying  秋仲英 
Raid on the White Tiger Regiment 
(film) 
Qi xi Bai Hu Tuan 《奇襲白虎團》 
Raise the Red Lantern  《大紅燈籠高高掛》 
Recalling Woman Revolutionary 
Madam Wang Qiu Jin 
Huiyi Funu Gemingjia 
WangQiu Jin Nushi 
《回憶婦女革命家 
王秋瑾女士》 
(The) Red Detachment of Women 
(film) 
Hong Se Niang Zi Jun 《紅色娘子軍》 
Red Guards of Lake Hong (film) Hong Hu Chi Wei Dui 《洪湖赤衛隊》 
(The) Red Lantern (film) Hong Deng Ji 《紅燈記》 
reform and open-up (aka ‘Chinese 
economic reform’) 
 改革開放 
(to) regard harmony as the most 
valuable  
yi he wei gui  以和為貴 
Regulations on Administration of 
Films 
 電影管理條例 
Reign behind a Curtain (film)  《垂廉聽政》 
Resist! (film) Dai Kong! 《抵抗》 
Return from the Battleground (film) Chin Dei Gwat Loi 《戰地歸來》 
Revenge at Guang Chang Long (film)
Kwong Cheung Lung Yan 
Sau Gei 
《廣昌隆恩仇記》 
rights-defending weiquan 維權 
rites of Confucianism  
(an imprecise translation) 
li 禮 
Rock Kids (film)  《搖滾青年》 
Romance of Book and Sword (film)  《書劍恩仇錄》 
Romance of the Songsters (film) Goh Lui Ching Chiu 《歌侶情潮》 
(The) Romantic Thief White 
Chrysanthemum (film) 
Ching Chaak Pak Kuk Fa 《情賊白菊花》 
Sang Hu  桑弧 
Saving General Yang (film) Zhonglei Yang Jia Jiang 《忠烈楊家將》 
scar films shanghen dianying 傷痕電影 
scar literature shanghen wenxue 傷痕文學 
scholar ru 儒 
separation of five powers  五權分立 
Seven-Day Post of Chinese and 
Foreign News (newspaper) 
Chung Oi Sun Man Chat 
Yat Po 
《中外新聞七日報》 
Sex and Zen (film)  《玉蒲團之偷情寶鑑》 
Sha Jia Bang  《沙家》 
Sha Meng  沙蒙 
(The) Shaolin Temple (film)   《少林寺》 
Shaw, Run Run  邵逸夫 
Shaw, Runji.  Shao Zui Weng 邵仁傑, nickname「醉翁」 
Shek Hwei  石慧 
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English (in alphabetical order) Chinese Romanization Original Chinese 
Shen Ji  沈寂 
Shenzhen Film Enterprise  深圳影業公司 
Shochiku Company Limited  松竹株式會社 
Shu, Don-lok  許敦樂 
Shu Shi  舒適 
Shui Hua  水華 
Si Ma Wen Sen  司馬文森 
sick man of East Asia dung ah beng fu 東亞病夫 
Sil-Metropole Organization Limited  銀都機構有限公司 
Sing Praise of the Revolution (film) Ge Ming Zan Ge 《革命贊歌》 
Sing Tao Daily (newspaper)  《星島日報》 
Sit Kok-sin  薛覺先 
Situ Huimin  司徒慧敏 
Some Opinions Regarding the 
Current Deepening of the System 
Reform of Film Industry  
Guanyu DangQian 
Shenhua Dianying Hangye 
Jizhi Gaige de Ruogan 
Yijian 
《關於當前深化 
電影行業機制改革 
的若干意見》 
Song of retribution (formerly March 
of the Guerrillas) (film) 
Ching Hei Goh or  
Zheng Qi Ge 
《正氣歌》 
Song of the Red Flag Hong Qi Pu 《紅旗譜》 
Sorrows of the Forbidden City (film) Qing Gong Mi Shi 《清宮秘史》 
(The) Soul of China (film) Guo Hun 《國魂》 
South China Film Association 
Wah Laam Din Ying Hip 
Wui 
華南電影協會 
South China Morning Post 
(newspaper) 
 《南華早報》 
Southern Film Company  南方影業公司 
stability preservation weiwen 維穩 
standardized national pronunciation 
of the most important characters  
Guoyin changyong zihui 國音常用字彙 
(The) State Administration of Press 
and Publication, Radio, Film, and 
Television 
Guojia Xīnwen Chuban 
Guangbo Dianying 
Dianshì Zongju 
國家新聞出版廣播電影電視
總局 
(The) State Administration of Radio, 
Film and Television (SARFT) 
Guojia Guangbo Dianying 
Dianshì Zongju 
國家廣播電影電視總局 
（廣電總局 in short） 
State Bureau for Letters and Calls Quojia Xin Fang Ju 國家信訪局 
Stealing a Roast Duck (aka The Trip 
of the Roast Duck) (film) 
Tau Shiu Aap or  
Tou Shao Ya 
《偷燒鴨》 
(The) Story of a Discharged Prisoner 
(film)  
Ying Hung Boon Sik 《英雄本色》 
(The) Story of Little Shrimp (film) Chun Feng Qiu Yu 《春風秋雨》 
study group dushu hui 讀書會 
Summer Palace (film)  《頤和園》 
Sun Fo  孫科 
Sun Luen Film Company  新聯影業公司 
Sun Lung-Kee   孫隆基 
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(The) Sunset in Geneva (film)  Ri Nei Wa Di Huang Hun 《日內瓦的黃昏》 
Sun Yat-sen  孫逸仙 aka 孫中山 
Sung Man-lei  宋萬里 
(the) superior man of Confucianism 
(an imprecise translation) 
junzi 君子 
Supreme Ultimate Taiji 太極 
Swallows Come Home (film) Yan Gui Lai 《燕歸來》 
Szeto Wah  司徒華 
Ta Kung Pao  大公報 
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy 
(film) 
Zhi Qu Wei Hu Shan 《智取威虎山》 
“Talks at the Yenan Forum on 
Literature and Art” 
 
〈在延安文藝座談會上 
的講話〉 
Tam, Patrick  譚家明 
Tan Rifeng  譚日峰 
Tang Huang  唐煌 
Tang Xiaodan  湯曉丹 
Teacher laoshi 老師 
Tears in a Fallen City (film)  《傾城之淚》 
Teddy Girls (film) Fei Lui Jing Juen 《飛女正傳》 
Teenage Dreamers (film)  《檸檬可樂》 
Television and Entertainment 
Licensing Authority 
 影視及娛樂事務管理處 
Ten Thousand Li Ahead (film) Qiancheng Wanli 《前程萬里》 
Three Charming Smiles (film) San Xiao 《三笑》 
(The) Three Principles of the People san min zhuyi 三民主義 
Tiantian Xin Bao (newspaper) Tiantian Xin Bao 《天天新報》 
Tien Feng  田豐 
(The) Tien Kwong Po (newspaper)  《天光報》 
Tien Zhuang-zhuang  田壯壯 
Tientsin Incident  
(aka the Tianjin Incident) 
 天津事變 
Tin Yat Motion Picture Co. Tianyi 天一片廠 
To, Chapman  杜汶澤 
To, Johnnie  杜琪峰 
To Live (film)  《活著》 
Toho Company Limited  東寶株式會社 
Tong Cheuk-man  唐卓敏 
Tong, Kent  湯鎮業 
Tong Shu-shuen  唐書璇 
Tong Yuejuan  童月娟 
Triads the Inside Story (film)  《我在黑社會的日子》 
‘traitors’ to the Chinese nation-race hanjian 漢奸 
(The) Truth (film) Fat Noi Ching 《法內情》 
Tse, Daniel  謝志偉 
Tse Yik-chi  謝益之 
 
364 
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Tsi Lo-lin  紫羅蓮 
Tsui Hark  徐克 
Tsui Siu-ming  徐小明 
Tu Guangqi  屠光啟 
Tung Chee Wah  董建華 
(The) Tung Tau squatter area  東頭村木屋區 
Tungmenghui  
(aka the Chinese United League or 
the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance)
 同盟會 
(An) Unforgettable Night (film) Yi Ye Fengliu 《一夜風流》 
(The) Union Film Enterprise Limited  中聯電影企業有限公司 
Union Press You Lian  友聯出版社 
(The) Untold Story (film)  《八仙飯店之人肉叉燒飽》
Vanguards of the Times (film) Si Doi Sin Fung 《時代先鋒》 
Vernacular Movement Baihuawen Yundong 白話文運動 
Victory on Road 9-Southern Laos  
(film) 
 《下寮九號公路大捷》 
(The) Voice of Free Front (film) 
Zi You Zhen Xian Zhi 
Sheng 
《自由陣線之聲》 
Wah Kiu Man Pao (newspaper)  《華僑晚報》 
Wah Kiu Yat Pao (newspaper)  《華僑日報》 
Wang Bin  王濱 
Wang Canzhi  王燦芝 
Wang Chu Chin (aka Wang Jujing)  王菊金 
Wang Hao  王豪 
Wang Jiadong  王家楝 
Wang Jialiang  王家梁 
Wang Tingjun  王廷鈞 
Wang Tung  王童 
Wang Weici  王慰慈 
Wang Weiyi  王為一 
Wang Xiaomin  王孝敏 
Wang Yanhua  王焱華 
Wang Yuande  王沅德 
Wang Yulin  王玉琳 
War of Jiawu  甲午戰爭 
War of the Underworld (film)  《洪興仔之江湖大風暴》 
Waving the Red Ribbon (film) 
Foon Baai Hung Ling 
Daai, 
《款擺紅綾帶》 
Wen Jiabao  溫家寶 
Wen Tianxiang  
(aka Man Tin-cheung) 
 文天祥 
Wen Wei Po (newspaper)  《文匯報》 
When the Grape is Ripe (film) Putao Shouliao de Shi Hou 《葡萄熟了的時候》 
White Gold Dragon (film) 
Bak Kam Lung or  
Baijin Loong 
《白金龍》 
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White-Haired Girl (film) Bai Mao Nu 《白毛女》 
White Vengeance (film) Hong Men Yan 《鴻門宴》 
Witch, Devil, Man (film) Shen Gui Ren 《神鬼人》 
(The) Witty Sorcerer (film) 
Joh Chi Hei Cho or 
Zuo Ci Xi Cao 
《左慈戲曹》 
(The) Woman Knight of Mirror Lake 
(film) 
Jìng Xiong Nu xia –  
Qiu Jin 
《競雄女俠 – 秋瑾》 
Wong, Barbara   黃真真 
Wong, Cheuk-hon  黃卓漢 
Wong, James Howe  黃宗霑 
Wong Man-lei Wong Man-lei 黃曼梨 
Wong, Taylor  黃泰來 
Wong Toi Wong Toi 黃岱 
Wong Yan Lung  黃仁龍 
Won’t Face the Dark Again 
(literal translation) (song) 
Chat Hak Jeung Bat Joi 
Min Dui  
《漆黑將不再面對》 
(The) World Theatre  新世界戲院 
World Today (magazine) Jin Ri Shi Jie 《今日世界》 
Wu, Dip-ying (aka Hu Dieying)  胡蝶影 
Wu Pang  胡鵬 
Wu Xingzai  吳性栽 
Wu Zhiying   吳芝瑛 
Wu Zuguang  吳祖光 
Xi Jinping  習近平 
Xia Yan (aka Hsia Yen)  夏衍 
Xian Mei-Ya  
Culture Communication Limited 
 
西安美亞 
文化傳播有限公司 
Xiao comes first among all the moral 
behaviors (literal translation) 
baixing yi xiao wei xian 百行以孝為先 
Xiao is the fundamental of  
Chinese culture  
Zhongguo wenhua  
yi xiao wei ben 
中國文化以孝為本 
Xiao Wu (aka The Pickpocket) (film)  《小武》 
Xie Jin  謝晉 
Xing Zuwen  刑祖文 
Xinhai Revolution 
(aka The Revolution of 1911) 
Xinhai Gemin 辛亥革命 
Xinhua (aka Hsin Hua) News Agency 
(aka New China News Agency) 
 
新華通訊社 
（「新華社」in short） 
Xu Kailei  徐開壘 
Xu Zihua  徐自華 
Xunzi  荀子 
Yamaguchi, Yoshiko  
(widely known as Li Xianglan) 
Li Xianglan 
山口淑子 
aka 李香蘭 
Yan Jiaqi  嚴家其 aka 嚴家祺 
yang  陽 
Yang, Evan (aka Yieh Veng) Yi Wen 易文 
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Yang Hansheng  陽翰笙 
Yang Wen  楊文 
Yangcheng Wan Bao (newspaper) Yangcheng Wan Bao 《羊城晚報》 
Yantai Ri Bao (newspaper) Yantai Ri Bao 《烟台日報》 
Yao Ke  姚克 
yat  日（指日本） 
Yau, Herman Yau Lai-to 邱禮濤 
Yee, Derek  爾冬陞 
Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow  
(aka The Plague) (film) 
Jok Tin Kam Tin Ming Tin 
(aka Wan Yik) 
《昨天今天明天》 
aka《瘟疫》 
Yeung Chi-hsiao  楊吉爻 
Yeung Tin-lok  仰天樂 
Yim Ho  嚴浩 
Yim Shan-shan (aka Yan Shanshan)  嚴珊珊 
yin  陰 
Ying Liang  應亮 
Yip, Cecilia  葉童 
Yonghua (aka Yong Hwa) Motion 
Picture Industries Limited 
 永華影業公司 
Young and Dangerous series (film)  《古惑仔》系列 
Yu Ling  于伶 
Yu Mo-wan  余慕雲 
Yu, Ronny  于仁泰 
Yue, Griffin (aka Yue Feng)  岳楓 
Yue Opera  越劇 
Yuen, Corey   元奎 
Yuen Yang-an   袁仰安 
Yung Hwa Motion Picture Industries 
Limited 
 永華影業公司 
Zen, Rachel   單慧珠 
Zhai Qiang  翟強 
Zhang Haipeng  張海鵬 
Zhang Shankun  張善琨 
Zhang Weiping  張偉平 
Zhang Yimou  張藝謀 
Zhang Zautang  張照堂 
Zhejiang Yue Opera Troupe  Zhejiang Yue Ju Tuan 浙江越劇團 
Zeng Zi  曾子 
Zhou Chengren   周承人 
Zhou Enlai  周恩來 
Zhou Xuan  周璇 
Zhu Shilin  朱石麟 
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